THE  INSTITUTE  OF  POLITICS  PUBLICATIONS, 
WILLIAMS  COLLEGE,  WILLIAMSTOWN,  MASS. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

EIGHT  LECTURES  DELIVERED 

IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 

IN  AUGUST,  1921 


BY 

JAMES   BRYCE 


MODERN  DEMOCRACIES 

HOLY  ROMAN  EMPIRE 

THE  AMERICAN  COMMONWEALTH 

THE   STUDY    OF    AMERICAN   HIS- 
TORY 

UNIVERSITY   AND    HISTORICAL 
ADDRESSES 

ESSAYS  AND  ADDRESSES  IN  WAR 
TIME 

STUDIES     IN     CONTEMPORARY 
BIOGRAPHIES 

SOUTH  AMERICA,  OBSERVATIONS 
AND  IMPRESSIONS 


INTERNATIONAL   RELATIONS 

EIGHT  LECTURES  DELIVERED  IN  THE 
UNITED  STATES  IN  AUGUST,  1921 


BY 
JAMES  BRYCE 

(VISCOUNT  BETCH) 


JT3eto 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1922 

All  rights  reserved 


PRINTED   IN    IHB    UNITED    STATES    OF    AMERICA 


COPYRIGHT,  1922, 
BY  THE  PRESIDENT  AND  TRUSTEES  OF  WILLIAMS  COLLEGE 


Set  up  and  printed.     Published  February,  1922. 


Press  of 

J.  J.  Little  &  Ives  Company 
New  York,  U.  S.  A. 


LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
SANTA  BARBARA 


.fi 


DEDICATION 

To  the  Honorable  CHARLES  EVANS  HUGHES 

My  Dear  Mr.  Hughes: 

The  interest  you  have  taken  in  the  Institute  of  Poli- 
tics and  its  aims,  as  well  as  our  own  long  friendship, 
prompt  me  to  offer  to  you  this  little  book  on  Interna- 
tional Relations.  You  are  one  of  those  who  are  to-day 
working  most  earnestly  and  effectively  for  the  promo- 
tion of  cooperation  and  good  feeling  between  States; 
and  I  need  not  say  how  warmly  your  efforts  for  that 
purpose  are  appreciated  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic. 

Believe  me 

Most  truly  yours, 
December  22nd,  1921.  JAMES  BRYCE. 


PREFACE 

These  lectures,  addressed  to  an  audience  which, 
though  it  contained  professors  of  history  and  public 
law  from  many  universities,  was  mainly  non-profes- 
sional, do  not  attempt  to  deal  with  the  more  intricate 
branches  of  the  large  subject  covered  by  the  term  In- 
ternational Relations.  Now  printed  almost  exactly  as 
they  were  delivered  three  months  ago,  they  treat  of 
that  subject  only  in  a  few  of  its  broader  aspects,  and 
are  directed  to  a  practical  aim  which  is  at  this  mo- 
ment much  in  the  minds  of  thoughtful  men  every- 
where. Painfully  struck  by  the  fact  that  while  the 
economic  relations  between  nations  have  been  growing 
closer,  and  the  personal  intercourse  between  their  mem- 
bers far  more  frequent,  political  friendliness  between 
States  has  not  increased,  such  men  have  been  asking 
why  ill  feeling  continues  still  so  rife.  Why  is  it  that 
before  the  clouds  of  the  Great  War  have  vanished  from 
the  sky  new  clouds  are  rising  over  the  horizon?  What 
can  be  done  to  avert  the  dangers  that  are  threatening 
the  peace  of  mankind? 

This  book  is  intended  to  supply  some  materials  for 
answering  the  questions  aforesaid  by  throwing  upon 
them  the  light  of  history.  It  is  History  which,  record- 
ing the  events  and  explaining  the  influences  that  have 
moulded  the  minds  of  men,  shows  us  how  the  world  of 
international  politics  has  come  to  be  what  it  is.  His- 


viii  PREFACE 

tory  is  the  best — indeed  the  only — guide  to  a  compre- 
hension of  the  facts  as  they  stand,  and  to  a  sound  judg- 
ment of  the  various  means  that  have  been  suggested  for 
replacing  suspicions  and  enmities  by  the  cooperation  of 
States  in  many  things  and  by  their  good  will  in  all. 

London,  Dec.  22nd,  1921. 


CONTENTS 

LECTURE  I. 
THE  EARLIER  RELATIONS  OF  TRIBES  AND  STATES  TO  ONE  ANOTHER       1 

Different  views  of  primitive  mankind — The  "state  of 
nature"  as  between  tribes;  i.e.,  war  is  the  "natural"  relation 
of  communities — The  theory  of  a  Golden  Age  of  Peace. 
First  Period,  War  everywhere  in  early  times.  Second 
Period,  An  era  of  comparative  peace  under  the  Roman 
Empire — The  Monotheistic  religions  as  an  international 
force — Influence  of  Christianity — Islam.  Third  Period, 
Action  of  the  clergy  for  peace;  the  Truce  of  God — 
The  Pope  and  the  Emperor  as  guardians  of  peace 
— Decline  of  ecclesiastical  influence  after  the  fourteenth 
century — Cesare  Borgia  and  Machiavelli — Fourth  Period. 
Wars  of  Religion  between  Christian  states — Plans  for 
a  general  peace — the  Balance  of  Power — Competition  of 
States  in  seizing  new  countries.  Fifth  period,  Events  lead- 
ing up  to  the  Great  War  of  1914— Decline  of  dynastic 
influences — Political  propaganda  for  international  purposes 
— The  Congress  of  Vienna:  the  Holy  Alliance — Five  great 
international  figures — The  importance  in  history  of  the 
Individual  Leader. 

LECTURE  II. 
THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  EFFECTS  IN  THE  OLD  WORLD  ...      33 

Causes  that  brought  the  War — Germany  and  France  in 
and  after  1870— The  growth  of  Armaments — The  Peace 
Treaties  of  Paris — Causes  of  their  failure  to  secure  a  real 
peace — Germany  after  the  War — Dissolution  of  the  Haps- 
burg  Monarchy — The  New  States;  Austria,  Czecho-Slo- 
vakia — Frontiers  of  Austria  and  Italy:  Tirol — Hungary 
and  Transylvania — Yugo-Slavia,  Albania — Bulgaria,  Ru- 
mania— Russia  and  Siberia — Finland,  Esthonia,  Latvia, 
Lithuania — Poland  and  the  Ukraine — The  Turkish  Em- 
pire—Constantinople— Armenia — The  Further  East. 

LECTURE  III. 
NON-POLITICAL  INFLUENCES  AFFECTING  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS      74 

Production  and  industry— Sources  of  natural   -vealth — 
Commercial  and  economic  interests — The  influence  of  In- 
ix 


x  CONTENTS 

ternational  Trade  for  Peace  and  for  War — Protective 
Tariffs  and  Free  Trade — Trading  influences  as  affecting 
Russia  and  Germany  before  1914 — Like  influences  as 
affecting  the  relations  of  England  and  Germany  before 
1914 — Transportation  and  the  routes  of  commerce — The 
"Freedom  of  the  Seas" — Fishery  rights — Railroads — Inter- 
national finance — Loans  to  foreign  governments  and  their 
consequences — How  far  ought  governments  to  inter- 
fere to  aid  traders  and  capitalists? — "Satan's  Invisible 
World." 

LECTURE  IV. 
THE  CAUSES  OF  WAE 112 

Existing  conditions  in  Europe — Disappearance  of  Family 
Relationships  as  an  international  factor — Decline  of  .the 
influence  of  religion  on  international  politics — Fanaticism 
in  Muslim  peoples — The  influence  of  racial  sentiment — 
Nationality  as  a  Sentiment  and  a  Fact — Illustrations  of  in- 
fluences and  conditions  which  create  nationality — Nation- 
ality and  Liberty  formerly  associated,  now  less  so— The 
Principle  of  Self-Determination — "Natural  Boundaries" — 
Difficulties  that  arise  in  trying  to  give  effect  to  the  princi- 
ple of  Nationality — International  disputes  arising  froni 
the  migration  of  the  subjects  of  one  State  into  the  terri- 
tories of  another — Contacts  of  the  White  and  the  Coloured 
Races — The  influence  of  theoretical  doctrines, on  the  rela- 
tions of  States — Influences  making  for  friendship  between 
Nations — Intellectual  influences  as  affecting  or  failing  to 
affect  the  feelings  of  peoples  towards  one  another — Con- 
trast between  the  friendly  feelings  of  individuals  towards 
foreigners  and  the  antagonisms  of  States — The  Politicians 
and  the  Press  as  influences  affecting  sentiment  abroad 
— Summary  review  of  the  various  factors  which  make  for 
amity  or  enmity  between  nations. 

LECTURE  V. 
DIPLOMACY  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  .       .      ,      .       .       .       .148 

Diplomatic  Envoys  in  the  past  and  the  present — The 
qualities  needed  in  an  Envoy — The  duties  of  Envoys 
and  services  they  may  render — To  speak  the  truth  or  to 
conceal  it? — Some  dicta  regarding  the  practice  of  diplo- 
macy— The  real  utility  of  diplomatic  envoys — Interna- 
tional Law — Is  it  fit  to  be  called  Law? — "Nature"  as  a 
source  of  International  Law — Rules  regarding  the  conduct 
of  War — Recent  violations  of  those  rules — Services  which 
International  Law  may  render — Treaties  and  their  dura- 
tion— Instances  of  the  repudiation  of  treaties — Interven- 


CONTENTS  xi 

tion  and  Neutralization — The  Cooperation  of  States  for 
common  purposes — The  need  for  revising  and  amending 
the  rules  of  International  Law — Creation  of  a  Body  for 
the  purpose  aforesaid — The  enforcement  of  International 
rules. 

LECTURE  VI. 

POPULAR  CONTROL  OF  FOREIGN   POLICY  AND  THE  MORALITY  OF 

STATES 176 

The  demand  that  the  People  should  direct  foreign  policy 
— By  what  method  can  the  people  act  for  this  purpose? — 
Difficulties  involved:  have  the  people  the  knowledge 
required? — Arguments  for  and  against  the  change  pro- 
posed— Cases  in  which  Popular  Control  may  work  well — 
Will  Popular  Control  raise  the  Moral  Standard  of  State 
action? — Why  has  that  Standard  been  low? — Standards 
why  higher  for  Individuals  than  for  States — The  Argument 
of  State  Necessity — Two  theories  of  the  Duty  of  States — 
What  the  State  may  not  do,  and  will  injure  itself  by 
doing — There  is  nevertheless  some  difference  between  the 
duty  of  a  State  and  that  of  an  Individual. 


LECTURE  VII. 

METHODS  PROPOSED  FOR  SETTLING  INTERNATIONAL  CONTROVERSIES    206 

Diplomatic  Conferences  and  Congresses — The  Berlin 
Congress — The  Hague  Conferences — The  Reduction  of 
Armaments — Problems  involved  in  Reduction  of  Land  and 
Sea  Forces — Methods  for  removing  causes  of  international 
friction  that  threaten  war — Arbitration  in  the  cases  called 
"Justiciable" — Instances  of  Wars  which  Judicial  Arbitra- 
tions would  not  have  averted — Mediation  or  Conciliation 
— Cases  to  which  this  method  has  been  or  might  have  been 
applied — Merits  of  the  Method — How  should  a  Concil- 
iating Authority  be  created? — What  functions  should  it 
have? 


LECTURE  VIII. 

OTHER  POSSIBLE  METHODS  FOR  AVERTING  WAR      ....    235 

(a)  Alliances,  offensive  and  defensive,  or  defensive  only 
— Rights  between  States  inherent  in  such  Alliances,  (b) 
A  Super-State  or  Federation  of  the  World — Objections  to 
a  Super-State:  the  differences  between  the  Component 
members  too  great — No  such  unity  now  exists  as  existed 


CONTENTS 

in  Europe  when  the  World  State  was  advocated  in  the 
Middle  Ages — Existing  States  would  refuse  to  join  the 
contemplated  Federation,  (c)  A  Combination  of  Civilized 
States  formed  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  war — Essen- 
tial requisites  for  such  a  Combination — Organs  needed  for 
its  effective  action — Difficulties  that  might  arise  in  its 
working — Compulsive  Methods  available:  the  Commer- 
cial Boycott,  or  a  possible  resort  to  force — Necessity  for 
some  joint  action  to  avert  war — Lessons  which  the  Great 
War  has  taught — The  welfare  of  every  nation  now  in- 
volved in  the  welfare  of  others — What  the  United  States 
might  effect  for  the  world — The  need  for  a  sense  of  World 
Citizenship — Responsibility  and  power  of  every  member 
of  a  Democracy. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  OF 
THE  OLD  WORLD  STATES 

LECTURE  I 

INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS   IN  THE  PAST. 

THE  subject  assigned  tc  me  in  the  arrangement  of 
the  courses  of  lectures  to  be  delivered  to  this  Institute, 
viz. :  the  relations  of  States  and  peoples  to  one  another, 
is  one  of  vast  extent,  which  covers  or  is  closely  con- 
nected with  nearly  every  branch  of  the  principal 
human  sciences, — Ethics,  Economics,  Law  and  Pol- 
itics. The  matters  with  which  these  sciences  have 
to  deal  have  all  of  them  affected  the  relations  of  inde- 
pendent communities,  and  History  is  a  record  of  the 
phases  through  which  these  relations  have  passed. 
But  the  subject,  although  very  large — I  might  say 
because  very  large — admits  of  being  briefly  treated. 
Since  no  one  will  expect  a  lecturer  to  enter  into  details, 
he  may  confine  himself  to  mapping  out  the  subject, 
drawing  its  general  outlines,  noting  the  salient  features 
and  the  most  critical  issues,  and  examining  some  few 
of  the  presently  urgent  problems. 

In  order  to  explain  what  the  international  relations 
of  the  Old  World  States  were  before  the  Great  War  and 
are  now,  I  propose  to  devote  the  first  two  lectures  to  a 
rapid  sketch  of  the  character  which  relations  of  nations 

i 


2  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

and  States  have  borne  in  the  past,  so  as  to  show  what 
the  general  experience  of  mankind  has  been  and 
through  what  recent  experiences  it  reached  the  point  at 
which  things  stood  in  the  fateful  year  1914,  when  the 
powder  train  that  had  been  so  long  in  laying  was  fired. 
In  this  lecture  I  will  try  to  give  you  passing  glimpses  of 
the  ancient,  mediaeval,  and  modern  world,  proceeding 
in  the  next  to  describe  the  international  situation  when 
the  war  broke  out,  that  we  may  see  what  were  the 
causes  and  conditions  which  brought  about  that  war 
and  made  it  an  extension  unprecedented  in  the  annals 
of  mankind. 

My  aim  is  to  lay  before  you  a  statement,  clear  and 
impartial,  so  far  as  I  can  make  it  so,  of  Facts.  Many 
are  the  theories  that  might  be  constructed,  many  the 
reflections  with  which  the  facts  could  be  adorned,  we 
can  all  spin  theories  and  delight  ourselves  with  re- 
flections at  our  own  pleasure  but  before  allowing  our- 
selves such  enjoyments,  let  us  have  a  clear  and  con- 
nected grasp  of  the  facts.  Now  and  then  I  will  ven- 
ture to  illustrate  general  propositions  I  may  have  to 
state  by  referring  to  incidents  that  have  come  within 
my  personal  knowledge,  some  of  which  are  not  re- 
corded in  books.  Those  whose  memory  goes  back  a 
long  way  are  exposed  to  the  danger  of  indulging  too 
much  in  recollections  of  the  bygone  days — recollec- 
tions which  have  a  keen  interest  for  those  who  re- 
member the  circumstances  and  conditions,  now  for- 
gotten by  their  juniors,  through  which  the  world  was 
traveling  sixty  or  seventy  years  ago,  but  which  are  apt 
to  be  comparatively  uninteresting  to  the  present  gener- 
ation. Nevertheless,  concrete  cases  recollected  in 
their  environment  help  to  illuminate.  When  we  can 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  IN  THE  PAST  3 

connect  a  general  proposition  with  an  illustrative  in- 
stance, it  seems  to  become  more  real  and  more  fertile 
in  suggesting  lines  of  thought  worth  following. 

Some  few  words  at  the  outset  about  a  subject  old  but 
never  yet  exhausted  and  not  likely  to  be  exhausted, 
viz. :  Human  Nature — by  which  I  mean  not  merely  the 
nature  of  Man,  but  Man  as  he  was  in  a  State  of  Nature. 
The  significance  of  this  point  for  the  study  of  inter- 
national relations  is  that  although  in  civilized  countries 
every  individual  man  is  now  under  law  and  not  in  a 
State  of  Nature  towards  his  fellow  men,  every  political 
community,  whatever  its  form,  be  it  republican  or 
monarchical,  is  in  a  State  of  Nature  towards  every 
other  community ;  that  is  to  say,  an  independent  com- 
munity stands  quite  outside  law,  each  community  own- 
ing no  control  but  its  own,  recognizing  no  legal  rights 
to  other  communities  and  owing  to  them  no  legal 
duties.  An  independent  community  is,  in  fact,  in  that 
very  condition  in  which  savage  men  were  before  they 
were  gathered  together  into  communities  legally  or- 
ganized. 

It  is  well  to  insist  upon  this  point,  because  those  who 
are  accustomed  to  live  in  civilized  communities  where 
every  citizen  is  subject  to  the  law  of  his  own  com- 
munity, do  not  always  realize  that  the  Community 
itself  is  outside  law  altogether.  It  is  in  precisely 
the  same  condition  in  which  stood  our  savage  an- 
cestors, or  rather  the  savage  ancestors  of  those  Indians 
who  were  here  before  your  ancestors  came,  when  every 
tribe  of  Algonquins  or  Iroquois  stood  in  a  State  of 
Nature  towards  every  other  and  had  no  rights  and  no 
duties  and  no  law  except  what  people  call  the  Law 
of  Force.  That  is  exactly  the  position  in  which  every 


4  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

civilized  community  stands  now.  It  is  a  law  unto 
itself,  subject  to  no  legal  control  and  therefore  to  no 
responsibility,  except  that  (to  be  subsequently  con- 
sidered) which  the  public  opinion  of  the  world  imposes. 

Now  what  really  was  the  State  of  Nature?  There 
have  been  two  theories  about  it,  two  conceptions  of 
the  facts  and  the  forces  at  work,  and  the  history  of 
international  relations  records  the  long  conflict  be- 
tween these  two  views  or  conceptions,  a  conflict  in 
which  there  has  been  and  will  be  no  victory,  because 
each  view  is  true,  based  upon  facts  which  belong  to 
man's  mental  constitution,  and  yet  not  so  completely 
true  as  to  exclude  the  truth  of  the  other  view. 

"War,"  says  Plato,  "is  the  natural  relation  of  every 
community  to  every  other" :  7r6Xe/*os  <f>v<rei  Mpxti  irpds 
oTrAaas  rds  TroXeis.  So  another  ancient  Greek  observer  said : 
"Every  man  is  a  wolf  to  every  other  man":  &j/t?/>cS7ros 
dj>tfpd>7r<i>  Xu/cos.  Many  other  wise  men,  ancient  and 
modern,  have  spoken  to  the  like  effect.  Yet  there  has 
been,  and  that  from  the  earliest  times,  another  view  of 
the  nature  of  man  and  of  what  is  called  the  State  of 
Nature.  Over  against  the  doctrine  of  the  Wolf  and 
the  state  of  war  there  was  also  a  doctrine  of  the  Lamb 
and  the  state  of  peace.  The  poet  Hesiod  describes  to 
us  a  Golden  Age  in  which  there  was  no  strife,  and  many 
of  you  will  remember  that  Virgil,  in  his  famous  Fourth 
Eclogue,  amplifying  the  traditions  of  the  older  poets, 
makes  the  Sibyl  prophesy  the  return  of  an  era  of  un- 
broken peace  like  that  which  is  described  in  the  eleventh 
chapter  of  Isaiah.  If  the  pessimist  school  of  thinkers 
can  point  to  history  as  a  record  of  incessant  strife,  the 
optimist  school  can  find  in  their  study  of  man's  soul 
and  essence  a  basis  for  their  hopes  of  betterment. 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  IN  THE  PAST  5 

The  Stoic  philosophers  looked  upon  man  as  a  being 
in  whom  evil  impulses  were  in  constant  conflict  with 
right  reason  and  therefore  thought  of  him  as  attaining 
his  true  nature  when  these  passions  had  been  subdued 
by  reason  and  the  sense  of  justice.  That  peace  in  the 
soul  which  Reason  ought  to  give  seemed  to  them  to  be 
natural  because  nature  tended  of  herself  to  evolve 
what  is  highest  and  best  in  man;  and  when  that 
tendency  had  prevailed,  man  would  be  at  peace  with 
his  fellows.  Various  thinkers  in  various  ages  have 
hesitated  between  these  two  conceptions  or  have  tried 
to  hold  them  altogether.  In  the  foreground  they  saw 
man  as  he  has  shown  himself  in  history,  a  creature  of 
aggressive  propensities  prompting  him  to  rob  or  kill, 
while  behind  these  they  saw  an  amiable  vision  of  Man 
as  he  may  once  have  been  in  an  age  of  innocence,  or  as 
he  may  again  be  when  either  religion  or  philosophy  has 
tamed  the  impulses  that  move  him  for  evil.  Each 
school  of  thinkers  can  take  Nature  to  mean  either  the 
sum  of  the  mental  or  the  moral  phenomena  which 
belong  to  man  as  they  have  usually  throughout  history 
displayed  themselves  in  action,  or  can  discover  in  those 
phenomena  a  vital  principle,  the  development  of 
which,  along  the  lines  the  Creator  has  prescribed,  will 
by  degrees  subdue  the  lower  passions  and  enthrone  the 
higher  passions  hi  power. 

Though  I  must  turn  away  from  the  field  of  specula- 
tion to  that  of  Fact,  let  us  try  to  remember  through 
the  whole  course  of  this  inquiry  into  the  relations  of 
States  to  States  two  fundamental  propositions.  One 
is  that  every  independent  political  community  is,  by 
virtue  of  its  independence,  in  a  State  of  Nature 
towards  other  communities.  The  other  proposition  is 


6  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

that  the  prospect  of  improving  the  relations  of  states 
and  peoples  to  one  another  depends  ultimately  upon 
the  possibility  of  improving  human  nature  itself.  You 
may  say  that  a  sound  and  wide  view  of  national  in- 
terests, teaching  the  peoples  that  they  would  gain 
more  by  co-operation  than  by  competition  or  by  con- 
flict, may  do  much  to  better  the  relations  of  communi- 
ties. But  in  the  last  resort  the  question  is  one  of  the 
moral  progress  of  the  individual  men  who  compose  the 
communities.  Communities  are  nothing  at  all  except 
so  many  individual  men,  and  human  nature  will  ad- 
vance no  further  in  communities  taken  as  wholes  than 
the  members  of  the  communities  themselves  advance. 
And  this  is  the  reason  why  those  who  seek  to  improve 
human  society  must  begin  by  working  as  individuals; 
not  to  throw  the  responsibility  upon  the  communities, 
but  to  remember  that  the  community  is  what  the  men 
and  women  make  it.  Human  Nature  in  the  civilized 
nations — and  international  advance  can  only  go  on  if 
it  goes  on  simultaneously  in  many  nations — human 
nature  can  only  be  raised  and  sustained  by  the  effort  of 
individuals.  Can  it  be  raised  to  and  sustained  at  a 
higher  level  than  it  has  yet  attained?  That  is  the 
great  question,  and  that  is  the  question  to  which  I  hope 
to  return  in  a  later  lecture  of  this  course. 

Now  let  us  turn  to  history.  The  relations  of  nations 
to  one  another  are  those  of  War  and  Peace:  it  is  of 
these  I  shall  have  to  speak  to  you.  Now  from  ancient 
times  History  shows  us  far  more  of  War  than  of  Peace. 
If  ever  there  was  a  Golden  Age,  the  ancients  had  to  con- 
fess that  there  were  no  records  regarding  it,  and  no- 
where have  any  traces  of  it  been  discovered.  When 
the  curtain  rises — that  curtain  which  conceals  the 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  IN  THE  PAST  7 

dark  prehistoric  past — we  see  fighting  everywhere  over 
the  earth.  All  the  races  of  Europe  were  fighting — 
Celts,  and  Iberians,  and  Slavs,  and  Teutons.  Each 
tribe  was  always  at  war  with  other  tribes.  So  were  the 
great  civilized  kingdoms  of  antiquity,  Syrians,  Baby- 
lonians, Lydians,  Medes  and  Persians,  with  wild 
hordes  of  Kimmerians  and  Scythians  descending  from 
time  to  time  out  of  the  bleak  and  misty  North  upon 
the  lands  of  sunshine  and  wealth.  All  around  the 
Mediterranean,  Greek  cities  were  living  in  constant 
conflict  with  one  another,  and  the  neighboring  cities 
were  the  most  hostile.  Athens  hated  Megara,  Thebes 
hated  Plataea,  Spartans  hated  and  fought  with  Messen- 
ians.  And  this  was  true  of  Gauls  and  Spaniards  also. 
These  facts  which  ancient  historians  report  are 
exactly  similar  to  those  which  we  know  from  the 
reports  of  travelers  who  have  visited  the  newly  dis- 
covered countries  since  the  voyages  of  Columbus  and 
Vasco  de  Gama.  Everywhere  war,  everywhere  the  de- 
light in  war.  The  Sioux  and  the  Blackfeet  and  the 
Crows  upon  the  prairies  of  the  Missouri  River  fought 
with  one  another  with  the  same  fierceness  as  Campbells 
and  Frasers  and  Macdonalds  fought  in  Scotland  upon 
the  shores  of  Loch  Etive  and  Loch  Lochy.  In  Hawaii 
and  in  Tahiti  and  in  New  Zealand,  chiefs  were  always 
at  war  with  their  neighbors.  Still  more  ferocious  upon 
this  continent  were  the  feuds  of  Mexican  tribes  like 
the  Aztecs  and  Tlascalans  with  one  another.  It  was 
the  same  in  Africa,  where  Tshaka,  the  king  of  the 
Zulus,  slaughtered  all  his  neighbors  eighty  years  ago 
in  South  Africa,  playing  the  part  there  of  the  Mongol 
conqueror  Timur,  who  was  known  by  the  piles  of  skele- 
tons that  he  left  behind  him.  The  only  mitigations  of 


8  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

the  all-pervading  practice  of  strife  were  to  be  found  in 
the  protection  that  was  accorded  to  heralds  or  messen- 
gers bearing  what  we  should  call  a  flag  of  truce,  and  in 
the  recognition  of  certain  customs  regulating  com- 
munications between  enemies;  and  along  with  these 
customs  in  the  practice  of  calling  as  witnesses  to  an 
agreement  supernatural  beings,  such  as  the  deities  of 
earth  and  heaven,  whom  we  find  invoked  in  the  Iliad 
when  a  truce  was  made  between  the  Greeks  and  the 
Trojans,  and  such  as  the  Sun  and  the  Wind  when  an 
agreement  made  by  Irish  kings  in  the  days  of  St. 
Patrick  was  placed  under  their  protection.  I  mention 
these  things  because  they  are  the  first  beginnings  of 
what  has  been  developed  into  a  kind  of  international 
law.  International  law  began  in  connection  with  war, 
because  war  was  what  brought  peoples  most  frequently 
and  directly  into  relations  with  one  another  which 
needed  some  kind  of  regulation.  And  we  may  perhaps 
add  that  there  was  even  in  the  rudest  tribes  some  sort 
of  vague  disapproval  of  certain  kinds  of  behavior,  such 
as  the  killing  of  prisoners  by  torture,  massacres  upon 
a  great  scale,  unprovoked  attacks  upon  a  harmless 
tribe,  the  violation  of  a  promise  made  in  a  particularly 
solemn  way.  Yet  this  disapproval  was  seldom  strong 
enough  to  restrain  any  chief  or  any  community  that 
saw  direct  advantage  to  itself  from  high-handed  aggres- 
sion or  from  a  breach  of  faith. 

To  the  incessant  bloodshed  and  plunder  which  I 
have  described  as  characterizing  everywhere  over  the 
world  this  first  period  of  international  relations,  there 
succeeded  what  may  be  called  a  Second  Period — an 
age  of  comparative  peace,  and  indeed  the  only  season  of 
widely  extended  peace  which  civilized  mankind  has 
ever  enjoyed.  This  second  period,  which  was  on  the 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  IN  THE  PAST  9 

whole  the  most  peaceful  era  the  civilized  peoples  have 
ever  seen,  dates  from  a  little  before  the  beginning  of 
our  era,  though  not  necessarily  connected  with  it. 
Rome  had  conquered  the  world,  as  the  result  of  a 
series  of  wars  which  brought  the  whole  Mediterranean 
world  and  part  of  the  East  under  her  sway  and  she  set 
herself  in  the  days  of  Augustus  to  repress  all  strife 
within  the  limits  of  her  realm.  The  absorption  and 
unification  into  the  gigantic  Roman  dominion  of  many 
kingdoms  and  many  city  states  caused  their  in- 
habitants after  four  or  five  generations  to  begin  to 
think  of  themselves  as  being  all  Romans,  and  gave 
them  what  would  be  called  to-day — the  term  is,  of 
course,  a  new  one — a  kind  of  Collective  Nationality. 
This  unification  effected  by  the  conquests  of  Rome  left 
no  international  relations  subsisting  within  the  Em- 
pire, though  such  relations  continued  to  exist  with 
barbarous  or  semi-civilized  peoples  outside  the  Em- 
pire, such  as  the  unsubdued  Teutons  In  northern  Ger- 
many, such  as  the  Caledonians  in  North  Britain,  such 
as  the  Parthians,  and  afterwards  the  Persians,  away 
beyond  the  Euphrates.  This  Pax  Romano,  was  not  a 
perfect  world-peace,  because  there  was  always  some 
fighting  on  the  Northern,  Eastern  and  Southern 
frontiers,  and  some  internal  conflicts  between  rival 
aspirants  to  the  imperial  throne.  But  still  it  was  a 
better  time  than  there  had  ever  been  before,  or  than 
there  was  to  come  for  a  long  time  thereafter. 

The  most  interesting  feature  for  us  moderns  is  that 
in  this  second  period  there  appeared  a  new  force  which 
has  ever  since  influenced  the  relations  of  states;  I 
mean  the  influence  of  the  monotheistic  religions.  Their 
action  on  politics  is  one  of  the  most  curious  and  note- 
worthy points  in  the  whole  course  of  the  history  of 


10  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

the  relation  of  states  to  another.  The  monotheistic 
religions,  because  they  are  monotheistic,  ore  mutually 
exclusive.  In  the  pre-Christian  world  every  people, 
however  attached  it  was  to  its  own  deities,  admitted 
the  deities  of  other  peoples  as  being  equally  true  and 
equally  disposed  to  help  their  votaries.  Even  if  those 
deities  inspired  the  disgust  which  Juvenal  felt  for  the 
animal  gods  of  Egypt,  still  there  was  no  disposition  to 
interfere  with  their  worship,  for  each  people  had  a 
right  to  its  own  gods,  the  protectors  of  the  land  they 
dwelt  in.  But  the  Christian  church,  after  it  had 
triumphed  over  the  various  idolatries  older  and  newer 
in  the  fourth  century,  began  to  lend  itself  to  the  sup- 
pression of  pagan  rites,  and  still  later  it  embarked  upon 
a  career  of  persecution  which  lasted  in  Spain  down  to 
the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Everybody  can  see 
now  how  absolutely  opposed  to  the  teachings  of  the 
Gospel  persecution  was.  But  after  the  fifth  century 
no  one  seems  to  have  seen  that  till  far  down  in  the 
Middle  Ages.  Thus  a  new  ground  for  international 
enmities  arose.  Thereafter  another  monotheistic  re- 
ligion appeared  in  the  seventh  century.  That  was 
Islam.  Now  Islam  was  militant  and  intolerant  from 
the  very  first.  It  did  not  need  to  decay  or  decline  into 
a  state  of  intolerance,  as  Christianity  did,  because  it 
was  meant  to  be  intolerant.  It  put  to  the  sword  all 
idolaters,  including  the  Fire-worshippers  of  Persia, 
who  were  its  first  victims,  and  it  reduced  the  "Peoples 
of  the  Book,"  as  the  Mussulmans  call  the  Jews  and  the 
Christians,  to  a  subjection  which  left  them  very  little 
except  their  lives. 

Now  Christianity,  being  a  religion  of  peace  which 
preached  good  will  among  men,  and  a  religion  which 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  IN  THE  PAST          11 

had  prevailed  by  spiritual  forces  only  against  the 
physical  force  of  the  Roman  imperial  government, 
might  have  been  expected  to  change  the  face  of  the 
world  by  leading  the  nations  that  accepted  it  to  obey 
its  precept  to  love  one  another.  Its  mission  was  to  put 
an  end  to  wars,  at  least  among  Christians,  and  its  duty 
to  the  heathen  was  to  treat  them  not  as  enemies  or  as 
wilful  sinners,  but  as  fellow-creatures  who  had  dwelt 
in  darkness  and  who  were  to  be  illumined  by  the  soft 
light  of  the  gospel.  These  things,  however,  did  not 
come  to  pass.  When  differences  of  doctrine  arose 
among  Christians,  they  became  the  cause  first  of 
anger  and  antagonism,  and  presently  of  armed  strife. 
The  Prankish  King  Clovis,  himself  very  recently  and 
very  imperfectly  converted,  alleged  as  a  ground  for  his 
attack  upon  the  Visigothic  Kingdom  of  Aquitania  that 
"these  Arians  ought  not  to  be  permitted  to  possess  the 
best  part  of  Gaul."  Three  centuries  later  Charle- 
magne forced  Christianity  upon  the  Saxons  by  the 
sword,  and  after  three  centuries  more  the  Norwegian 
Saint  Olaf  earned  his  title  of  saint  by  no  merit  except 
that  of  fighting  against  heathens,  for  there  was  cer- 
tainly nothing  in  his  character  or  career  except  fighting 
against  heathens  to  justify  that  title.  His  predeces- 
sor, King  Olaf  Trygvasson,  had  set  an  example  of 
forcible  conversion  by  making  a  venomous  snake  crawl 
down  the  throat  of  a  heathen  chief  who  refused  to  be 
converted. 

All  through  the  Dark  Ages  there  was  practically  as 
much  fighting  between  those  who  called  themselves 
Christians  as  there  had  been  in  any  previous  age.  The 
only  result  of  the  appearance  of  the  new  religion  in 
the  field  of  politics  might  seem  to  have  been  to  add  a 


12  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

new  cause  for  war,  either  against  non-Christians  or  as 
between  one  section  of  Christians  and  another.  Some- 
times even  prelates,  like  Bishop  Odo  of  Bayeux,  the 
brother  of  William  the  Conqueror,  or  the  Bishop  of 
Jaen  in  the  last  war  of  the  "Catholic  Kings"  Ferdinand 
and  Isabella  against  the  Moors  of  Granada,  themselves 
took  armor  and  fought  to  kill.  This  is  perhaps  the  sad- 
dest of  all  the  disappointments  that  history  records.  A 
spiritual  power  had  arisen  in  the  world  which  seemed 
capable  of  extinguishing  the  bad  passions  of  mankind 
and  the  greatest  evil  from  which  civilized  society  had 
suffered,  and  this  power  did  not  fulfil  its  mission  or  ac- 
complish its  task.  The  propensities  of  human  nature 
were  too  strong  for  it.  Instead  of  bringing  together  into 
one  body  men  of  different  races  and  faiths,  it  created  a 
distinction  between  those  within  and  those  without 
the  pale  which  provided  a  reason  for  aggression  and 
an  excuse  for  ferocity.  The  Spanish  Conquistadores 
in  Mexico  and  Peru  seem  to  have  thought  themselves 
justified  in  slaughtering  the  Indians  because  the  Indian 
natives,  not  being  Christians,  were  deemed  to  be  out- 
side the  pale  and  not  under  the  protection  of  God. 
You  may  remember  that  the  Dominican  monk  Valdes, 
who  acted  as^chaplain  to  Pizarro,  said  to  the  Spaniards 
when  they  were  preparing  for  their  great  massacre  of 
the  Indians  in  the  square  of  Caxamarca,  "I  absolve 
you,  Castilians;  fall  on  and  slay." 

Nevertheless,  the  principles  of  the  Gospel  were  not 
so  completely  forgotten  as  to  make  good  men  desist 
from  efforts  to  restrain  violence.  At  the  end  of  the 
tenth  century,  when  private  war  was  so  general  over 
the  whole  European  Continent  that  practically  every 
layman  had  to  put  himself  in  a  state  of  defence  against 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  IN  THE  PAST          13 

everybody  else,  French  Synods  began  to  proclaim  what 
was  called  the  Pax  Ecclesice — church  peace — which  for- 
bade private  war  at  certain  periods;  and  some  years 
later  there  was  created  a  Truce  of  God,  which  all  men 
were  required  to  swear  to  observe  during  certain  holy 
seasons  and  for  certain  days  in  each  week.  Those  regu- 
lations, which  were  meant  to  apply  to  private  warfare 
rather  than  to  regular  wars  between  potentates,  were 
enforced  by  ecclesiastical  penalties.  They  were  con- 
stantly broken,  so  that  someone  remarked  that  as  much 
sin  was  being  committed  by  perjury  as  was  committed 
by  the  fighting  which  the  oaths  were  meant  to  check. 
Nevertheless,  these  attempts  constituted  a  sort  of 
standing  testimony  by  the  Church  to  the  duty  that 
was  laid  upon  it  to  promote  peace. 

These  attempts  usher  in  what  we  may  call  a  Third 
Period.  The  first  was  that  which  saw  endless  wars  in 
the  early  Mediterranean  and  West  European  world; 
the  second  was  that  of  the  Roman  Empire,  and  this 
third  period  covered  five  centuries,  and  in  it  an  at- 
tempt was  made  to  apply  Christianity  to  the  better- 
ment of  political  relations.  When  the  authority  of  the 
Pope  as  Universal  Bishop  became  generally  recognized 
in  the  West,  it  became  part  of  his  functions  to  prevent, 
as  far  as  possible,  international  as  well  as  private  wars, 
and  the  similar,  though  less  complete,  recognition  of 
the  Emperor  as  the  secular  head  and  ruler  of  Christen- 
dom imposed  upon  the  latter  a  like  duty.  This  was 
the  first  serious  effort  ever  made  to  treat  the  whole 
body  of  Christians  as  a  single  ecclesiastico-civil  com- 
munity bound  to  obey  two  sovereigns  God  had  placed 
over  them,  sovereigns  charged  with  functions  of  main- 
taining order  and  repressing  violence  here  on  earth  and 


14  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

of  leading  men  to  eternal  felicity  thereafter.  The 
doctrine  was  expounded  in  many  books,  the  most 
famous  of  which — two  treatises  well  deserving  to  be 
studied  at  this  day — are  the  book  called  De  Monarchia, 
written  by  Dante  Alighieri,  and  the  book  called  "The 
Defender  of  the  Peace" — Defensor  Pacis, — by  the 
younger  contemporary  of  Dante,  Marsilius  of  Padua. 

No  one  denied  this  doctrine  of  the  rights  and  duties 
of  the  Emperor  or  the  Pope,  but  while  it  gave  immense 
power  to  the  Pope,  who  could  inflict  spiritual  penalties 
which  men  feared,  and  who  often  used  them  with  a 
righteous  purpose,  it  did  far  less  to  help  the  Emperor, 
who  had  no  correspondingly  effective  power;  and  so 
it  happened  that  the  authority  of  the  latter  practically 
disappeared  after  the  middle  of  the  thirteenth  century. 
The  system  was  grand  in  its  conception,  but  it  broke 
down  when  the  two  Supreme  Powers  quarreled,  and 
for  a  couple  of  centuries  they  were  seldom  even  on 
speaking  terms.  Their  quarrel  fatally  weakened  the 
Emperor,  while  temporal  ambitions  so  invaded  and 
corrupted  the  Church  that  the  Pope  and  the  bishops 
lost  by  degrees  their  moral  authority  and  found  their 
spiritual  weapons  blunted  by  having  been  frequently 
abused  for  non-spiritual  ends.  The  high  aspirations 
which  had  marked  the  beginning  of  the  thirteenth 
century  died  away  and  before  the  middle  of  the  fif- 
teenth a  decadence  had  set  in  which  seemed  to  threaten 
all  the  influences  of  Christianity  upon  national  and 
international  life. 

This  decline  was  especially  conspicuous  in  Italy. 
Religion  had  in  Italy  been  formalized  and  divorced 
from  ethics.  The  blessing  of  such  a  man  as  Rodrigo 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  IN  THE  PAST          15 

Borgia,  Pope  Alexander  VI,  was  still  supposed  to  have 
a  sort  of  magical  effect,1  but  no  one  could  have  received 
from  him  with  a  grave  face  any  exhortation  to  virtue, 
and  it  is  fair  to  Pope  Alexander  to  say  that  he  had 
too  much  humor  ever  to  offer  such  exhortations.  The 
growth  of  the  arts  and  of  material  prosperity  had  made 
private  warfare  less  frequent,  so  there  was  not  quite  so 
much  bloodshed  and  ferocity  as  there  had  been,  but 
force  and  fraud  were  recognized  as  the  inevitable  and 
hardly  blameworthy  methods  which  States  must  em- 
ploy against  one  another.  The  typical  representative 
of  Italian  statecraft  was  Cesare  Borgia,  one  of  the  most 
interesting  figures  of  the  Renaissance,  with  a  career 
typical  in  Italy,  as  that  of  Louis  XI  had  been  typical 
in  France,  as  that  of  Ferdinand  the  Catholic  was 
typical  of  the  succeeding  age  in  Spain.  A  manual  of 
the  applied  science  of  statecraft  was  supplied  by  Ma- 
chiavelli  in  his  book  called  The  Prince,  a  work  which 
has  exposed  his  memory  to  undeserved  obloquy,  be- 
cause he  did  no  more  than  describe  and  examine  what 
was  the  accepted  practice  of  his  own  time.  There  was 
nothing  in  the  book  which  sovereigns  had  not  been 
doing  for  ages,  nothing  which  plenty  of  statesmen 
have  not  been  doing  ever  since  without  needing  to  turn 
to  Machiavelli's  pages  for  guidance. 

This  brings  us  down  to  the  Fourth  Period,  which 
opens  with  the  great  ecclesiastical  schism  of  the  six- 
teenth century,  for  it  saw  the  emergence  of  new 
phenomena  which  profoundly  affected  the  relations  of 
States  to  one  another.  Religious  differences  arising 
from  the  teachings  of  Luther  and  Zwingli  and  Calvin 

*An  amusing  instance  may  be  found  in  Ferdinand  Gregorovius' 
Life  of  Lucrezia  Borgia. 


16  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

created  new  grounds  of  international  hostility.  Protes- 
tant monarchs  and  peoples,  threatening  and  threatened 
by  the  Catholic  monarchs,  quarreled  with  one  another, 
till  in  the  year  1618  their  strife  led  to  a  war  that 
dragged  on  for  thirty  years  and  bled  Germany  white, 
leaving  her  impoverished,  desolate,  exhausted.  At  last 
the  year  1648  brought  a  peace  which  was  memorable 
for  two  reasons.  It  was  arranged  at  the  first  of  those 
great  European  congresses  which  at  Osnabriick  and 
Miinster,  thereafter  at  Utrecht  in  1713,  then  again  at 
Vienna  in  1814,  then  at  Berlin  in  1878,  then  at  Paris 
in  1919,  assembled  to  settle  the  terms  of  peace  after  a 
great  war.  The  two  Treaties  of  Westphalia  (1648) 
re-constituted  the  relations  of  the  leading  Powers  for 
many  years,  laying  a  foundation  for  all  subsequent 
efforts  to  determine  their  respective  rights.  These 
treaties  turned  what  had  been  that  mediaeval  Empire 
which  claimed  to  be  Universal  into  a  sort  of 
Germanic  Confederation,  dividing  central  Europe  into 
two  sections,  Roman  Catholic  and  Protestant,  ap- 
proximately equal  in  population  and  resources,  so 
that  each  might  hope  to  be  able  to  defend  itself  against 
the  other.  The  scheme  framed  for  Germany  became 
the  basis  for  all  Europe  of  what  was  called  the  Balance 
of  Power.  Here  we  touch  a  very  important  point  in 
the  evolution  of  international  relations,  because  the 
Balance  of  Power  was  the  center,  or  what  might  be 
called  the  mainspring,  of  European  politics  for  more 
than  two  centuries  from  that  date.  The  idea  had 
sprung  up  that  in  order  to  prevent  any  one  State  from 
becoming  strong  enough  to  threaten  the  independence 
of  other  States,  there  must  always  be  maintained  an 
equilibrium  between  the  great  States.  When  any 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  IN  THE  PAST          17 

monarchy,  such  as  at  one  time  Spain,  at  another 
Austria  under  the  Hapsburgs  (who  were  usually 
closely  allied  with  their  Spanish  kindred),  at  another 
period  France  under  Louis  XIV,  came  to  constitute  a 
menace  to  its  neighbors,  those  neighbors  felt  bound  to 
form  a  league  for  their  joint  protection  against  the 
danger.  This  idea  or  scheme  was  often  abused.  It 
led  to  alarms  that  were  sometimes  ill-founded:  it 
created  what  have  been  called  Preventive  Wars — wars 
made  to-day  in  order  to  prevent  a  war  from  being  made 
to-morrow,  efforts  to  repel  attacks  which  might  never 
have  come.  Thus  discredited  by  misuse,  it  became  a 
term  of  reproach  as  a  delusion  of  kings  and  diplo- 
matists. Nevertheless  there  were  moments,  such  as 
that  when  the  power  of  Louis  XIV  dominated  the 
European  continent,  when  there  really  did  seem  to  be 
need  for  a  combination  of  other  States  to  resist  an  ag- 
gression which  would  have  injured  peoples  as  well  as 
monarchs,  and  the  career  of  Napoleon  Bonaparte 
showed  that  the  danger  was  not  extinct.  After  the 
fall  of  the  Napoleonic  Empire  Russia  became  the 
Power  which  was  most  generally  dreaded,  until  the 
Crimean  War  in  1853  and  thereafter  the  war  with  Japan 
disclosed  her  weakness.  We  know  what  alarm  the  mili- 
tary strength  of  Germany  began  to  excite  among  her 
neighbors  after  1870. 

From  the  earlier  years  of  this  Fourth  Period  we 
note  the  beginnings  of  what  may  be  distinguished  as 
secular  plans, — because  they  differ  from  the  ecclesi- 
astical plans  that  I  have  already  described — to  prevent 
wars  by  forming  combinations  of  independent  king- 
doms for  that  purpose.  In  these  plans  there  emerge 
rudimentary  ideas  of  international  conciliation  and  ar- 


18  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

bitration.  The  incessant  wars  of  the  fifteenth  century- 
suggested  to  the  great  Erasmus  the  need  for  some  con- 
certed efforts  to  secure  peace,  and  those  of  you  who 
have  not  seen  it  may  be  advised  to  read  a  little  book  of 
his,  published  in  the  early  sixteenth  century  and  quite 
recently  reprinted,  called  The  Complaint  of  Peace, 
in  which  Peace  personified  raises  her  voice  of  lamenta- 
tion to  say  that  although  Christianity  is  her  friend 
and  advocate  and  everybody  professes  to  desire  her 
beneficent  presence,  she  is  everywhere  wounded  hi  the 
house  of  her  friends.  This  need  for  some  concerted  ef- 
fort seems  to  have  been  first  suggested  to  the  Bohemian 
king  George  Podiebrad  by  one  of  his  ministers. 
Much  later  it  prompted  Henry  IV  of  France  or  his 
minister  Sully  to  devise  a  scheme  called  the  "Grand 
Design,"  which  contemplated  a  so-called  "Christian 
Republic,"  to  be  presided  over  by  the  Romano-Ger- 
manic Emperor,  with  a  Council  or  Perpetual  Senate, 
consisting  of  sixty-four  Commissioners,  who  were  to 
debate  questions  of  common  interest  and  preserve 
peace  by  settling  disputes  between  nations.  The  idea 
was  revived  later  by  the  Abbe  de  St.  Pierre,  in  France, 
and  won  sympathy  from  the  great  Leibnitz.  It  is  to 
the  same  sense  of  the  evils  of  war  that  we  must  assign 
thet  beginnings  of  International  Law  as  something 
more  than  a  mere  body  of  commercial  customs. 

It  was  just  before  the  beginning  of  this  period  that 
the  field  of  international  politics  was  enlarged  by  the 
discovery  of  new  lands,  the  claims  to  which  created 
fresh  grounds  for  rivalry  and  strife  among  European 
potentates.  When  the  Portuguese  and  Spanish  naviga- 
tors were  exploring  the  unknown  shores  of  the  tropical 
Atlantic,  Pope  Alexander  VI  issued  a  bull  delimiting 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  IN  THE  PAST          19 

the  regions  which  each  Power  might  appropriate. 
Presently  England,  Holland,  and  France  came  upon 
the  scene,  the  two  former  disregarding  the  claims  of 
Spain  and  Portugal,  and  building  up  colonial  domin- 
ions for  themselves.  This  process  of  appropriation, 
whence  arose  many  wars,  was  supposed  to  have  ended 
thirty  years  ago  by  the  carving  up  of  Africa  into  areas 
assigned  by  various  treaties  to  France,  Germany, 
Britain,  and  Italy;  but  still  later  the  United  States 
took  Hawaii,  Puerto  Rico,  and  the  Philippine  Isles, 
and,  more  recently,  Germany  lost  her  recently  acquired 
African  and  Oceanic  possessions,  which  were  at  Ver- 
sailles allotted  to  various  Powers  to  be  administered 
under  mandates.  The  only  parts  of  the  world  that 
have  not  now  been  appropriated  in  some  way  or  other 
by  Powers  belonging  to  the  European  races  are  China, 
Mongolia,  Japan,  Persia,  Abyssinia,  Siam,  and  some 
fragments  of  Western  Asia.  Even  the  islands  of  the 
Pacific  are  virtually  ruled  either  by  some  white  Power 
— that  is  to  say,  a  Power  of  European  origin — or  by 
Japan. 

Finally,  by  a  series  of  gradual  changes  during  the 
nineteenth  century  we  pass  out  of  the  Fourth  Period 
into  the  Fifth,  which  comes  down  to  the  end  of  the 
Great  War  in  1918-20.  It  is  characterized  by  two  new 
phenomena  of  great  import.  The  first  of  these  new 
phenomena  is  a  change  and  enlargement  in  the 
meaning  of  the  word  "State."  During  previous 
periods  "the  State"  had  meant,  in  a  monarchy,  the 
personal  ruler,  in  republics,  such  as  Venice,  or  Genoa, 
or  Hamburg,  a  small  ruling  clique.  Louis  XIV,  when 
he  said,  "I  am  the  State,"  spoke  the  truth,  for  his  per- 
sonal will  (though  of  course  largely  guided  by  his 


20  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

advisers)  was  supreme.  The  army  and  the  navy 
and  the  civil  service  were  his  own,  obeying  his  com- 
mands. All  over  Europe  it  was  the  sovereigns  who 
made  war  and  peace  at  their  own  pleasure,  not  con- 
sulting their  peoples.  Territories,  passing  by  rules  like 
those  which  in  every  country  determine  the  succession 
to  real  estate,  were  inherited,  conveyed  and  adminis- 
tered like  private  property.  Those  who  served  in  the 
army  and  navy  were  everywhere  regarded,  and  re- 
garded themselves,  as  being  the  servants  of  the  Crown. 
Kings  appointed  and  recalled  envoys  at  their  own 
sweet  will  and  pleasure,  and  kings  were  usually,  unless 
they  were  too  stupid  or  too  indolent,  the  directors  of 
their  own  foreign  policy.  But  in  the  course  of  the 
nineteenth  century  the  personal  power  of  the  Sov- 
ereign waned  everywhere,  and  what  was,  nominally 
at  least,  the  power  of  the  people  was  substituted,  until 
at  last  a  final  blow  was  given  to  this  system  by  the 
destruction  in  1918-19  of  the  three  great  empires  of 
Russia,  Austria,  and  Germany. 

The  other  new  phenomenon  arises  from  that  last 
mentioned.  It  is  the  growing  employment  of  what 
are  called  "propaganda  campaigns"  for  the  diffusion 
of  ideas  and  sentiments  among  peoples.  Nations,  or 
sections  of  a  nation,  or  sections  present  in  several 
nations  which  try  to  act  together,  endeavor  to  spread 
and  win  support  inside  or  outside  their  own  countries 
for  the  doctrines  which  they  unite  in  holding  and  wish 
to  diffuse  in  other  nations.  Religions  or  religious  sects 
have  often  done  this:  it  is  now  done  by  the  votaries 
of  political  or  economic  doctrines  also.  Propaganda 
has  this  peculiar  quality,  that  it  can  work  by  non-offi- 
cial methods  and  agencies  altogether  irrespective  of 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  IN  THE  PAST          21 

organized  governments.  Governments  can  resort  to  it, 
and  sometimes  do  so,  but  it  is  also  now  largely  used  by 
sections  of  nations,  and  can  be  so  used  to  any  extent. 
It  appeals  not  to  force,  but  to  opinion  or  prejudice. 
All  the  international  relations  that  we  have  been 
hitherto  considering  were  relations  of  force.  Propa- 
ganda is  a  war  on  opinion  by  opinion,  and  therefore  it 
is  or  may  be  at  the  same  time  a  means  of  spreading 
useful  opinion  and  a  danger  to  honest  opinion  while  al- 
ways a  tribute  to  the  power  of  popular  opinion.  Being 
an  effort  to  make  or  capture  opinion,  it  may  be  disin- 
terested, springing  from  a  sincere  faith  in  some  princi- 
ple, the  influence  of  which  its  votaries  seek  to  extend. 
But  it  may  be  used  in  a  less  worthy  spirit  by  any  group 
or  section  of  persons  who  have  their  own  and  possibly 
their  selfish  aims  in  view.  The  first  conspicuous  in- 
stance of  it  was  shown  in  the  proclamations  that  were 
issued  by  the  French  Revolutionary  leaders  in  the 
European  wars  from  1792  onward.  They  sought  to 
awaken  or  stimulate  opinion  against  despots  by 
preaching  in  Germany  and  Italy  the  glories  of  Liberty 
and  Equality.  Since  those  days  the  public  opinion  of 
the  civilized  peoples  in  general  has  become  a  powerful 
factor  in  international  politics,  sometimes  by  alarming 
those  rulers  of  any  particular  country  who  have  in- 
curred the  displeasure  of  the  bulk  of  opinion  in  other 
peoples,  sometimes  by  stimulating  a  minority  in  one 
country  to  greater  efforts  because  it  counts  upon  sup- 
port from  sympathizers  in  another  country.  Thus  the 
volume  of  opinion  which  in  Britain  was  shocked  hi 
1847-49  by  the  cruelties  perpetrated  by  the  Neapolitan 
government  on  political  prisoners,  and  which  there- 
after with  increasing  force  approved  the  efforts  of 


22  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

Italian  patriots  to  free  their  country  from  domestic 
tyranny  and  from  foreign  rule,  did  much  to  encourage 
those  patriots,  and  caused  whatever  influence  the 
British  government  at  any  moment  possessed  to  be 
usually  exerted  in  favor  of  Italian  freedom.  Even  as 
far  back  as  the  Congress  of  Vienna  in  1814-15,  and  the 
interchanges  of  views  and  plans  between  the  Great 
Powers  which  followed,  and  again  in  the  attitude  of 
George  Canning  and  President  Monroe  and  John 
Quincy  Adams  towards  the  insurgents  in  Spanish 
America  whom  the  Holy  Alliance  wished  to  help  Spain 
to  reduce  to  obedience,  the  liberal  sentiments  which 
prevailed  in  Britain  and  the  United  States  proved  to 
be  no  contemptible  factor  in  international  affairs,  for 
they  were  capable  of  influencing  the  action  of  their 
governments.  This  was  true  also  at  the  time  when 
Kossuth  pleaded  the  cause  of  the  Hungarian  people 
before  British  and  American  audiences  in  1850,  and 
during  the  years  when,  between  1858  and  1860,  the 
Austrians  and  the  petty  princes  of  Italy  were  being  ex- 
pelled from  their  dominions  in  that  country. 

Three  other  more  recent  illustrations  are  worth 
noting,  for  they  help  to  explain  three  kinds  of  propa- 
ganda which  are  being  employed  to-day,  different  in 
aims,  but  similar  in  method.  The  first  is  that  of  those 
revolutionaries  in  Continental  Europe  who,  rejecting 
patriotism  and  nationality,  seek  to  spread,  some  of 
them  Anarchist,  others  Communist  doctrines.  The 
former  hope  to  destroy  all  existing  States,  and  the 
very  notion  of  any  compulsory  power  vested  in  the 
State.  The  latter  propose  to  transform  all  existing 
States  by  turning  them  into  huge  industrial  coopera- 
tive societies  in  which  there  shall  be  no  property  and 
only  one  class,  the  so-called  Proletarian.  Both  these 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  IN  THE  PAST          23 

propagandas  justify  and  zealously  practice  the  use  of 
force,  but  both  aim  at  success  by  appealing  also  to 
opinion. 

Another  species  of  propaganda  is  ethnological,  a 
curious  recent  invention.  It  is  an  appeal  to  the  senti- 
ment of  racial  solidarity  in  a  people  which  is  politi- 
cally divided  up,  living  under  the  dominion  of  sev- 
eral States.  Pan-Slavism  used  to  be  preached  both 
in  Russia  itself  and  by  Russians  in  countries  with 
a  Slavonic  population,  such  as  Serbia  and  Bosnia, 
the  idea  being  that  all  the  Slavonic  peoples  should,  so 
far  as  possible,  unite  themselves  as  one  under  the 
patronage  of  Russia,  the  greatest  Slavonic  state.  The 
idea  of  what  is  called  Pan-Turanianism,  the  notion  of 
a  union  of  Asiatic  peoples  speaking  languages  of  an 
agglutinative  type,  such  peoples  as  Turks  and  other 
Tartars,  Kirghizes,  Kalmuks,  and  so  forth,  seems  to 
have  been  invented  by  some  German  savant  as  a 
weapon  to  be  used  against  Russia  as  well  as  against 
the  Christian  races  of  the  Near  East.  Some  few 
Germanized  Turks,  like  that  varnished  ruffian  Enver 
Bey,  tried  to  employ  it  in  the  Great  War,  but  as  far 
as  one  can  gather  it  has  been  pretty  nearly  crushed 
out  between  the  Communist  propaganda  of  the  Bol- 
•sheviks  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Pan-Islamic  propa- 
ganda of  the  Turks  on  the  other.  Pan-Islamism,  the 
third  kind  of  propaganda,  and  the  largest  and  the 
most  formidable,  is  an  attempt  to  renew  the  original 
aggressive  movement  of  the  Muslim  peoples  against 
the  Christian,  and  in  particular  to  strengthen  the 
Turkish  Sultan  by  exalting  him  as  Khalif  of  the  whole 
Mohammedan  world,  a  plan  due  to  the  restless  ambi- 
tion of  Abdul  Hamid,  who  tried  to  rehabilitate  an 
almost  extinct  title  and  claim  of  a  semi-religious  kind 


24  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

in  order  to  repair  the  Turkish  loss  of  military  strength, 
and  sent  his  emissaries  into  India  in  order  to  create  dis- 
affection to  the  British  Government,  which  had  begun 
to  press  him  for  better  treatment  of  the  Eastern 
Christians  under  his  abominable  rule. 

The  Khalif — literally  successor — is  not,  as  some  have 
sought  to  represent  him,  a  spiritual  authority  like  the 
Pope,  but  primarily  a  leader  of  Muslim  hosts  in  war 
and  a  leader  in  public  prayers  in  the  Mosque.  He  may 
be  deposed — and  Abdul  Hamid  was  in  fact  at  last  de- 
posed— for  a  breach  of  the  Sacred  Law. 

All  these  efforts,  official  and  non-official,  spring  out 
of  the  emancipation  of  the  masses  of  the  people  from 
the  control  of  their  former  rulers  and  the  consequent 
desire  to  capture  public  opinion.  It  has  now  become 
worth  while  to  appeal  to  the  peoples.  As  long  as  the 
monarchs  had  the  sole  or  even  the  usually  predominant, 
power,  it  was  not  the  peoples  that  were  thought  of, 
but  the  sovereigns.  That  is  to  say,  modern  propaganda 
is  an  attempt  to  turn  to  account  that  deliverance  of  the 
peoples  from  the  habit  of  unreasoning  obedience  which 
made  the  masses,  formerly  indifferent  to  politics, 
acquiescent  in  whatever  international  action  their 
Governments  chose  to  take.  All  the  kinds  of  propa- 
ganda described  resemble  one  another  in  transcending 
national  boundaries  and  in  creating  a  fanaticism  which 
may  be  just  as  unreasoning  as,  and  more  dangerous 
than,  obedience  used  to  be. 

I  have  referred  to  the  Congress  of  Vienna.  It,  and 
4he  Holy  Alliance  to  which  it  gave  birth,  deserve  a 
word  of  further  mention,  because  they  embody  yet  an- 
other attempt  to  create  a  system  for  the  prevention 
of  wars.  This  time  the  attempt  was  made  by  a  secular 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  IN  THE  PAST          25 

instead  of  an  ecclesiastical  authority,  but  it  was  made 
after  the  fall  of  Napoleon,  in  the  name  and  under  the 
then  dominant  influence  of  the  Emperor  Alexander  I 
of  Russia,  and  of  those  two  much  less  interesting  po- 
tentates, the  Emperor  of  Austria  and  the  King  of 
Prussia.  That  which  these  three  Emperors  proposed 
to  do  sounds  very  curious  when  read  to-day.  They 
declared  solemnly  before  the  world  that  they  "take  for 
their  sole  guide  the  precepts  of  justice,  Christian 
charity  and  peace  as  being  the  only  means  of  con- 
solidating human  institutions  and  remedying  their  im- 
perfections," with  much  more  to  the  like  effect;  and 
they  go  on  to  say  that  "they  will  themselves  put  these 
principles  in  practice  both  towards  their  subjects  and 
towards  one  another."  These  three  exalted  beings  who 
proposed  to  guide  the  world  to  justice  and  peace  were, 
in  fact,  very  fallible  human  creatures,  two  of  them  by 
no  means  models  of  virtue.  It  is  right  to  say  that  the 
Tsar  Alexander  had  a  quick  and  mobile  intelligence, 
and  also,  mingled  with  his  vanity,  a  really  philan- 
thropic spirit. 

How  the  Holy  Alliance  failed  you  all  know.  It  was 
based  upon  that  illusion  of  the  divine  right  of  kings 
which  had  in  the  sixteenth  century  replaced  the  older 
illusion  of  the  divine  commission  given  to  the  Roman 
Emperor,  and  it  was  an  illusion  which  would  have 
needed  angels  instead  of  weak  and  selfish  men  to  put 
its  principles  into  practice.  Intrigues  and  jealousies 
raged  among  the  members  of  the  Congress  at  Vienna, 
and  their  divergent  interests  soon  drew  them  apart. 
England,  which  had  never  been  a  member  of  the  Holy 
Alliance,  soon  found  herself  in  opposition  to  the  anti- 
liberal  policies  of  the  three  Emperors,  and  she,  acting 


26  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

with  the  United  States,  checked  their  plans  for  helping 
Spain  to  crush  her  revolting  colonists  and  reestablish 
despotism  in  the  New  World.  That  was  the  last  effort 
to  create  peace  on  the  basis  of  autocratic  doctrine 
thinly  disguised  under  the  robe  of  religion. 

To  complete  this  brief  sketch  of  the  Fifth  Period 
and  before  I  proceed  to  describe  the  existing  relations 
of  civilized  States,  some  few  sentences  may  be  given 
to  five  prominent  figures  who  did  most,  either  by  the 
work  they  achieved,  or  by  the  example  they  set,  to 
make  Europe  what  it  was  in  1914.  These  five  typify 
in  a  striking  manner  the  diverse  tendencies  that  were 
at  work  in  the  revolutionary  period  that  began  with 
1789  and  their  careers  show  how  greatly  individual  men 
affect  the  march  of  events. 

Of  these  international  men  two  were  ministers  of 
monarchies,  two  were  revolutionaries,  and  one  was 
both  a  revolutionary  and  a  monarch.  That  was  Na- 
poleon Bonaparte,  whose  place  in  modern  history 
would  be  as  great  as  that  of  Julius  CaBsar  in  ancient 
history  if  the  world  had  not  grown  so  much  wider  in 
the  seventeen  centuries  that  separated  the  Roman 
hero  from  the  Corsican.  Napoleon  changed  the  face 
of  European  politics  as  Caesar  had  done  when  he  con- 
quered Gaul,  when  he  impinged  upon  Germany  and 
Britain  and  assured  the  supremacy  of  Rome  around 
the  Mediterranean.  No  single  man  since  Dr.  Martin 
Luther  had  done  so  much  to  influence^,  the  march  of 
events  as  Bonaparte  did  between  his  first  Italian  cam- 
paign hi  1796  and  his  failure  against  Russia  in  1812.  In 
France  he  rebuilt  the  fabric  of  administration.  Clear- 
ing the  ground  in  Germany  and  Italy,  he  gave  a  death 
blow  to  what  remained  of  feudalism,  and  he  awakened 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  IN  THE  PAST          27 

the  peoples  to  a  desire  for  freedom  and  a  sense  of  na- 
tionality which  he  had  no  intention  to  inspire.  Show- 
ing what  might  be  effected  by  a  highly  trained  army 
in  the  hands  of  a  military  genius,  he  made  the  attain- 
ment of  a  world-dominion  seem  possible,  a  deadly 
ambition  to  implant  in  any  military  chief  or  militant 
nation  that  might  follow,  and  set  therewith  an  example 
of  an  absolute  disregard  of  good  faith  and  ruthless 
indifference  to  human  life  which  brought  the  standard 
of  international  conduct  to  a  point  almost  lower  than 
that  at  which  the  Prussian  Frederick  II  had  left  it. 
Not  only  did  the  victories  of  the  revolutionary  armies 
disclose  the  weakness  of  the  old  monarchies  and  de- 
prive them  of  the  respect  they  had  received  from  their 
subjects,  but  the  monarchs  themselves  lost  moral  au- 
thority as  persons.  The  subjects  saw  the  selfishness 
and  turpitude  of  those  who  as  heads  of  ancient  and 
famous  dynasties  had  been  credited  with  a  sense  of 
dignity  and  honor,  and  the  glamor  of  reverence  faded. 
The  Corsican  adventurer  had  torn  the  veil  away,  and 
sovereigns  had  grovelled  before  him. 

The  second  great  figure  is  Bismarck.  He,  too,  was 
daring,  and  successful  by  his  daring;  almost  as  un- 
scrupulous in  his  methods  as  Napoleon,  though  far 
more  unselfish  in  his  aims,  and  rather  less  false  in  his 
dealings.  Superior  to  Napoleon  in  his  perception  of 
what  was  and  what  was  not  attainable,  he  effected  the 
unification  of  Germany  and  created  afresh  the  domin- 
ance of  Prussia  by  sagacious  foresight  and  by  a  skilful 
use  of  the  sentiment  of  national  pride,  using  alternately 
an  adroit  diplomacy  and  an  overwhelming  military 
force.  Though  he  never  concealed  his  contempt  for 
constitutional  doctrines  and  the  rights  of  legislatures 


28  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

his  services  to  the  nation  made  him  popular,  and  justi- 
fied his  methods  in  the  nation's  eyes.  But — and  here 
again  he  may  be  compared  to  Napoleon — he  did  a  dis- 
service to  his  own  country  by  the  pernicious  precedents 
he'  set.  Those  traditions  of  unscrupulous  craft  which, 
practiced  by  Frederick  II,  Bismarck  inaugurated  afresh 
and  invested  with  the  fascination  of  success,  captivated 
the  mind  of  his  nation.  The  men  into  whose  weaker 
hands  the  conduct  of  policy  fell  imitated  his  boldness 
but  forgot  his  prudence,  because  they  had  not  his  gift 
for  grasping  the  totality  of  the  European  situation. 
But  though  much  of  the  work  which  Bismarck  accom- 
plished by  his  diplomatic  arts  was  undone  by  his  suc- 
cessors, it  is  probable  that  in  the  future  the  chief  part 
of  it  may  remain,  and  it  is  also  possible  that  in  the 
future  his  example  may  become  a  warning  instead  of 
a  lure. 

The  three  other  international  men  who  adorned  the 
last  generation  must  not  be  forgotten.  Cavour  was  a 
practical  statesman,  not  inferior  to  Bismarck  in  his 
power  of  seeing  what  was  possible  and  in  choosing  the 
means  to  compass  it.  He,  more  than  any  other  states- 
man, brought  about  the  unity  of  Italy,  doing  his  work 
in  a  patriotic  spirit,  not  without  guile — he  confessed  it 
himself — but  perhaps  with  no  more  guile  than  the 
character  of  Louis  Napoleon  and  the  other  men  he 
had  to  deal  with  might  seem  to  excuse. 

Kossuth,  too,  like  Cavour,  was  a  patriot,  and  would 
have  created  or  re-created  a  free  Hungary  but  for  the 
irresistible  horde  of  Russian  invaders  launched  against 
her  by  the  Tsar  Nicholas  I.  Old  men  among  you  in 
America  can  still  remember  the  impression  which  the 
stately  presence  and  impassioned  eloquence  of  the 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  IN  THE  PAST          29 

exiled  Hungarian  leader  made  upon  them  as  upon 
English  audiences.  I  remember  very  well  the  en- 
thusiasm aroused  in  Glasgow  by  a  speech  he  made 
there  hi  1850.  And  late  hi  life,  when  he  was  past 
eighty  years  of  age,  I  saw  him  again,  and  admired 
afresh  his  undimmed  intellectual  force  and  the  old  air 
of  lofty  dignity. 

Mazzini,  whom  also  it  was  my  privilege  to  know, 
was  an  idealist,  far  higher  in  quality  than  most  states- 
men and  with  a  greater  power  of  influencing  men 
through  their  best  emotions  than  most  idealists  have 
had.  He  appealed  to  the  deepest  feelings  and  stirred 
the  noblest  hopes  of  his  countrymen,  preaching  a 
gospel  of  liberty  and  a  brotherhood  of  peace  among 
the  peoples  whom  he  sought  to  liberate.  His  amis 
were  not  attained  in  the  form  he  desired.  Well  do  I 
recall  the  vehemence  with  which  he  insisted  that  the 
monarchy  of  the  House  of  Savoy,  which  had  already, 
when  I  saw  him,  embraced  all  Italy  except  Rome, 
could  never  accomplish  for  Italy  what  he  believed  a 
republic  would  accomplish.  The  behavior  of  the  free 
peoples  under  republican  as  well  as  under  monarchical 
forms  has  not  verified  Mazzini's  hopes,  but  the  impulse 
he  gave  supplied  the  motive  power  which  the  practical 
statesmen  like  Cavour  employed,  and  his  writings  may 
yet  help  to  inspire  some  later  generation. 

I  note  the  careers  of  these  men  as  instances  to  show 
how  large  is  the  unpredictable  element  in  the  field  of 
international  as  well  as  in  that  of  domestic  politics. 
Modern  writers  claiming  to  be  scientific  try  to  repre- 
sent general  causes  as  everything  and  the  individual 
great  man  as  no  more  than  some  particular  being  in 
whom  the  general  tendencies  of  an  age  find  practical 


30  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

expression.  "If  these  tendencies,"  they  say,  "had  not 
been  embodied  in  Bonaparte  or  in  Bismarck  or  in 
Cavour,  they  would  equally  well  have  been  embodied  in 
and  given  force  to  some  other  personality."  History 
contradicts  that  assumption.  The  man  who  gives  ef- 
fect to  the  tendencies  may  make  all  the  difference,  and 
the  coming  of  the  man  is  unpredictable.  Crises  arrive 
when  some  leader  in  the  sphere  of  thought,  like  Maz- 
zini,  or  in  the  sphere  of  action,  like  Bismarck,  is  needed 
to  personify  and  carry  to  success  the  effort  an  age 
seems  to  be  making.  Sometimes  the  man  appears,  but 
far  more  frequently  the  man  does  not  appear  and  that 
which  he  might  have  done  is  not  achieved.  Had  there 
been  no  Bismarck  and  no  Mazzini  we  should  have  seen 
to-day  a  very  different  Europe.  Had  there  been  Bis- 
marcks  and  Cavours  and  Mazzinis  since  A.D.  1900  we 
should  have  seen  a  very  different  Europe  to-day.  All 
calculations,  all  predictions  must  leave  a  wide  margin 
for  the  influence  which  the  presence  of  some  powerful 
personality  may  exert.  The  fact  that  the  ultimate 
source  of  power  resides  in  the  people  often  obscures  the 
fact  that  in  all  political  action,  and  especially  in  foreign 
relations,  the  people  as  a  whole — I  say  this  less  of  your 
country  than  I  say  it  of  Europe,  but  there  is  some  truth 
in  it  everywhere — in  all  political  action,  and  especially 
in  foreign  relations,  the  masses  of  the  people  have  com- 
paratively little  knowledge  and  even  less  initiative. 
Broadly  speaking,  the  people  are  what  their  leaders 
make  them.  Under  every  political  constitution  that 
has  ever  been  devised  the  Many  are  inspired  and  led 
by  the  Few.  Indeed,  the  larger  the  mass,  the  fewer 
are  those  to  whom  it  looks  and  whom  it  follows,  for 
the  less  the  mass  knows  of  the  real  facts  and  the  really 


INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS  IN  THE  PAST          31 

significant  issues,  the  more  must  it  depend  on  promi- 
nent individual  men  for  guidance;  and  the  fewer  are 
the  prominent  figures  that  can  be  watched  and  judged. 
How  are  the  people  to  judge  of  the  men  whom  they 
are  to  trust  and  follow  unless  they  can  constantly 
watch  them?  How  can  the  people  watch  them  unless 
they  have  time  to  do  so?  How  can  the  people  judge 
of  their  actions  in  foreign  relations  unless  they  under- 
stand those  foreign  relations  themselves  and  see 
whether  the  men  are  guiding  wisely  or  not?  Never- 
theless, however  little  international  issues  are  within 
the  knowledge  of  the  Average  Man,  the  Average  Man 
must  trust  somebody.  In  a  wood  any  trail  is  better 
than  no  trail  at  all,  for  it  promises  to  lead  you  out 
somewhere.  He  who  scrambles  wildly  over  the  rocks 
and  through  the  thick  bushes  may  go  round  and  round 
and  arrive  nowhere.  When  one  traverses  after  night- 
fall a  dangerous  mountain  path  the  local  peasant  who 
knows  something  about  the  path  must  be  followed, 
whatever  the  risks.  He  may  miss  his  way,  he  may 
conceivably  wish  to  lead  you  astray,  but  if  you  have 
no  knowledge  of  your  own,  it  is  safer  to  follow  him 
rather  than  grope  in  the  dark  among  precipices. 
European  peoples,  as  we  shall  presently  see,  have  been 
groping  in  the  dark  for  the  last  three  years,  and  their 
relations  to  one  another  during  and  since  the  War  have 
been  left  to  a  few  guides.  How  these  guides  attempted 
to  deal  with  these  relations,  and  with  what  success, 
we  must  now  proceed  to  inquire. 

I  shall  endeavor  in  the  next  lecture  to  give  you  some 
few  facts  regarding  the  political  condition  of  the  Old 
World  States  at  the  beginning  of  the  Great  War  and 
at  its  end  also,  so  far  as  it  can  be  said  to  have  ended, 


32  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

and  we  shall  then  have  some  materials  for  judging 
whether  the  wisdom  with  which  international  relations 
need  to  be  handled  has  grown  with  the  progress  of  the 
years. 


LECTURE  II 

THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS. 

THE  last  lecture  brought  us  down  to  our  time,  that 
is,  to  the  beginning  of  the  Great  War  in  1914.  Let  us 
now  see  what  were  the  events  and  the  forces  that  had 
led  or  driven  Europe  to  the  verge  of  the  abyss  into 
which  her  nations  plunged  in  that  awful  year.  The 
plunge  was  sudden,  but  the  propulsive  forces  had  been 
long  at  work.  The  direct  occasion  and  proximate 
cause  of  the  war  was  the  murder  of  the  Archduke 
Francis  Ferdinand  at  Sarajevo,  followed  by  the  ulti- 
matum which  the  Austrian  Government  delivered  to 
the  Serbian;  but  the  real  sources  of  strife  lay  deeper 
and  the  study  of  them  must  begin  by  a  study  of  the 
conditions  hi  Germany,  which  had  been  since  the  days 
of  Charles  V  the  political  centre  of  Europe.  The 
mighty  German  nation  which  had  so  recently  as  1871 
become  one  State  had  come  to  hold  a  position  which  af- 
fected the  relations  of  all  the  other  countries  to  one 
another.  The  Napoleonic  wars  had  shattered  its  an- 
cient and  outworn  territorial  arrangements,  and  it 
found  itself  in  the  year  1848,  the  Year  of  Revolutions 
— which  some  of  you  may  be  old  enough  to  remember 
— and  down  till  1864,  when  the  war  of  the  Germanic 
Confederation  against  Denmark  opened  a  new  era, 
divided  into  two  groups  or  sections,  the  Germanic  parts 
of  Austria,  with  a  number  of  the  minor  States,  forming 
one  group,  calling  themselves  the  "Great  Germans" 

33 


34  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

(Grosse  Deutscheri),  while  the  other  group,  headed  by 
Prussia,  including  others  of  the  minor  States,  were 
called  by  their  opponents  the  "Little  Germans,"  i.e., 
those  who  held  that  a  united  German  State  would  get 
on  better  with  Austria  outside  it  rather  than  within 
it.  The  growing  passion  for  National  Unity,  no 
less  than  the  ambitions  of  the  Prussian  king  and 
aristocracy,  who  protested  against  the  leadership 
claimed  by  the  Hapsburg  dynasty,  more  ancient  but 
more  sluggish  and  unprogressive  than  the  Prussian 
Hohenzollerns,  led  to  the  war  of  1866,  which  brought 
about,  along  with  the  exclusion  of  Austria  from  Ger- 
many, the  break-up  of  the  Germanic  Confederation 
and  the  creation  of  a  North  German  League  dominated 
by  Prussia.  Though  this  League  was  a  matter  of  purely 
German  concern,  against  which  other  Powers  had  no 
right  to  protest,  Louis  Napoleon,  supported  for  once 
by  French  opinion  as  a  whole,  saw  in  it  a  menace  to 
France,  which  feared  the  creation  of  a  great  State 
whose  army  had  shown,  in  its  brilliant  victories  over 
Austria,  the  amazing  military  efficiency  it  had  attained. 
The  old  suspicions  which  the  German  and  French  peo- 
ples had  entertained  of  one  another  as  far  back  as  the 
days  when  Louis  XIV  seized  Alsace  were  suddenly  in- 
tensified. It  was  this  alarm  which  France  felt  at  the 
rise  of  a  formidable  neighbor,  together  with  the  con- 
comitant belief  in  Germany  that  Louis  Napoleon  was 
contemplating  an  attack  upon  Prussia  before  she  had 
completely  absorbed  the  other  German  States,  that 
precipitated  the  war  of  1870. 

Well  remembering  the  events  of  that  fateful  year, 
in  the  autumn  of  which  I  was  traveling  in  America,  I 
feel  able  to  say  that  both  in  the  United  States  and  in 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  35 

England  the  French  Emperor,  long  deemed  the  dis- 
turber of  the  peace  of  Europe,  was  regarded  as  the 
aggressor,  and  that  in  consequence  the  sympathy  of 
the  large  majority  of  Englishmen  and  of  Americans 
went  with  Germany  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  In 
1914  most  Englishmen  and  Americans  had  forgotten 
these  facts,  and  they  saw  in  the  behavior  of  the  Prus- 
sian Government  in  1870  only  an  anticipation  of  the 
action  of  that  Government  in  1914,  totally  different 
as  the  circumstances  were  on  the  two  occasions.  For 
a  decade  before  1870  American  and  English  Liberals 
looking  upon  Louis  Napoleon  as  the  standing  danger  to 
the  peace  of  Europe  expected  his  overthrow  to  usher 
in  an  era  of  tranquillity.  Italy  had  been  unified,  her 
national  aspirations  satisfied,  all  was  going  well  with 
her.  Might  not  the  same  happy  result  be  expected 
from  the  recognition  of  the  principle  of  nationality  in 
Germany? 

This  difference  between  the  two  outbreaks  of  war 
needs  to  be  remembered.  English  Liberals,  drawing 
a  parallel  between  the  cases  of  Germany  and  Italy, 
they  extended  the  same  sympathy  to  the  desire  of  the 
Germans  to  be  united  in  a  single  free  State  that  they 
had  long  been  giving  to  a  similar  effort  in  Italy. 
Liberal  principles  had  been  making  way  in  Germany 
up  to  1864  and  seemed  likely  to  gain  further  strength. 
Why  should  France  fear  a  free  Germany?  This  was 
also  the  general  sentiment  in  America.  Few,  if  any, 
foresaw  the  course  things  were  destined  to  take.  Who 
could  have  supposed  that  German  liberalism  would 
wither  away  under  the  influence  of  victories  and  the 
military  spirit  victories  fostered? 

How  fallible  are  the  human  judgments  even  when 


36  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

those  from  whom  they  proceed  are  impartial  specta- 
tors! When  in  1871,  at  the  end  of  the  war,  Germany 
took  away  from  France  Alsace  and  part  of  Lorraine, 
a  new  and  abiding  source  of  hostility  was  created. 
Though  the  great  bulk  of  the  population  of  Alsace 
was  Teutonic  in  blood  and  speech,  the  annexation  was 
unwelcome  even  to  the  bulk  of  the  Teutonic  element. 
Yet  it  might,  perhaps,  have  in  course  of  tune  been  ac- 
quiesced in  by  the  Alsatians  had  not  the  German 
Government  committed  two  fatal  errors  after  the  an- 
nexation. Its  severe  rule  in  Alsace  kept  the  in- 
habitants disaffected,  and,  knowing  that  France  would 
seek  to  recover  the  lost  provinces,  it  from  time  to  tune 
threatened  her  and  sometimes,  as  in  1875,  seemed  to 
contemplate  armed  aggression.  This,  coupled  with  the 
rapid  growth  of  population  and  wealth  in  Germany, 
drove  France  to  seek  support  elsewhere.  She  found 
it  in  Russia,  which  had  become  alienated  from  Ger- 
many after  the  fall  of  Bismarck,  while  the  German 
Government,  after  it  had  lost  Russian  friendship, 
strengthened  itself  by  alliances  with  Austria  and  Italy. 
All  these  five  Powers  went  on  increasing  their  armies 
by  imposing  a  practically  universal  compulsory  service 
on  their  inhabitants,  and  when  Germany  began  to 
create  a  strong  navy,  England,  in  which  there  had  been 
theretofore  no  antagonism  to  the  Germans,  took  alarm 
and  set  about  increasing  her  fleet,  conceiving  that  as 
she  had  only  a  very  small  army  and  did  not  produce 
enough  grain  to  feed  her  people,  she  must  make  herself 
absolutely  safe  against  invasion  and  against  the  risk  of 
a  blockade  which  might  starve  her  people.  Attempts 
made  to  bring  about  an  intermission  of  the  building 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  37 

of  warships  failed,  and  suspicion  became  in  both  coun- 
tries more  acute. 

Before  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  enor- 
mous expansion  of  naval  and  military  armaments  was 
not  only  beginning  to  drain  the  resources  of  the  six 
great  nations,  but  was  keeping  them  in  a  state  of 
perpetual  anxiety.  Attempts  were  made  at  two  Hague 
Conferences  to  reduce  this  tension,  and  to  provide 
better  means  for  the  settling  of  international  disputes. 
These  seemed  to  promise  a  measure  of  success,  but  the 
causes  which  made  France  and  Russia  suspicious  of 
German  and  Austrian  designs  were  not  such  as  any 
Court  of  Arbitration  could  deal  with,  for  they  raised 
no  legal  or  so-called  "justiciable"  issues;  nor  could 
any  mediation  induce  either  the  Russian  or  the  Aus- 
trian Government  to  agree  to  a  scheme  which  would 
remove  the  causes  of  trouble  which  distracted  South- 
eastern Europe,  where  rival  nations — Serbs,  Bulgars, 
Greeks  and  Rumans — had  each  its  aspirations  and 
found  in  Austria  or  in  Russia  support  for  its 
claims. 

The  tension  remained.  Europe  found  itself  on  the 
edge  of  a  catastrophe,  and  at  last  the  catastrophe  came 
out  of  an  event — the  murder  of  the  heir  to  the  throne 
of  Austria — which  was  the  work  of  a  group  of  irre- 
sponsible ruffians.  That  which  had  been  making  the 
crash  inevitable  was  the  mind — or  rather,  perhaps,  the 
temper  and  nervous  excitability — of  the  parties  con- 
cerned. The  growth  of  armies  had  produced  a  large 
military  and  naval  caste,  a  great  profession  in  which 
the  habit  of  thinking  about  war  had  in  some  countries 
grown  to  be  a  mental  obsession,  almost  a  disease.  The 


38  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

building  up  of  huge  armies  and  navies  had  created  the 
desire  to  use  them.  Shakespeare  has  said : 

"How  oft  the  sight  of  means  to  do  ill  deeds 
Makes  ill  deeds  done." 

It  was  natural  that  Generals  and  Admirals  always 
occupied  with  drilling  and  manoeuvres  and  the  study 
of  battles  and  campaigns  should  grow  weary  of  waiting 
for  an  opportunity  that  seemed  never  to  arrive  of 
turning  their  knowledge  to  account  and  putting  their 
theories  to  the  test  of  practice.  They  were  like  dogs 
trained  to  hunt  but  kept  always  on  the  leash.  Would 
you  be  surprised  if  a  football  team  constantly  practis- 
ing, but  never  allowed  by  the  college  authorities  to  go 
forth  to  contend  against  another  team  from  another 
college,  should  some  day  break  loose  and  seek  out  an- 
tagonists equally  impatient?  So  long  as  powerful 
naval  and  military  castes  exist,  it  will  be  hard  to  keep 
down  armaments. 

The  narrow  avoidance  of  war  on  several  occasions 
had  left  the  governments  and  the  military  castes  not 
more,  but  from  year  to  year  less  pacific  in  spirit,  for 
there  was  no  will  to  peace.  Any  spark  was  enough  to 
fire  the  train.  Fear,  moreover,  was  added.  Russia 
and  Germany  each  feared  the  other,  each  dreaded  a 
sudden  attack  by  the  other.  Let  us  allow  to  the  Ger- 
mans the  benefit  of  that  consideration.  They  really 
were  in  bona  fide  terror  of  what  Russia  might  do  and 
thought  that  their  chance  was  to  strike  at  Russia  be- 
fore the  onslaught  which  they  certainly  expected  from 
her  had  actually  materialized.  Each  Government  was 
supported  by  the  mass  of  popular  opinion.  Each  felt 
impelled  to  strike  before  the  enemy  whose  attack  it 
feared  had  carried  preparations  further. 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  39 

After  the  War  came  the  settlement  by  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  victorious  Powers  assembled  at  Paris, 
not  a  fortunate  spot  for  the  deliberations  on  which 
they  were  entering.  Of  them  and  of  the  methods  they 
employed  this  is  not  the  place  or  the  time  to  speak. 
You  have  all  read  the  books  which  have  been  written, 
both  about  the  war  and  about  the  negotiations  at  Paris. 
You  have  believed  some  things  and  you  have  dis- 
counted other  things.  This  certainly  may  be  said: 
The  work  that  was  done  by  the  representatives  of  the 
Powers  assembled  at  Paris  has  received  in  Europe  little 
but  censure.  There  are  some  people  who  like  some 
parts  of  the  treaties,  but  I  know  of  no  person  who  has 
ever  praised  any  treaty  as  a  whole ;  indeed  there  seems 
to  be  no  treaty  that  has  not  received  far  more  blame 
than  praise  from  any  competent  authority.  Comparing 
these  treaties  negotiated  at  Paris  with  those  which  were 
framed  by  the  Congress  of  Vienna  in  1814-15,  Euro- 
pean critics — I  am  not  here  giving  my  own  opinions, 
but  trying  to  represent  to  you  what  one  hears  from  all 
parts  of  Europe — European  critics  observe  that  the 
men  at  Vienna, — the  Tsar  Alexander,  Metternich, 
Hardenberg,  Castlereagh,  Talleyrand  and  the  rest  of 
them, — may  have  had  bad  principles  and  employed 
despotic  methods  and  disregarded  or  misconceived  the 
interests  of  their  peoples,  but  at  any  rate  they  knew 
what  they  were  doing  and  they  gave  effect  to  their 
principles.  Their  work,  after  all,  bad  as  it  was,  be- 
stowed upon  Europe  a  tolerable  peace  which  lasted  for 
more  than  thirty  years.  But  there  is  not  one  of  the 
treaties  of  1919-20  which  is  not  already  admitted  to 
need  amendments.  Some  are  utterly  condemned  by 
results  already  visible.  Some  are  seen  to  be  leading 


40  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

straight  to  future  wars.  One  hears  people  say  all  over 
Europe:  "The  sort  of  peace  that  these  negotiations 
have  given  us  is  just  as  bad  as  war." 

With  these  strictures  and  with  many  others  you  are 
familiar,  and  you  will  judge  for  yourselves  how  far 
they  are  deserved.  But  let  a  word  be  said  in  extenua- 
tion, indicating  reasons  why  some  compassion  should 
be  shown  to  these  much-criticised  plenipotentiaries. 
Let  us  as  against  these  severe  judgments  give  con- 
sideration to  the  difficulties  which  faced  the  negotia- 
tors at  Paris.  The  men  at  Vienna  had  a  common 
ground  in  their  faith  in  monarchical  principles  and  in 
their  reliance  upon  military  force  to  carry  out  their 
principles.  They  had  only  monarchs  to  consider,  not 
peoples,  and  they  could  do  what  they  thought  best  for 
the  interest  of  those  whom  they  served.  But  the  ne- 
gotiators of  Paris  differed  in  their  principles  and  ideas, 
and  not  all  of  them  seem  to  have  believed  in  the  princi- 
ples they  professed.  Some  European  critics  have  sug- 
gested that  there  were  among  them  persons  who 
thought  that  they  must  play  down  to  their  own 
electorates  and  regard  not  altogether  what  ought  to  be 
done  but  also — perhaps  even  more — what  would  ad- 
vantage them  in  their  next  electoral  campaign. 
Popular  prejudices,  popular  passions  and  cupidities, 
had  to  be  humored  or  gratified. 

Moreover — and  this  is  an  excuse  which  must  not  be 
lightly  brushed  aside — the  task  before  them  was  one 
of  unprecedented  difficulty.  New  States  had  to  be 
created,  territories  redistributed,  indemnities  secured, 
and  all  upon  a  scale  incomparably  greater  than  any 
international  conference  or  congress  had  ever  before 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  41 

attempted  to  deal  with.  A  task  so  great  needed  not 
politicians  of  the  usual  type,  but  persons  of  the  quali- 
ties which  it  is  the  fashion  to  call  those  of  the  Super- 
man. We  are  all  supposed  to  know,  vaguely  at  least, 
what  the  Superman  is.  Taking  the  term  in  its  best 
sense,  Supermen  were  needed — men  who  possessed 
wide  vision,  with  a  calm  judgment  raised  above  the 
revengeful  passions  of  the  moment,  men  loving  justice 
and  seeking  for  justice,  looking  beyond  the  present  to 
the  future,  seeking  the  good  of  mankind  as  well  as  the 
temporary  advantage  of  their  respective  nations;  men 
who  were  able  to  appreciate  the  workings  of  those  bet- 
ter forces  which  alone  can  bring  peace  and  reconcile- 
ment to  a  distracted  world.  Such  men  did  not  appear. 
Why  should  they  have  appeared?  Why  should  they 
have  been  expected?  There  is  no  saying  more  false  than 
that  which  declares  that  the  Hour  brings  the  Man.  The 
Hour  many  and  many  a  tune  has  failed  to  bring  the 
Man,  and  never  was  that  truth  more  seen  than  in  the 
last  seven  years. 

To  describe  the  existing  relations  between  the 
Great  States  of  the  Old  World  as  settled  by  the  Paris 
Conference — for  I  leave  their  proposals  for  securing 
the  future  peace  of  the  world  and  their  scheme  of 
Mandates  to  be  considered  later — it  is  convenient  to 
begin  with  the  four  great  Empires  which  were  between 
1914  and  1919  either  destroyed  or  divided,  viz.:  Russia, 
Germany,  Austria  and  Turkey,  and  to  explain  what  is 
the  attitude  to  one  another  and  to  their  neighbors  in 
which  each  of  the  States  now  created  out  of  these  four 
Empires  stands.  My  aim  is  to  convey  to  you,  in  the 
briefest  outline,  an  impression  of  the  position  in  which 


42  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

the  European  peoples  find  themselves,  of  the  feelings 
they  entertain  towards  one  another  and  of  the  conse- 
quences to  be  expected  from  these  feelings.  Do  their 
emotions  tend  towards  war  or  towards  peace,  or  shall 
we  see  prolongation  of  that  intermediate  state  of 
suspicion  and  preparation  for  war  which  is  almost  as 
bad  as  actual  conflict? 

First,  a  word  as  to  Germany,  which  though  reduced 
in  area  is  still  Germany,  still  a  mighty  nation,  full  of  in- 
tellectual force  united  by  a  strong  national  sentiment. 
Germany,  which  continues  to  call  herself  the  Reich 
(the  Realm),  albeit  now  a  republic  instead  of  a  mon- 
archy, is  the  most  populous  of  European  countries  after 
Russia,  with  inhabitants  industrious  as  well  as  highly 
educated  and  with  great  productive  industries.  Be- 
tween her  and  France  the  ancestral  antagonism,  dating 
back  to  the  day  of  Louis  XIV's  aggressions,  is  now 
more  bitter  than  ever,  and  seems  likely  to  last  in 
France  as  long  as  the  French  generation  lives  which 
remembers  the  devastations  wrought  in  1918  by  the  re- 
tiring German  armies,  and  to  last  in  Germany  at  least 
as  long  as  her  government  continues  to  pay  immense 
sums  in  reparations  and  indemnities  for  the  losses 
which  the  Allies  suffered  in  the  war.  Dissatisfaction 
has  been  freely  expressed  in  France  that  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  did  not  detach  from  the  German  realm  and 
assign  to  France  all  the  German-speaking  lands  west 
of  the  Rhine.  It  is  argued  that  their  possession 
would  have  secured  to  the  French  strategic  advantages, 
as  well  as  the  industrial  benefits  which  the  soil 
and  the  minerals  of  those  lands  offered.  But  it  may 
be  doubted  whether  France  would  not  have  suffered 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  43 

more  politically  than  she  could  have  gained  materially 
by  a  repetition  of  the  error  which  Germany  committed 
when  she  annexed  Alsace  and  part  of  Lorraine  in  1871, 
for  the  population  of  the  Germanic  territory  taken 
would  have  been  disaffected,  and  no  German  would 
have  ceased  to  plan  and  work  for  the  recovery  of  what 
are,  upon  the  principle  of  nationality,  purely  German 
lands.  Some  have  argued  that  as  France  desired  to 
keep  Germany  weak  lest  she  should  again  become 
formidable,  it  might  have  been  a  more  promising 
policy  to  dismember  the  Realm  in  the  hope  that  dis- 
memberment would  revive  the  old  "particularistic" 
spirit  among  the  German  populations,  and  thus  keep 
the  Southern  States,  such  as  Bavaria,  Saxony  and 
Wiirtemberg,  from  seeking  reunion  with  the  other  Ger- 
man regions.  Plans  were  suggested  by  which  the  ex- 
periment might  have  been  tried,  though  clearly  op- 
posed as  it  was  to  the  principles  enounced  in  the  well 
known  Fourteen  Points.  But  there  was  little  prospect 
of  ultimate  success  before  it. 

This  war  has  shown  one  unprecedented  feature, 
painful  in  the  prospect  it  opens.  The  victors  bear  as 
much  resentment  against  the  vanquished  as  the  van- 
quished do  against  the  victors.  I  say  "unprecedented," 
for  I  can  recall  no  similar  case,  though  not  venturing 
to  say  that  none  has  existed.  There  is  no  blacker 
cloud,  pregnant  with  future  storm,  hanging  over 
Europe  now  than  that  which  darkens  the  banks  of  the 
Rhine.  Not  even  after  Jena  in  1806,  not  even  after 
Gravelotte  and  Sedan,  and  the  capitulation  of  Paris  in 
1871,  has  the  prospect  of  reconcilement  between  the 
two  neighbor  peoples  seemed  so  distant.  All  the  gov- 


44  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

ernments  committed  grave  strategic  and  still  graver 
political  errors  during  the  war,  but  none  seems  likely  to 
prove  more  deplorable  in  its  results  than  the  devasta- 
tion ordered  by  the  German  High  Command  while  its 
armies  were  retreating  in  1918. 

Into  the  tangled  question  of  indemnities  and  their 
mode  of  payment  I  will  not  enter.  Enough  to  say  that 
though  everyone  agrees  that  the  claim  to  indemnities 
is  based  on  principles  not  contested  and  often  applied 
before,  it  remains  doubtful  what  will  be  Germany's 
ability  to  pay. 

The  name  "Austria"  has  now,  by  the  dissolution  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy,  returned  to  its 
original  meaning  as  denoting  the  two  archduchies  of 
Upper  and  Lower  Austria  (the  East  March  of  the  old 
Romano-Germanic  Empire  in  the  eleventh  century), 
to  which  were  added  later  Styria,  Carinthia,  Carniola, 
Tirol  and  Salzkammergut.  These  countries,  largely 
mountainous,  do  not  provide  sufficient  food  for  their  in- 
habitants, and  have  little  beyond  timber  and  some  min- 
erals to  export.  Productive  manufacturing  industry 
was  concentrated  in  Vienna,  which  supplied  goods  to 
all  parts  of  the  Monarchy,  as  well  as  (in  some  lines  of 
trade,  such  as  glass  and  fine  leather  work  and  up- 
holstery) to  foreign  countries  also.  Before  the  peace 
negotiations  began  at  Versailles,  the  non-German  parts 
of  the  Austrian  dominions  had  revolted.  Bohemia  and 
Moravia  were  predominantly  Czech  in  population, 
Croatia,  Dalmatia,  Bosnia,  half  of  Istria  and  Carniola 
were  Slavonic,  as  was  Galicia  also.  The  Treaty  of  St. 
Germain  made  with  Austria  recognized  these  ac- 
complished facts,  which  were  in  accordance  with  the 
principles  of  nationality,  and  proceeded  to  determine 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  45 

the  frontiers  of  the  greatly  reduced  Austria  (now  a  Re- 
public) and  of  the  new  republics  which  were  creating 
themselves  out  of  the  large  so-called  Austria,  or  rather 
Austrian  half  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy, 
which  had  existed  before  1914.  In  the  case  of  the  re- 
public of  Czecho-Slovakia,  the  boundaries  of  the  an- 
cient kingdom  of  Bohemia  were  adhered  to  on  the 
North  and  Southwest,  although  such  a  frontier  in- 
cludes several  millions  of  men  who  speak  German  and 
deem  themselves  Germans.  This  departure  from  the 
principle  of  nationality  may,  perhaps,  be  defended  on 
the  ground  both  of  antiquity  and  of  the  difficulty  of  de- 
parting from  the  so-called  "natural  frontier"  which  is 
indicated  by  the  mountain  masses  of  the  Riesen 
Gebirge  on  the  Northeast,  of  the  Erz  Gebirge  on  the 
Northwest,  and  the  Bohmer  Wald  on  the  South;  and 
Professor  Masaryk,  the  President  of  the  Czecho- 
slovak Republic,  one  of  the  three  great  men  whom 
the  war  has  brought  to  the  front,  and  a  man  whose 
declarations  may  be  trusted,  has  declared  the  wish  of 
his  State  to  treat,  as  it  will  be  true  wisdom  for  it  to  do, 
the  German  element  with  full  friendliness  and  justice. 
It  is,  nevertheless,  possible  that  difficulties  may  here- 
after arise  from  the  desire  of  that  element  to  be  added 
to  their  Germanic  brethren  on  the  other  side  of  the 
mountains.  In  Carinthia,  where  the  German  popula- 
tion is  mingled  with  a  Slavonic  (Slovene)  population, 
the  expedient  of  a  popular  vote  or  so-called  Plebiscite 
was  fitly  resorted  to,  under  the  supervision  of  persons 
appointed  by  the  Allies  and  the  expression  by  the  ma- 
jority of  its  wish  to  be  included  in  Austria  has  been 
judiciously  respected. 
The  third  question  that  arose  related  to  the  frontiers 


46  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

of  Austria  and  Italy.  Italy  may  well  be  held  entitled 
to  claim  that  the  territories  which  lay  along  the  Carnic 
or  so-called  Dolomite  Alps,  away  to  the  northeast  of 
Venice,  should  be  included  within  her  limits,  because, 
although  those  territories  contain  a  certain  Slavonic 
element,  the  line  of  the  Carnic  Alps  does  furnish  a  con- 
venient defensible  frontier,  and  the  possession  by  a 
possibly  hostile  Power  of  districts  on  the  Italian  slope 
had  long  constituted  a  menace  to  Italy. 

But  now  we  come  to  another  and  very  different  case. 
That  is  the  case  of  Tirol.  The  territory  which  used  to 
stand  on  our  maps  as  Tirol  consisted  of  two  parts,  one, 
the  old  County  (Grafschaft)  of  Tirol  (so  called  from 
an  ancient  castle  near  Meran),  which  passed  by  in- 
heritance to  the  Hapsburg  family  in  A.D.  1335,  the 
other  the  bishopric  of  Trent,  which  comprised  the 
lower  valley  of  the  river  Adige  before  it  enters  the  Lake 
of  Garda,  together  with  some  tributary  valleys  (Val  di 
Non,  Val  di  Sole  and  Val  Sugana),  lying  northwest  and 
northeast  of  the  cathedral  city  of  Trent  and  subject  to 
its  bishop.  Of  these  two  territories  the  latter  is  en- 
tirely Italian  speaking,  and  was  justly  claimed  by  and 
allotted  to  Italy.1  The  foreign  region,  however,  is, 
except  as  respects  a  very  small  area  on  its  southern 
border,  where  the  Italian-speakers  predominate,  a 
German-speaking  land,  and  in  no  part  of  the  Austrian 
dominions  had  there  been  a  stronger  loyalty  to  the 
house  of  Hapsburg,  nor  was  there  when  the  war  ended 
a  more  fervid  patriotism  and  more  determined  will  to 
share  the  fortunes  of  Germanic  Austria.  Nevertheless, 

*I  omit  many  details,  for  to  deal  with  them  would  lead  me  far 
from  the  main  lines  of  the  settlement  to  be  described. 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  47 

the  Italian  government  put  forward  a  claim  to  annex 
all  that  part  of  Tirol  proper  (the  ancient  county) 
which  lies  south  of  the  main  chain  of  the  Rhaetic  and 
Noric  Alps,  alleging  that  they  needed  that  lofty  chain 
as  a  strategic  frontier,  although  in  point  of  fact  the 
configuration  of  the  watershed  and  the  valleys  would 
have  given  Italy  a  more  defensible  frontier  further 
south,  at  the  defile  of  Klausen. 

Italy  had,  of  course,  no  historical  title  whatever  to 
the  purely  Germanic  region  she  sought  to  acquire. 
However,  the  principle  of  Nationality  was,  in  this 
case,  thrown  overboard  by  the  Allied  Powers,  and  a 
quarter  of  a  million  of  German  Tirolese,  countrymen 
of  the  national  hero,  Andreas  Hofer,  who  had  led  their 
forefathers  in  a  gallant  resistance  when  Napoleon 
transferred  them  to  Bavaria  in  1805,  were  handed 
over  to  Italy  as  if  they  had  been  so  many  cattle. 
England  and  France  defended  their  action  in  agreeing 
to  this  breach  of  principle  by  pleading  a  secret  treaty 
in  which  they  had  promised  this  territory  to  Italy  in 
1915,  when  they  were  endeavoring  to  induce  her  to 
enter  the  war  on  their  side.  It  was  a  promise  that 
ought  never  to  have  been  made.  The  other  Allied 
Powers  had  no  such  excuse  to  offer,  and  do  not  seem  to 
have  offered  any.1  Whether  they  did  not  know  what 
they  were  doing  or  whether  they  knew  but  did  not  care 
has  not  been  announced. 

*  It  may  be  added  that  the  strategic  arguments,  whatever  they  may 
be  worth,  which  the  Italian  Government  alleged  in  1915  for  desiring 
to  have  the  Brenner  frontier  against  Austria,  lost  their  force  when 
Austria  sank  from  being  a  Great  Power  with  fifty  millions  of  people 
to  a  petty  State  of  six  and  a  half  millions. 


48  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

Vorarlberg,  a  small  mountainous  region  on  the  east- 
ern bank  of  the  Rhine  before  it  enters  the  Lake  of  Con- 
stance, and  one  which  has  usually  been  treated  as  part 
of  Tirol,  expressed  its  wish,  after  the  collapse  of  the 
Hapsburg  monarchy,  to  be  admitted  as  a  Canton  into 
the  Swiss  Confederation  which  it  adjoins,  but  the  Swiss 
Government  did  not  accept  the  offer,  opinion  in 
Switzerland  being  divided  on  the  subject,  and  opposi- 
tion on  the  part  of  France  apprehended  on  the  ground 
that  the  annexation  might  strengthen  the  German  ele- 
ment in  Switzerland.  In  point  of  fact,  it  would  have 
been  rather  to  the  advantage  of  all  the  Allied  Powers  to 
have  allowed  Vorarlberg  to  go  to  Switzerland,  in  which 
event  it  would  have  shared  the  neutrality  which 
Switzerland  enjoys,  rather  than  to  have  left  it  in  an 
economic  situation  which  forces  it  to  desire  union 
with  Germany.  Here  it  may  be  noted  that  the  Treaty 
of  St.  Germain  forbids  Austria  as  a  whole  to  unite  her- 
self with  Germany,  a  disregard  of  the  so-called  princi- 
ple of  Self-Determination  which  the  Allied  Powers 
justified  on  the  ground  that  such  a  union  would 
strengthen  Germany.  The  Tirolese  have  recently  taken 
a  popular  vote  by  which  they  expressed  a  wish  to 
be  joined  to  Germany,  but  there  is  no  present  likeli- 
hood that  this  wish  will  be  regarded,  so  this  question 
remains  to  cloud  the  prospects  of  future  tranquillity. 

No  part  of  Europe,  except,  of  course,  Russia,  has 
fallen  since  the  end  of  the  war  into  a  state  of  poverty 
and  misery  so  pitiable  as  has  Austria,  and  especially 
the  once  proud  imperial  city  of  Vienna.  The  severe 
terms  of  the  Treaty  of  St.  Germain,  treating  her  with 
her  greatly  reduced  resources  as  liable  for  a  very  large 
part  of  the  sum  due  for  reparations  and  indemnities  by 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  49 

the  old  monarchy,  piled  on  her  a  load  of  debt  so  far 
exceeding  her  capacity  to  pay  that  the  currency  sank  to 
less  than  one  per  cent  of  its  former  value,  and  the 
starving  population  of  the  towns  (especially  of 
Vienna)  has  been  kept  alive  by  charitable  gifts  from 
Great  Britain  and  America.  No  voice  has,  so  far  as 
I  know,  ever  been  raised  in  any  of  the  Allied  countries, 
and  certainly  not  in  the  United  States  or  Britain,  to 
justify  the  harsh,  not  to  say  cruel,  terms  of  that  treaty. 
The  economic  difficulties  were  aggravated  by  the 
stoppage  of  the  supplies  of  coal  and  food  which  Vienna 
had  formerly  received  from  Bohemia,  Moravia,  Hun- 
gary and  the  now  emancipated  Slavonic  regions  on 
the  South.  These  countries  ceased  after  1918  to  export 
to  Austria,  and  it  is  only  recently  that  some  coal  has 
begun  to  come  from  Czecho-Slovakia.  This  misfor- 
tune might  have  been  averted  had  the  Allied  Powers 
made  it  a  condition  of  their  recognition  of  the  new 
States  that  they  should  impose  no  regulations  prevent- 
ing free  trade  between  themselves  and  Austria,  which 
they  had  been  wont  to  supply  with  what  she  needed, 
receiving  from  Vienna  manufactured  goods  in  return. 
Conditions  of  permanent  peace,  with  a  promise  of  a 
return  to  normal  relations,  economic  and  diplomatic, 
cannot  be  expected  until  these  questions  of  commer- 
cial intercourse  have  been  adjusted.  The  British  Gov- 
ernment and  the  French  Government  have  now  begun 
to  recognize  the  seriousness  of  the  situation,  and  have 
recently  arranged  a  conference  to  be  held  between 
these  former  Austrian  states  and  Austria  in  order  to 
rectify,  if  possible,  these  mistakes,  committed  when  the 
treaty  was  made. 
Hungary,  the  other  half  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 


50  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

Monarchy  as  it  stood  before  1914,  had  been  an  inde- 
pendent State  ever  since  the  Magyars,  a  Finnic  people 
from  the  borders  of  Europe  and  Asia,  entered  the 
Middle  Danube  Valley  in  the  end  of  the  ninth  century, 
and  came  within  the  circle  of  European  civilization 
under  their  first  Christian  king  (St.  Stephen)  in  the 
beginning  of  the  eleventh.  Before  the  war  she, 
with  Transylvania,  constituted  an  independent  king- 
dom under  a  Hapsburg  king.  It  had  a  population 
of  seventeen  millions,  but  of  these  not  more  than  half 
were  of  Magyar  blood  and  speech,  the  rest  belonging 
to  various  other  races,  Slovaks  in  the  Northwest, 
Ruthenes  (a  Slavonic  race)  in  the  Northeast,  Rumans 
in  parts  of  the  East  and  of  Transylvania,  and  Serbs  hi 
those  southern  districts  which  border  on  Serbia,  There 
was,  therefore,  a  case  for  detaching  from  the  central, 
purely  or  predominantly  Magyar,  part  of  Hungary 
those  surrounding  regions  in  which  any  of  the  other 
above  named  races  was  evidently  more  numerous  than 
were  the  Magyars,  at  least  if  the  members  of  any  such 
race  showed  a  wish  to  be  detached.  The  Powers  as- 
sembled at  Paris,  however,  went  much  further.  By 
the  Treaty  of  Trianon  they  took  from  Hungary  large 
districts  in  the  south  in  which  the  Slavonic  and  Hun- 
garian elements  were  nearly  equal.  They  took  from 
her  in  the  northwest  tracts  in  which  Slovaks  did  not 
substantially  outnumber  Magyars,  including  the  uni- 
versity city  of  Pressburg  or  Poszony,  the  ancient  capital 
of  the  country.  They  took  away  the  Ruthenian  dis- 
tricts in  the  northwest  without,  so  far  as  I  have  been 
able  to  ascertain,  taking  adequate  measures  to  learn  the 
wishes  of  the  Ruthenian  people  itself,  alleged  by  the 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  51 

Magyars  to  desire  the  maintenance  of  its  connection 
with  them ;  and  they  cut  off  from  Hungary  large  regions 
in  the  east,  in  parts  of  which  the  Magyars  constituted 
a  majority,  as  well  as  the  whole  of  Transylvania  in 
which  at  least  one-third  spoke  Hungarian,  and  desired 
to  remain  a  part  of  the  Hungarian  realm. 

The  effect  of  these  territorial  changes  has  been  to 
strip  Hungary  of  more  than  half  of  her  territory,  while 
also  crippling  her  economically  by  taking  away  nearly 
all  her  forest  lands  and  much  of  her  mineral  wealth, 
and  educationally  by  depriving  her  of  two  of  her  chief 
universities.  These  are  grave  injuries,  for  no  suffi- 
cient explanation  has  ever  been  given  to  the  world  for 
these  measures  which  seem  impolitic  as  well  as  unjust. 
You  are'doubtless  aware  that  a  thick  veil  of  secrecy  has, 
from  the  first,  hung  over  the  proceedings  of  the  nego- 
tiating Powers,  and  though  subsequent  revelations,  not 
always 'discreet,  have  given  some  light,  much  still  re- 
mains matter  for  conjecture.  It  is  a  singular  fact 
that  though  no  diplomatic  proceedings  for  three  gener- 
ations have  been  so  important  as  those  of  1919-20, 
and  though  never  before  was  there  so  general  a  demand 
for  publicity,  none  have  ever  been  kept  so  carefully 
shrouded  in  mystery. 

The  Magyars,  although  obliged  to  submit  for  the 
moment,  have  not  concealed  their  resolve  to  recover 
whenever  they  can  the  territories  of  which  they  hold 
themselves  to  have  been  unjustly  deprived.  They 
urge  that  though  it  may  be  true  that  they  did  in  time 
past  abuse  their  control  to  try  to  Magyarize  the  non- 
Magyar  elements  in  the  population  of  Hungary,  such 
past  errors  furnish  no  reason  for  now  subjecting 


52  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

them  to  unfair  treatment  at  the  hand  of  those 
other  races  to  whose  rule  they  have  been  transferred. 
Though  in  this  case,  as  in  others,  provisions  have  been 
placed  in  the  treaties  of  peace  for  .securing  the  rights 
of  minorities,  it  is  more  than  doubtful  whether  such 
provisions  will  be  observed,  nor  can  we  be  sure  that 
the  newly  founded  League  of  Nations,  commissioned 
to  enforce  them,  will  have  the  power  to  do  so.1 

It  is  much  to  be  feared  that  the  Treaty  of  Trianon 
has  prepared  in  Hungary  a  fruitful  soil  to  receive  the 
seeds  of  future  war,  and  that  no  good  relations  can  be 
expected  between  her  and  her  two  southern  neighbor 
states,  to  which  I  now  pass.  The  new  kingdom  called 
that  of  the  Serbs,  Croats  and  Slovenes,  and  known  also 
as  Yugo-Slavia  (land  of  the  South  Slavs)  consists  of 
several  Slav  peoples  now  united  into  one  kingdom 
under  the  king  of  Serbia.  It  includes  several  separate 
regions,  viz.,  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia,  the  provinces  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  detached  from  Turkey  in  1878, 
and  annexed  by  Austria  in  1909,  the  provinces  of  Croa- 
tia and  Dalmatia,  till  recently  parts  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy,  so  much  of  the  other  Austrian 
provinces  of  Istria,  Carniola  and  Carinthia  as  has  not 
gone  to  Italy  or  been  left  to  Austria,  and  finally  the 
hitherto  independent  kingdom  of  Montenegro.  The  in- 
habitants of  these  areas  all  speak  dialects  of  the  South 
Slav  language,  the  speeches  of  the  peasant  Croats  and 
Serbs  in  the  north  differing  from  one  another  hardly 
more  than  the  dialect  of  Northumberland  differs  from 

1The  nations  concerned  are  reputed  to  be  already  considering 
treaties  for  the  protection  in  one  another's  territories  of  the  numer- 
ous minorities  now  liable  to  be  unfairly  treated.  One  must  hope 
that  such  arrangements  may  diminish  the  too  numerous  grounds  of 
quarrel. 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  53 

that  of  Devon.  The  Slovene  tongue  is  rather  more 
distinct,  but  of  the  same  linguistic  family.  Another 
line  of  division  between  the  Yugo-Slav  people  separ- 
ates the  Roman  Catholic  Croats  and  Slovenes  from  the 
adherents  of  the  Orthodox  Eastern  Church  in  Serbia 
and  Montenegro,  not  to  speak  of  the  many  Muslims  of 
Bosnia.  The  impulse  of  a  common  desire  for  inde- 
pendence and  national  unity  has  kept  these  differences 
from  proving  so  serious  as  the  foreign  observer  had  ex- 
pected. But  they  are  not  to  be  ignored;  and  in  any 
cace  it  will  be  no  easy  matter  to  build  up  a  compact 
state  in  a  population  which  though  naturally  gifted, 
has  been  little  trained  to  self-government,  is  unstable 
in  temper,  and  at  a  low  level  of  education,  except  on 
the  Dalmatian  coast,  where  Italian  culture  is  of  old 
standing,  and  in  one  or  two  of  the  Croatian  cities. 

The  external  relations  of  the  South  Slav  state  with 
Austria  ought  to  be  and  may  probably  be  friendly  now, 
for  the  frontier  questions  between  the  countries  have 
been  settled.  So  they  may  be  with  Hungary  also,  if 
the  claims  of  the  two  states  to  border  territories  in 
which  Magyars  and  Serbs  dwell  intermingled  can  be 
adjusted.  As  regards  Italy,  the  compromise  effected 
by  the  Treaty  of  Rapallo  has  removed  immediate  risks 
of  conflict,  but  the  ambiguous  position  of  Fiume  and 
the  annoyance  felt  by  the  Slavs  at  the  assignment  to 
Italy  of  some  of  the  cities  on  the  mainland  of  Dalmatia 
as  well  as  some  of  the  Adriatic  islands,  furnishes 
grounds  for  future  dissension.  Here,  however,  it  must 
be  admitted  that  Italy  had  a  case,  for  two  or  three  of 
these  cities  had  been  Italized  while  they  were  ruled  by 
Venice,  and  the  unprotected  Adriatic  shores  of  East- 


54  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

ern  Italy  lying  opposite  the  numerous  deep  inlets  of 
the  Dalmatian  coast  warranted  Italian  naval  strate- 
gists.in  requiring  securities  against  a  sudden  attack  by 
sea.  There  is,  however,  no  present  likelihood  that 
Yugo-Slavia  will  be  strong  enough  on  land  or  on 
sea  to  pick  a  quarrel  with  Italy.  She  will  have  enough 
to  do  in  organizing  herself  at  home,  and  in  trying  to 
assimilate  the  diverse  elements  in  her  population. 

I  come  now  to  other  sources  of  trouble  that  may 
arise  between  the  South  Slavs  and  their  neighbors  on 
the  South  and  West.  The  Allied  Powers  prudently 
refused  to  divide  Albania  between  Yugo-Slavia  and 
Greece,  leaving  this  interesting  group  of  tribes,  de- 
scendants of  the  ancient  Illyrians  whom  Rome  found 
it  hard  to  tame,  to  work  out  their  own  salvation  in 
their  own  way,  hitherto  a  wild  way,  but  likely  to  be 
softened  now  that  the  Turks  are  out  of  the«  way. 
The  Skipetar  tribes,  as  they  call  themselves,  may  con- 
tinue for  a  while  to  raid  their  neighbors  and  fight 
among  themselves,  but  they  are  naturally  gifted  people, 
retaining  some  of  the  chivalric  traditions  of  the  Middle 
Ages,  and  with  a  patriotism  which  the  need  for  de- 
fence against  the  larger  peoples  on  their  borders  may 
keep  alive.  Travelling  in  Albania  a  good  many  years 
ago,  I  wished  to  cross  a  certain  lonely  region  and  when 
asked  whether  I  could  do  so  with  a  fair  prospect  of 
getting  through,  the  answer  was:  "If  you  have  a  wife 
or  sister  with  you,  you  will  be  safe.  Otherwise  your 
throat  will  be  cut." 

On  the  East,  Yugo-Slavia  is  confronted  by  Bulgaria, 
whose  people,  though  they  speak  a  Slavonic  tongue 
which  differs  little  from  Serb  and  from  Russian,  are 
largely  of  Finnic  slock.  Descending  from  the  middle 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  55 

course  of  the  Volga  in  the  eighth  century  A.  D.  they 
adopted  the  tongue  of  the  Slavs  whom  they  conquered 
and  with  whom  they  became  commingled,  but  in  physi- 
cal structure  and  in  character  they  are  sharply  con- 
trasted with  the  Serbs,  their  bodies  more  solid,  their  in- 
tellect less  imaginative  and  susceptible,  a  people  of 
patient  industry  and  steady  will,  good  fighters  and  able 
to  support  defeat  and  rise  from  it  with  a  resolve  to  re- 
cover what  they  have  lost.  A  rivalry  accentuated  by 
the  short  wars  of  1885  and  1913  has  unfortunately 
created  bad  relations  between  them  and  the  Serbs,  and 
become  one  of  the  factors  in  preventing  the  formation 
of  that  Confederation  of  the  Baltic  peoples,  to  include 
Serbs,  Greeks  and  Humans  as  well  as  Bulgarians  which 
the  friends  of  the  races  liberated  from  the  Turkish 
tyranny  dreamt  of  forty  years  ago.  Bulgaria  has  at 
present  few  friends,  for  the  Rumans  have  taken  terri- 
tory inhabited  by  a  Bulgarian  population  in  the  Dob- 
rudsha  south  of  the  lower  Danube,  the  Greeks  have  re- 
ceived parts  of  Thrace  where  there  is  a  large  Bulgarian 
element,  and  have  occupied  the  seaports  on  the  north 
coast  of  the  ^Egean  Sea,  and  the  Serbs  have  appropri- 
ated a  large  region  in  Southern  Macedonia,  where  the 
Bulgarian  element  is  (as  I  can  say  from  knowledge 
acquired  in  travelling  through  these  countries)  in  a 
large  majority.  This  was  one  of  the  grievous  errors 
committed  by  the  Allied  Powers  assembled  at  Paris. 
Disregarding  the  appeal  of  the  Macedonians  to 
the  principles  of  nationality  and  self-determination 
which  would  have  made  Southern  Macedonia  autono- 
mous or  assigned  it  to  Bulgaria,  refusing  to  constitute 
in  that  region  a  small  and  more  or  less  autonomous 
state  under  the  protection  of  the  Allied  Powers,  or  of 


66  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

the  League  of  Nations,  they  left  most  of  it  to  Serbia 
(which  had  conquered  it  from  the  Bulgarians  in  the 
war  of  1913)  and  the  rest  to  Greece.  The  Mace- 
donians have  had  to  submit,  but  they  have  not  re- 
nounced their  aspirations;  so  one  may  fear  trouble  in 
this  quarter  as  soon  as  a  prospect  of  satisfying  those 
aspirations  rises  over  the  horizon.  With  Greece  a 
peaceful  settlement  seems  more  probable,  and  should 
Greek  policy  again  be  guided  by  the  statesmanship  of 
Venizelos  or  some  one  else  imbued  with  his  foresight, 
this  may  come  about.  The  question  of  the  Dobrudsha 
is  more  difficult,  for  the  sentiments  on  both  sides  are 
more  unfriendly,  Rumania  fearing  the  recuperative 
powers  of  Bulgaria,  Bulgaria  resenting  Rumania's  ac- 
tion, when,  in  the  darkest  moment  of  her  own  for- 
tunes, Rumanian  'troops  were,  although  no  state  of 
war  existed  between  the  countries,  sent  in  to  occupy 
it.  In  referring  to  Rumania,  it  may  be  well  to  men- 
tion that  she  has  another  territorial  issue  to  settle, 
viz.,  a  controversy  with  Russia  over  part  of  Bessarabia, 
which  the  Rumans  reasonably  claim  as  inhabited  by 
a  population  of  their  race  and  speech.  This  region 
the  present  Bolshevik  government  refuses  to  concede. 
Of  Rumania's  position  towards  Hungary,  which  will 
demand,  if  she  sees  a  chance  of  success,  the  restora- 
tion of  Magyar  districts  assigned  by  the  Paris  treaties 
to  Rumania,  I  have  already  spoken. 

The  general  result  of  this  survey  of  Southeastern 
Europe,  which  for  many  years,  and  especially  since 
1875,  when  an  insurrection  in  Herzegovina  sounded 
the  first  tocsin  of  danger,  had  been  one  of  those 
parts  of  Europe  in  which  the  subterranean  fires  might 
at  any  moment  threaten  a  volcanic  eruption,  is  to 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  57 

show  that  these  fires  are  as  hot  as  ever.  At  present 
Bulgaria  stands  isolated,  but  her  neighbors  are  united 
only  by  dislike  and  fear  of  her.  No  State  is  really 
friendly  with  any  other.  Political  federation,  or  even 
such  a  Customs  Union  and  Railway  Union,  as  might 
help  each  of  them  to  a  better  development  of  their  re- 
spective resources,  seems  still  remote. 

We  may  now  turn  northwards  to  the  countries  which 
formed  part  of  the  third  and  largest  of  the  three  great 
Empires.  Of  Russia  itself,  that  is  to  say,  of  the  vast 
region  from  the  Gulf  of  Finland  to  the  Sea  of  Japan 
which  obeyed  the  Tsars  in  February,  1917,  and  which 
seemed  when  I  travelled  through  it  in  1913,  to  be 
loyal  and  attached  to  its  rulers,  I  will  not  attempt  to 
speak.  I  remember  going  to  a  religious  service  in  the 
city  of  Tomsk  in  Siberia  on  the  Name  Day  of  the  heir 
to  the  Russian  throne.  The  whole  official  and  uni- 
versity population  of  the  town  was  gathered  in  the 
cathedral  and  the  service  went  on  for  three  hours,  dur- 
ing which  everybody  had  to  stand,  weariness  relieved 
only  by  the  beautiful  music,  and  everybody  seemed  to 
be  animated  not  only  by  piety  but  by  a  religious  de- 
votion to  the  Tsar  and  the  Romanoff  dynasty.  Less 
than  five  years  from  that  date,  at  a  town  in  the  Ural 
Mountains  on  the  confines  of  Siberia,  the  Tsar  and  his 
wife  and  his  daughters  and  the  innocent  little  heir  for 
whom  the  people  in  Tomsk  had  prayed,  were  all  bar- 
barously murdered,  and  not  a  voice  of  pity,  not  a  voice 
of  anger  was  raised  anywhere  within  the  Russian  em- 
pire. You  may  say  that  the  masses  were  terrified,  but 
what  had  become  of  the  loyalty?  How  easy  it  is  to 
over-rate  appearances!  Everybody  believed  that  the 
Tsar  occupied  a  semi-divine  position  in  Russia,  and 


68  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

that  the  empire  of  the  Tsar  was  based,  and  solidly 
based,  upon  that  feeling  of  religious  devotion  to  his 
person.  But  all  vanished  and  even  the  Russian 
Church  was  not  able  to  avert  it. 

Russia  and  Siberia  have  not  yet  received  any  Gov- 
ernment recognized  de  jure  by  the  civilized  Powers; 
and  there  is  no  regular  peace  between  them  and  the 
neighboring  lands  to  East  and  West.  What  has 
Fate  in  store  for  them?  Predictions  would  be  mere 
guesswork.  If  the  experience  of  States  which  have  in 
past  times  lapsed  into  anarchy  or  fallen  under  the 
dominion  of  a  group  of  adventurers  ruling  by  mere 
force,  without  a  shred  of  constitutional  or  moral  au- 
thority, were  to  furnish  any  ground  for  a  forecast,  we 
should  expect  the  rise  of  some  military  despotism  like 
that  of  Bonaparte.  But  whence  or  when  will  the  De- 
liverer appear?  Three  attempts  have  been  made  by 
Denikin,  by  Koltchak,  by  Wrangel,  and  have  failed. 

Some  thoughtful  Russians,  now  in  exile,  look  not  so 
much  for  an  overthrow  of  the  Bolshevik  despotism  as 
for  a  gradual  transformation  of  it  into  an  oligarchy 
with  the  element  of  Communist  doctrine  gradually 
reduced  until  it  is  ultimately  eliminated  as  con- 
demned by  experience.  The  leading  figure  in  the  rul- 
ing group  has  already  confessed  that  Communism  will 
not  work  in  Russia.  Whoever,  be  it  an  oligarchic  group 
or  a  military  chief,  establishes  order  and  some  sort  of 
regular  and  more  or  less  legal  government,  will  find  a 
country  from  which  its  best  intellects  have  been  re- 
moved, some  by  starvation,  many  by  murder,  others 
by  exile,  so  the  task  of  reconstruction  will  be  all  the 
more  difficult,  more  difficult  by  far  than  was  that  of 
Bonaparte  when  he  overthrew  the  Directory  in  1799. 

Leaving  Great  Russia  and  Siberia  alone  for  the  pres- 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  59 

ent  (Siberia  is  still  to  be  deemed  a  part  of  Russia  and 
is  ruled  by  the  Republic  of  Soviets),  we  may  con- 
sider the  racial  communities  which,  claiming  each  a 
nationality  of  its  own,  have  tried  to  form  themselves 
into  States  out  of  the  ruins  of  the  Tsarist  dominion. 
Of  these  Finland  had  already  not  only  a  strong  national 
feeling  but  a  distinct  language  (or  rather  two  lan- 
guages), Finnish  and  Swedish,  quite  unlike  Russian. 
Having,  moreover,  possessed  an  autonomous  constitu- 
tion, though  one  which  the  Russian  Government  had 
been  seeking  to  destroy  by  constant  encroachments, 
it  was  in  a  measure  accustomed  to  self-government. 
Finland  has  now  given  itself  a  new  and  fairly  well 
constructed  constitution,  and  its  republican  govern- 
ment has  worked  normally  for  several  years,  since 
the  suppression  of  the  Communist  agitation,  which  the 
Bolshevists  had  encouraged.  Those  who  control  the 
Republic  of  Soviets  have,  for  the  present,  ceased  to 
molest  it. 

Esthonia  is  a  small  Finnish  country  which  welcomed 
the  opportunity  of  shaking  itself  clear  of  Slavonic  and 
Bolshevized  Russia,  and  has  succeeded  for  three  years 
in  maintaining  its  independence.  It  has  had  few  rela- 
tions with  Sweden,  nor  has  racial  affinity  led  it  to  an 
alliance  with  Finland  on  the  other  side  of  the  Gulf. 
Having  no  dynasty,  nor  any  eminent  personality  fit  to 
be  turned  into  a  king,  it  is  now  a  republic  struggling 
to  produce  republicans. 

The  Letts,  a  small  people,  but  intelligent  and  active, 
with  the  great  commercial  city  of  Riga  for  their  capital, 
have  set  up  a  government  in  their  country,  which  they 
call  Latvia,  and  they  were  engaged  when  I  last  heard 
from  a  private  correspondent  there,  in  studying,  with 
a  view  to  imitation,  the  constitution  of  the  United 


60  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

States  and  in  absorbing  the  writings  of  Walter  Bagehot. 
So  far,  so  good ;  let  us  wish  them  all  success.1 

The  Lithuanians,  once  constituting  an  independent 
kingdom,  thereafter  united  with  Poland  and  ultimately 
swallowed  up  in  Russia,  are,  like  the  rural  Letts,  a 
peasant  people,  but  the  sentiment  of  nationality  which 
sprang  up  among  the  small  educated  class  and  had 
been  much  developed  during  the  last  half  century,  dis- 
posed them  to  welcome  in  1917  the  chance  of  inde- 
pendence; and  they  have  been  resisting  the  attempt 
made  by  the  new  Polish  republic  to  absorb  them  on 
the  ground  that  Lithuania  was  once  part  of  a  Polish 
kingdom. 

The  prospects  of  Poland  raise  problems  too  large 
to  be  entered  upon  here.  There  are  almost  as  many 
parties  in  Poland  as  there  are  politicians,  and  the  com- 
plications of  those  parties,  as  well  as  of  creeds  and  lan- 
guages, are  so  intricate  and  so  shifting  that  few  Western 
observers  have  been  able  to  disentangle  the  threads. 
Poland  is  a  country  which  has  always  engaged  Ameri- 
can, French  and  British  sympathies  from  the  gallant 
fight  it  repeatedly  made  to  recover  its  independence 
ever  since  that  public  crime,  the  partition  of  Poland, 
which  was  perpetrated  by  Frederick  II  of  Prussia  as 
the  tempter  of  the  more  estimable  Maria  Theresa  of 
Austria  and  as  the  accomplice  of  the  more  unscrupulous 
Catherine  II  of  Russia.  We  all  wish  and  hope  that  a 
Polish  State  will  endure,  but  what  form  it  will  take  and 

1 A  good  deal  of  German  culture  has  soaked  in,  so  to  speak,  among 
the  Letts,  and  the  country  is  not  too  large  for  them  to  be  able  to 
know  one  another,  and  so  find  the  persons  who  are  best  fitted  to 
become  leaders  and  administrators.  In  all  countries  that  had  pre- 
viously been  governed  by  a  foreign  bureaucracy  and  had  possessed 
no  representative  institutions,  the  discovery  of  men  fit  to  administer 
is  a  serious  initial  difficulty. 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  61 

what  territories  it  will  include  are  questions  still  wrapt 
in  darkness.  The  only  one  of  its  neighbors  with  whom 
its  relations  have  been  friendly  is  Hungary.  Though 
nearly  connected  with  the  Czechs  by  religion  (for  the 
great  bulk  of  the  Poles  are  Roman  Catholics)  and  by 
linguistic  affinities,  there  was  recently  a  sharp  con- 
troversy between  the  peoples  over  the  question  of 
Teschen,  but  latterly  prospects  of  a  rapprochement 
have  appeared.  Towards  the  Germans  feeling  is  much 
more  bitter.  The  dispute  over  Upper  Silesia  which  we 
have  been  watching  during  the  last  few  weeks,  saw  the 
two  countries  virtually  in  arms  against  one  another. 
The  position  of  Danzig,  a  German  city,  and  the  so- 
called  "corridor,"  giving  Poland  an  access  to  the  Baltic 
sea  at  that  point,  furnishes  another  cause  for  future 
disputes.  The  reciprocal  animosity  of  Russians  and 
Poles  has  been  conspicuous  for  three  centuries.  Two 
years  ago  the  Bolshevists  attacked  and  tried  to  subdue 
Poland,  which  was  saved  largely  by  the  sympathy  of 
the  French  Government,  who  sent  generals  to  advise 
the  Polish  military  staff.  Since  the  First  Partition  the 
French  friendliness  towards  the  Poles,  which  had  fre- 
quently expressed  itself  on  the  occasions  when  they 
renewed  their  struggle  for  freedom,  has  been  recently 
strengthened  by  the  belief  that  an  independent  Poland 
would  be  a  check  upon  Germany.  The  principle  of 
nationality  justified  the  Poles  trying  to  recover  from 
Prussia  Posen,  most  of  which  is  essentially  Polish.  But 
Lithuania  and  the  other  contiguous  parts  of  the  Empire 
of  the  Tsars  are  not  to  be  placed  in  the  same  category. 
The  Poles  seem  to  be  falling  into  the  old  and  fatal  error 
of  mistaking  increase  of  territory  for  increase  of 
strength.  To  acquire  subjects  who  must  be  held  down 


62  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

by  force  and  to  be  obliged  to  provide  troops  and  fortifi- 
cations for  widely  extended  frontiers  is  a  cause  of  weak- 
ness for  any  State  which  has  not  swiftly  growing  re- 
sources and  an  overflowing  population  needing  new 
lands  to  cultivate.  A  Polish  republic  confined  to  lands 
inhabited  by  the  Polish  race  would  be  more  powerful 
than  the  vast  realm  of  bygone  centuries  whose  image 
floats  before  the  eyes  of  Polish  patriots  to-day.  In  her 
own  interest  Poland  would  do  better  to  forego  the 
attempt  to  regain  out  of  mere  historic  sentiment  the 
boundaries  of  her  ancient  kingdom  as  it  stood  in  the 
beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century. 

Lastly  we  come  to  what  is  called  Ukrainia,  the  land 
of  the  Little  Russians  of  Kiev  as  distinct  from  the 
Great  Russians  of  Moscow.  Let  me  say  that  the 
Ukrainians  are  the  same  people  that  we  used  to  call 
the  Little  Russians,  and  of  the  same  race  as  that  which 
we  have  lately  been  hearing  called  Ruthenian.  These 
are  only  different  names  for  the  same  people,  a  race 
which  inhabits  Eastern  Galicia,  parts  of  Western  Rus- 
sia, and  parts  of  Northeastern  Hungary. 

Whether  these  Little  Russians  or  Ukrainians  are 
really  sufficiently  distinct  from  the  Great  Russians  of 
Moscow  to  be  fit  to  be  constituted  into  an  independent 
kingdom  may  well  be  doubted.  The  agitation  on  be- 
half of  a  separate  Ukrainian  nationality  would  seem 
to  be  rather  a  factitious  thing  which  has  grown  up 
among  the  very  small  educated  class.  The  differ- 
ences of  language  and  character  between  these  two 
main  subdivisions  of  the  Russian  stock  (for  I  will  not 
trouble  you  with  the  White  Russians  and  Red  Rus- 
sians) are  greater  than  is  that  between  the  men  of 
Northern  and  those  of  Southern  France,  but  not  as 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  63 

great  as  that  between  Swedes  and  Norwegians,  or  be- 
tween Spaniards  and  Portuguese.  The  Ukrainians  or 
Ruthenes  (of  Western  Russia)  had  been  submissive 
and  fairly  contented  subjects  of  the  Tsars  till  there 
grew  up  among  the  professorial  and  literary  class, 
some  forty  years  ago,  a  nationalistic  agitation,  which 
in  the  end  of  the  last  century  began  to  be  secretly 
fostered  by  the  Austrian  government  (probably  at 
the  instigation  of  the  German  Government)  for  its 
own  political  purposes,  since  it  wished  to  draw  this 
branch  of  the  people  towards  its  own  Ruthenes  in 
Eastern  Galicia  and  Northeastern  Hungary.  The 
Bolsheviks  seem  to  have  stamped  out  for  the  time 
being  these  separatist  aspirations,  which  may  not  have 
struck  deep  roots  into  the  masses  or  to  have  now 
strength  enough  to  keep  alive  an  independent  Ukrain- 
ian State,  should  any  such  be  created. 

Between  Ukrainia  and  Great  Russia,  as,  indeed, 
between  all  the  Baltic  States  I  have  been  describing, 
there  are  no  natural  boundaries.  The  whole  region 
from  the  Gulf  of  Finland  to  the  Euxine  is  one  vast 
open  plain  varied  sometimes  by  lakes,  sometimes  by 
swamps.  The  courses  of  the  rivers — and  rivers  are 
scarcely  ever  to  be  deemed  natural  boundaries,  since 
they  unite  rather  than  separate  those  who  dwell  on 
their  opposite  banks — cannot  be  taken  as  any  lines  of 
demarcation  between  the  races  that  occupy  this  great 
plain.  The  social  and  economic  condition  in  which  the 
new  Baltic  republics  find  themselves  bears  some  resem- 
blance to  that  of  the  new  Balkan  States  delivered  within 
the  last  hundred  years  from  Turkish  rule.  They  are 
small,  poor,  and  still  imperfectly  organized,  while  over 
against  them  will  stand  a  huge  and  populous  Russia, 


64  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

again  powerful  whenever  she  receives  a  government 
capable  of  restoring  a  regular  administration  and  de- 
veloping her  immense  resources.  To  protect  themselves 
against  aggression,  and  to  improve  their  prospects  of 
material  growth,  these  new  States  ought  to  be  united 
in  a  defensive  confederation,  and  should  resolve,  if  they 
can  be  induced  to  see  their  real  interests,  to  set  up  no 
high  tariffs  to  obstruct  trade  between  them.  The  Baltic 
States,  moreover,  in  case  Russia  should  not  herself 
enter  into  their  federal  system — for  they  may  fear  her 
predominance  if  she  did — ought  to  offer  to  her  the 
amplest  facilities  for  the  free  use  of  their  seaports. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  Russia  herself,  once  her 
internal  troubles  have  subsided  and  she  is  again  a 
military  power  will  probably — unless  military  arma- 
ments have  been  everywhere  reduced — endeavor  to 
reconquer  all  the  territories  she  has,  for  the  mo- 
ment, lost,  except,  perhaps,  Poland  and  Finland. 
The  Russian  exiles,  survivors  from  the  old  regime 
who  have  escaped  into  Western  Europe,  make  no 
secret  of  their  desire  to  recover  the  Baltic  lands, 
which  had  been  largely  Russified  before  1917,  and 
some  of  them  long  to  reconquer  even  the  territories 
beyond  the  Caucasus  in  which  the  native  races  had 
been  only  superficially  affected  by  Tsarist  rule.  Such 
an  attempt  would  raise  a  whole  crop  of  new  questions, 
capable  of  furnishing  materials  for  new  wars.  Russia 
would  be  well  advised  to  let  the  Caucasus  be  her 
southern  boundary.  Can  any  better  boundary  be 
imagined  than  a  tremendous  mountain  range,  some  of 
whose  summits  reach  eighteen  thousand  feet  in  height 
and  with  practically  only  one  pass  across  it  fit  for 
wheeled  vehicles?  No  better  natural  line  of  political 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  65 

demarcation  could  be  found  in  the  world  and  it  would 
be  a  great  deal  better  for  Russia  to  recognize  this  fact 
rather  than  to  try,  out  of  mere  patriotic  sentiment,  to 
recover  Georgia,  Armenia  and  the  Tatar  regions  now 
called  Azerbaijan. 

As  respects  Europe,  a  Russian  monarchy  of  one  hun- 
dred millions  of  people,  with  the  immense  wealth  and 
growing  population  of  Siberia  thrown  in,  would  be 
a  menace  to  its  neighbors.  Before  the  war  it  was 
formidable  enough  to  alarm  Germany,  and  would  have 
been  more  than  a  match  for  any  European  Power  had 
not  the  administrative  system,  military  and  naval  as 
well  as  civil,  been  worm-eaten  by  a  corruption  which 
prevailed  up  to  the  very  highest  circles.  Here,  how- 
ever, the  future  becomes  too  misty  for  our  eyes  to 
penetrate  it.  Many  years  may  pass  before  the 
moral  as  well  as  material  damage  wrought  during 
the  last  few  years  can  be  repaired.  In  our  time,  the 
strength  of  any  State  towards  its  neighbors  depends 
at  least  as  much  upon  its  internal  unity  as  upon  its 
army  and  navy.  It  was  the  habit  of  obedience  and  a 
sort  of  worship  of  the  Tsar  as  a  superhuman  being  that 
held  Russia  together  till  1917.  That  obedience  gone, 
that  spell  of  reverence  broken,  it  may  take  long  to  re- 
store unity  and  order. 

From  war-scourged  Europe  I  turn  to  Western  Asia, 
which  has  seen  a  more  horrible  if  not  a  greater  slaugh- 
ter than  even  that  which  Europe  shuddered  at  during 
these  last  years.  The  Turkish  Empire  and  the  con- 
fusion which  its  fall  and  that  of  the  Russian  Tsar- 
dom  have  produced  over  the  lands  which  lie  between 
the  JSgean  Sea  and  the  Caspian  need  a  somewhat  full 
explanation,  because  they  have  been  less  closely  fol- 


66  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

lowed  in  America  than  in  Europe,  and  they  illustrate 
the  evils  to  which  both  Interventionist  and  Non-Inter- 
ventionist policies  are  exposed  when  civilized  and  semi- 
civilized  States  come  into  relations  with  one  another. 
For  more  than  two  centuries — in  fact,  ever  since  its 
weakness  became  evident  and  irremediable — the  Turk- 
ish Monarchy  has  been  the  danger  spot  of  the  Old 
World.  When  a  State  is  both  barbarous  and  decrepit, 
insurrection  is  the  proper  remedy.  The  misgoverned 
subjects  of  the  Sultanate  ought  to  have  risen  against  it, 
destroyed  it  and  created  new  States.  This  did  not  hap- 
pen, because  the  Muslims,  much  as  they  hated  the  evils 
of  their  own  government,  hated  their  Christian  fellow- 
subjects  more,  and  because  the  Turkish  Government 
was  able  to  borrow  money  by  which  it  could  purchase 
arms  and  repress  insurrections  by  massacre;  while  the 
so-called  Christian  Powers  were  so  jealous  of  one  an- 
other that  there  were  always  some  among  them  willing 
to  support  the  Turk  rather  than  permit  his  dominions 
to  pass  to  any  other  among  themselves.  Thus,  though 
the  Sultan  lost  in  succession  Greece,  Albania,  Serbia, 
Bulgaria,  Bosnia,  Tripoli  and  Crete,  he  still  retained 
parts  of  Europe  and  all  his  Asiatic  dominions  till  Tur- 
key wantonly  declared  war  against  France  and  Eng- 
land in  1914. 

The  war  between  the  Allies  and  the  Turks,  in  which 
the  United  States  had  not  joined,  though  diplomatic 
relations  with  the  Turks. had  been  broken  off,  was 
closed,  or  rather  was  supposed  to  have  been  closed,  by 
the  Treaty  of  Sevres,  signed  in  1920,  the  last  of  those 
negotiated  at  Paris,  but  not  yet  ratified.  Its  provi- 
sions, while  most  unwisely  leaving  the  Sultan  to  reign 
in  Constantinople,  assured  to  the  Allied  Powers  a 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  67 

means  of  control  over  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Darda- 
nelles, as  being  sea  passages  of  incomparable  impor- 
tance. Adrianople  and  a  small  land  area  north  of  Con- 
stantinople were  given  to  the  Turks,  while  the  rest  went 
to  Greece  to  which  were  also  allotted  Smyrna  and  cer- 
tain districts  along  the  eastern  coast  of  the  ^Egean,  with 
the  islands  in  that  sea,  except  Rhodes  and  Cos.  France 
received  what  is  called  a  "sphere  of  commercial  influ- 
ence" in  Eastern,  and  Italy  another  such  sphere  in 
Western  Asia  Minor.  The  Turkish  Government  at 
Constantinople,  overawed  by  the  Allied  fleets,  would 
have  accepted  these  provisions,  but  a  body  of  rebel 
Turks  in  Asia  Minor,  composing  the  so-called  Nation- 
alist party  (the  remnants  of  the  infamous  "Committee 
of  Union  and  Progress,"  which  declared  war  on  France 
and  England  in  1914),  and  supported  by  a  large  force 
composed  of  ex-soldiers  and  irregulars,  refused  to  sub- 
mit, and  have  rejected  even  those  large  concessions 
from  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  which  the  Powers  offered 
to  them  at  a  recent  conference  in  London.  At  this 
moment  Greek  and  Turkish  forces  are  fighting,  both  in 
Asia  and  Europe,  for  the  districts  which  the  Treaty  of 
Sevres  gave  them,  and  the  outcome  is  still  doubtful. 
Of  Syria  and  Eastern  Cilicia,  which  France  has  ob- 
tained under  a  mandate  from  the  Allied  Powers  and  of 
Palestine,  similarly  assigned  to  England,  I  need  not 
speak,  for  neither  region  constitutes  a  State  capable 
of  international  relations.  Armenia  is,  however,  in  a 
different  position,  for  she  is  a  State,  though  as  yet 
only  on  paper.  The  interest  which  the  people  of  the 
United  States  have  taken  in  the  fortunes  of  the  hap- 
less Armenians  for  whom  American  missionaries  have 
done  so  much  during  the  last  eighty  years,  an  interest 


68  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

further  shown  by  the  splendidly  generous  help  which 
American  charity  has  extended  to  the  refugees  since 
1915,  leads  me  to  devote  a  few  sentences  to  explain 
the  present  situation  in  that  part  of  what  was  the 
Turkish  Empire. 

Promises  that  the  Armenians  should  be  delivered 
from  the  yoke  of  their  oppressors  were  made  by  France 
and  England  during  the  war,  in  which  they  had  invited 
and  received  the  aid  of  many  Armenian  volunteers, 
who  fought  bravely  in  both  armies,  and  it  was  hoped 
that  the  United  States  might  be  induced  to  accept  a 
"mandate"  to  supervise  the  administration  of  the 
country  for  a  few  years  till  it  was  able  to  stand  alone. 
But  when  Turkey  submitted  after  her  defeat  in  the 
autumn  of  1918,  an  armistice  was  hastily  granted  to 
her,  which  failed  to  provide  for  the  immediate  evacua- 
tion of  the  Armenian  districts  by  the  Turks,  and  the 
stipulations  made  for  the  disarmament  of  the  Turkish 
armies  were  not  enforced,  so  after  some  months  the 
Turks,  at  first  utterly  disheartened,  recovered  their 
old  arrogance,  assuming  the  delays  and  negligence  of 
the  Allies  to  be  due  to  indifference  or  timidity.  The 
Turkish  Nationalists  in  Asia,  representing  the  Com- 
mittee of  Union  and  Progress  who  had  seized  power  in 
1905  and  carried  Turkey  into  the  war  under  German 
influence  in  1914,  assembled  an  armed  force  and  have 
from  their  headquarters  at  Angora  continued  to  defy 
both  the  Allies  and  the  Sultan's  Government,  retain- 
ing Armenia  in  their  military  occupation,  though  the 
Treaty  of  Sevres  provides  for  its  constitution  as  an 
independent  State  to  be  added  to  that  Armenian  Re- 
public at  Erivan  of  which  I  shall  presently  speak. 
Whether  the  Allies  will  succeed  by  diplomatic  means 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  69 

in  compelling  the  evacuation  of  the  districts,  parts  of 
the  Turkish  Empire  before  the  war,  allotted  to  Ar- 
menia by  the  award  made,  at  the  request  of  the  Allies, 
by  President  Wilson,  remains  to  be  seen. 

As  some  travelers  have  passed  unfavorable  criticisms 
upon  the  Armenian  people,  it  is  my  duty  to  add  that  the 
strength  of  character  of  the  race  has  been  amply  proved 
not  only  by  the  tenacity  with  which  they  have  clung  to 
their  national  traditions  embodied  in  a  copious  ancient 
literature,  but  by  the  fact  that  both  in  1895  and  in 
1915  tens  of  thousands  of  Armenian  men  and  women 
who  could  have  saved  their  lives  by  embracing  Islam 
preferred  to  die  as  martyrs  for  their  Christian  faith. 

Why  the  Turkish  Government,  which  had  in  1915 
massacred  a  million  of  its  Christian  subjects,  women 
and  children  as  well  as  men,  under  circumstances  of 
brutality  and  cruelty  unsurpassed  in  the  history  even 
of  the  blood-stained  East — why  that  government, 
which  had  treated  the  British  prisoners  whom  it  cap- 
tured in  Mesopotamia  with  an  inhumanity  which 
caused  the  death  of  more  than  half  of  the  private  sol- 
diers— the  officers  would  probably  have  suffered  equally 
but  for  the  intervention  on  their  behalf  of  German 
officers — why  after  these  crimes  that  Government 
should  have  been  treated  by  the  Allies  with  such  ex- 
traordinary lenity  and  should  now  have  fresh  indul- 
gence offered  to  it  by  proposed  modifications  in  the 
Treaty  of  Sevres — these  are  mysteries  the  explanation 
whereof  is  probably  known  to  some  of  you  as  it  is  to 
me.  But  the  secret  is  one  which,  as  Herodotus  says 
of  some  of  those  tales  which  he  heard  from  the  priests 
in  Egypt,  is  too  sacred  for  me  to  mention. 

A  few  words  more  will  complete  what  has  to  be 


70  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

said  of  the  plight  in  which  Asia  has  been  left  by  the 
war,  to  which  the  United  States  was  not  a  party.  When 
the  Empire  of  the  Tsars  collapsed  a  year  before  the 
overthrow  of  the  Sultans,  the  native  races  whom  Rus- 
sia had  ruled  south  of  the  Caucasus  set  up  three  inde- 
pendent republics.  That  of  Azerbaijan  a  region  (con- 
quered by  Russia  from  Persia)  on  the  Caspian  was 
chiefly  inhabited  by  Mohammedan  Tatars.  It  has  now 
been  overrun  and  is  controlled  by  the  Bolsheviks. 
Georgia,  on  the  Black  Sea,  inhabited  by  an  ancient 
Christian  race,  whose  king  surrendered  his  dominions 
to  Russia  more  than  a  century  ago,  was  attacked  on 
the  one  side  by  the  Nationalist  Turks,  on  the  other  by 
the  Bolsheviks,  and  the  latter  now  dominate  it,  al- 
though the  Allied  Powers  recognized  it  a  year  ago.  The 
third  republic,  with  Erivan  for  its  capital,  was  set  up 
by  the  Armenians,  after  the  Russian  revolution  of  1917, 
and  a  legislature  was  elected  by  Universal  Suffrage  in 
1919.  This  republic  also  has  now  been  overpow- 
ered by  Bolshevik  attacks  from  the  East,  coupled 
with  Turkish  attacks  from  the  West,  and  is  being 
ground  to  pieces  between  these  two  millstones,  though 
some  of  the  Armenians  still  hold  out  in  the  mountains. 
This  Armenian  State  had  been  recognized  by  the  Allied 
Powers  and  its  representative  signed  the  Treaty  of 
Sevres,  which  contemplated  the  addition  to  it  of  the  ter- 
ritory to  be  allotted  to  Armenia  by  President  Wilson's 
award.  The  future  of  the  Armenian  nation,  an  intelli- 
gent, energetic  and  progressive  race,  who  constitute 
the  chief — indeed  almost  the  only — civilizing  influence 
in  Western  Asia,  still  hangs  in  the  balance.  From  day 
to  day  we  do  not  know  what  is  going  to  happen  and 
whether  the  promises  made  by  the  Powers  to  the  Ar- 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  71 

menians  will  ever  be  redeemed.  Among  all  the  peoples 
that  have  suffered  by  the  War,  they  have  suffered 
most  and  been  most  cynically  abandoned. 

The  other  remaining  fragment  of  the  Tsarist  Em- 
pire (for  I  have  already  referred  to  Siberia)  is  Western 
Turkestan,  where  the  Khanates  of  Khiva  and  Bokhara 
had  been  brought  under  Russian  rule  soon  after  the 
middle  of  last  century.  It  has  been  the  scene,  since 
the  break  up  of  the  Empire  in  1917,  of  much  fighting 
between  native  tribes  and  Bolshevik  Russians  or  Bol- 
shevized  natives,  and  authentic  news  of  its  condition 
seems  almost  unattainable.  The  Tatars  are  mostly 
fanatical  Muslims,  and  the  Russians  few  in  number. 
Almost  as  uncertain  are  the  prospects  of  Persia,  a 
country  long  on  the  verge  of  anarchy,  and  the  north- 
ern part  of  which  was,  when  the  war  began,  falling 
under  Russian  control.  The  brief  career  there  of  Mr. 
Morgan  Schuster,  whom  President  Taft  selected  to 
restore  order  to  Persian  finances,  and  whom  the  Rus- 
sians compelled  the  Shah  to  dismiss,  is  instructive,  but 
I  must  not  yield  to  the  temptation  to  draw  from  it  the 
morals  it  suggests. 

To  complete  this  survey  of  the  sorely  plagued  Old 
World  a  few  words  need  to  be  said  about  the  three 
Powers  which  in  the  Far  East  confront  one  another 
with  no  friendly  mien.  Bolshevik  Russians  stand 
armed  along  the  Selenga  and  Amur  rivers.  The  Japa- 
nese, who  have  been  occupying  Vladivostock,  have 
armies  facing  the  Bolsheviks,  but  apparently  not  at 
present  engaged  in  fighting  them.  China  has  but  a 
weak  hold  on  Manchuria,  its  southern  part  being  vir- 
tually controlled  by  Japan,  which  has  influence  hi  Shan- 
tung also,  through  her  command  of  the  railway  which 


72  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

the  Germans  built.  In  China  itself  the  present  position 
is  unstable,  for  some  of  the  provinces  are  practically 
ruled  by  their  governors,  and  those  of  the  South  do  not 
recognize  the  authority  of  Peking.  Japan  annexed 
Korea  in  1910  after  her  war  with  Russia,  and  has  a  firm 
grip  on  it,  though  a  large  section  of  the  Koreans  are  dis- 
affected. Before  1914  the  Russians  had  extorted  from 
China  considerable  rights  over  Western  Mongolia,  and 
when  I  was  in  Siberia  in  1913  people  seemed  to  think 
that  these  rights  would  be  turned  into  a  protectorate 
stretching  as  far  south  as  the  Western  Himalayas. 
Whether  the  Bolsheviks  will  resume  the  policy  of  en- 
croachment and  how  far  the  Chinese  Government  will 
resist  them  nobody  seems  to  know.  Meantime,  the 
Mongols  are  protected  by  the  weakness  of  their  neigh- 
bors. There  is  plenty  of  inflammable  material  in  Asia 
as  well  as  in  Europe,  but  at  the  moment  there  is  less 
immediate  danger  to  peace  in  Asia  than  we  now  see 
nearer  home. 

The  list  I  have  given  you  of  the  dangers  which  now 
threaten  the  peace  of  the  world  is  a  long  one,  and 
some  might  have  been  added  which  want  of  tune 
obliges  me  to  omit.  Long  as  the  list  is,  it  seems  to 
me  a  duty  to  present  the  facts  as  those  in  England 
who  have  given  constant  attention  to  the  subject 
see  them,  for  those  facts  are  apparently  not  fully 
known  to  most  Americans.  The  war  and  the  so-called 
peace  which  has  followed  the  war  have  left  the 
Old  World  in  a  situation  which  Americans  need  to 
realize,  since  they  also  are  affected  by  it.  They  cannot 
treat  the  economic  and  financial  and  political  disasters 
which  have  befallen  the  great  European  countries  as 
matters  that  can  be  regarded  from  a  distance  with 


THE  GREAT  WAR  AND  ITS  RESULTS  73 

calmness  or  with  that  complacency  which  the  ancient 
poet  attributes  to  the  man  who  from  the  shore  sees 
vessels  laboring  in  the  storm.  You  may  rather  feel,  as 
another  ancient  poet  observes,  that  nobody  can  be  un- 
concerned when  his  neighbor's  house  is  in  a  blaze.  In 
the  New  World  as  well  as  in  the  Old,  all  men  of  good 
will  are  concerned  to  try  to  bring  about  a  better  peace 
by  removing  the  dangers  and  injustices  which  bode 
future  wars.  It  will  tax  all  the  wisdom  and  self-control 
of  the  Old  World  Powers  to  do  this,  and  I  doubt 
whether  it  can  be  done  without  the  help  of  the  New 
World. 

Do  not  suppose  me  to  mean  that  a  new  European 
war  is  imminent.  No  country  is  in  a  position  to  re- 
sume fighting  this  year  or  next  year  or  the  year  after. 
But  history  has  taught  us  that  fires  allowed  to  smolder 
long  are  likely  ultimately  to  break  out,  and  it  will 
be  the  part  of  wisdom  to  rake  out  the  embers  and 
quench  them  with  all  the  water  that  can  be  found. 
I  hope  to  indicate  in  a  later  lecture  how  this  may  be 
done,  and  shall  then  endeavor  to  show  that  it  is  the 
interest  as  well  as  the  duty  of  all  nations  to  join 
in  a  task  which  involves  the  future  of  mankind. 


LECTURE  III 

THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  ON  INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 

THE  relations  of  States  to  one  another  which  we 
have  been  so  far  considering  are  primarily  political 
relations,  affecting  the  territories  of  States  and  the  po- 
sition which  each  State  holds  towards  its  neighbors 
as  an  independent  community  desiring  to  maintain  its 
position  in  the  world.  But  there  are  other  relations 
also,  which  it  is  convenient  to  deal  with  separately,  be- 
cause they  are  influenced  by  motives  of  a  material  na- 
ture, estimable  in  money,  and  because  they  affect  not 
merely  the  interests  of  a  State  as  a  whole,  but  also,  and 
often  more  largely,  those  of  particular  groups  or  classes 
within  a  State,  such  groups  or  classes  having  private 
or  class  interests  which  may  not  be  those  of  the  whole 
State,  though  such  groups  or  classes  may  not  be 
strong  enough  to  influence  the  general  policy  of  the 
State  and  its  attitude  towards  other  States.  These 
interests  and  the  influences  they  can  exert  may  be  con- 
sidered under  four  heads — those  of  Production,  of 
Commerce,  of  Transportation,  of  Finance.  They  are 
too  numerous  and  various  to  be  dealt  with  in  detail. 
All  I  can  do  here  and  now  is  to  enumerate  some  of 
special  consequence,  illustrating  their  general  influence 
by  a  few  conspicuous  examples. 

74 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  75 

Under  the  head  of  Production  there  will  fall  the  de- 
sire of  a  State  to  acquire,  either  for  itself  as  a  State 
or  for  groups  of  its  citizens,  natural  sources  of  wealth 
valuable  for  the  purposes  of  producing  wealth  to  be 
used  by  the  citizens  at  home,  or  to  be  exchanged  with 
the  inhabitants  of  foreign  countries  by  way  of  trade. 
Such  desires  may  take  the  form  of  efforts  to  acquire  the 
territory  in  which  the  natural  sources  of  wealth  exist, 
or  to  make  arrangements  with  other  States  for  obtain- 
ing the  products  of  the  latter  on  advantageous  terms, 
possibly  to  the  exclusion  of,  or  disparagement  of  com- 
petition by  other  States. 

The  kinds  of  natural  wealth  most  coveted  in  earlier 
days  were  mines  of  the  precious  metals,  gold  and 
silver.  Now,  however,  with  the  progress  of  science  and 
the  consequent  development  of  manufacturing  indus- 
tries, other  minerals  have  become  more  important. 
Coal  and  iron  come  first,  platinum  and  copper  next. 
Copper  was  prized  by  savage  peoples  because,  being 
more  easily  worked  than  iron,  it  was  available  for  the 
making  of  weapons.  It  led  Tshaka,  the  famous  Zulu 
chief,  to  carry  his  murderous  raids  and  conquests  over 
large  parts  of  Southeastern  Africa  and  build  up  a  sort 
of  empire  there  a  century  ago.  Its  use  for  electrical  in- 
dustries has  latterly  given  it  great  importance.  Nickel 
has  acquired  a  special  value  because  it  is  largely  used 
in  the  making  of  plates  for  war  vessels.  Radium,  the 
rarest  of  the  metals,  is  also  the  most  precious,  and  one 
can  guess  what  would  be  the  fate  of  any  weak  com- 
munity in  which  it  might  be  discovered  in  abundance. 
Of  the  importance  of  coal  we  have  had  a  striking 
instance  in  the  provisions  made  by  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  regarding  the  mines  which  exist  in  the 


76  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

Saar  Valley,  in  the  Teschen  region  and  in  Upper 
Silesia.  The  possession  of  rich  coal  fields  may  expose 
a  State  to  the  aggression  of  its  neighbors,  or  may  en- 
able it  to  make  advantageous  bargains  with  its  neigh- 
bors by  undertaking  to  supply  fuel  to  them  on  favorable 
terms.  It  may  be  incidentally  remarked  that  as  coal, 
especially  when  found  in  conjunction  with  iron,  19 
the  basis  of  manufacturing  industries,  it  creates  a 
large  wage-earning  population,  and  that  such  a  popu- 
lation, enjoying,  especially  under  universal  suffrage, 
important  political  power,  may  enter  into  industrial 
and  political  connections  with  a  like  wage-earning 
element  in  other  countries.  Such  connections  tend  to 
create  (as  will  be  presently  noted)  a  new  set  of  rela- 
tions, unofficial,  but  possibly  of  international  signifi- 
cance, between  sections  of  peoples  apart  from  their  gov- 
ernments. 

Where  a  region  inhabited  by  savage  tribes  or  by  a 
semi-civilized  people  is  believed  to  be  rich  in  any 
source  of  natural  wealth,  its  possession  is  coveted  by 
civilized  States,  and  has  often  become  a  subject  of 
strife  between  them.  The  history  of  tropical  America 
since  the  days  when  Raleigh  tried  to  capture  for  Eng- 
land the  supposed  gold  resources  of  Guiana,  and  the 
history  of  Africa  within  the  last  half  century,  show 
how  often  jealousies  and  wars  have  arisen  where  the 
chief  colonizing  Powers,  Spain,  Holland,  England, 
France  and  latterly  Germany,  Belgium  and  Italy  also 
were  concerned.  Spitzbergen,  almost  the  only  part  of 
the  earth's  surface  which,  because  barren  and  unin- 
habited, had  remained  an  unappropriated  No  Man's 
Land  until  the  twentieth  century,  acquired  value  when 
coal-bearing  strata,  largely  horizontal  and  therefore 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  77 

capable  of  being  cheaply  and  easily  worked,  were  dis- 
covered, so  for  some  years  before  1914  rights  in  it  were 
the  subject  of  negotiations  between  Russia,  England, 
Norway,  Sweden,  Germany  and  even  the  United  States, 
for  an  American  group  also  asserted  interests  in  some 
of  the  mining  areas.  These  conflicting  claims  have 
now  been  settled  by  a  recognition  of  Norwegian  sover- 
eignty over  the  islands,  Norway  being  that  part  of  the 
European  continent  which  lies  nearest  to  them. 

A  remarkable  illustration  of  the  greed  shown  by 
capitalistic  groups  in  different  countries  to  appro- 
priate natural  resources  has  recently  appeared  in  the 
case  of  the  mineral  oils.  The  invention  first  of  the 
internal  combustion  engine,  and  thereafter  of  aircraft, 
suddenly  extended  the  use  and  enhanced  the  value 
of  these  oils  and  threw  an  apple  of  contention  among 
the  great  States.  Some  important  oil  fields,  such  as 
those  of  Mexico  and  those  of  Persia,  lie  in  regions 
whose  inhabitants  have  neither  the  skill  nor  the  capital 
nor  the  security  for  life  and  property  that  are  needed 
to  enable  the  natives  of  the  country  to  develop  them, 
so  the  foreign  capitalist  jumps  in,  a  syndicate  is  formed, 
and  some  State  standing  behind  the  capitalist  syndi- 
cate tries  to  back  it  up,  because  the  Government  of 
the  foreign  State  wants  oil  for  the  purposes  of  war. 
Hence  many  complaints,  many  misstatements  and 
misunderstandings,  many  intrigues,  many  efforts  by 
means  not  always  above  suspicion  to  obtain  the  lion's 
share  of  the  spoil.  Thus  ill-feeling  may  be  created  be- 
tween States  because  groups  of  private  citizens  seeking 
their  private  gain,  and  inducing  their  Governments  to 
press  their  claims,  do  not  care  how  much  international 
ill  will  they  may  provoke. 


78  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

The  interest  every  State  has  in  turning  to  the  fullest 
account  its  own  productive  power  is,  of  course,  height- 
ened when  its  industries  are  directed  to  the  aim  not 
merely  of  meeting  the  wants  of  its  home  market  but 
to  that  of  producing  commodities  to  supply  the  needs 
of  other  countries.  Thinly  populated  countries  like 
Argentina  and  Brazil,  which  cannot  consume  all  their 
own  meat,  coffee  and  sugar,  as  well  as  populous  coun- 
tries like  Belgium,  Germany  and  England,  which  pro- 
duce more  goods  than  their  home  consumption  can 
absorb,  have  an  interest  in  securing  foreign  markets 
for  their  products.  This  brings  us  to  a  second  branch 
of  the  subject,  the  international  relations  which  com- 
merce creates. 

Though  the  trading  intercourse  of  States  has  always 
exerted  a  potent  influence  upon  their  politics,  trade 
relations  have  become  far  more  important  within  the 
last  two  centuries  through  the  development  of  manu- 
factures and  the  cheapening  and  acceleration  of  trans- 
port facilities.  "Aujourd'hui"  to  use  words  spoken 
seven  years  ago  by  M.  Millerand,  now  President  of  the 
French  Republic,  "les  interets  economiques  menent  le 
monde."  I  need  not  therefore  go  back  to  the  days 
when  the  Greeks  settled  themselves  on  the  Hellespont 
and  Bosphorus  to  profit  by  the  corn  trade  from  the 
maritime  parts  of  Scythia,  nor  to  the  later  days  when 
Rome  depended  for  food  on  the  harvests  of  Egypt  and 
North  Africa,  nor  even  to  the  early  struggles  of  com- 
mercial Holland  against  Portugal  and  Spain.  One  case, 
however,  deserves  a  word  of  mention,  because  it  shows 
the  power  which  a  small  number  of  sordidly  selfish 
persons  engaged  in  one  particular  line  of  business  could 
exert  upon  the  policy  of  great  States,  even  when  every 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  79 

consideration  of  humanity  was,  or  ought  to  have  been, 
arrayed  against  them.  The  Portuguese,  the  Dutch 
and  the  English  shipowners  during  the  seventeenth 
and  eighteenth  centuries  carried  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  miserable  negroes  from  Africa  to  the  two  American 
continents;  and  the  Governments  of  their  respective 
countries  set  so  much  store  by  this  traffic  that  the  safe- 
guarding of  it  for  their  shipowners  was  repeatedly 
stipulated  for  in  treaties.  The  planter  who  bought  the 
slaves  when  landed  in  Brazil  or  Carolina  might,  at 
least,  plead  that  he  could  not  cultivate  his  estates 
without  African  labor  and  could  get  that  labor  in  no 
other  way,  but  the  wealthy  men  who  in  Europe  sup- 
plied the  ships  for  this  abominable  traffic  and  the 
statesmen  who  regarded  it  as  a  means  of  enriching 
their  respective  countries,  had  no  such  excuse  to  allege. 
Strange  that  selfish  greed  and  want  of  thought  could 
make  civilized  men  calling  themselves  Christians  ob- 
tuse to  considerations  of  morality,  justice,  and  com- 
passion. It  took  twenty  years  from  the  time  when 
Clarkson  raised  his  voice  against  the  Slave  Trade  in 
England  down  to  the  day  when  the  British  Parliament 
passed  an  act  for  its  abolition ;  and  twenty  years  more 
were  needed  before  it  was  forbidden  by  law  to  the  sub- 
jects of  all  the  other  European  countries,  Portugal 
coming  last  of  all. 

As  men's  needs  and  tastes  increase  with  the  prog- 
ress of  cvilization,  each  country  becomes  more  de- 
pendent on  others,  and  as  many  commodities  can  be 
produced  better  or  more  cheaply  in  some  countries 
than  in  others,  the  need  for  an  exchange  of  products 
always  grows.  The  desire  of  traders  in  each  country 
to  have  the  largest  possible  market  for  their  exports, 


80  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

and  the  parallel  desire  in  each  country  to  obtain  raw 
materials  or  manufactured  goods  on  the  easiest  terms, 
naturally  lead  both  producers  and  consumers — and  all 
countries  are  both  producers  and  consumers,  because 
they  must  pay  by  their  products  for  what  they  receive 
to  be  consumed — to  desire  the  maintenance  of  good  re- 
lations with  one  another.  Each  profits  by  the  exchange 
made  with  the  other,  and  thus  they  work  together 
for  the  common  good.  When  a  quarrel  arises  between 
two  countries  trading  with  one  another,  especially 
if  it  threatens  war,  the  producers  and  the  exporting 
merchants  foresee  a  danger  to  their  sales  abroad,  while 
consumers  foresee  a  rise  in  prices  or  a  difficulty  in  se- 
curing a  due  supply  of  whatever  they  have  been  wont 
to  receive.  Both  producers  and  consumers  have,  there- 
fore, an  interest  in  urging  their  respective  governments 
to  settle  the  dispute  before  it  reaches  the  point  at  which 
the  financial  world  takes  alarm,  stocks  begin  to  fall, 
speculation  in  exchanges  springs  up.  It  would  appear 
from  these  familiar  facts  that  a  powerful  guarantee  for 
peace  is  provided  by  international  trade,  so  that  the 
larger  is  the  volume  that  trade  attains,  and  the  more 
numerous  are  the  persons  directly  engaged  in  it,  or 
whose  welfare  it  affects,  so  much  the  less  likely  are 
States  to  seek  in  war  a  solution  of  their  controversies. 
Many  thinkers  and  statesmen  have  regarded  this  as 
the  influence  which  would  ultimately  put  an  end  to 
war  by  making  every  nation  feel  the  losses  to  both 
the  contending  parties  which  war  cannot  but  involve. 
It  was  this  consideration  that  chiefly  moved  Richard 
Cobden  to  his  advocacy  of  unrestricted  trade.  His 
was  an  enlightened  mind,  seeking  not  the  advantage 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  81 

of  his  own  country  in  particular,  but  thinking  of  man- 
kind as  a  whole. 

Here,  however,  another  influence  intervenes.  There 
are  in  every  country  persons  who  produce  commod- 
ities, be  they  food  or  raw  materials  or  manufactured 
goods,  similar  to  those  which,  coming  from  foreign 
countries,  are  imported  and  offered  for  sale  to  their 
fellow-citizens  hi  competition  with  the  commodities 
which  they  themselves  have  to  sell.  If  these  imported 
commodities  are  offered  at  lower  prices  than  the  prices 
at  which  the  home  producer  can  afford  to  sell  them  in 
his  home  market  so  as  to  yield  a  profit,  they  are,  if  of 
equal  quality,  likely  to  be  bought  in  preference  to  the 
same  commodities  produced  at  home.  The  home  pro- 
ducer, therefore,  either  loses  part  of  the  sale  he  would 
otherwise  have  obtained,  or  is  obliged  to  lower  his  prices 
to  meet  the  competition  of  the  commodities  coming 
from  abroad.  He  complains  of  this  as  unfair,  and  de- 
mands that  the  unfairness  should  be  rectified  by  the  im- 
position of  an  import  duty  on  the  foreign  products 
which  will  give  his  own  commodities  an  advantage  in 
the  home  market.  He  argues  that  if  his  fellow-citizens, 
the  home  consumers,  are  so  lacking  hi  a  sense  of  civic 
brotherhood,  and  in  the  patriotism  which  desires  that 
all  profits  should  be  kept  at  home  and  no  part  go  to  the 
foreigner,  such  selfishness  ought  to  be  cured  by  law, 
that  is,  by  a  law  placing  on  imports  duties  sufficiently 
high  to  reduce,  or  exclude,  foreign  competition. 

This  claim  made  by  the  home  producer  has  in  most 
countries  been  listened  to.  It  began  with  the  em- 
ployers of  labor  who  desired  a  tariff  to  ward  off  the 
competition  of  foreign  goods,  but  it  was  also  taken  up 


82  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

by  agriculturists,  who  wished  to  see  their  grain  or 
fruits  similarly  defended.  Latterly,  it  has,  in  some 
countries,  been  reinforced  by  the  support  of  the  hand- 
workers. In  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  for  instance, 
the  wage-earning  class  has  been  steadily  pressing  for 
an  increase  of  import  duties.  Those  colonies  had  in 
their  early  days  found  it  so  inconvenient  to  raise  reve- 
nue for  the  service  of  the  State  by  direct  taxation, 
that  pretty  high  duties  were  imposed  upon  wares  im- 
ported from  abroad.  This  led  to  the  creation  of  manu- 
facturing industries  hi  countries  where  such  industries 
were  really  exotics,  because  manufactured  goods  were 
being  produced  so  much  more  cheaply  in  Europe  that 
they  could,  even  after  paying  the  cost  of  a  long  ocean 
transport,  have  been  sold  in  Australia  at  a  lower  price 
than  similar  goods  produced  there.  Now,  the  work- 
men in  Australia  have  been  constantly  pressing  that 
their  wages  should  be  raised.  When  the  courts  of  law 
which  fix  wages  awarded,  as  they  usually  did,  a  rise, 
the  manufacturers  insisted  that  they  could  make  no 
profit  on  their  business  unless  the  tariff  on  imports 
was  also  so  raised  as  to  enable  them  to  sell  their  goods 
at  a  higher  price  than  would  be  possible  under  foreign 
competition.  This  claim  was  allowed,  and  the  tariff 
further  raised.  The  process  went  on  steadily;  as  wages 
rose  higher  and  higher,  the  tariff  was  also  raised  in  order 
that  the  employers  should  be  enabled  to  pay  the  rising 
wages.  The  wage  earners  are,  accordingly,  now  fully 
persuaded  that  their  interests  require  very  high  duties 
to  secure  constant  employment,  and  to  secure  it  at  a 
high  rate  of  pay.  Were  the  employers  only  interested, 
the  high  duties  might  possibly  disappear,  to  be  re- 
placed by  a  tariff  for  revenue  only,  for  this  would,  of 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  83 

course,  benefit  the  wage-earner  regarded  as  a  con- 
sumer, but  the  latter  thinks  of  himself  chiefly  as  a 
producer  and  prefers  high  wages  to  cheaper  commodi- 
ties. How  far  this  happens  elsewhere,  I  cannot  say. 
It  certainly  happens  in  Australasia. 

I  am  here  neither  defending  nor  condemning  any 
particular  fiscal  policy,  but  am  concerned  only  to  in- 
dicate the  effect  which  high  tariffs  have  upon  interna- 
tional relations.  These  effects  are  twofold.  In  the 
first  place,  they  have  furnished  many  occasions  for 
disputes  between  States.  Every  State  that  has  an 
interest  in  getting  the  largest  possible  market  for  its 
products,  desires  to  induce,  or  (if  it  has  the  power)  to 
compel  every  other  State  to  admit  those  products  to 
its  market,  either  free  of  duty  or  at  a  tariff  low  enough 
to  enable  them  to  be  largely  sold,  while  most  States 
desire  to  keep  their  tariffs  high  enough  to  give  a  sub- 
stantial advantage  to  their  own  producers.  Hence  the 
scale  of  duties  on  imports  has  become  a  constant  sub- 
ject of  negotiations  between  States. 

When  governments  succeed  in  reaching  those  ar- 
rangements which  are  called  Commercial  Treaties,  by 
which  reciprocal  abatements  of  import  duties  are  con- 
ceded so  that  the  producers  in  each  country  are  able  to 
count  on  a  considerable  sale  in  the  market  of  the  other, 
there  is  a  prospect  that  trade  between  them  may  be- 
come brisk,  and  as  the  peoples  get  to  know  one  another, 
their  common  advantage  may  induce  friendliness. 
These  treaties  are  usually  made  on  the  Bismarckian 
basis  of  Do  ut  des;  I  give  you  something  to  get  some- 
thing from  you.  It  is  a  "deal"  wherein  each  nation 
makes  some  concession  from  its  normal  tariff.  An  il- 
lustrative instance  occurs  to  me  in  the  case  of  a  treaty 


84  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

which  I  had  long  ago  to  negotiate  with  Spain.  By  it 
Great  Britain  lowered  her  duties  on  certain  Spanish 
wines  in  return  for  a  lowering  by  Spain  of  her  duties 
on  certain  British  textile  goods.  I  remember  taking 
the  treaty  to  Mr.  Gladstone,  who  was  then  Prune  Min- 
ister, and  asking  him  whether  he  had  any  objection. 
He  "hummed  and  hawed"  and  looked  a  little  askance 
at  it,  but  said  at  last  that  though  he  saw  in  it  a  slight 
deviation  from  sound  fiscal  principles,  he  would  not 
object  to  it  if  the  Foreign  Office  desired  it,  and  so  it 
was  ratified.  It  did  not,  however,  last  very  long.  As 
usually  happens  in  such  cases,  the  Spanish  textile 
manufacturers  went  to  their  Government  and  said  that 
they  were  displeased  at  seeing  the  duty  on  British  tex- 
tiles lowered,  and  would  rather  go  back  to  the  higher 
tariff.  The  Spanish  Government  assented,  for  the 
manufacturers  could  influence  votes,  and  the  treaty  was 
after  a  while  allowed  to  expire. 

That  sort  of  thing  frequently  happens.  The  famous 
commercial  treaty  which  Cobden  negotiated  with  Louis 
Napoleon,  in  1860,  was  made  for  a  term  of  years,  and 
then,  at  the  instance  of  French  industrials,  was  not 
renewed.  The  policy  of  France  has  latterly  been  to 
make  her  commercial  agreements  for  much  shorter  peri- 
ods than  was  the  practice  of  Germany.  In  every  coun- 
try objections  are  likely  to  be  raised  by  interested  sec- 
tions and  when  the  working  of  such  a  treaty  has  created 
discontent  in  either,  or  both,  of  the  contracting  coun- 
tries, each  Government  tries  to  coerce  the  other  into 
giving  it  more  favorable  terms.  Then  ensues  what  is 
called  a  Tariff  War,  in  which  each  State  raises  its  tariffs 
higher  and  higher  in  the  hope  of  "bluffing"  the  other 
into  compliance  with  its  own  demand.  There  was  some 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  85 

time  ago  such  a  conflict  between  Italy  and  France,  and 
another  (some  time  before  the  Great  War)  between 
Russia  and  Germany,  in  which  in  both  countries,  pro- 
ducers as  well  as  consumers,  suffered,  and  the  com- 
promise to  which  the  contending  States  were  ulti- 
mately driven  did  not  allay  the  irritation  which  strife 
had  created. 

The  obstacles  to  trade  offered  by  custom  houses  have 
sometimes  brought  about  a  commercial  union  of  inde- 
pendent States  for  the  purposes  of  the  duties  to  be 
imposed  on  the  import  or  export  of  goods.  This  hap- 
pened when  the  thirteen  States  of  the  North  Ameri- 
can Confederation  united  in  the  National  Government 
set  up  by  the  National  Constitution  of  1788-89.  A 
later  case  was  the  formation  of  a  Zollverein  (literally, 
Tolls  Union)  in  1828-34  by  the  several  kingdoms  and 
principalities,  except  Austria,  which  constituted  the 
then  existing  Germanic  Confederation,  a  case  remark- 
able, because  it  helped  to  lead  forward  to  the  union 
of  all  those  States  in  the  German  Empire,  established 
in  1871.  This  Union  still  subsists,  though  now  under 
a  republican  form,  hi  the  German  realm  of  to-day, 
which  continues  to  have  a  certain  federal  character. 
An  opposite  phenomenon  is  seen  in  the  case  of  six 
countries,  each  of  which,  though  all  of  the  six  are 
legally  parts  of  the  same  monarchy  and  have  a  com- 
mon foreign  policy,  has,  nevertheless,  come  to  possess 
its  own  system  of  customs  dues.  In  that  union  of  self- 
governing  commonwealths,  which  is  popularly  called 
the  British  Empire,  Great  Britain  and  all  the  five 
British  self-governing  dominions  (Canada,  New- 
foundland, Australia,  New  Zealand,  South  Africa) 
have  each  one  its  own  tariff,  enacted  by  its  own  legis- 


86  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

lature.  No  two  have  the  same  tariff.  You  will  doubt- 
less remember  that  in  1911,  a  commercial  treaty  (sub- 
sequently disapproved  by  the  Canadian  Parliament) 
was  negotiated  between  the  United  States  and  the  Do- 
minion of  Canada  without  the  interference  of  Great 
Britain.  When  some  years  ago  a  group  of  British  poli- 
ticians were  advocating  the  formation  of  a  uniform 
tariff  for  all  the  territories  of  the  British  Crown  they 
were  soon  forced  to  drop  the  project,  because  it  became 
clear  that  each  Dominion  wished  to  have  its  own  tariff, 
even  when  that  tariff  bore  hard  upon  articles  exported 
from  Great  Britain.  Each  was  willing  to  give  the 
mother  country  some  preference  in  its  market,  but 
would  not  consent  to  admit  her  products  free  of  duty, 
or  to  adopt  the  British  scale  of  import  duties,  for  the 
manufacturers  in  the  several  Dominions,  and  the  work- 
men they  employed,  feared  the  competition  of  British 
producers. 

One  class  of  cases  needs  mention  in  which  special 
reasons  may  induce  States  to  set  up,  for  reasons  other 
than  commercial,  tariffs  taking  certain  articles  out  of 
the  category  of  those  which  can  be  dealt  with  on  the 
principles  usually  applicable  to  commercial  relations. 
When  any  country  is  so  far  behind  in  the  arts  of  indus- 
trial production  that  its  workshops  cannot  produce 
articles  needed  for  the  purposes  of  war,  such  as  heavy 
guns  or  armor-plated  ships,  at  a  profit  to  the  producer, 
such  a  nation  may  feel  itself  obliged  to  provide  for  a 
supply  of  these  articles  in  war  time  by  placing  upon 
ironwares  and  certain  other  substances  used  hi  war, 
duties  sufficiently  high  to  make  it  profitable  to  produce 
them  at  home.  Such  conditions  take  the  case  out  of  the 
operation  of  normal  economic  principles.  Russia  was 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  87 

long  in  this  position.  She  could  not,  owing  to  the  back- 
wardness of  her  industries  and  her  geographical  posi- 
tion, afford  to  depend  upon  other  countries  for  articles 
essential  to  her  military  safety,  so  she  maintained  a  high 
tariff  on  those  articles,  and  foreign  firms  established 
factories  in  her  territory.  It  may,  however,  be  main- 
tained that  she  would  have  done  better  to  grant  a  sub- 
vention or  bounty  to  the  home  manufacturers  rather 
than  encourage  them  by  a  tariff,  for  a  tariff  makes  the 
goods  to  which  it  applies  dearer  to  all  purchasers,  and 
in  so  doing  sometimes  hampers  other  industries  by  rais- 
ing the  price  of  articles  which  they  need  for  their  own 
manufacturing  production.  In  this  instance,  so  far 
from  free  trade  killing  war,  it  was  war,  or  rather  the 
fear  of  war,  that  was  killing  free  trade.  There  is  visible 
in  Australia,  and,  indeed,  in  some  other  countries,  a 
sentiment,  assuming  the  guise  of  patriotic  self-reliance, 
that  the  country  should  be  self-sufficing,  able  to  provide 
herself  with  everything  she  needs  which  climatic  con- 
ditions do  not  absolutely  forbid  her  to  produce,  even  if 
in  so  doing  she  incurs  heavy  economic  loss.  This  is  a 
strange  and  futile  resistance  to  those  laws  of  geography 
and  natural  development  which  have  given  special  op- 
portunities to  particular  regions  and  peoples.  Why 
grow  bananas  under  glass  in  Norway  if  you  can  import 
them  from  Jamaica?  Which  of  us  would  think  of 
learning  to  do  something  badly  which  others  can  do 
better  for  us,  be  it  playing  the  fiddle,  or  painting,  or 
conducting  a  lawsuit,  or  mending  a  motor  car? 

If  you  ask  what  has  proved  in  fact  to  be  the  influ- 
ence of  commercial  considerations  in  preserving  peace 
by  making  each  nation  unwilling  to  quarrel  with  those 
to  whom  it  profitably  sells  and  from  whom  it  profitably 


88  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

buys,  two  recent  instances  may  be  cited  to  throw  light 
on  the  question — instances  which  show  how  these  con- 
siderations, on  which  Cobden  and  other  eminent  men 
who  followed  him  have  set  high  value,  failed  to  have 
their  expected  effect. 

Russia  was  before  1914  one  of  the  best  markets 
which  her  great  neighbor,  Germany,  had  for  manu- 
factured goods,  and  was  also  one  of  the  most  promis- 
ing fields  for  the  employment  of  German  capital  in 
industrial  enterprises.  The  prosperity  and  purchasing 
power  of  Russia  were  growing  fast,  so  German  manu- 
facturers had  a  cogent  motive  for  desiring  Russia's 
prosperity  and  for  extending  the  very  profitable  trade 
they  were  driving  wi£h  her.  Nevertheless,  this  mo- 
tive did  not  prevent  the  German  Government  from  go- 
ing to  war  with  Russia  in  1914,  a  step  contemplated  as 
probable  for  some  time  previously,  as  was  shown  by  the 
newspaper  campaigns  which  the  German  and  the  Rus- 
sian newspapers  carried  on  against  one  another.  The 
action  of  Germany  may  have  been  due  partly  to  a  fear 
of  Russia's  material  growth,  which  made  her  think  it 
best  to  strike  at  once,  partly  to  the  confident  belief 
that  Russia,  even  though  leagued  with  France,  could 
be  easily  overthrown  and  brought  into  a  commercial 
subservience  which  would  enable  German  traders  to 
dominate  Russia  and  hold  it  as  their  exclusive  pre- 
serve. Be  this  as  it  may,  considerations  of  imme- 
diate economic  loss  counted  for  little  or  nothing.  Even 
the  leading  German  manufacturers  and  financiers  did 
not  try  to  prevent  war. 

The  other  case  is  still  more  instructive.  For  many 
years  before  1914  the  growing  commercial  prosperity 
of  Germany  had  made  for  the  expansion  of  the  trade 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  89 

between  her  and  England.  Among  all  foreign  coun- 
tries she  was  England's  largest  customer,  and  both 
countries  were  profiting  immensely  by  this  trade. 
Though  they  competed  hi  some  kinds  of  goods,  they 
were  in  other  kinds  complementary  to  one  an- 
other, for  English  manufacturers  bought  from  Ger- 
many many  partly  manufactured  articles  and  after 
finishing  them  exported  them  to  Germany  as  well  as 
elsewhither.  Despite  the  check  on  imports  which  the 
high  German  tariff  imposed,  the  German  market  was 
extremely  valuable  to  England,  and  the  English  mar- 
ket no  less  valuable  to  Germany.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  had  begun  to  exist  in  English  manufacturing  and 
mercantile  circles  a  certain  jealousy  of  the  rapid  ex- 
tension of  German  trade,  whi^h  was  supplanting  that 
of  England  in  certain  markets,  such  as  those  of  Spanish 
America,  the  importance  of  which  British  exporters 
had  been  the  first  to  discover.  This  German  advance 
was  sometimes  attributed  to  the  active  support  which 
the  German  Government  gave  to  its  own  subjects,  but 
it  was  due  much  more  to  the  assiduity  of  German  busi- 
ness firms  and  their  agents  in  studying  the  require- 
ments of  the  foreign  customer,  and  to  the  tireless  dili- 
gence of  their  agents  on  the  spot  in  mastering  the 
languages  spoken  in  the  countries  where  they  were 
employed  and  in  pushing  their  goods  by  every  means 
available.  British  travellers  admitted,  and  could  not 
but  admire,  the  energy  which  the  Germans  threw  into 
their  work.  This  vexation  at  the  success  of  their  com- 
petitors sometimes  found  expression  in  the  British 
press,  and  any  such  expressions  were  exaggerated  in 
the  German  press,  for  there  are  everywhere  some 
newspapers  willing  to  make  mischief.  Yet  the  jealousy 


90  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

aforesaid  did  not  really  chill  the  relations  of  the  two 
peoples,  for  it  was  checked  by  the  English  sense  of  fair 
play,  which  recognized  that  hard  work  deserved  suc- 
cess, and  it  certainly  did  not  affect  the  official  policy 
of  England  towards  Germany,  which  continued  to  be 
friendly  till  the  extension  of  the  German  navy  raised 
apprehensions  of  a  different  nature. 

The  many  English  friends  of  Germany,  who  did 
their  best  for  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  good-will 
between  the  nations — and  especially  those  of  us  who 
knew  Germany,  who  had  lived  in  Germany  or  had  in 
days  of  youth  studied  in  German  universities,  together 
with  those  who  loved  German  literature  and  German 
music — all  these  refused  to  believe  that  Germany 
could  be  seriously  hostile  to  England,  and  also  regarded 
the  common  interest  that  both  countries  had  in  their 
great  and  growing  trade  as  being  a  valuable  asset  for 
the  preservation  of  peace.  But  these  cool-headed 
Germans  had  to  contend  in  their  own  country  against 
the  feeling  that  it  was  unfair  that  so  great  a  mercantile 
State  as  Germany  had  become  should  have  possessions 
abroad  less  extensive  and  less  worth  having  for  busi- 
ness purposes  than  were  the  dominions  of  Britain  or 
of  France.  That  she  had  not  possessions  so  valuable 
was  of  course  due  to  the  fact  that  Holland,  France  and 
Britain  had  begun  to  be  exploring  and  colonizing  Pow- 
ers in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  when 
there  was  virtually  no  German  State,  but  only,  under 
the  semblance  of  an  Empire,  a  congeries  of  petty,  al- 
most independent,  monarchies,  none  of  them  occupied 
with  enterprise  by  sea.  Had  the  Netherlands  been  po- 
litically a  part  of  a  united  Germany  in  those  two  later 
centuries,  as  they  were  in  the  eleventh  and  twelfth 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  91 

centuries,  the  course  of  history  would  have  been  en- 
tirely different,  and  half  of  the  tropical  world  might 
have  been  German. 

However,  as  I  have  said,  many  persons  in  England, 
and  some  in  Germany,  believed  that  the  reciprocal 
benefits  which  the  two  countries  drew  from  their  trade 
constituted,  if  not  a  security,  yet  a  strong  force  making 
for  peace.  We  in  England  were  mistaken.  See  what 
happened  hi  1914! 

When  the  decisive  moment  came  at  which  the  Ger- 
man Government  had  to  decide  whether  it  would  by 
entering  Belgium  bring  England  into  the  war  that  was 
already  breaking  out  against  Russia  and  France,  and 
when  the  British  Government  and  Parliament  had  to 
decide  whether  they  would  enter  the  war  as  the  oppo- 
nents of  Germany,  all  these  material  considerations, 
all  thought  of  the  economic  advantages  which  each 
country  derived  from  peaceful  commercial  intercourse, 
vanished  like  a  morning  mist  in  the  presence  of  those 
other  motives  which  drove  the  nations  into  war,  Ger- 
many, it  would  seem,  confidently,  England  regretfully. 
As  a  dam  gives  way  when  a  waterspout  has  filled  the 
valley  above  it  with  a  raging  torrent,  so  that  founda- 
tion of  common  material  interests  which  counseled 
both  to  keep  the  peace,  proved  fatally  insecure.  Politi- 
cal reasons  overcame  all  others.  Among  these  reasons 
there  was,  probably,  in  the  minds  of  many  Germans 
the  belief  that  a  successful  war  would  make  Germany 
supreme  hi  industry  and  trade  as  well  as  in  the  arts 
of  war,  and  enrich  her  with  the  colonial  possessions  she 
desired.  Nevertheless,  there  was  one  famous  captain 
of  commerce,  Herr  Ballin,  the  head  of  the  greatest 
shipping  enterprise  hi  the  world,  the  Hamburg- Ameri- 


92  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

can  Company,  who,  when  he  perceived  that  the  coun- 
sels of  peace  had  not  prevailed,  saw  the  approaching 
ruin  of  the  vast  business  his  energy  had  built  up,  and, 
like  Ahithophel  in  the  Book  of  Samuel  when  his  wise 
counsel  was  not  followed,  put  an  end  in  despair  to  his 
own  life.  Such  incidents  move  us  all,  even  in  the 
midst  of  a  world  catastrophe.  As  Virgil  says:  "Sunt 
lacrymce  rerum  et  mentem  mortalia  tangunt" 

A  third  set  of  questions  that  brings  nations  into 
relations  affecting  their  commercial  intercourse  are 
those  belonging  to  trade  routes  and  the  transport  of 
goods  along  them.  First,  of  sea  routes.  Every  nation 
desires  above  all  things  free  access  to  that  highroad 
to  everywhere,  which  the  oldest  of  poets  called  thirty 
centuries  ago  the  Wide-Wayed  Sea.  Russia  is  the 
only  great  State  that  has  found  this  access  through 
her  northern  ports  closed  during  the  winter  by  ice, 
and  through  her  southern  ports  on  the  Black  Sea  liable 
to  be  at  any  time  closed  by  the  Power  which  holds  the 
shores  of  the  Bosphorus  and  Dardanelles.  She  haa 
long  sought  a  warm  water  harbor  on  the  Atlantic,  and 
thought  of  buying  one  from  Norway.  She  had,  before 
the  war,  got  a  sort  of  haven  on  the  Arctic  coast  west 
of  the  mouth  of  the  White  Sea,  but  eastwards  thence 
along  the  Siberian  and  Kamchatkan  coasts  there  was 
none  nearer  than  Vladivostock  on  the  Sea  of  Japan, 
unsurpassed  as  a  naval  station,  for  the  long  channel  of 
approach  is  eminently  defensible  and  capable  of  being 
kept  open  throughout  winter  by  an  ice  breaker.  The 
desire  for  this  warm  water  port  had  much  to  do  with 
Russia's  eastward  march  down  the  Amur  river;  and 
the  desire  for  uncontrolled  access  to  the  Mediterranean 
was  a  strong  motive  for  seeking  to  possess  Constant!- 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  93 

nople,  that  mistress  of  two  seas  whose  position  as  the 
meeting  point  of  Europe  and  Asia  has  given  it  a  unique 
international  importance.  The  passages  of  the  Sound 
and  the  Greater  and  Lesser  Belts  which  connect  the 
Baltic  with  the  Cattegat  and  North  Sea,  as  also  the 
isthmuses  which  are  now  traversed  by  the  canals  of 
Suez  and  Panama,  have,  as  everybody  knows,  given 
rise  to  controversies  and  negotiations  between  mari- 
time powers. 

The  claims  which  certain  nations  advanced  to  wide 
stretches  of  sea,  culminating  in  Spain's  assertion  of  a 
right  to  the  whole  of  the  Pacific  Ocean  and  Portugal's 
assertion  of  a  right  to  the  Atlantic  south  of  Morocco, 
as  well  as  to  the  whole  of  the  Indian  Ocean,  have  long 
been  obsolete,  and  it  is  hard  to  know  what  is  meant 
by  the  phrase,  "Freedom  of  the  Seas,"  which  has  been 
frequently  bandied  about  during  the  last  few  years, 
but  never  authoritatively  explained,  still  less  defined. 
As  the  seas  have  long  been  perfectly  and  equally  free 
to  all  vessels  in  peace  time,  the  phrase  must  appar- 
ently be  taken  to  refer  to  the  seas  when  they  become 
a  theater  of  war,  on  which  fleets  contend  as  armies 
fight  on  land,  and  on  which  warships  destroy  warships, 
and  capture  their  enemies,  as  enemy  forces  are  de- 
stroyed by  infantry,  cavalry  and  artillery.  But  what 
do  the  words  mean  as  applied  to  the  operations  of 
naval  war?  What  sort  of  "freedom"  is  desired  on  sea? 
Does  the  term  mean  that  no  nation  is  to  be  allowed  to 
possess  a  navy  of  preeminent  strength,  or  does  it  refer 
to  the  much  debated  right  of  warships  to  capture  the 
trading  ships  of  an  enemy  and  the  vessels  and  goods 
belonging  to  neutrals,  and  the  goods  of  an  enemy  car- 
ried in  neutral  ships?  (I  pass  by  the  right  of  blockad- 


94  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

ing  enemy  ports  and  the  questions  relating  to  contra- 
band, for  these  are  different  matters.)  There  is  much 
to  be  said,  on  both  sides,  about  these  rights  of  capture, 
but  they  do  not  seem  to  have  been  raised  in  the  nego- 
tiations that  have  followed  the  war,  and  they  need  not 
be  discussed  here,  though  they  will  doubtless  be  dis- 
cussed hereafter. 

There  have  been  many  controversies  between  States 
over  the  use  for  navigation  of  rivers  dividing  two 
States,  or  descending  from  one  State  into  another,  and 
treaties  often  contain  provisions  regulating  the  respec- 
tive rights  of  riparian  States.  A  good  example  is  fur- 
nished by  the  Danube,  the  lower  navigation  of  which 
was  placed  by  the  Treaty  of  Paris  in  1856  under  the 
control  of  an  International  Commission,  on  which  the 
States  interested  were  represented  and  which  worked 
efficiently.  Some  great  streams  are,  like  the  Amazonas, 
entirely  open,  Brazil  having  very  properly  recognized 
the  rights  of  Peru  and  Ecuador  to  have  free  access  to 
the  Atlantic.  The  recent  Treaty  of  Versailles  has  dealt 
with  the  Vistula  and  the  Oder  and  the  Elbe  and  the 
Rhine;  and  Switzerland,  which  was  not  a  party  to  that 
treaty,  has  raised  points  affecting  her  rights  on  the  last 
named  river.  The  control  of  the  lower  part  of  the 
Scheldt  was  a  subject  of  constant  contention  between 
Holland,  which  held  (and  still  holds)  both  banks, 
and  the  Power  to  which  Antwerp  belonged,  so  that  the 
Emperor  Joseph  II  said  that  if  the  Dutch  would  allow 
his  ships  to  pass  freely  through  from  that  city  to  India 
he  would  drop  all  the  other  grievances  against  the 
United  Provinces  whereof  he  complained. 

Water  serves  other  purposes  besides  navigation.    It 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  96 

is  inhabited  by  fish.  Flowing  water  is  not  only 
a  source  of  mechanical  power,  but  can  be  em- 
ployed for  irrigation.  No  controversies  have  given 
more  trouble  than  those  raised  over  fishing  rights. 
Those  recognized  by  the  Treaty  of  1783  as  existing  on 
the  coasts  of  Newfoundland  and  Canada  were  a  bone  of 
contention  between  the  American  and  British  Govern- 
ments from  1783  to  1910,  when  they  were  finally  settled 
by  arbitration — a  remarkable  arbitration,  because  it  is, 
so  far  as  I  know,  the  only,  or  almost  the  only,  case  in 
history  where  both  parties  were  perfectly  well  satisfied. 
A  useful  illustration  both  of  the  intricate  questions 
which  arise  when  rivers  are  concerned,  and  of  the  best 
way  of  settling  such  questions,  may  be  found  in  the  pe- 
culiar and  instructive  case  of  two  streams,  whose  course 
lies  partly  in  the  Northwestern  United  States  and 
partly  in  Western  Canada,  viz.,  the  St.  Mary's  River 
and  the  Milk  River.  These  two  streams,  the  courses 
of  which  pass  backwards  and  forwards  from  the  United 
States  into  Canada  and  from  Canada  into  the  United 
States,  are  serviceable  to  both  countries,  partly  for 
irrigation,  partly  for  navigation,  and  each  country 
could  inflict  inconvenience  on  the  inhabitants  of  the 
other  by  asserting  rights  of  ownership  within  its  own 
territory  without  regard  to  the  interests  of  the  neigh- 
bor country.  To  prevent  any  such  unneighborly  ac- 
tion, and  to  provide  for  the  best  use  of  the  waters  for 
the  benefit  of  both  countries,  a  treaty  was  drafted  in 
1908,  and  finally  approved  in  1910,  which  outlined  an 
arrangement  meant  to  secure  that  common  beneficial 
use,  by  "pooling"  the  waters  of  both,  treating  them  as 
one  common  stream  to  be  used  equally  for  the  pur- 


96  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

poses  of  the  two  countries.1  The  carrying  out  of  the 
scheme  was  entrusted  to  an  International  Commission 
composed  of  delegates  from  both  the  United  States  and 
Canada,  with  very  wide  powers  of  adjusting  both  water 
questions  and  other  matters  which  might  from  time  to 
time  affect  the  economic  relations  of  the  two  peoples. 
This  Commission  has  worked  well  and  has  shown  itself 
capable  of  settling  controversial  questions  that  might 
have  given  rise  to  ill  feeling  had  each  nation  stood 
stiffly  upon  its  legal  rights,  especially  as  it  would  (in 
most  instances)  have  been  hard  to  say  what  the  legal 
rights  were. 

The  open  sea  is  open  to  all,  but  though  its  shores 
are  normally  under  the  sole  control  of  the  State  to 
which  they  belong,  still  inasmuch  as  some  use  of  the 
coasts  is  practically  indispensable  to  those  who  catch 
the  fish  in  the  adjoining  waters,  questions  are  apt  to 
arise  between  the  local  fishermen  and  those  who  come 
from  other  countries,  and  the  adjustment  of  these 
questions  may  become  difficult,  even  when  provisions 
regarding  them  have  been  inserted  in  treaties.  As  re- 
gards Newfoundland  the  respective  treaty  rights  of 
the  native  and  of  the  American  fisherman  had  repeat- 
edly led  to  friction,  which  lasted  till  the  arbitration  of 
1912.  France  also  attached  high  importance  to  the 
rights  hi  the  cod  fisheries  which  her  fishermen  enjoyed 
under  old  treaties,  because  the  fishing  vessels  which 
came  to  the  Banks  of  Newfoundland  every  spring  in 

1  It  is  a  pleasure  in  this  connection  to  pay  a  tribute  to  the  wisdom, 
tact  and  diplomatic  skill  of  Mr.  Elihu  Root,  with  whom  the  earlier 
negotiations  that  led  to  the  settlement  of  the  terms  of  that  treaty 
were  conducted,  and  also  to  the  judgment  and  fairness  of  Mr.  Robert 
Bacon,  who  succeeded  Mr.  Root  as  Secretary  of  State  and  in  whom 
America  has  lost,  during  the  war,  one  of  its  most  high-minded 
statesmen. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  97 

large  numbers  from  Brittany  and  Normandy  furnished 
the  reservoir  from  which  the  French  navy  drew  its 
supply  of  hardy  mariners.1 

Another  instance  of  a  different  kind  will  illustrate 
the  many  points  that  may  arise  where  the  subjects  of 
several  nations  pursue  their  occupations  in  the  same 
sea  area.  There  was  forty  years  ago  a  pernicious  traf- 
fic in  ardent  spirits  carried  on  in  the  North  Sea  by 
small  ships  which  sold  these  drinks  to  the  fishing  boats, 
demoralizing  their  crews  and  increasing  the  dangers 
that  belong  to  a  stormy  sea.  The  British  Government, 
anxious  for  the  welfare  of  its  fisher  folk,  tried  to  bring 
about  an  agreement  between  the  several  States  whose 
fishermen  frequented  these  waters,  and  asked  them  to 
join  in  enacting  a  sort  of  police  code  to  be  enforced 
upon  what  you  would  call  in  America  the  "floating 
saloons"  that  did  the  mischief.  France,  Holland,  Den- 
mark, Belgium  and  Norway  agreed,  but  the  German 
Government  held  out,  not  from  any  objection  to  tem- 
perance in  general,  but  at  the  instance,  as  we  were 
told,  of  a  small  group  of  distillers  and  liquor  dealers 
in  a  few  North  German  ports,  who  made  large  gains 
out  of  selling  their  poisonous  stuff  to  the  fishermen. 
Happening  to  hear  that  Bismarck  had  been  asking  for 
certain  facilities  for  German  steamers  in  the  harbor  of 
Hong  Kong,  which  our  colonial  authorities  had  been 
refusing,  I  communicated,  having  then  charge  of  the 
matter,  with  our  Colonial  authorities  at  Hong  Kong, 
explaining  the  point  to  them.  They  consented  to  grant 
the  facilities,  and  we  then  told  Bismarck  that  if  Ger- 
many would  join  in  our  proposed  restrictions  of  the 

1  One  of  the  questions  which  arose  between  Britain  and  France  was 
whether  lobsters  are  included  under  the  word  "fish." 


98  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

North  Sea  liquor  trade,  her  steamers  might  have  the 
berths  they  desired  in  the  harbor  of  Hong  Kong.  This 
"deal"  appealed  to  the  business  sense  of  the  great 
Chancellor,  who  was  never  above  small  gains.  The 
German  steamers  got  what  they  wanted  at  Hong  Kong, 
and  the  wished-for  police  rules  were  established  for  the 
North  Sea  under  the  authority  of  all  the  Powers  con- 
cerned. 

Stepping  from  water  to  dry  land,  I  may  remind 
you  that  trunk  lines  of  railroad  serving  the  various 
countries  they  traverse  affect  economic  as  well  as 
strategic  interests.  Railways  seek  not  only  the  short- 
est routes  and  the  most  populous  centers  of  industry, 
but  are  often  determined  in  their  course  by  the  physi- 
cal contour  of  the  country.  Where  they  are  obliged  to 
traverse  a  mountain  range  they  must  do  so  at  the  low- 
est possible  level,  and  with  the  fewest  possible  tunnels 
and  rock  cuttings.  No  railway  crosses  the  Pyrenees, 
but  five  have  since  1867  been  made  across  the  mam 
chain  of  the  Alps.  (There  are  indeed  six,  if  one  counts 
the  Semmering  and  Karst  line  from  Vienna  to  Triest.) 
Two  of  these  (Gothard  and  Simplon)  pass  through 
Switzerland,  and  there  was  much  negotiation  between 
the  four  great  States  whose  traffic  was  affected,  while 
efforts  were  made  by  governments,  and  by  the  citizens 
of  the  countries  concerned,  to  secure  shares  hi  the  com- 
panies that  built  the  lines.  The  neutrality  of  the  Swiss 
Confederation  has  become  more  important  than  ever 
from  the  military  consequence  these  lines  would  have 
could  belligerents  use  them.  It  is  of  enormous  benefit 
to  Europe  that  the  great  Transalpine  railroads  pass 
through  a  neutral  country,  and  a  neutral  country  that 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  99 

showed  in  the  recent  war  that  she  had  the  courage  to 
defend  her  neutrality. 

There  is  also  another  way  in  which  railroads  have 
come  into  politics.  Concessions  to  construct  them  are 
often  sought  by  rival  groups  of  capitalists  in  different 
countries,  and  Governments  do  their  best  to  secure  the 
concession  for  the  group  they  favor.  Much  political 
pressure,  as  well  as  other  inducements,  were  applied 
to  China  by  several  foreign  Powers,  and  some  of  these 
Powers  made  bargains  among  themselves  by  which 
their  respective  claims  to  a  share  were  appeased.  Some- 
thing similar  had  happened  in  Turkey,  where  at  last 
the  great  prize,  the  concession  of  an  extension  of  the 
Anatolian  railways  across  the  Taurus  range  and  the 
Amanus  to  Aleppo,  Carchemish,  Mosul  and  Bagdad 
was  secured  by  Germany.  The  apprehensions  of  Rus- 
sia and  England  delayed  the  completion  of  the  under- 
taking for  some  years,  but  their  opposition  was  finally 
dropped  in  1914,  just  before  the  war,1  and  the  tunnels 
through  the  two  mountain  ranges  were  finished  during 
the  war,  but  too  late  to  make  much  difference  to  mili- 
tary operations.  The  line  was  taken  out  of  German 
control  by  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  The  recent  con- 
struction of  a  railway  across  the  Desert  of  Suez  and 
Sinai,  which  links  up  Egypt  to  the  lines  running  from 
the  Mediterranean  coast  northwards  to  Damascus, 
Horns  and  Aleppo,  and  the  long  Mecca  Pilgrims  line 
constructed  by  Sultan  Abdul  Hamid  from  Damascus  to 
Medina,  may  have  no  small  influence  on  the  politics  as 

1  Surprise  has  often  been  expressed  that  the  advantage  conceded 
to  Germany  obtained  by  the  withdrawal  of  opposition  to  the  Bagdad 
railway  and  by  the  very  large  territories  yielded  to  her  in  Africa 
did  not  operate  to  dissuade  her  from  entering  on  war  at  that  moment. 


100  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

well  as  the  trade  of  all  these  regions.  These  railways 
made  possible  the  existence  of  such  a  thing  as  the  new 
Arab  kingdom  of  the  Hedjaz,  for  without  it  the  diffi- 
culty of  reaching  Eastern  Syria  from  Mecca  would  be 
very  great. 

This  brings  us  to  a  fourth  branch  of  the  subject,  the 
influence  of  International  Finance  upon  diplomacy. 
European  States  may  be  classified  as  the  Lending 
Countries,  France,  England,  Holland  and  Belgium, 
and  the  Borrowing  Countries,  the  chief  among  which 
have  been  Russia,  Italy,  Spain,  Portugal  and  Turkey. 
Germany  has,  on  the  whole,  followed  the  principle  of 
Polonius,  "Neither  a  borrower  nor  a  lender  be."  She 
used  to  spend  nearly  all  her  disposable  capital  either 
at  home  or  in  her  Colonial  dominions,  but  some  was 
invested  in  Italy,  and  the  influence  it  gave  her  there 
was  actively,  though,  as  it  turned  out,  unsuccessfully, 
exerted  to  induce  Italy  to  remain  neutral  in  the  late 
war.  To-day  almost  the  only  country  that  has  capital 
to  invest  is  the  United  States,  and  the  impoverishment 
of  the  States  that  were  recently  belligerents  gives  Amer- 
ican financial  interests  an  influence  almost  without 
precedent  in  history,  the  exercise  of  which  may  make 
a  great  difference  to  the  welfare  of  the  Old  World. 

That  capital,  superabundant  in  one  country,  should 
be  lent  to  another  which  needs  it  for  the  execution  of 
public  works,  such  as  railway  building,  or  for  the  de- 
velopment of  natural  resources,  such  as  mines,  or  for 
providing  plant  to  work  large-scale  industries — this  is 
natural  and  legitimate.  English  capital  went  in  this 
way  at  one  time  to  America  and  afterwards  to  Argen- 
tina, and  no  political  harm  followed.  American  capital 
would  go  now  to  Siberia,  if  Siberia  were  delivered  from 
Bolshevik  rule,  and  it  would  give  an  enormous  lift  to 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  101 

that  vast  country.  But  there  are  cases  in  which  the 
results  of  the  process  have  been  unfortunate.  The 
making  to  Turkey  of  loans  which  were  in  some  cases 
guaranteed  by  the  governments  of  West  European 
countries  gave  the  lenders  in  those  countries  a  regret- 
table interest  in  the  maintenance  of  a  detestable  tyr- 
anny, and  the  bulk  of  the  money  which  the  Turks  ob- 
tained was  spent  upon  ships  and  guns  to  be  used  to  pro- 
long that  tyranny,  while  the  rest  was  either  wasted  or 
appropriated  by  Turkish  Ministers.  Similarly  the  im- 
mense sums  borrowed  by  that  profligate  rascal,  Ismail, 
formerly  Khedive  of  Egypt,  from  West  European  finan- 
ciers were  consumed  in  a  luxury  which  did  not  benefit 
the  country.  When  its  revenues  could  no  longer  pay 
the  interest  on  these  loans,  the  bondholders  pressed 
their  governments  to  intervene.  The  Western  Govern- 
ments, acting  for  their  own  and  the  other  creditors,  got 
the  Sultan  to  depose  Ismail,  and  set  up  what  was  called 
a  Dual  Financial  Control,  which  ultimately  led  to  a 
British  Protectorate,  and  so  to  the  severance  of  Egypt 
from  Turkey,  with  a  consequent  benefit  to  the  Egyp- 
tian masses. 

Upon  the  present  situation  in  some  of  the  Caribbean 
Republics,  bristling  with  problems  still  unsolved,  I 
need  not  dwell,  for  you  are  more  familiar  than  I  can 
claim  to  be  with  the  events  which  have  led  to  the  as- 
sumption by  the  United  States  of  a  certain  slight  meas- 
ure of  financial  influence  in  Central  America,  as  well  as 
a  control  of  the  finances  of  San  Domingo  and  Haiti. 
The  mention  of  Latin  American  countries  suggests  a 
class  of  cases  in  which,  as  in  Turkey,  loans  have  in- 
truded themselves  into  politics.  The  dictators  of  some 
of  the  Republics,  calling  themselves  Presidents,  have 
been  wont  to  borrow  large  sums  in  Europe,  to  spend 

LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIF< 


102  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

part  of  such  sums  on  paying  the  troops  by  which  they 
kept  power,  and  to  invest  the  balance  in  France,  so  that 
when  they  were  threatened  with  dethronement  or  tired 
of  their  unquiet  life,  they  retired  to  Paris,  there  to 
spend  their  ill-gotten  gains.  Guzman  Blanco  of 
Venezuela,  whom  London  as  well  as  Paris  used  to  see  in 
the  heyday  of  his  fortunes,  was  an  instance,  and  not  the 
worst,  for  he  was  less  bloodthirsty  than  some  of  his 
fellows.  When  the  interest  on  these  loans  ceased  to 
be  paid,  the  European  bondholding  creditors  pressed 
their  Governments  to  compel  payment  by  the  dictators 
or  their  successors,  which  the  latter  were  unwilling,  as 
well  as  usually  unable,  to  do,  and  political  complica- 
tions naturally  followed.  You  remember  the  case  of 
Venezuela  in  1903,  which  may  prove  to  have  been  the 
last,  for  it  is  now  generally  felt  that  those  who  lend 
their  money  to  an  improvident  or  unscrupulous  gov- 
ernment, knowing  the  risks,  and  getting  high  interest 
because  the  risk  is  great,  are  not  entitled  to  ask  the 
aid  of  their  own  governments  to  save  them  from  loss 
in  a  speculation  which  has  turned  out  ill. 

The  case  of  the  French  loans  to  Russia  shows  an- 
other form  in  which  financial  motives  can  affect  poli- 
tics. When  France,  after  the  war  scare  of  1875,  found 
herself  alone  in  the  world  and  exposed  to  possible 
attack  from  a  more  numerous  and  more  strongly  armed 
neighbor  nation,  she  began  to  look  abroad  for  allies, 
and  after  a  tune  found  one.  As  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment desired  to  obtain  loans  of  money,  the  political 
interests  of  France  made  its  Government  indicate  its 
good  will  towards  Russia  as  a  borrower,  and  French  in- 
vestors responded,  so  Russia  succeeded  in  borrow- 
ing from  them  very  large  sums,  estimated  at  about  five 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  103 

billions  of  dollars  in  all,  and  that  not  only  from  the 
great  but  from  small  capitalists  also.  This  gave  the 
French  creditors  a  concern  in  the  welfare  of  Russia 
which  drew  close  the  relations  between  the  two  coun- 
tries. The  revolution  in  Russia  reduced  the  value  of 
her  bonds  and  stopped  the  payment  of  interest  on  them, 
for  it  led,  after  eight  months,  to  the  installation  in 
power  of  the  Bolshevik  Communists,  who  declared 
themselves  hostile  to  and  sought  by  their  propaganda 
to  overthrow  all  so-called  "bourgeois"  Governments. 
But  the  French  have  not  lost  the  hope  that  there  may 
yet  be  established  in  Russia  some  Government  which 
will  recognize  and  fulfill  the  obligations  incurred  by  its 
Tsarist  predecessor,  and  there  are  Russian  exiles  well 
entitled  to  speak  who  share  that  hope. 

There  is  another  form  besides  loans  to  Governments 
in  which  financiers  acquire  interests  in  foreign  coun- 
tries, by  obtaining  from  the  governments  of  the  latter 
grants  of  natural  sources  of  wealth,  or  concessions  for 
the  construction  of  railways  or  harbors,  or  for  the 
building  of  warships.  As  these  contracts  often  promise 
large  profits  they  are  eagerly  sought  for,  and  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  State  to  which  the  would-be  contractor 
belongs  is  besought  to  press  his  offer  and  to  declare  that 
the  acceptance  of  it  will  be  taken  as  a  mark  of  political 
friendliness.  In  certain  countries  persuasion  is  accom- 
panied by  material  inducements  intended  to  secure  the 
favor  of  the  Minister  who  has  the  contract  to  dispose  of. 
Sometimes  when  a  foreign  Government  lends  money  or 
influences  its  subjects  to  lend  it,  this  is  done  on  the 
condition  that  lucrative  orders  are  given  to  the  sub- 
jects of  the  lending  State.  In  such  countries  as  Turkey 
and  Persia,  nothing  could  be  obtained  without  bribery, 


104  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

and  the  briber  recouped  himself  by  contriving  to 
squeeze  out  of  the  contract  a  good  deal  more  than  the 
stipulated  payments.  When,  as  often  happened,  dis- 
putes arose  over  the  fulfillment  of  a  contract,  the  con- 
tractor's Government  was  expected  to  take  up  his  case. 
It  was  no  small  part  of  the  work  of  many  an  Embassy 
or  Legation,  and  indeed  the  most  tedious  and  disagree- 
able part,  to  argue  these  cases,  and  to  resist  the  at- 
tempts which  some  Governments,  such  as  those  of  the 
less  reputable  among  Spanish  American  Republics, 
made  to  confiscate  the  existing  rights  of  one  foreign 
firm  in  order  to  have  something  to  sell  to  another  for- 
eigner. These  squabbles  did  not  often  lead  to  a  suspen- 
sion of  diplomatic  relations,  but  they  caused  irritation, 
and  tended  to  prevent  the  best  kind  of  foreign  firms 
from  dealing  with  the  countries  where  trouble  was  to  be 
expected. 

To  what  extent  ought  Governments  to  mix  policy 
with  business,  and  become,  as  it  has  been  said,  "drum- 
ming agents"  or  commercial  travelers,  for  their 
citizens? 

Some  countries  have  gone  far  in  this  direction.  Ger- 
many and  Belgium  used  to  be  quoted  as  examples, 
whereas  the  Governments  of  France  and  England  were 
complained  of  by  eager  promoters  of  enterprises  as  not 
going  far  enough.  The  English  Foreign  Office  was 
(in  the  days  of  which  I  can  speak  from  personal  knowl- 
edge) rather  cautious  and  reserved,  and  that  for  three 
reasons.  It  did  not  wish  to  appear  to  favor  any  par- 
ticular British  firm  more  than  any  other.  A  sense  of 
dignity  made  it  desire  to  stand  apart  from  the  pecu- 
niary interests  its  citizens  were  trying  to  push,  though 
it  recognized  the  duty  of  urging  that  any  vested  rights 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  105 

they  had  honestly  acquired  should  be  honestly  dealt 
with.  It  disliked  the  Bismarckian  methods  of  letting 
material  considerations  affect  the  lines  of  general  in- 
ternational policy,  and  desired  its  envoys  to  keep  out 
of  the  purlieus  of  backstairs  intrigue,  which  in  capitals 
one  could  name  resemble  the  dirty  lanes  of  their 
meaner  quarters.  Some  contracts  were  probably  lost 
to  British  citizens,  but  the  character  of  the  nation  in 
international  relations  was  kept  at  a  pretty  high  level. 
Several  other  States  maintained  the  same  standard. 

It  has  been  frequently  said  of  late  years  that  in  divers 
countries  the  great  firms  which  manufacture  muni- 
tions of  war  have  endeavored  to  influence  military  and 
naval  expenditure,  and  resorted  with  that  purpose  to 
a  secret  alarmist  propaganda,  or  even  tried,  devil- 
ish as  such  a  course  would  be,  to  stir  up  ill  feeling  be- 
tween nations,  in  order  to  induce  governments  to  pro- 
pose and  legislatures  to  appropriate  large  sums  of 
money  for  such  expenditure.  This  may  have  happened 
in  countries  which  it  is  better  not  to  name — I  have 
not  sufficient  knowledge  of  the  facts  to  express  an 
opinion — but  how  much  practical  effect  it  may  have 
had  is  another  question.  If  the  thing  was  ever  at- 
tempted in  England,  which  I  doubt,  I  do  not  believe 
that  the  policy  of  the  nation  was  affected  by  it.  I  am 
pretty  certain  it  did  not  happen  in  America. 

The  subject  dealt  with  in  this  lecture  is  so  large  that 
it  has  been  necessary  to  omit  many  facts  which  would 
have  illustrated  both  the  points  already  referred  to, 
and  some  others  of  less  consequence.  I  must  now 
hasten  on  to  submit  concisely  the  general  conclusions 
arising  from  a  review  of  the  whole  matter. 

The  States  whose  international  policy  has  been 


106  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

throughout  their  history  most  affected  by  commercial 
considerations  have  been  the  colonizing  and  seafaring 
States.  Spain  tried  to  keep  all  other  nations  from  trad- 
ing with  tropical  and  South  America,  and  with  her 
possessions  in  the  Far  East.  Portugal  tried  to  keep 
other  nations  out  of  the  East  Indies.  Both  countries 
showed  a  singular  incapacity  for  making  the  most  of 
their  transmarine  possessions,  and  did  not  in  the  long 
run  gain  wealth  or  strength  by  their  exclusive  policy. 
Though  Spain  was  for  a  tune  enriched,  the  revenues  she 
drew  from  Mexico  and  Peru  may  have  done  her  more 
harm  than  good.  Holland  managed  things  better,  and 
has  continued  not  only  to  hold  but  to  profit  by  her  pos- 
sessions in  the  East  Indian  archipelago.  As  a  country 
living  largely  by  trade,  her  home  territory  small  and 
not  very  productive,  trade  ruled  her  policy,  sometimes 
involving  her  in  strife  with  her  rivals.  Commerce  had 
not  quite  so  much  to  do  with  French  policy,  but  it  was 
linked  with  the  impulse  which  a  restlessly  active  and 
high-spirited  nation  felt  to  explore  and  to  acquire  terri- 
tories in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  A  like  impulse  led 
her  in  the  last  century  into  Africa,  where,  beginning 
with  Algeria,  she  has  now  obtained  vast  stretches  of 
territory,  and  added  to  them  Madagascar,  the  greatest 
of  African  islands.  It  is  hard  to  say  how  far  the  adven- 
turous impulse  aforesaid,  and  how  far  the  ambitions  of 
her  commercial  classes  have  respectively  contributed 
to  this  advance.  The  latter  set  of  considerations  has 
certainly  been  powerful,  and  it  is  now  inducing  her  to 
spend  large  sums  in  developing  her  recent  acquisitions 
in  Morocco. 

England  was  more  influenced  by  the  desire  for  trade 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  107 

than  was  France,  but  less  exclusively  so  than  Holland, 
because  her  home  territory  was  larger  and  she  aspired 
to  play  a  greater  part  in  European  politics.  Through 
the  eighteenth  century  trading  interests  were  always 
present  to  her  statesmen,  and  how  much  they  had  to 
do  with  her  wars  and  her  treaties  is  too  well  known  to 
need  illustration.  I  do  not  attempt  to  justify  parts  of 
her  earlier  dealings  with  China  nor  some  few  of  her 
later  acts  elsewhere,  but  in  these  instances  the  errors 
in  policy  which  governments  had  committed  and  par- 
liamentary majorities  had  supported  were  condemned, 
and  so  far  as  possible  reversed  by  the  people  when  a 
general  election  enabled  them  to  deliver  their  judg- 
ment. 

Germany  came  very  late  into  a  field  the  greater  part 
of  which  the  competing  commercial  countries  had  al- 
ready occupied,  but  she  showed  immense  energy  in 
making  good  her  position.  A  party  arose  which  be- 
lieved that  her  home  industries  had  much  to  gain  by 
the  acquisition  of  colonial  territories,  whence  she  could 
draw  raw  materials  and  the  population  whereof  would 
be  a  valuable  market  for  her  goods.  In  the  latter  be- 
lief she  was  probably  mistaken,  for  generations  may 
pass  before  African  negroes,  or  Papuan  aborigines, 
could  have  been  sufficiently  civilized  to  buy  goods 
enough  to  repay  Germany  for  what  she  had  spent  on 
public  works  in  those  countries  before  1914.  But  the 
belief  was  the  foundation  on  which  was  built  that 
Colonial  party  which  Bismarck,  though  personally  cold 
towards  it,  was  obliged  to  humor  in  the  conduct  of 
foreign  policy;  and  the  hope  of  obtaining  economic 
control  of  the  Asiatic  territories  of  Turkey  and  devel- 


108  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

oping  German  trade  there  counted  for  much  in  the 
ostentatious  friendship  with  which  the  German  Em- 
peror honored  Abdul  Hamid. 

Can  Governments  effect  much  for  the  promotion  of 
the  trading  interests  of  their  citizens?  Most  historians 
and  economists  would  have  answered  this  question  hi 
the  negative  before  the  German  bureaucracy  had 
shown  how  greatly  a  constantly  official  encouragement 
given  to  undertakings  abroad  may  stimulate  business 
men  to  increase  their  efforts.  Yet,  much  as  the  Ger- 
man government  achieved,  there  is  reason  to  believe 
that  commercial  classes  are  everywhere  prone  to 
overestimate  the  worth  of  official  support.  British 
traders  used  to  complain  that  the  Germans  went  ahead 
because  their  envoys  in  foreign  countries  were  more 
active  than  were  those  of  Britain  in  putting  pressure 
on  foreign  governments,  and  French  traders  com- 
plained that  foreign  competitors  had  a  like  advantage 
over  themselves  in  other  countries.  Both  used  to  ask 
their  Government  to  interfere  when  a  foreign  legisla- 
ture was  raising  import  duties,  though  in  fact  all  rep- 
resentations made  by  one  government  to  another  are 
thrown  away  unless  some  corresponding  concession  is 
offered,  and  a  bargain  made.  When,  as  a  member  of 
the  British  Parliament,  I  was  urged  by  my  constituents 
and  others  to  see  that  representations  were  addressed 
to  the  legislature  of  some  other  country  deprecating 
the  raising  of  its  tariff  on  British  goods,  I  always  re- 
plied that  such  representations  would  do  no  good,  and 
might  even  do  harm,  for  they  would  be  seized  upon  as 
confessions  that  the  British  exporter  wanted  to  "cap- 
ture the  home  market"  of  the  country  asked  to  desist 
from  a  fiscal  policy  which  domestic  reasons  were 
thought  to  prescribe. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  109 

Annexations  of  the  territories  inhabited  by  semi- 
civilized  peoples  are  often  advocated  by  commercial 
journals  on  the  ground  that  they  create  a  new  demand 
for  goods.  "Trade,"  it  is  said,  "follows  the  flag."  This 
may  happen  if  the  annexing  State  excludes  other 
countries  from  the  captured  territory  by  prohibitive 
tariffs ;  but  if,  as  has  been  stipulated  for  in  most  recent 
treaties  between  European  Powers,  no  customs  bar- 
riers are  erected,  the  goods  that  are  cheapest  and  best 
will  win,  whatever  their  country  of  origin. 

Neither  do  political  alliances  govern  the  course  of 
trade  between  allied  countries.  Political  reasons  may 
(as  in  the  case  of  France  and  Russia)  draw  capital  to- 
wards the  State  whose  armed  support  it  is  desired  to 
win  and  retain,  but  where  the  matter  is  one  of  buying 
and  selling,  a  French  peasant  would  not  pay  more  for 
a  pound  of  tallow  because  it  came  from  friendly  Russia, 
nor  a  Russian  peasant  turn  away  from  a  cheap  German 
knife  because  it  was  German. 

An  experience  of  many  years  leads  one  to  believe, 
first,  that  Governments  accomplish  less  in  the  long  run 
for  the  trading  interests  of  their  respective  nations 
than  is  believed,  and,  secondly,  that  they  often  do 
harm  by  inducing  their  traders  to  relax  their  own  en- 
ergy and  lose  the  keenness  of  their  initiative.  The  dan- 
gers to  a  state  and  a  people,  which  seem  almost  insep- 
arable from  the  mixing  of  general  national  policy  with 
the  pecuniary  interests  of  business  firms  or  classes  are 
more  serious  than  is  commonly  realized.  Money  can 
exercise  as  much  illegitimate  influence  in  democracies 
as  elsewhere.  In  some  of  them  it  can  buy  the  press, 
perhaps,  also,  a  section  of  the  legislators.  Where  the 
standard  of  public  virtue  is  fairly  high,  those  who  want 
to  get  something  from  a  government  will  not  attempt  to 


110  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

bribe,  but  will,  to  use  a  current  expression,  "try  to  get 
at  the  press,"  while  also  seeking  to  persuade  influential 
constituents  to  put  pressure  on  their  member,  and 
members  to  put  pressure  on  Ministers,  the  object  in 
view  being  represented  as  a  public  interest,  whereas 
it  is  really  the  interest  of  a  small  group.  When  the 
standard  is  low,  the  group  will  approach  the  private 
secretary  of  a  Minister,  or  even  a  Minister  himself. 
In  one  European  country  thirty  years  ago  a  bundle  of 
notes  would  be  slipped  under  a  portfolio  on  the  Minis- 
ter's table,  and  if  a  foreign  applicant  who  did  not,  as 
the  Scripture  says,  "know  the  manner  of  the  god  of  the 
land,"  1  expressed  surprise  at  the  unaccountable  de- 
lay in  completing  the  negotiation,  the  Minister  would 
rattle  loose  coins  in  a  drawer  till  the  hint  was  taken. 
These  were  coarse  methods.  Civilized  business  moves 
more  delicately  but  not  less  surely.  There  are  civilized 
countries  in  which  whoever  asks  what  can  be  done  to 
guide  the  politicians  and  the  press  in  a  particular  di- 
rection, is  told  to  get  hold  of  the  financiers,  because 
the  press  influences  the  Foreign  Office  and  the  finan- 
ciers influence  the  press,  and  both  influence  the  poli- 
ticians. That  wars  are  made  by  financiers  is  not  gen- 
erally true,  but  they  have  a  great  hand  in  negotiations 
and  in  fixing  the  lines  of  policy,  and  they  sometimes 
turn  it  in  directions  not  favorable  to  true  national  in- 
terests. Governments  must,  of  course,  consult  finan- 
ciers, and  may  often  not  only  profit  by  their  advice  but 
make  good  use  of  them.  A  consortium  of  banks  such 
as  has  been  set  up  for  China  may  prevent — and  I  think 
does  prevent — evils  which  would  arise  if  each  national 
group  intrigued  for  its  own  particular  interests.  There 
1  Kings,  ch.  XVH,  v.  26. 


THE  INFLUENCE  OF  COMMERCE  111 

are  upright  men,  men  valuable  to  a  nation,  in  "high 
finance,"  as  in  other  professions.  You  know  them  in 
America  as  we  know  them  in  England.  They  have 
their  sphere  of  action  necessary  to  the  world.  But 
wherever  large  transactions  involving  governments 
arise,  the  danger  signal  for  watchfulness  should  be 
raised. 

One  of  your  and  our  Puritan  ancestors  wrote  three 
centuries  ago  a  book  entitled  "Satan's  Invisible  World 
Revealed."  Satan  is  always  busy  where  there  is  money 
to  be  made,  but  the  political  secrets  of  his  "Invisible 
World"  rarely  see  the  light.  The  harm  the  Tempter 
does  is  done  not  merely  in  beguiling  individuals,  but 
in  perverting  the  lines  of  policy  which  national  honor 
and  interest  prescribe.  Every  Government  must  de- 
fend the  legal  rights  of  its  citizens  in  commercial  as  well 
as  in  other  matters,  and  secure  for  them  a  fair  field  in 
the  competition  that  has  now  become  so  keen.  But 
the  general  conclusion  which  anyone  who  balances  the 
benefits  attained  against  the  evils  engendered  by  the 
methods  that  have  been  generally  followed  is  this,  that 
striking  a  balance  between  loss  and  gain,  the  less  an  ex- 
ecutive government  has  to  do  with  business  and  with 
international  finance,  the  better  for  the  people. 


LECTURE  IV 

FORCES  AND  INFLUENCES  MAKING  FOR  WAR  OR  PEACE 

HAVING  examined  the  actual  relations  of  European 
and  Asiatic  States  to  one  another  and  indicated  the 
chief  commercial  and  industrial  factors  that  affect 
those  relations,  I  pass  on  to  consider  other  forces  and 
influences  which,  disposing  States  to  be  more  or  less 
friendly  to  each  other,  determine  their  attitude  upon 
the  international  stagey  *  This  enquiry  resolves  itself 
into  a  study  of  the  baUses  which  on  the  one  hand  lead  to 
strife,  and  on,the<ither  maintain  peace.  War  and  peace 
are  thertwo  well-defined  relations  which  international 
law  recognizes,  but  between  there  has  often  been,  and 
never  more  conspicuously  than  in  Europe  during  the 
last  twenty  years,  a  third  intermediate  category  of  rela- 
tions, viz.,  that  which  includes  cases  where  outward 
peace  and  a  diplomatic  intercourse  apparently  normal 
coexist  with,  and  scarcely  conceal,  an  attitude  of 
suspicion  which  leads  each  State  to  watch  its  neighbors 
distrustfully,  expecting  and  preparing  for  hostilities 
with  one  or  more  of  them.  Legally  there  is  peace; 
temperamentally  there  is  war.  Such  a  condition  of 
things,  though  it  often  heralds  a  great  conflict,  seldom 
follows  one,  because  the  belligerents  are  likely  to  be 
exhausted  and  the  vanquished  fear  to  renew  the  strife. 
Since  1919,  however,  the  causes  of  strife  in  Europe 
have  continued  to  be  so  numerous  that  even  fatigue, 

112 


MAKING  FOR  WAR  OR  PEACE  113 

poverty,  and  defeat  have  brought  no  confidence  in 
a  season  of  permanent  repose.  Exhaustion  will  pre- 
vent the  belligerents  of  1918  from  entering  on  wars 
within  the  next  few  years,  because  they  have  not  the 
funds  that  would  enable  preparations  to  be  made  on  a 
great  scale,  but  east  of  the  River  Oder  and  in  what  re- 
mains of  the  Turkish  Empire  all  the  way  to  the  Sea 
of  Okhotsk  there  is  scarcely  even  the  semblance  of 
peace.  Apart  from  the  risk  that  some  of  the  minor 
East  European  States  may  take  up  arms  against  others 
whom  they  think  no  better  prepared  than  themselves, 
we  must  remember  that  a  true  peace  does  not  exist 
where  there  is  a  wish  to  renew  war.  That  is  the  serious 
feature  in  the  present  situation. 

Among  these  forces  or  influences  that  have  worked 
for  war  or  for  peace,  one  which  formerly  played  a 
prominent  part  has  now  almost  entirely  vanished  with 
the  recent  fall  of  six  European  monarchies;  J  I  mean 
the  influence  of  family  relationships  between  reigning 
dynasties.  Everyone  knows  what  the  dynastic  ambi- 
tions of  the  house  of  Hapsburg,  Wittelsbach,  Hohen- 
zollern,  Romanoff,  Bourbon,  Braganza  meant  from 
the  time  of  Charles  V  down  to  our  own.  A  slight 
offered  to  one  of  these  houses  by  the  other  might  be 
enough  to  provoke  a  conflict;  a  marriage  might  lead 
to  the  settlement  of  a  war  which  had  caused  the  death 
of  many  thousands  of  soldiers.  All  these  things  have 
now  passed  away.  The  rivalries  of  these  families  did 
more  to  bring  about  strife  than  their  weddings  (not  al- 
ways love  matches)  did  to  ensure  peace.  The  war  of 
the  Spanish  Succession  arose  because  it  was  feared  that 

1  Portugal,  Austria,  Prussia,  Bavaria,  Saxony,  Wurtemberg,  not  to 
speak  of  the  smaller  principalities  included  in  the  German  Empire. 


114  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

a  Bourbon  king  on  the  throne  of  Spain  would  threaten 
the  European  balance  by  adding  the  power  of  Spain 
to  the  power  of  France.  But  after  the  Bourbon  had 
succeeded,  Spain  and  France  soon  began  to  quarrel  as 
they  had  quarrelled  before,  and  the  unfriendliness  of 
the  two  peoples  was  not  abated.  In  1914  the  fact  that 
the  Tsar  Nicholas  II  and  King  George  V  of  England 
were  each  of  them  cousins  of  the  German  Emperor 
did  not  delay  by  an  hour  the  two  declarations  of  war. 
The  last  trace  of  any  real  influence  which  attached  to 
family  ties  disappeared  with  the  death  of  Queen  Vic- 
toria of  England,  for  whom  her  grandson,  the  Emperor 
William,  had  a  deep  respect,  treasuring  everything  that 
related  to  her  with  extraordinary  veneration.  Had  she 
lived  for  another  fifteen  years,  it  is  just  possible — I  do 
not  say  probable  but  possible — that  a  breach  between 
Germany  and  England  might  have  been  avoided. 
-  Religion,  the  second  influence  to  be  here  noted,  has 
lost  much  of  its  former  power  in  international  politics. 
No  Protestant  nation  now  cares  whether  it  allies  itself 
with  a  Roman  Catholic  or  a  Protestant  nation;  and 
the  converse  is  almost  equally  true  of  the  Roman 
Catholic  nations.  Doubtless  an  English  King  cannot 
espouse  a  Roman  Catholic,  while  the  Protestant  prin- 
cesses of  Denmark  and  England  who  intermarried  with 
the  sovereigns  of  Russia  and  Spain  respectively  were 
required  to  change  their  ecclesiastical  allegiance.  It 
is  within  rather  than  between  countries  that  religious 
passions  still  accentuate  political  contests.  In  France, 
Belgium,  Holland,  Germany,  and  Austria  there  are 
clerical  parties.  In  Yugo-Slavia  the  Orthodox  popula- 
tions of  Serbia,  Montenegro,  and  Bosnia  stand  over 
against  the  Roman  Catholics  of  Croatia,  Dalmatia  and 


MAKING  FOR  WAR  OR  PEACE  115 

the  Slovene  regions,  and  both  differ  from  the  Slavonic 
Muslims  of  Bosnia,  who  however  are  not  numerous 
enough  to  make  trouble,  any  more  than  do  the  Muslim 
Pomaks  in  Bulgaria  who  sit  peacefully  in  the  legisla- 
tive Sobranje  of  that  State. 

It  is  otherwise  in  Asia,  where  fanaticism  is  still  fierce 
among  the  Muslim  peoples.  Though  it  was  not  hatred 
of  Christians  that  led  the  gang  of  ruffians  who  ruled 
Turkey  after  the  dethronement  of  Abdul  Hamid  to 
embark  on  a  policy  of  extermination,  but  rather  the 
desire  to  have  an  Empire  which  should  contain  none 
but  Islamic  elements,  still  no  condemnation  of  the 
massacres  of  1915  ever  came  from  any  Mohammedan 
quarter.  That  is  the  significant  fact.  To  the  average 
Muslim  unprovoked  murders,  though  they  are  a  sin 
which  the  pious  man  disapproves,  are  a  very  different 
thing  from  the  killing  of  a  True  Believer.  To  kill  an  in- 
fidel was  scarcely  deemed  an  offense  in  parts  of  the  Mo- 
hammedan East  and  it  needed  the  severest  diplomatic 
pressure  to  secure  some  fifteen  years  ago  the  punish- 
ment of  some  Muslim  robbers  who  had  murdered  two 
Englishmen.  So  the  Spaniards  in  the  New  World  felt 
little  horror  at  the  slaughter  of  unoffending  Indians, 
because  they  were  outside  the  fold.  Aborigines,  not 
being  Christians,  seemed  to  have  no  human  rights. 
Tantum  religio  potuit  suadere  malorum  1  was  said  long 
ago  by  Lucretius  in  a  very  different  sense,  but  cases 
like  these  remind  us  that  even  where  it  was  not  religion 
that  caused  the  cruelties,  differences  of  religion  can 
prevent  the  natural  feelings  of  pity  and  justice  from 
restraining  the  ferocious  impulses  of  man. 

How  powerful  a  force  Islam  has  been  is  shown  by  its 

1  "What  evils  religion  (or  superstition)  can  work." 


116  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

having  kept  alive  such  a  detestable  government  as  the 
Turkish  Sultanate  has  been.  Insurrections  would  long 
ago  have  overthrown  it  but  for  the  fact  that  its  Muslim 
subjects  supported  it  as  against  their  Christian  fellow 
subjects,  hating  it  less  than  they  hated  the  idea  of 
equality  between  themselves  and  Christians.  As  Islam 
continues  to  spread  among  the  black  races  in  the  in- 
terior and  along  the  East  coast  of  Africa  some  have 
expressed  the  fear  that  it  may  there  become  a  warlike 
and  aggressive  force.  Apart  from  any  such  risk,  its 
spread  is  to  be  desired,  for  it  raises  the  negroes  to  a 
higher  level  of  self-respect;  and  some  think  that  it  need 
not  seriously  interfere  with  the  growth  of  Christianity, 
though  it  is  of  course  very  much  easier  to  convert  an 
idolater  or  a  fetichist  than  a  Muslim. 
1  Racial  sentiment,  a  third  influence  that  has  within 
the  last  century  acquired  a  conscious  force  scarcely 
known  to  earlier  generations,  is  part  of  what  we  call 
by  the  name,  itself  a  quite  modern  name,  of  Nation- 
ality, and  may  be  considered  as  a  chief  factor  therein, 
though  by  no  means  the  only  factor,  for  we  see  cases 
in  which  two  races,  as  in  Belgium,  or  even  three  races, 
as  in  Switzerland,  form  part  of  a  single  well  marked 
community  whose  members  cherish  a  common  patriot- 
ism. Nationality  has  been  for  the  last  eighty  years  so 
great  a  force  at  first  for  good,  and  latterly  for  evil  also, 
that  it  needs  a  full  consideration. 

Let  us  begin  by  regarding  a  Nationality  as  an  Ag- 
gregate of  men  drawn  together  and  linked  together  by 
certain  sentiments.  The  chief  among  these  are  Racial 
sentiment  and  Religious  sentiment,  but  there  is  also 
that  sense  of  community  which  is  created  by  the  use  of 
a  common  language,  the  possession  of  a  common  litera- 


MAKING  FOR  WAR  OR  PEACE  117 

ture,  the  recollection  of  common  achievements  or  suf- 
ferings in  the  past,  the  existence  of  common  customs 
and  habits  of  thought,  common  ideals  and  aspirations. 
Sometimes  all  of  these  "linking  sentiments"  are  present 
and  hold  the  members  of  the  aggregate  together;  some- 
times one  or  more  may  be  absent.  The  more  of  these 
links  that  exist  in  any  given  case,  the  stronger  is  the 
sentiment  of  unity.  In  each  case  the  test  is  not  merely 
how  many  links  there  are,  but  how  strong  each  par- 
ticular link  is;  and  no  two  cases  are  quite  alike.  Of 
the  various  bonds  of  union  aforesaid  none  is  indis- 
pensable, not  even  that  of  a  common  language,  as  the 
case  of  Switzerland  proves,  nor  that  of  a  common 
religion,  as  the  case  of  Hungary  proves,  nor  that  of  a 
common  race,  as  both  Scotland  and  Switzerland  prove. 
Often  it  is  hard  to  say  whether  what  I  have  called  the 
Aggregate  united  by  sentiment  is  sufficiently  marked 
off  from  other  parts  of  a  nation  to  be  deemed  a 
nationality,  as  in  Spain  some  may  and  some  may  not 
consider  the  Catalans  and  the  Basques  to  be  each  a 
nationality  within  the  greater  nationality  of  Spain 
itself.  This  reminds  me  that  the  name  of  Nationality 
is  used  to  cover  not  only  a  part  of  a  Nation  but  also  a 
whole  Nation.  The  peoples  of  Spain,  Italy  and  Ger- 
many are  both  Nations  and  Nationalities,  though  in  the 
last  mentioned  case  there  are  Germans  outside  Ger- 
many (such  as  the  people  of  Tirol  and  many  of  the  in- 
habitants of  Danzig),  who  deem  themselves  to  be  mem- 
bers of  a  German  nationality  in  its  wider  sense. 

You  will  see  from  these  remarks  and  from  the  diverse 
instances  I  shall  proceed  to  mention  how  hard  it  is  to 
define  Nationality  in  terms  which  shall  be  at  once 
concise  and  correct,  covering  all  the  concrete  cases. 


118  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

Nevertheless  I  will  hazard  the  following  definition: 
The  Sentiment  of  Nationality  is  that  feeling  or  group 
of  feelings  which  makes  an  aggregate  of  men  conscious 
of  ties,  not  being  wholly  either  political  or  religious, 
which  unite  them  in  a  community  which  is,  either 
actually  or  potentially,  a  Nation. 

That  seems  rather  too  elaborate  a  definition,  but 
I  think  if  any  of  you  try  as  hard  as  I  have  tried 
to  find  a  more  concise  form  of  words,  you  will 
recognize  the  extreme  difficulty  of  covering  all  the 
cases  that  have  to  be  included.  As  Horace  said  long 
ago,  the  practical  sense  of  a  word  must  be  determined 
by  usage.  We  must  give  to  the  terms  that  belong  to 
any  language  the  meaning  in  which  the  majority  of 
the  people  who  speak  the  language  use  those  terms,  and 
make  the  definition  wide  enough  to  cover  all  that  such 
use  prescribes.  It  might  be  better  if  there  were  in  use 
terms  to  distinguish  a  Nationality  which  is  coextensive 
with  a  Nation  from  one  which  is  not  coextensive,  and 
to  distinguish  a  Nationality  which,  like  the  Scottish, 
does  not  seek  to  be  politically  independent  from  a  Na- 
tionality which,  like  the  Lithuanian,  does  so  desire. 
But  no  two  cases  are  quite  alike,  and  language,  instead 
of  trying  to  find  special  terms  or  names  to  describe  each, 
must  content  itself  with  general  terms,  remembering 
always  that  things  called  by  the  same  name  are  not 
necessarily  the  same. 

The  definition  I  have  suggested  excludes  cases  where 
the  ties  are  solely  religious,  for  no  one  would  call 
Roman  Catholics  or  Presbyterians  a  Nationality,  and 
those  where  they  are  purely  political,  for  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Monarchy,  though  it  was  tied  together  into 
a  sort  of  nation,  was  not  a  nationality  but  a  bundle 


MAKING  FOR  WAR  OR  PEACE  119 

of  jarring  nationalities.  So  to-day  Czecho-Slovakia 
and  Yugo-Slavia  are  political  entities  whose  popula- 
tions are  not  yet  sufficiently  united  by  other  ties  to 
have  acquired  a  sentiment  of  intellectual  or  moral 
unity,  though  they  may  in  time  acquire  it.  And  now 
let  us  pass  on  to  concrete  instances  in  hope  of  getting 
a  grasp  of  this  elusive  conception. 

The  Swiss  people  are  a  Nationality  as  well  as  a 
Nation,  because  they  are  united  not  only  politically 
but  also  by  a  common  pride  in  then-  historical  tradi- 
tions, a  common  literature,  common  political  ideas  and 
beliefs,  and  this  although  they  have  sprung  from 
different  races  and  use  three — or  rather  four — lan- 
guages.1 Switzerland  more  than  any  other  country 
lives  by  its  traditions.  They  are  the  force  which  keeps 
Switzerland  united  and  free  and  great — for  great  its 
people  is,  small  as  is  its  territory. 

The  Scottish  people  are  a  Nationality  because  al- 
though they  are  not  a  political  entity  (except  for  some 
few  minor  purposes)  and  speak  two  languages,  and 
spring  from  at  least  four  (perhaps  five)  races,  they  are 
united  by  common  traditions  and  their  pride  in  those 
traditions,  and  by  what  is  still  to  some  extent  a  dis- 
tinctive literature  as  well  as  by  distinctive  religious 
ideas  and  habits.  They  were  once  a  Nation,  cemented 
out  of  diverse  elements  by  the  long  wars  against 
England,  but  are  now  rather  to  be  deemed  a  Nation- 
ality. Their  peculiarities  have  been  much  affected  by 
their  union  with  the  larger  English  nation,  yet  national 
feeling  is  still  strong  enough  to  impel  them  in  the  many 
countries  they  inhabit,  to  celebrate  their  ancient  glories 

1  Four  if  we  include  Romansch,  still  spoken  in  the  valleys  of  the 
Upper  Rhine  and  in  the  Engadine. 


120  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

by  dining  together  on  the  day  of  their  Patron  saint, 
the  30th  of  November;  and  some  of  them  seem  dis- 
posed to  consider  proposals  to  give  them  a  legislature 
and  executive  inside  the  United  Kingdom. 

The  modern  Greeks  are  a  Nation  formed  out  of  three 
races — Hellenic,  Slavonic  and  Albanian — by  a  common 
hostility  to  the  Turks  from  whose  oppressions  they 
long  suffered,  a  common  religion,  and  the  recollections 
of  the  splendid  achievements  of  the  poets  and  states- 
men and  artists  of  the  Hellenes  of  antiquity.  Among 
the  Magyars,  the  last  of  the  Eastern  races  that  con- 
quered for  itself  a  place  in  Central  Europe,  national 
feeling  is  rooted  in  the  pride  of  a  high-spirited  people 
consolidated  by  frequent  conflicts,  at  one  time  with 
the  Turks,  at  others  with  the  Germanic  Hapsburgs. 
Among  the  Lithuanians,  the  Letts  or  Latvians,  and  the 
Esthonians  nationalist  sentiment  is  of  very  recent 
growth,  and  may  almost  be  called  the  artificial  creation 
of  a  propaganda  started  by  the  small  educated  class. 
But  as  each  of  these  peoples  has  a  racial  quality  of  its 
own,  and  was  glad  to  escape  from  the  control  of  an 
alien  Russian  or  Russo-German  bureaucracy,  the  sense 
of  independence  is  already  building  up  a  Nationality 
which  may  ripen  into  a  Nation. 

In  two  interesting  instances,  Religion,  associated 
with  Race,  has  been  almost  the  sole  influence  to  create 
the  sentiment.  The  Armenians  could  hardly  have  re- 
tained their  language  and  their  national  feeling,  strong 
as  that  feeling  now  is,  but  for  the  fact  that  their 
Church  held  them  together.  The  Jews,  having  lost  all 
hold  upon  their  ancient  home,  had  ceased  to  be  even 
a  Nationality  and  were  only  a  religious  community 
till  the  rise  of  the  Zionist  movement,  based  entirely 


MAKING  FOR  WAR  OR  PEACE  121 

upon  religion,  revived  the  conception  of  a  renewed 
national  life.  The  phenomena  which  Ireland  presents 
are  extraordinarily  curious,  and  in  some  aspects  unique, 
but  it  would  take  at  least  two  long  lectures  to  explain 
those  phenomena,  because  the  explanation  would  im- 
ply a  survey  of  Irish  history  from  the  twelfth  century 
onwards.  It  is  therefore  safer  to  decline  the  task. 

An  extremely  interesting  set  of  cases  may  be  found 
in  the  States  of  North  tropical  and  South  America  that 
emerged  a  century  ago  from  the  colossal  but  then  dis- 
solving colonial  Empire  of  Spain.  Before  the  Wars  of 
Independence  in  South  and  Central  America,  there 
were  no  nations  in  those  countries,  and  only  a  faintly 
nascent  sentiment  of  Nationality  in  Mexico,  in  Peru, 
and  in  what  is  now  Argentina.  The  struggle  against 
Spain  formed  the  inhabitants  of  these  wide  regions  into 
a  number  of  independent  States.  By  degrees  some  of 
the  States  grew  into  Nations,  i.e.,  Organized  Commun- 
ities with  a  sense  of  political  unity,  and  in  a  still  later 
stage  they  developed  the  other  feelings  which  make  a 
real  National  Sentiment,  such  as  pride  in  their  history, 
attachment  to  the  memory  of  heroes,  a  type  of  char- 
acter which  began  very  slowly  to  be  somewhat  diverse 
from  the  types  that  grew  up  in  their  neighbors.  These 
feelings  seem  to  be  now  strong  in  Uruguay,  Argentina, 
Brazil,  and  Mexico,  and  are  perhaps  strongest  in  Chile. 
In  the  Caribbean  republics,  where  the  aboriginal  Indian 
population  is  large  and  an  appreciation  of  the  intel- 
lectual elements  that  help  to  create  national  sentiment 
is  confined  to  very  small  groups,  the  feelings  aforesaid 
are  weak.  If  they  exist  in  such  states  as  Nicaragua 
or  Honduras,  they  must  be  in  a  still  rudimentary  stage, 
and  generations  may  pass  before  it  can  be  seen  whether 


122  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

Nationalism  will  arise  in  countries  whose  political 
detachment  from  their  neighbors  is  due  merely  to  the 
so-called  "accidents  of  history,"  and  is  maintained 
largely  by  jealousy  of  their  neighbors. 

Teutonic  North  America  shows  only  one  instance 
of  a  nationality  which  is  a  member, — not  a  Teutonic 
member,  though  fortunately  a  contented  member, — of 
a  large  nation ;  I  mean  the  French-speaking  population 
of  Canada,  which  remains  socially  as  well  as  linguisti- 
cally distinct  from  the  rest  of  the  Nation.  Central 
and  Eastern  Europe  and  Western  Asia  are  full  of 
discontented  nationalities,  some  quite  small.  Their 
discontent  has  caused  wars  and  is  likely  to  cause 
others.  Those  that  are  subject  to  alien  rule  desire  to 
shake  off  that  rule,  and  either  to  form  a  new  inde- 
pendent State,  as  the  Georgians  and  Armenians  desire, 
or  to  unite  themselves  with  States  composed  of  mem- 
bers of  their  own  race,  as  do  those  Tirolese  who  are  now 
ruled  by  Italy,  and  those  Bulgarians  who  are  now  ruled 
by  Serbs,  and  those  Magyars  who  have  been  trans- 
ferred to  Rumania. 

These  aspirations  of  the  East  European  and  West 
Asiatic  nationalities  deserve  our  sympathy  and  their 
justice  seems  clearly  admitted  in  the  famous  "Fourteen 
Points"  (for  they  fell  within  the  terms  of  that  docu- 
ment) and  by  the  Powers  who  accepted  those  points. 
Whatever  may  be  said  regarding  the  declarations  then 
made,  they  obtained  a  recognition  at  the  conclusion  of 
the  Armistice  which  raised  hopes,  many  of  which  have 
not  been  realized. 

Seventy  years  ago,  in  the  midst  of  the  revolutions  of 
1848-49  made  in  Europe  in  the  names  of  Liberty  and 
Nationality,  those  two  conceptions  were  indissolubly 


MAKING  FOR  WAR  OR  PEACE  123 

associated  in  the  minds  of  those  then  called  Liberals, 
not  only  in  England  but  more  or  less  in  those  hopeful 
and  freedom  loving  spirits  all  over  Europe  and  in  the 
United  States  who  saw  that  such  oppressed  coun- 
tries as  Italy,  Hungary  and  Poland  could  enjoy 
no  freedom  till  alien  rule  was  expelled.  It  was  as- 
sumed that  every  nationality  when  it  had  secured  its 
own  freedom  would  sympathize  with  every  other  na- 
tionality, and  be  guided  in  all  its  action  by  the  love  of 
freedom.  This,  however,  did  not  come  to  pass.  Hun- 
gary, though  she  forbore  from  seeking  to  annex  lands 
not  previously  held  by  the  Hungarian  Crown,  tried 
after  the  recovery  of  her  own  freedom  to  Magyarize  the 
Slovak  and  Human  and  Serb  populations  which  in- 
habited parts  of  her  old  territory.  So  the  Poles,  now- 
adays forgetting  that  the  sympathy  they  had  received 
and  deserved  in  their  long  struggle  for  independence 
was  given  to  them  as  a  Nationality,  have  been  seeking 
to  incorporate  Lithuania^  whose  inhabitants  are  not 
Polish,  on  the  ground  of  a  former  political  union. 
Greeks  and  Serbs  do  not  like  to  recognize  the  claims  of 
the  Albanians  to  districts  in  which  that  element  pre- 
dominates. National  sentiment  has  in  fact  become  in- 
fected by  National  Vanity,  which,  disregarding  the 
sentiments  of  others,  thinks  only  of  itself.  This  is  the 
reason  why  that  which  was  supposed  to  be  a  means  to 
peace,  and  indeed  a  guarantee  of  peace,  once  the  just 
claims  of  each  nationality  had  been  satisfied,  has  now 
become  a  source  of  war,  a  force  making  in  some  quar- 
ters for  revolt  and  dissolution  and  in  some  even  for 
aggression  upon  neighbors.  Let  us  nevertheless  re- 
member that  this  sentiment  could  not  have  power 
enough  to  work  harm  if  it  had  not  also  possessed  pow- 


124  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

erful  elements  of  good.  Without  it,  freedom  would  not 
have  been  achieved  in  many  a  country  that  was  suffer- 
ing under  tyranny. 

Unhappily  the  Powers  represented  at  Paris,  for- 
getting the  promises  made  to  recognize  the  principles 
of  Nationality  and  Self-Determination,  have  by  the 
recent  treaties  left  some  grievances,  arising  out  of  the 
claims  of  Nationalities,  unredressed  and  have  created 
other  grievances  that  did  not  exist  before,  thus  sow- 
ing the  seeds  of  future  trouble. 

You  will  ask,  Was  it  possible  to  give  effect  every- 
where to  those  principles?  Those  who  know  the  diffi- 
culties will  at  once  answer — It  was  not  possible.  You 
could  not  everywhere  apply  the  doctrines  of  Nation- 
ality and  Self-De termination.  Existing  facts  forbade 
the  hope  of  success.  Let  us  be  quite  clear  upon  that 
point.  The  promises  made  ought  to  have  been  fulfilled 
wherever  it  was  possible  to  fulfill  them  without  creating 
fresh  troubles  and  worse  resentments.  But  there  were 
places  where  this  could  not  have  been  done  without 
hardship  or  injustice.  Take,  for  instance,  the  case  of 
strategic  and  so-called  "Natural  Boundaries."  The 
doctrine  of  the  strategic  boundary  is  dangerous,  be- 
cause easily  pervertible,  and  it  ought  rarely  to  be  ad- 
mitted. In  England  it  was  repudiated  with  the  utmost 
energy  and  with  complete  success  as  was  shown  in  the 
election  of  1880  when  Disraeli  in  1878  sought  to  justify 
the  Afghan  war  upon  the  ground  that  it  was  necessary 
to  have  what  he  called  a  "scientific  frontier"  for  India. 
It  cannot  be  recognized  in  the  case  of  the  Rhine  by 
making  that  river  the  boundary  between  France  and 
Germany  all  along  its  course,  for  it  would  if  applied 
there  injure  two  peoples  and  greatly  increase  the  risks 
of  war  between  them.  But  there  are  exceptional  cases 


MAKING  FOR  WAR  OR  PEACE  125 

in  which  much  may  be  said  for  a  slight  departure  from 
the  principle  of  Self-Determination  in  order  to  estab- 
lish a  frontier  which  will  make  for  the  maintenance  of 
peace.  Such  a  case  seems  to  be  that  of  the  northeastern 
frontier  of  Italy  for  about  fifty  miles  northward  from 
Triest.  Here  Austria  held  before  the  war  the  westward 
slope  of  the  Alps  and  threatened  Italy  from  that  slope 
north  and  south  of  the  town  of  Gorizia  (Gorz).  Italy, 
having  no  defensible  frontier  to  the  west,  was  obliged 
to  maintain  a  very  large  force  to  defend  herself  on  that 
side.  To  allow  Italy  to  extend  her  line  to  the  water- 
shed of  the  Carnic  Alps  in  this  region  promised,  on  the 
balance  of  considerations,  to  make  for  peace,  and  was 
a  reasonable  course  to  take  even  though  it  did  involve 
the  placing  under  Italy  a  certain,  though  not  large, 
element  of  Slovene  population.  Each  case  must  be 
judged  on  its  own  special  circumstances. 

There  are  regions  in  Europe,  such  as  the  lower  Da- 
nubian  countries,  such  as  parts  of  Poland  and  Western 
Russia,  many  parts  of  the  Balkan  peninsula,  many 
parts  of  Western  Asia,  where  populations  belonging  to 
different  nationalities  dwell  on  the  same  ground  so 
inextricably  intermingled  that  no  boundary  line  can  be 
drawn  which  would  not  leave  villages  of  one  nation- 
ality within  a  territory  which  the  preponderance  of  an- 
other nationality  makes  it  proper  to  allot  to  that  other. 
This  applies  to  the  case  of  Bohemia  (mentioned  in 
Lecture  II)  and  to  much  of  Northern  Hungary.  The 
censure  justly  passed  on  those  who  made  the  Paris 
treaties  is  that  in  many  cases  where  it  was  possible 
to  do  justice  to  national  sentiment  by  honestly  trying 
to  cany  out  the  principles  of  nationality  and  self- 
determination,  they  did  not  do  what  could  have  been 
and  ought  to  have  been  done  to  draw  just  boundaries 


126  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

and  to  ascertain  the  wishes  of  the  populations  con- 
cerned. As  I  have  already  dealt  with  some  of  those 
cases,  I  will  be  content  with  repeating  that  grave  errors 
have  been  committed  (among  others)  in  the  cases  of 
the  Bulgarians  in  Macedonia  and  the  Magyars  (and 
especially  the  Szeklers)  in  Transylvania  and  Hungary, 
to  which  must  be  added  the  German-speaking  popu- 
lation of  Tirol,  referred  to  in  Lecture  II.  In  these  and 
other  cases  it  is  to  be  feared  that  the  discontents  due  to 
a  sense  of  injustice  will  injure  the  States  to  which  un- 
willing subjects  have  been  allotted,  and  will,  even  as 
the  possession  of  Alsace-Lorraine  by  Germany  main- 
tained ill  feeling  between  France  and  Germany,  become 
the  source  of  many  troubles  in  the  future. 

The  infractions  of  the  rights  of  minorities  that  are 
already  taking  place  in  some  regions  (such  as,  for  ex- 
ample, those  which  in  Transylvania  have  been  trans- 
ferred to  Rumania)  afford  ground  for  anger  and  mis- 
trust between  States  and  may  lead  to  appeals  to  arms. 

Where  the  disparity  of  populations  inhabiting  the 
same  areas  is  due  to  the  migration  of  the  subjects  of 
one  State  into  the  territory  of  another,  a  further  set 
of  international  disputes  may  arise.  When  Chinese 
or  Japanese  or  Hindus  seek  to  settle  themselves  on  the 
Pacific  coasts  of  America  or  in  -Australia  or  South 
Africa,  are  they  entitled  to  rights  equal  to  those  of 
the  native  inhabitants?  If  political  rights  are  refused 
on  the  ground  that  the  settlers  may  not  be  permanent 
residents,  are  they  entitled  to  equal  private  civil  rights, 
or  may  special  restrictions  be  placed  upon  them,  such 
as  California  forty  years  ago  tried  to  impose  on  Chinese 
or  such  as  Australia  imposes  now?  If  the  foreign 
immigrant  is  ill-treated,  as  some  Italian  workmen 


MAKING  FOR  WAR  OR  PEACE  127 

were  once  ill-treated  in  Louisiana,  what  compensation 
may  the  Government  of  the  country  where  the  offence 
happened  be  required  to  make?  We  all  know  the 
bitter  feeling  between  nations  to  which  instances  of  this 
nature  give  rise. 

Behind  these  cases  stands  a  larger  question.  Has  a 
State  any  right  to  forbid  entrance  to  harmless  for- 
eigners of  any  particular  race  or  to  make  the  color  of 
their  skin  a  ground  for  exclusion?  Upon  this  subject 
two  doctrines  have  been  advanced.  One,  which  found 
favor  two  generations  ago,  held  that  prima  facie  every 
human  being  has  a  natural  right  to  migrate  from  any 
one  part  of  the  world  to  any  other,  the  world  being 
the  common  inheritance  of  mankind,  and  that  only 
very  special  conditions  can  justify  the  exclusion  of 
any  particular  race  or  class  of  men.  The  other  doctrine 
is  that  each  State  is  at  all  times  free  to  exclude  any 
foreigners  from  entering  any  part  of  its  territory,  and 
that  no  ground  for  complaint  on  the  part  of  any  other 
States  arises  from  such  exclusion,  unless  where  a  foreign 
State  claims  that  its  own  citizens  are  being  discrimi- 
nated against  either  in  breach  of  treaty  rights  or  in 
a  way  calculated  to  wound  its  national  susceptibilities. 

Now  which  of  these  doctrines  is  right?  The  White 
Races  have  used  both  as  each  suited  their  convenience. 
The  former  doctrine  justified  the  white  man's  con- 
quests in  new  countries  which  were  thinly  peopled  by 
savage  or  backward  tribes,  unable  to  use  the  resources 
Nature  provided.  Such  races  were  either  subjugated, 
or  possibly  exterminated,  by  Spaniards,  Dutch,  French, 
English  or  Russians;  and  the  title  by  prior  occupation 
which  any  of  these  nations  acquired  was  subsequently 
disturbed  only  when  some  stronger  white  State  ejected 


128  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

the  first  white  occupiers,  as  England  ejected  Spain 
from  Jamaica  and  the  United  States  ejected  Spain 
from  the  Philippines. 

International  law  throws  little  light  on  the  question 
except  by  recording  instances  in  which  disputes  have 
arisen  and  the  arguments  then  employed;  but  opinion 
has  latterly  tended  to  recognize  the  right  of  absolute 
exclusion  by  the  State  which  owns  the  territory,  so  far 
at  least  as  that  right  is  not  offensively  exercised. 
This  view  has  been  justified  in  the  case  of  some  of  the 
colored  races  by  two  practical  arguments:  One  is  that 
as  friction  cannot  be  prevented  from  arising  between 
the  colored  immigrants  and  the  whites  among  whom 
they  come,  it  is  safer  they  should  not  come  at  all. 
The  other  is  that  the  growth  of  a  mixed  race  produced 
by  the  union  of  whites  and  persons  of  color  raises  diffi- 
cult political  as  well  as  social  problems.  This  mixed 
race  might  in  some  countries  prove  inferior  to  both 
of  the  parent  stocks;  and  the  troubles  that  have 
arisen  in  several  countries  suggest  that  it  at  present 
is  safer  to  discourage  the  entrance  of  any  large  num- 
ber of  Africans  or  Southeastern  Asiatics  into  countries 
now  inhabited  by  white  men  only. 

I  need  hardly  say  that  both  in  Australasia  and  on 
the  Pacific  Coast  of  America  the  really  operative  rea- 
sons have  been,  as  respects  the  mass  of  the  white 
element,  neither  one  nor  the  other  argument,  but  a 
certain  instinctive  aversion  to  aliens,  and  the  fear  that 
the  immigrants  would  compete  for  labor  at  a  reduced 
rate  of  wages.  "We  are  ruined  by  Chinese  cheap 
labor." 

Prudent  statesmen  have  usually  temporized  in  these 
cases.  This  seemed  the  only  course  open  to  the  British 
Indian  authorities,  who  could  not  induce  the  author!- 


MAKING  FOR  WAR  OR  PEACE  129 

ties  of  British  Africa  to  give  free  entrance  to  immi- 
grants from  India.  But  the  problem  might  become 
serious  if  any  people  were  to  persist  in  their  policy  of 
exclusion  so  far  as  to  keep  practically  empty  vast  areas 
too  hot  to  be  cultivated  by  white  labor,  and  into  which 
races  of  another  color  would  like  to  pour  the  overflow 
of  their  constantly  increasing  population.1  There  is  no 
international  authority  entitled  to  intervene,  but  if  the 
problem  should  ever  become  acute,  it  may  have  to  be 
solved  by  a  public  opinion  of  the  world — a  public 
opinion  which  does  hot  now.  exist  but  which  ought  to 
exist — and  solved  with  a  view  to  the  benefit  of  man- 
kind as  a  whole,  a  thing  not  yet  recognized  as  constitut- 
ing a  paramount  aim  which  international  policy  ought 
to  recognize. 

The  eighteenth  century,  which  saw  the  virtual  dis- 
appearance of  religion  as  a  force  influencing  the  rela- 
tions of  independent  States  to  one  another,  saw  the 
first  beginning  of  another  set  of  doctrinal  influences 
which  may  tell  upon  those  relations  in  a  somewhat 
similar  way.  Revolutionary  ideas  first  spread  from 
the  United  States,  after  1776,  into  France.  From 
France  they  spread  into  other  countries  of  Europe. 
To  the  propaganda  of  what  used  to  be  called  Liberal 
or  Radical  ideas  which  was  carried  on  by  the  French 
revolutionaries  and  their  armies  there  succeeded  more 
recently  two  new  forms  of  propaganda.  Anarchism 
has  never  secured  ascendency  in  any  country  and  it 
could  not,  if  faithful  to  its  principles,  become  a  State, 
because  its  aim  is  to  get  rid  of  organized  States  alto- 
gether. An  anarchist  State  would  be  a  contradiction 
in  terms.  But  Marxian  Communists  have  seized  the 

1  This  wish  seems  to  me  to  have  been  exaggerated  so  far  as  respects 
the  people  of  Japan,  for  they  do  not  generally  desire  to  settle  in 
regions  so  hot  as  Northern  Australia. 


130  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

Government  of  one  great  country,  and  are  from  it 
endeavoring  to  make  their  doctrines  prevail  in  all  other 
States,  though  they  candidly  confess  that  Russia, 
owing  to  the  regrettable  tendency  of  the  peasants  to 
cling  to  the  individual  ownership  of  land,  is  not  yet  in  a 
condition  to  give  full  effect  to  those  doctrines,  just  as 
a  similar  failure  in  popular  receptivity  prevented  them 
from  holding  the  ground  under  Bela  Kun  in  Hun- 
gary. Whatever  be  the  fate  of  this  form  of  Com- 
munism— which  is  said  to  have  extended  its  activities 
as  far  as  Winnipeg  in  the  West  and  India  in  the  East — 
it  is  probable  that  speculative  economic  theories  may 
hereafter  play  an  increasingly  important  role  and  may 
so  permeate  or  alarm  two  or  three  existing  political 
parties  as  to  tell  upon  the  foreign  policy  of  States. 

It  has  been  thought  that  so-called  "Laborism"  or 
some  other  form  of  economic  doctrine  fervently  em- 
braced may — especially  if  it  appears  simultaneously  in 
several  countries — stimulate  or  retard  the  international 
action  of  Governments.  Not  long  ago,  the  Labor  or- 
ganizations in  England  threatened  a  general  strike 
in  order  to  influence  the  attitude  of  the  Government 
towards  Bolshevik  Russia.  But  the  sympathy  which 
the  French  Socialists  felt  for  German  Socialists  in  1914 
made  little  or  no  difference  to  the  conduct  of  the 
French  Government,  and  still  less  did  any  sympathy 
with  French  Socialism  govern  the  action  of  German 
Socialists. 

Nevertheless,  cooperation,  open  or  secret,  between 
revolutionary  parties  in  different  States,  seems  likely 
to  grow  and  may  prove  a  disturbing  force  hi  the  future, 
for  it  breaks  up  the  solidarity  of  nations.  Nearly  every 
change  that  diminishes  some  old  evil  or  danger  brings 


MAKING  FOR  WAR  OR  PEACE  131 

with  it  some  new  dangers  into  the  field.  The  feeling 
of  Nationality  which  had  helped  to  overthrow  despot- 
ism ran  to  excess  when  it  incited  ambitious  peoples 
to  aggression.  Laborism  and  other  forms  of  class  senti- 
ment reduce  the  evil  side  of  such  an  excess  of  national 
sentiment  when  they  tend  to  divide  a  people  into  sec- 
tions, but  in  doing  so  fresh  evils  arise,  for  domestic  dis- 
cords may  be  created  or  exacerbated.  The  passion 
which  appears  in  individuals  as  "vanity"  or  "arro- 
gance" or  "self-realization,"  and  in  nations  as  "self- 
glorification,"  becames  pernicious  in  whatever  channels 
it  may  flow,  because  it  tends  to  ignore  or  override  the 
rights  of  others. 

From  considering  the  forces  which  cause  ill  feeling 
between  States,  it  is  natural  to  pass  to  those  which 
create  good  feeling.  What  of  Friendship?  We  are 
wont  to  personify  Nations  and  talk  of  them  as  we  do 
of  individual  men.  As  there  is  friendship  between 
men,  and  as  friendship  prevented  strife  between  indi- 
viduals even  before  law  was  sufficiently  established  to 
do  so,  may  not  the  Friendship  of  Nations  make  for 
peace?  The  analogy  between  men  and  States  has  been 
present  to  every  writer  on  politics  since  Plato. 

What  is  the  Friendship  of  Nations?  In  a  charming 
little  essay  on  Friendship  which  forms  the  eighth  and 
ninth  books  of  Aristotle's  Nicomachean  Ethics,  Friend- 
ships are  classed  under  three  heads,  those  resting  on 
Interest  or  Advantage,  on  Pleasure,  and  on  Goodness  or 
the  love  of  Virtue.  Where  each  of  two  men  can  benefit 
the  other,  common  advantage  will  draw  them  together. 
Where  each  finds  pleasure  in  the  society  of  the  other, 
there  will  be  mutual  kindliness.  Where  a  man  recog- 


132  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

nizes  greatness  or  goodness  in  another  man,  he  will, 
if  himself  capable  of  seeing  and  loving  excellence,  be 
attracted  to  the  person  in  whom  he  discovers  it.  If 
we  apply  these  categories  to  nations,  we  shall  find  that 
a  sense  of  common  interest  has  often  produced  more 
or  less  of  good  will  and  at  any  rate  of  cooperation.  The 
nations  are  inclined  to  profess  friendship,  and  will  extol 
one  another  by  appropriate  compliments  on  public  oc- 
casions so  long,  but  only  so  long,  as  each  expects  the 
cooperation  of  the  other  to  continue. 

There  were  in  the  ancient  world  some  instances  of 
permanent  friendships  between  independent  states, 
i.e.,  of  a  goodwill  between  the  individual  citizens  of 
the  several  communities  warm  enough  to  strengthen 
the  alliance  between  their  governments.  Athenians 
and  Platseans  were  united  by  such  a  tie,  though  it 
rested  primarily  on  the  protection  which  Plataea  usu- 
ally found  in  this  alliance  with  her  powerful  neighbor, 
and  in  the  advantage  which  Athens  drew  from  having 
a  sort  of  outpost  against  Thebes  in  PlatsBa.  So  in 
medieval  Italy  the  Florentines  had  a  kind  of  an  affec- 
tion for  the  French,  and  in  the  sixteenth  century  the 
attachment  of  the  Scots  to  France,  although  it  was 
mainly  grounded  in  their  common  enmity  to  England, 
came  to  have  a  touch  of  sentiment  in  it.  But  as  Aris- 
totle observes,  a  friendship  based  on  reciprocal  advan- 
tage comes  to  an  end  when  the  advantages  disappear, 
and  in  the  constant  changes  of  politics  this  frequently 
happens.  Alliances  are  unstable:  the  partner  of 
to-day  may  be  the  secret  or  even  open  enemy  of 
to-morrow.  Think  of  the  changes  in  the  relations  of 
the  great  States  of  Europe  since  1870 — how  Germany 
was  in  turn  the  friend  of  Russia,  of  Italy  and  of  Aus- 


MAKING  FOR  WAR  OR  PEACE  133 

tria,  how  France  was  unfriendly  to  Russia,  in  and 
for  a  long  while  after  1852,  and  thereafter  her  ally 
against  Germany,  how  Englishmen  used  for  many  a 
year  to  talk  of  a  war  with  Russia  as  inevitable.  Inter- 
est is  no  sure  basis  for  national  friendship. 

When  we  come  to  Pleasure  as  a  source  of  Friendship, 
the  analogy  between  individuals  and  nations  breaks 
down.  The  kind  of  enjoyment  that  men  of  congenial 
tastes  derive  from  one  another's  society  cannot  exist 
between  masses  of  men,  while  that  drawn  from  what 
the  poets  or  artists  of  one  nation  give  to  another  is 
confined  to  an  insignificant  minority  in  the  latter. 
There  were  in  Germany  before  the  late  war  many 
thousands  of  Germans  who  loved  Shakespeare — in  fact 
they  often  said,  and  that  truly,  that  whether  or  no  they 
appreciated  Shakespeare  more,  they  honored  him  more 
and  acted  his  dramas  more  than  we  did  in  England — 
there  were  many  who  admired  Newton  and  Darwin, 
Macaulay  and  Thomas  Carlyle,  particularly  Carlyle; 
as  there  were  also  in  England  those  who  delighted  in 
Goethe  and  Beethoven  and  honored  the  memory  of 
Dr.  Martin  Luther.  But  the  feelings  which  these  per- 
sons had  towards  the  country  to  which  such  men  be- 
longed counted  for  nothing  when  peace  and  war  hung 
in  the  balance. 

Admiration  of  intellectual  or  moral  excellence  is 
even  less  to  be  expected  from  a  nation  towards  a  na- 
tion. Aristotle  observes,  somewhat  grimly,  that  friend- 
ships of  Virtue  are  rare,  because  the  men  whose 
goodness  can  inspire  affection  are  a  very  small  minor- 
ity. Nobody  ever  heard  of  a  nation  whose  virtues 
made  other  nations  love  it.  Each  people  is  much  more 
apt  to  disparage  the  merits  of  others,  and  this  habit, 


134  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

odious  in  private  life  between  individual  men,  passes 
uncensured  when  it  is  practised  towards  a  foreign 
people,  because  each  people  likes  to  find  grounds  for 
believing  in  its  own  superiority.  Moral  merits  are  in 
point  of  fact  hardly  at  all  more  diffused  through  any 
one  nation  than  through  another,  and  intellectual  gifts, 
which  are  more  easily  recognized  than  moral  excellence, 
are  quite  as  likely  to  rouse  jealousy  and  rivalry  as 
admiration.  Yet  there  are  cases  in  which  an  excep- 
tionally noble  figure  appearing  in  one  nation  may  be 
so  honored  and  loved  in  another  as  to  make  it  feel 
more  tenderly  towards  the  people  whence  that  figure 
has  come.  I  have  spoken  of  Goethe  and  Beethoven; 
I  might  say  the  same  of  Dante  and  Tasso  and  Mazzini, 
but  the  best  instances  I  can  think  of  are  to  be  seen 
in  the  affectionate  reverence  with  which  Washington 
and  Lincoln  are  regarded  hi  Europe,  and  of  course,  espe- 
cially in  England. 

Moreover,  though  little  reliance  can  be  placed  on 
sentiments  of  friendship  as  influencing  the  political 
relations  of  States,  we  must  also  remember,  and  it  is 
a  comfort  to  remember,  that  national  animosities  sel- 
dom pervade  a  whole  people  unless  there  has  been 
inflicted  some  grave  injury  which  has  created  the  de- 
sire for  revenge.  Though  there  had  been  a  succession 
of  wars  between  England  and  France  through  and  after 
the  Middle  Ages,  there  was  never  any  real  hatred  be- 
tween the  peoples,  not  even  among  the  French  when 
the  Plantagenet  kings  were  fighting  over  large  parts 
of  France.  Neither  did  the  Prussian  people  begin  to 
hate  the  French  till  Napoleon  dealt  harshly  with  them 
after  the  battle  of  Jena;  nor  did  the  French  hate  the 
Germans  till  1871,  when  Alsace  was  taken  away.  Gen- 


MAKING  FOR  WAR  OR  PEACE  135 

erally  speaking,  whatever  dislike  exists  among  the 
richer  and  middle  classes  does  not  go  far  down  into 
the  masses  of  the  nation,  just  as  a  frost,  sharp  on  the 
surface  of  the  ground,  seldom  chills  it  to  a  depth  of 
more  than  a  very  few  feet.  It  is  only  where  a  sort  of 
fierce  tribal  spirit  lingers,  as  in  §pme  parts  of  South- 
eastern Europe  and  Western  Asia,  that  one  can  speak 
of  international  animosities  as  affecting  whole  peoples. 
Even  as  between  Christians  and  Muslims  religious  an- 
tagonism (where  not  stimulated  artificially)  seldom 
creates  personal  aversion.  I  have  seen  in  American 
missionary  colleges  Muslims,  Orthodox  Greeks  and 
Armenians  studying  in  perfect  harmony  and  join  in 
singing  the  same  hymns. 

Some  of  you  may  remark  that  there  is  a  sense  in 
which  all  civilized  peoples  form  one  great  community, 
each  part  of  which  profits  by  the  labors  of  the  others, 
and  enjoys  the  contributions  they  make  to  the  common 
stock.  Science,  Learning,  Polite  Literature,  Art  hi  all 
its  forms,  have  nothing  to  do  with  national  differences. 
Those  who  follow  those  pursuits  owe  as  much  to  their 
fellow  workers  abroad  as  to  those  at  home,  and  are, 
those  especially  who  devote  themselves  to  the  sciences 
of  nature,  which  have  least  of  all  to  do  with  the 
quarrels  of  men,  brought  into  profitable  cooperation 
with  one  another.  Might  not  these  learned  and 
scientific  classes  use  their  influence  to  mitigate  the 
asperities  of  politics  and  help  the  peoples  to  better 
understand  and  appreciate  one  another? 

Influences  of  this  kind  have  been  from  time  to  time 
discernible.  Instances  were  seen  during  the  Great 
War.  Two  great  professions  that  are  now  powerful  in 
all  the  larger  and  some  even  of  the  smaller  countries, 


136  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

the  officers  of  the  Armies  and  the  officers  of  the 
Navies,  showed  such  phenomena.  The  upper  ranks 
of  the  army  in  each  country  admired  that  country  in 
which  the  army  had  carried  nearest  to  perfection  its 
peculiar  science  and  art.  The  same  happened  as  re- 
gards the  navy.  Accordingly,  in  nearly  every  country 
the  soldiers  admired  and  felt  a  certain  sympathy  with 
Germany,  which  had  brought  her  army  to  the  highest 
point  of  efficiency.  Similarly,  in  every  country — and 
this  applies  to  the  New  World  in  some  cases  as  well  as 
to  the  Old — the  naval  officers  gave  their  sympathy  to 
England,  which  had  led  the  way  in  naval  excellence. 

This  illustration  is  drawn  from  the  sphere  of  actual 
work,  but  the  principle  applies  to  studies  of  a  less 
practical  kind.  Men  who  have  come  under  the  in- 
fluence of  the  literature  or  music  of  another  country 
or  have  studied  in  its  great  schools  conceive  a  liking 
for  its  thought  and  its  ways,  which  might  enable  them 
to  interpret  it  in  a  favorable  sense  to  their  own  country- 
men and  so  commend  that  foreign  country  to  good  will. 

It  is  a  long  step  from  war  to  theology,  but  we  have 
heard  of  countries  whose  students  of  divinity  had 
resorted  chiefly  to  German  Universities  and  who  had 
brought  back  therefrom  an  admiration  for  German 
learning  which  tinged  their  political  proclivities  dur- 
ing the  conflict  of  1914  to  1918,  making  them  hostile 
to  the  Entente  Powers.  "Tantcene  animis  ccelestibus 
irce." 

Apart  from  these  cases  of  professional  feeling,  which 
I  cite  merely  as  instances  of  sympathies  transcending 
national  boundaries,  not  as  having  in  any  way  made 
for  peace,  the  most  highly  educated  class,  though  it 
owes  allegiance  to  truth  above  everything  else,  has 


MAKING  FOR  WAR  OR  PEACE  137 

done  less  than  might  have  been  expected  to  dispel  dis- 
trust between  nations  and  enable  the  benefits  of  con- 
cord to  be  appreciated.  As  Heraclitus  said  long  ago, 
"Much  Knowledge  does  not  teach  Wisdom,"  so  we  see 
that  men  of  science  and  learning  may  be  too  deeply 
absorbed  in  their  own  studies  to  take  note  of  what  is 
passing  in  the  political  world,  or  may  be  sometimes 
swept  away  just  like  others  by  whatever  current  of 
momentary  feeling  pervades  their  social  class.  Some- 
times again,  they  may,  if  public  teachers,  be  under  the 
orders  of  their  Government,  and  so  feel  bound  to  sup- 
port its  policy,  be  it  wise  or  foolish,  a  fact  which  sug- 
gests the  remark  that  the  less  there  is  of  official  control 
over  University  teachers  and  ministers  of  religion,  so 
much  the  better  for  themselves  and  for  their  country. 
It  is  your  good  fortune  here,  as  it  has  been  ours  in  Eng- 
land and  Scotland,  that  hardly  any  teachers  or  preach- 
ers have  had  anything  whatever  to  gain  by  trying  to 
win  favors  from  the  political  powers  that  be.  Science 
and  learning  ought  to  draw  men  of  different  nations  to- 
gether into  one  body  pursuing  the  same  ideals,  loyalty 
to  truth  and  gentleness  of  spirit  and  the  power  of  ap- 
preciating minds  unlike  our  own.  And  it  is  to  be 
hoped  that  the  learned  scientific  men  in  the  recently 
belligerent  countries  will  henceforth  do  their  best  to 
re-create  those  ties  which  formerly  bound  men  of 
learning  and  science  together  all  over  the  civilized 
world. 

In  this  respect  Europe  has  gone  backwards  rather 
than  forwards  since  the  Middle  Ages.  The  sentiments 
of  national  rivalry  and  jealousy  were  then  compara- 
tively feeble  among  the  aristocracies  and  the  burghers, 
and  practically  non-existent  among  the  common  folks, 


138  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

while  the  Church  was  a  potent  influence  in  keeping 
the  people  together  and  in  inspiring  a  sense  of  religious 
unity  which  rose  above  all  distinctions  of  race  and 
speech.  Unity  showed  itself  in  institutions  the  action 
of  which  transcended  national  boundaries.  Such  were 
those  General  Councils  in  which  the  leading  ecclesias- 
tics and  University  authorities  of  all  Catholic  countries 
assembled,  as  at  Constance  and  Basel,  at  Pisa  and 
Florence,  to  regulate  common  affairs,  and  put  an  end 
to  schisms. 

Other  links  between  peoples  were  found  in  the  great 
religious  Orders  and  especially  those  of  St.  Benedict, 
St.  Dominic  and  St.  Francis,  playing  in  the  medieval 
Christian  commonwealth  a  part  which  may  be  com- 
pared with  that  of  the  nervous  system  in  the  human 
body,  serving  the  whole  of  it  by  transmitting 
both  perceptions  and  impulses  to  action.  These  Or- 
ders, and  the  Universities  likewise,  belonged  to  all 
countries  as  well  as  to  that  in  which  they  had  sprung 
up.  Students  of  law  went  from  all  Europe  to  Bologna, 
students  of  medicine  to  Salerno,  students  of  magic  to 
Padua,  students  of  logic  and  theology  to  Paris  and  Ox- 
ford. Many  of  you  will  recall  a  remarkable  instance 
from  the  fourteenth  century,  when  in  a  conflict  that 
had  arisen  between  the  Germanic  Emperor,  Lewis  IV, 
and  the  Pope,  the  three  foremost  champions  of  the 
latter  were  three  University  teachers  and  scholastic 
disputants,  the  Italian  Marsilius  of  Padua,  the  French- 
man John  of  Jandun,  and  the  Englishman  William  of 
Ockham.  This  sense  of  unity  was  unhappily  lost  in 
the  storms  of  the  Reformation,  and  has  never  been  per- 
fectly restored. 

We  cannot  say  that  the  sense  of  a  Christian  Com- 


MAKING  FOR  WAR  OR  PEACE  139 

monwealth  did  much  to  avert  wars  in  the  days  of 
which  I  have  been  speaking,  but  it  imposed  a  certain 
slight  measure  of  restraint  upon  unscrupulous  mon- 
archs  who  wished  to  seize  a  neighbor's  territory  at  the 
moment  when  he  was  least  prepared.  It  is  not  a  mere 
coincidence  that  the  age  in  which  that  sense  showed 
signs  of  decay  was  also  the  age  in  which  statesmen 
showed  themselves  most  shamelessly  unscrupulous. 
The  general  opinion  of  the  thirteenth  century  was 
more  shocked  by  Charles  of  Anjou's  judicial  murder  of 
Conradin,  son  of  the  Emperor  Conrad  IV,  than  the 
opinion  of  the  fifteenth  was  shocked  by  Cesare  Borgia's 
treacherous  murder  at  Sinigaglia  of  the  men  whom  he 
had  invited  to  meet  him  as  friends.  So  too,  frightful 
as  were  the  assassinations  and  massacres  which  stain 
the  annals  of  religious  warfare  in  the  sixteenth  century, 
they  were  often  perpetrated  on  behalf  of  a  cause  in 
whose  triumph  men,  fanatics  perhaps,  thought  the 
safety  of  souls  involved.  It  was  when  religious  sanc- 
tions had  virtually  disappeared  in  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury and  the  rule  of  force  was  alone  recognized,  that 
Frederick  of  Prussia  and  Catherine  of  Russia  did  not 
hesitate  to  destroy  the  national  existence  of  Poland  in 
order  to  enlarge  their  respective  dominions.  Selfish- 
ness, personal  or  national,  was  recognized  as  the 
natural  course  rulers  would  pursue  and  no  authority 
was  recognized  as  entitled  to  rebuke  it. 

In  those  medieval  days  to  which  I  have  referred,  that 
which  one  people  knew  of  its  neighbors  came  partly 
from  the  very  few  who  travelled  on  business,  partly 
from  the  monks  and  friars  who  went  to  and  fro  from 
one  house  of  their  Order  to  another.  The  latter  were 
everywhere  at  home,  and  they  played  a  useful  part  hi 


140  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

enabling  one  part  of  each  nation,  and  the  most  edu- 
cated part,  to  have  some  idea  of  what  each  other  nation 
was  thinking  and  doing.  Nowadays,  when  communi- 
cations are  far  easier  and  swifter,  there  would  seem  to 
be  ampler  means  by  which  nations  may  learn  about 
one  another  what  they  need  to  know;  and  this  change 
ought,  one  would  think,  to  make  for  good  will.  Let 
us  pause  to  consider  some  of  these  means. 

Why  is  it  that  although  nations  do  not  seem  to  like 
one  another,  each  of  us  when  he  journeys  abroad  does 
not  dislike  but  usually  finds  much  to  like  in  the  in- 
habitants of  other  countries? 

Wherever  one  travels,  does  not  one  everywhere  find 
that  the  people,  i.e.,  the  average  men  and  women, 
country  folk  and  townsfolk,  are  kindly  and  likeable, 
human  beings  up  to  the  level  of  one's  own  countrymen 
in  most  social  and  moral  respects?  Their  merits  and 
virtues  are  not  quite  the  same  as  those  of  our  own 
countrymen,  nor  are  their  faults,  but  they  have  merits 
enough  to  make  intercourse  with  them  agreeable.  It 
was  my  pleasant  experience,  when  travelling  in  every 
country  of  Europe  and  many  countries  outside  Europe, 
to  find  everywhere  that  there  was  much  to  like  and  ad- 
mire in  the  peoples  of  all  the  countries  one  visited. 
But  in  every  country,  however  kindly  the  reception 
accorded  to  the  visitor,  I  found  that  the  people  did  not 
seem  to  like  other  peoples,  and  their  nearest  neighbors 
any  better  than  the  others.  Why?  Was  it  because  the 
nations  didn't  know  one  another?  If  so,  why  did  the 
absence  of  knowledge  practically  mean  dislike,  or  at 
least  a  want  of  friendliness?  Let  us  see  what  means 
they  had  for  knowing  one  another. 

Formal  and  official  intercourse  between  nations  is 


MAKING  FOR  WAR  OR  PEACE  141 

through  their  governments.  Now  governments  may 
be  more  or  less  courteous  in  their  intercourse,  but  on 
the  whole  they  find  courtesy  the  best  policy,  and  prac- 
tice it.  Yet,  after  all,  those  who  represent  them  meet,  or 
correspond  by  despatches,  not  to  exchange  expressions 
of  regard  but  to  discuss  differences,  and  differences  do 
not  make  for  friendship.  Governments  are  obliged,  or 
think  themselves  obliged,  to  be  sometimes  pretty  stiff 
in  contending  for  their  interests  or  what  they  think 
their  interests.  They  often  slip  into  charges  and 
threats.  Sometimes  they  try  to  "score  off"  one 
another  and  indulge  in  sarcasms  better  omitted.  On 
the  whole,  very  little  friendship  comes  out  of  the  inter- 
course of  governments. 

Next  come  the  politicians,  the  men  who  talk  and 
write  about  politics,  and  whose  words  are  published 
and  read  in  other  countries,  sometimes  with  little 
perception  of  the  greater  or  less  importance  of  the 
person  from  whom  the  words  proceed.  We  know  other 
countries  a  great  deal  through  the  politicians.  Now 
the  politicians  are,  as  far  as  my  experience  goes,  always 
hospitable  and  friendly  to  a  visitor  from  another 
country.  One  admires  their  cleverness  and  their  good 
manners,  and  finds  oneself  at  home  among  them.  But 
it  is  also  true  that  in  no  country  do  the  politicians,  as 
known  by  their  speeches  and  conduct,  give  the  best  im- 
pression of  their  nation.  I  have  never  travelled  in  any 
country  hi  which  I  did  not  hear  my  private,  non- 
political,  acquaintances  say,  "Don't  judge  us  by  our 
politicians." 

It  is  not  for  me  to  attempt  to  explain  the  phenom- 
enon; you  can  do  that  for  yourselves.  Those  of  you 
who  have  a  practical  knowledge  of  the  ins  and  outs 


142  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

of  politics  have  means  of  understanding  why  human 
nature  does  not  wear  its  most  engaging  aspect  in 
public  life. 

Thirdly,  there  is  the  influence  of  the  press.  Every 
civilized  country  is,  of  course,  known  to  other  countries 
chiefly  through  the  press,  that  is  to  say,  through  books 
and  newspapers.  Why  has  its  influence  made  more 
frequently  for  ill-will  than  for  friendship  between 
peoples?  Now  every  newspaper  thinks  "first,  foremost 
and  all  the  tune"  of  its  circulation.  Some  have  an 
honest  wish  not  only  to  describe  facts  correctly  but  to 
inculcate  views  they  think  sound.  But  not  many  resist 
the  temptation  to  say  what  will  please  their  readers. 
Every  people  likes  to  be  praised  and  to  be  told  that 
its  claims  are  well  founded  and  its  purposes  laudable. 
Praise  of  one's  country  is  always  agreeable,  but  dis- 
praise of  other  countries  is  more  welcome  than  praise 
of  other  countries.  The  praise  which  writers  and  pub- 
lic speakers  have  to  bestow  is  generally,  in  the  first 
instance,  given  to  their  own  nation,  and  when  there  is 
a  controversy  between  nations,  any  statement  of  facts 
or  arguments  favoring  the  case  of  the  opposing  nation 
is  ill  received  and  may  be  resented.  There  is  a  dis- 
position in  human  nature  to  take  dispraise  of  others  as 
in  a  certain  sense  praise  to  ourselves.  Nothing  is 
easier,  nothing  gives  more  pleasure  to  the  meaner  sort 
of  minds,  than  to  read  denunciations  of  the  folly  or  un- 
fairness of  the  governments  or  politicians  or  news- 
papers of  foreign  countries.  Newspapers  think  they 
"score  points"  when  they  give  rein  to  offensive  crit- 
icism of  the  foreigner,  while  they  are  exceedingly  chary 
of  treading  upon  the  toes  of  their  own  nation. 

These  things  do  harm,  and  do  harm  out  of  all  pro- 


MAKING  FOR  WAR  OR  PEACE  143 

portion  to  the  real  importance  of  the  things  that  are 
said  and  of  the  persons  who  say  them.  Attacks  or 
sneers  made  recklessly  and  hastily  in  the  press  of  one 
country  about  another  sting  and  remain  and  are  cited 
long  afterwards,  even  when  they  did  not  in  the  least 
represent  the  sentiment  of  the  nation  to  which  the 
reckless  scribe  belonged.  This  seems  to  be  especially 
true  between  the  countries  of  Continental  Europe. 
When  I  speak  of  "foreign  countries,"  I  do  not  class 
England  and  the  United  States  in  that  category,  for 
this  reason:  The  newspapers  of  our  respective  coun- 
tries are  not  blameless,  though  they  probably  are  more 
internationally  courteous  now  than  formerly.  But  we 
are  not  "foreign"  to  one  another  as  France,  Germany 
and  Italy  are  foreign  to  each  other.  We  know  one  an- 
other's ways,  and  we  can  discount  what  our  newspapers 
say.  You  can  laugh  over  any  spiteful  thing  that  might 
be  said  in  the  British  press  about  this  country,  and 
if  any  such  thing  were  ever  to  be  said  in  an  Ameri- 
can newspaper  about  England  we  likewise  should  dis- 
count it. 

Speaking  broadly,  it  must  be  confessed  that  the  press 
of  all  the  nations  taken  together  has  done  much  to  set 
them  in  an  unlovely  light  to  one  another  and  said  more 
to  provoke  enmity  than  to  win  friendship. 

In  some  cases  newspapers  have  helped  to  make  wars, 
and  in  not  a  few  they  have  been  used  by  unscrupulous 
statesmen  to  produce  exasperation  bringing  war  nearer. 
The  press  is  more  dangerous  than  the  politicians,  be- 
cause the  latter  can  be  made  responsible  to  public 
opinion  for  the  mischief  they  do,  while  the  anonymous 
writer  cannot.  At  present  the  scanty  knowledge  each 
people  has  of  its  neighbors  puts  each  at  the  mercy  of 


144  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

the  press;  and  that  is  one  of  the  reasons  for  trying  to 
get  the  people  to  take  more  pains  to  understand  foreign 
affairs. 

You  may  say  that  each  people,  since  it  knows  that 
its  own  government,  its  own  politicians  and  its  own 
press  do  not  represent  its  best  temper  and  its  highest 
spirit,  possibly'  not  even  its  general  spirit,  ought  to 
remember  that  the  same  is  true  of  neighbor  peoples. 
That  may  be  a  good  ground  for  tolerant  judgments  of 
other  nations;  but  after  all,  every  nation  cannot  help 
being  judged  by  those  who  purport  to  speak  for  it  and 
whose  voices  go  abroad.  It  will  always  be  liable  to  be 
judged  by  its  government,  and  must  suffer  if  its  gov- 
ernment misrepresents  it.  If  it  wishes  to  escape  blame, 
let  the  electors  turn  out  the  government.  If  its 
politicians  misrepresent  it,  let  them  be  punished  by  its 
displeasure.  If  it  feels  its  public  opinion  to  be  fairer 
and  sounder  than  is  that  of  government  and  politicians, 
as  has  not  infrequently  happened  in  England,  let  it  see 
that  wiser  and  saner  opinion  finds  due  expression  in  its 
press.  To  all  of  us,  Englishmen  and  Americans,  it  is 
galling  to  see  ourselves  misjudged  by  foreigners,  and 
exposed  to  an  ill-will  which  we  sometimes  have  not 
deserved.  But  when  this  happens,  the  fault  usually 
lies,  more  or  less,  with  ourselves. 

Having  now  seen  the  chief  influences,  non-political 
as  well  as  directly  political,  which  have  hitherto 
worked  for  amity  or  enmity  between  nations,  let  us 
try  to  sum  up  the  chief  causes  of  war  in  modern  times. 

First.  There  is  still,  as  there  was  two  thousand  years 
ago,  the  lust  for  territory,  arising  sometimes  from  a 
belief  that  the  larger  a  State's  area,  the  greater  is  likely 


MAKING  FOR  WAR  OR  PEACE  145 

to  be  its  military  power  and  general  prosperity.  This 
passion,  once  strong  in  monarchs,  can  infect  peoples, 
even  the  freest  and  the  most  enlightened.  The  old, 
unreasoning,  violent  impulses  to  self-assertion  and 
aggression  may  blaze  up  as  hotly  in  popularly  governed 
nations  as  they  did  in  savage  tribes.  The  desire  that 
many  a  nation  feels  to  see  more  and  more  of  the  world's 
surface  colored  on  the  world's  map  as  its  own  is  still 
potent,  so  when  any  territory  has  been  temporarily 
occupied,  many  voices  will  cry  out  that  the  Flag  must 
never  be  lowered  where  it  has  once  been  hoisted! — or 
that  a  "scientific  frontier"  or  a  "natural  boundary" 
must  be  obtained.  A  nation  that  holds  the  coast  will 
say  that  it  ought  to  have  the  "hinterland";  a  nation 
that  dwells  some  way  from  the  sea  will  insist  that  it 
must  have  an  outlet  and  ports  to  develop  its  commerce. 
Any  pretext  will  do; — the  protection  of  a  native  race, 
a  large  share  in  some  natural  product  needed  for  war- 
fare, a  blessing  to  be  conferred  upon  the  world  by  the 
diffusion  of  a  higher  type  of  civilization. 

Second.  Religious  hatred,  potent  in  the  East,  not 
quite  extinct  in  some  parts  of  Europe. 

Third.  Injuries  inflicted  on  the  citizens  of  one  State 
by  the  Government  or  citizens  of  another.  These,  when 
not  redressed,  have  often  brought  nations  to  the  edge  of 
war  and  sometimes  pushed  them  over;  but  the  estab- 
lishment of  Courts  of  Arbitration  now  goes  some  way 
to  supply  a  safeguard. 

Fourth.  Commercial  or  financial  interests.  These 
do  not  so  often  directly  cause  a  resort  to  arms,  but  they 
create  ill  feeling  and  distrust  which  make  any  passing 
incident  sufficient  to  evoke  complaints  or  threats. 

Fifth.    Sympathy  with  those  who  are  oppressed  by 


146  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

an  alien  Government,  especially  if  the  sufferers  belong 
to  a  kindred  race,  is  a  more  creditable  motive  for  hos- 
tilities than  the  others  I  have  mentioned,  yet  has  some- 
times been  used  as  a  pretext  for  war  when  justice  might 
have  been  otherwise  attained. 

Sixth.  There  are  wars  due  to  fear.  A  nation 
which  sees  its  neighbor  or  neighbors  growing  in  mili- 
tary strength,  and  finds  reason  to  mistrust  their  pur- 
poses, is  tempted  to  anticipate  the  dreaded  attack  by 
itself  attacking.  Wars  thus  arising  are  sometimes  de- 
scribed as  Preventive.  Bismarck,  when  he  was  once 
accused  of  planning  a  war  of  this  kind,  replied  that  he 
condemned  any  such  war  because  it  might  be  needless. 
"None  of  us,"  he  said,  "can  look  into  the  cards  which 
are  held  by  Providence."  Nevertheless,  the  fear  of  a 
sudden  onslaught  has  continued  to  throw  Governments 
and  peoples  into  suspicions  and  anxieties  which  itself 
tends  to  bring  war  about.  It  was  this  nervousness, 
this  tremulous  apprehension,  that  led  the  greater 
European  States  to  increase  from  year  to  year  their 
naval  and  military  armaments  till  these  had  in  1914 
gone  so  far  that  there  were  persons  who  seemed  to  wish 
for  war  in  the  hope  that  the  decision  war  would  bring 
must  put  an  end  to  costly  preparations  for  it  and  to 
the  crushing  burdens  those  preparations  entailed.  The 
price  has  been  paid  and  the  result  desired  has  not  been 
attained. 

The  enquiry  which  has  occupied  us  has  so  far  shown 
that  international  relations  have  from  the  earliest 
times  been  constantly  interrupted  by  war  and  always 
troubled  by  the  fear  of  it;  and  we  have  seen  that  now, 
when  it  is  conducted  on  a  vaster  scale  than  ever  before, 
the  danger  of  its  recurrence  has  not  diminished.  Let 


MAKING  FOR  WAR  OR  PEACE  147 

us  now  pass  from  a  survey  of  the  past  to  consider  what 
are  the  agencies  and  what  the  machinery  by  which  in- 
ternational relations  may  be  so  improved  as  to  create 
solid  hopes  for  peace  in  the  future. 


LECTURE  V. 
DIPLOMACY  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW. 

DIPLOMACY,  considered  as  the  science  or  art, — al- 
though it  is  rather  the  latter  than  the  former, — of  con- 
ducting the  intercourse  of  independent  political  com- 
munities, is  a  comparatively  new  thing,  dating  only 
from  the  seventeenth  century,  when  the  greater  Euro- 
pean states  began  to  keep  permanently  resident  envoys 
in  one  another's  capitals  and  the  management  of  foreign 
relations  slipped  from  the  hands  of  monarchs,  or 
their  temporary  favorites,  into  those  of  ministers  whom 
the  king  trusted  and  employed,  then  becoming  an  im- 
portant function  of  government.  It  was  the  increasing 
volume  of  work  to  be  done  and  the  increasing  compli- 
cation of  the  issues  to  be  dealt  with  that  made  these 
developments  necessary.  A  still  greater  change  came 
with  the  invention  of  the  electric  telegraph,  for  when 
the  minister  in  his  office  at  home  could  at  any  moment 
obtain  information  from  or  send  instructions  to  the  en- 
voy abroad,  the  discretion  of  the  latter  was  narrowed 
and  the  labors  of  the  minister  were  increased.  Envoys 
were  for  a  long  time  not  only  chosen  by  the  king,  but 
regarded  as  his  personal  servants,  whom  he  accredited 
to  his  brother  monarchs  and  who  were  entitled  to  re- 
spect because  they  directly  represented  him,  so  that 
an  injury  done  to  one  of  them  was  deemed  an  insult 
to  his  sovereign. 

148 


DIPLOMACY  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  149 

In  France  and  England  nobles  were  usually  selected 
as  envoys,  but  the  Spaniards  frequently  employed 
friars,  who  had  three  special  qualifications.  They  trav- 
elled and  lived  cheaply,  whereas  a  lay  ambassador  was 
expected  to  maintain  great  state  at  a  great  cost.  They 
were  better  educated  than  most  nobles,  and  they  were 
not  so  likely,  when  living  in  the  country  to  which  they 
were  sent,  to  fall  under  local  social  influences,  and 
especially  those  which  feminine  charms  might  exert. 
English  kings — partly,  perhaps,  for  this  last  mentioned 
reason — sometimes  employed  bishops,  two  of  whom  are 
remembered  as  exceptionally  successful.  As  it  was  the 
envoy's  business  to  win  the  favor  of  the  sovereign  to 
whom  he  might  be  accredited  and  to  make  as  many 
friends  as  possible  among  his  entourage,  a  man  was 
selected  quite  as  much  in  respect  of  courtly  gifts  as  of 
intellectual  attainments.  Now,  however,  diplomacy 
has  in  nearly  every  country  become  a  profession,  and 
in  England,  and,  I  believe,  in  France  and  Germany 
also,  admission  to  it  is  by  competitive  examination. 
This  plan,  with  some  obvious  advantages,  has  the  dis- 
advantage of  tending  to  form  a  professional  way  of 
looking  at  and  dealing  with  things  which  may  narrow 
a  man's  outlook,  and  dispose  him  to  lay  too  much  stress 
upon  usages  and  technicalities.  In  England  the  For- 
eign Office  at  home  and  the  diplomatic  profession 
abroad  are  now  considered  one  service,  but  neither 
there  nor  elsewhere  are  the  most  important  posts  con- 
fined to  persons  who  have  passed  through  it. 

There  are  other  countries  in  which  a  man  may  be 
taken  out  of  ordinary  civil  life  and  suddenly  sent  to 
fill  a  mission  of  high  importance  at  a  foreign  capital. 
The  lack  of  previous  special  experience  need  not  pre- 


150  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

vent  such  a  man  from  succeeding  if  he  has  native  tact, 
judgment  and  the  power  of  inspiring  confidence.  No 
better  example  could  be  cited  than  that  of  the  late  Dr. 
James  B.  Angell,  formerly  president  of  the  University 
of  Michigan,  who  was  the  best  ambassador  any  Power 
had  during  many  years  sent  to  the  exceptionally  diffi- 
cult post  of  Constantinople,  unless  I  except  the  British 
Sir  William  White,  who  possessed  the  special  advan- 
tage of  a  life-long  knowledge  of  the  East.  Cases  like 
President  AngelFs  and  that  of  Mr.  John  Hay,  to  which 
many  more  might  be  added,  show  that  professional 
experience  and  special  knowledge  are  less  essential 
than  is  commonly  believed. 

The  qualities  which  are  most  needed  in  an  envoy, 
besides  a  quick  shrewdness  and  an  aptitude  for  grasping 
all  the  facts  of  every  case,  are  on  the  one  hand  a  cour- 
tesy which,  giving  to  the  other  party  no  excuse  for 
rudeness  or  threats,  candidly  recognizes  whatever 
strength  his  case  may  possess,  and  on  the  other 
hand  a  firmness  which  always,  to  use  a  popular  ex- 
pression, "keeps  up  his  own  end  of  the  stick,"  never 
permitting  any  imputation  on  his  own  country  to  pass 
unchallenged.  I  remember  how  one  of  our  ablest 
statesmen,  who  had  gone  on  a  special  mission  to  Russia 
some  fifty  years  ago,  told  me  that  in  a  private  con- 
versation with  the  Tsar  Alexander  II,  the  latter,  usu- 
ally a  kindly  and  reasonable  man,  once  made  some 
unfriendly  comments  on  the  action  of  the  British  Gov- 
ernment. The  British  envoy  replied :  "My  duty  to  my 
sovereign  and  my  country  requires  me  to  tell  Your 
Imperial  Majesty  that  I  cannot  for  a  moment  admit 
the  justice  of  the  observations  that  have  fallen  from 


DIPLOMACY  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  151 

you.  They  do  not  seem  to  me  to  be  warranted  by  the 
facts." 

In  the  days  when  kings  were  to  a  great  extent  their 
own  ministers,  it  was  of  course  necessary  that  those 
accredited  to  them  should  possess  a  keen  insight  into 
character,  because  every  negotiation  might  turn  upon 
the  temper,  the  foibles,  the  mental  tendencies  of  the 
sovereign.  This  gift  is  hardly  less  necessary  in  dealing 
with  a  modern  Minister  than  it  was  in  the  old  days 
with  a  monarch  like  the  Emperor  Charles  V  or  Louis 
XIV  of  France.  Each  has  his  idiosyncrasies,  his  fixed 
ideas,  his  prejudices,  his  likings  or  aversions.  He  may 
be  open-minded,  genial,  trustworthy,  so  that  in  dealing 
with  him  you  can  put  your  cards  on  the  table.  He  may 
be  suspicious,  or  niggling,  or  wily,  needing  to  be  contin- 
ually watched.  Invaluable,  therefore,  is  the  habit  of 
closely  observing  every  feature  of  character,  every  indi- 
cation of  the  purposes  which  he  cherishes  but  may 
not  wish  to  avow.  In  some  men  this  habit  is  in- 
stinctive: to  others  it  comes  only  by  experience 
or  never  comes  at  all.  There  is,  of  course,  a  sense  in 
which  large  general  causes  determine  the  march  of 
human  affairs,  yet — and  this  is  a  thing  which  is  apt  to 
be  forgotten  by  those  who  look  only  to  general  causes — 
the  proclivities  and  ways  of  thinking,  the  honesty  or 
dishonesty,  the  selfishness  or  public  spirit,  the  irritabil- 
ity or  rashness  or  overcaution  of  individual  men  hold- 
ing important  posts  make  more  difference  in  the  course 
of  events  than  the  ordinary  citizen  or  sometimes  even 
the  historian  understands. 

I  remember  an  anecdote  which  illustrates  the  way 
in  which  a  man  may  use  opportunities  and  try  to  read 


152  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

the  character  or  to  obtain  an  obvious  advantage  when 
dealing  with  a  Foreign  Minister.  I  do  not  vouch  for 
the  truth  of  the  story,  but  tell  it  as  I  heard  it  in  Berlin. 
One  of  the  admirers  of  Prince  Bismarck  had  presented 
to  him  as  a  gift  a  large  and  powerful  dog.  It  was,  I 
think,  a  wolfhound,  or  something  between  a  wolfhound 
and  a  mastiff;  a  big  animal  of  formidable  appearance. 
It  had  a  habit  of  growling  and  sometimes  even  of 
snapping  when  it  found  reason  to  suspect  that  anyone 
displeased  its  master.  Bismarck  frequently  kept  this 
dog,  which  was  known  in  Berlin  as  the  Reichshund, 
the  "Hound  of  the  Empire,"  by  his  side  when  he  re- 
ceived foreign  ambassadors.  The  story  went  that  the 
dog  would  now  and  then  growl  and  show  its 
teeth  in  a  threatening  way  at  the  foreign  ambassador, 
who  was  seated  hard  by,  not  far  from  the  creature's 
fangs.  Bismarck  seemed  to  relish  the  uneasiness  which 
the  ambassador  could  not  help  showing  at  the  behavior 
of  the  dog,  and  he  derived  from  his  visitor's  embarrass- 
ment an  advantage  in  his  negotiations  similar  to  that 
which  is,  I  believe,  sought  in  the  game  of  baseball  by 
the  practice  of  what  you  call  "rattling  the  pitcher." 

The  duties  of  a  diplomatic  envoy  in  quiet  times  con- 
sist chiefly  in  the  adjustment  of  comparatively  petty 
questions  relating  to  business  matters,  and  especially 
to  favors  asked  or  grievances  complained  of  by  the 
citizens  of  the  country  he  represents,  with  the  trans- 
mission of  similar  requests  or  complaints  made  by  the 
government  to  which  he  is  accredited  on  behalf  of  its 
own  citizens.  Such  time  as  remains  over  from  current 
business  of  this  kind  is  usefully  devoted  to  following 
the  politics  of  the  country  in  which  he  resides  and  re- 
porting to  his  own  government  on  passing  events  and 


DIPLOMACY  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  153 

the  movements  of  public  opinion.  In  this  respect  the 
functions  of  envoys  have  undergone  great  changes  in 
recent  tunes.  It  is  not  with  sovereigns  and  courts  that 
envoys  are  today  chiefly  concerned ;  more  important  is 
it  that  they  should  observe  and  study  the  wider  circles 
of  politicians  who  sit  in  legislatures  and  of  journalists 
who  address  and  profess  to  represent  public  sentiment. 
The  British  traveller,  who  fifty  years  ago  in  vacation 
journeys  through  Europe  used  to  pay  his  respects  to  the 
ambassadors  and  ministers  of  those  days,  was  often  sur- 
prised at  the  slender  knowledge  they  seemed  to  possess 
of  political  parties  and  of  popular  feeling  in  the  coun- 
tries where  they  resided.  Nowadays  these  are  the 
things  an  envoy  most  needs  to  regard.  He  ought  to 
have  his  eyes  everywhere  and  on  everything.  The 
accounts  he  transmits  to  his  government  at  home  may 
be  of  great  service  to  them  in  explaining  the  situation 
they  have  to  deal  with,  in  pointing  out  to  what  extent 
words  may  be  discounted  which  have  been  said  publicly 
for  the  purpose  of  producing  political  effect,  and  also 
in  the  way  of  explaining  unavowed  motives,  of  indi- 
cating hidden  dangers.  The  things  which  his  Foreign, 
Office  at  home  cannot  be  expected  to  understand,  and 
particularly  the  ebbs  and  flows  of  popular  sentiment, 
are  the  things  he  must  carefully  report  and  explain. 
So  far  as  his  own  direct  action  is  concerned,  his  aim 
will  be  not  merely  to  straighten  out  difficulties,  but  to 
prevent  differences  from  passing  into  disputes.  It  is 
always  better  to  keep  controversies  from  arising  than 
to  be  driven  to  argue  and  settle  them,  probably  by  com- 
promise, after  they  have  begun  to  be  troublesome. 

The  maxims  that  have  been  laid  down  for  the  con- 
duct of  diplomatists  are  practically  those  which  any 


164  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

man  of  experience  in  any  business  or  profession  would 
lay  down  for  the  conduct  of  life.  They  may  best  be 
gathered  from  the  biographies  of  such  men  as  Met- 
ternich,  Bismarck,  Cavour,  Lord  Lyons,  Lord  Dufferin, 
Lord  Granville,  and  Charles  Francis  Adams,  the  elder. 

Busch's  volumes  on  Bismarck  are  entertaining,  and 
of  some  political  value,  but  a  much  better  insight 
into  modern  diplomatic  questions  and  methods  is  to 
be  found  in  the  two  volumes  of  Bismarck's  "Recol- 
lections" which  he  dictated  in  his  old  age.  It  is  a  book 
full  of  weighty  thought  which  shows  you  what  the 
diplomacy  of  Europe  used  to  be  thirty  years  ago — how 
crafty,  how  cynical,  in  a  sense  how  unscrupulous.  The 
book  ought  to  be  weighed  and  pondered  by  everybody 
who  desires  to  understand  the  history  of  Europe  in 
Bismarck's  day.  Bismarck  was  more  successful  but  not 
more  unscrupulous  than  most  of  his  contemporaries, 
and  certainly  not  more  so  than  Louis  Napoleon  and 
the  Austrians  whose  diplomatists  Prussia  outwitted. 

The  question  that  used  to  be  most  often  canvassed 
by  our  predecessors  relates  to  the  obligation  of  an 
envoy  to  speak  or  to  conceal  the  truth.  It  was  sup- 
posed three  centuries  ago  that  the  chief  duty  of  diplo- 
matists was  to  deceive,  and  so  a  tradition  arose 
that  diplomatists  are  not  believed,  because,  however 
honest  they  may  personally  be,  their  profession  in- 
volves deception.  Sir  Henry  Wotton,  long  British 
envoy  at  Venice,  got  into  trouble  for  having  written 
in  the  album  of  a  friend  in  a  jest  that  was  taken 
for  earnest,  that  an  Ambassador  was  "an  honest  man 
sent  to  lie  abroad  1  for  the  good  of  his  country."  Bis- 

1The  word  "lie"  was  commonly  used  then  as  equivalent  to  "re- 
side." 


DIPLOMACY  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  155 

marck  is  reported  to  have  said  that  it  was  his  practice 
to  speak  the  truth  because  he  knew  people  would  not 
believe  him.  Bonaparte  said  of  a  statesman  of  his 
day:  "He  lies  too  much.  It  is  necessary  to  lie  some- 
times, but  not  always." 

In  the  mouths  of  the  envoys  of  some  countries  false- 
hood is  so  much  a  matter  of  course  that  it  excites 
neither  surprise  nor  reprobation.  I  remember  that 
when  I  was  Under  Secretary  at  the  British  Foreign 
Office  in  1886  the  Turkish  ambassador,  who  was  him- 
self a  man  of  exceptional  ability,  called  on  me  one  day 
to  express  the  earnest  desire  and  settled  purpose  of  the 
Sultan  Abdul  Hamid,  to  do  everything  he  could  to 
promote  the  welfare  of  his  Christian  subjects,  and 
grant  the  fullest  protection  to  them.  These  admirable 
sentiments  were  delivered  by  the  ambassador  with  the 
utmost  gravity  and  an  air  of  perfect  conviction.  Cour- 
tesy required  that  I  should  listen  to  him  with  equal 
gravity,  but  what  he  said  was  of  course  just  what  had 
been  said  dozens  of  times  before  by  Turkish  ambas- 
sadors and  had  always  been  belied  by  Turkish  conduct. 
The  little  comedy  was  being  played  again  as  it  had 
been  played  so  often  before.  The  ambassador  knew 
that  I  knew  he  was  playing  it,  and  he  knew  also  that 
I  knew  that  he  knew  that  I  knew  it.  But  that  made  no 
difference,  and  doubtless  the  solemn  farce  went  on  from 
time  to  time  as  long  as  Abdul  Hamid  reigned,  when- 
ever a  new  Turkish  envoy  came  to  London. 

It  is  of  course  not  always  possible  to  say  all  that 
one  might  like  to  say,  and  some  illustrious  men  have 
on  occasion  deviated  a  little,  or  more  than  a  little,  from 
veracity.  Cavour  when  dealing  with  Louis  Napoleon 
gave  expression  to  much  less  than  he  thought;  but  then 


156  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

Cavour  knew  the  kind  of  trickster  he  had  to  handle. 
The  relations  of  states  being  what  they  are,  no  Euro- 
pean or  Asiatic  government — I  hope  it  may  be  better 
in  the  Western  Hemisphere — can  tell  the  world  all  it  is 
doing  or  means  to  do.  But  on  the  whole,  in  the  long 
run,  even  if  one  looks  at  the  matter  not  from  the  ethical 
but  solely  from  the  business  point  of  view,  more  is  lost 
than  gained  by  deceit.  A  temporary  advantage  may 
be  won,  but  confidence  is  destroyed  so  soon  as  the  truth 
comes  out  (which  it  generally  does),  and  the  men- 
dacious government  is  thereafter  mistrusted  even  when 
it  is  not  lying. 

Someone  has  said  that  nothing  is  more  useless  than 
a  general  maxim,  because  it  is  dangerous  to  apply  it 
without  a  careful  study  of  the  circumstances  of  each 
particular  case.  Nevertheless  such  maxims  have  a 
value  in  embodying  a  principle  from  which  the  exami- 
nation of  the  particular  case  may  begin.  They  are 
signs  set  up  to  call  attention  to  possible  dangers,  useful 
because  they  make  one  stop  to  reflect  and  consider  how 
far  the  maxim  is  applicable  in  the  particular  circum- 
stances that  are  present.  I  have  culled  from  the  biog- 
raphies of  some  eminent  men,  and  I  recall  from  the 
words  of  others,  certain  dicta  which,  while  generally 
applicable  to  the  conduct  of  life,  may  be  deemed  to 
have  special  bearing  on  a  diplomatist's  work: 

Never  make  secrets  out  of  non-essential  things. 
When  frankness  is  safe,  be  frank.  The  diplomatist 
who  is  too  obviously  reserved,  or  as  the  French  say 
"boutonne"  (buttoned  up),  loses  the  chance  of  hear- 
ing what  others  might  be  willing  to  tell.  Needless 
secrecy  is  usually  a  mark  of  timidity. 

Never  make  superfluous  admissions  nor  say  more 


DIPLOMACY  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  157 

than  is  needed  to  explain  or  justify  your  government's 
course  or  your  own. 

It  was  a  maxim  of  Napoleon's  never  to  reverse  a 
policy  nor  admit  a  defeat. 

He  who  goes  to  another  country  to  represent  his 
own,  goes  to  represent  his  country  as  a  whole  and  not 
any  party  in  it,  and  should  put  aside  all  his  former 
political  affiliations. 

An  envoy  should  never  show  any  predilection  for 
any  political  party  in  the  country  he  goes  to,  nor  ex- 
press an  opinion  on  its  political  issues.  Having  known 
more  than  a  generation  of  American  ambassadors  in 
England,  I  have  admired  the  discretion  which  they 
have  always  shown  hi  that  respect,  and  can  remember 
no  one  who  said  anything  in  public  from  which 
it  could  be  gathered  whether  he  sympathized  with 
Liberals  or  with  Conservatives.  Neither  should  the 
envoy  ever  fall,  or  let  it  be  supposed  that  he  has  fallen, 
under  the  influence  of  any  person  or  group  in  the 
country  where  his  service  lies. 

It  has  been  said  of  Napoleon  that  he  never  lost  his 
temper  unless  he  meant  to  lose  it.  To  be,  or  to  seem, 
exasperated  may  possibly,  though  rarely,  be  justified  if 
it  becomes  necessary  for  an  envoy  to  show  that  his  gov- 
ernment will  stand  no  nonsense.  This  advantage  is 
claimed  for  the  method,  that  while  your  adversary  is 
discomposed,  the  man  who  seems  to  be  losing  his  tem- 
per really  remains  cool. 

In  negotiations,  bluffing  is  a  dangerous  practice  to 
which  no  envoy  should  resort  except  by  the  express 
instructions  of  his  own  government.  They  ought  to 
know  better  than  he  can  whether  they  "hold  the  cards." 

Before  entering  on  an  important  interview  reflect  on 


158  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

the  course  it  is  likely  to  take,  so  as  to  be  prepared 
as  far  as  possible  for  your  adversary's  arguments. 
Napoleon's  success  in  war  was  largely  due  to  his  habit 
of  thinking  out  beforehand  all  possible  eventualities. 

Resist  the  temptation  to  satirical  criticisms.  It  is 
said  that  Frederick  the  Great  brought  on  a  war  with 
Russia  by  an  imprudent  sarcasm  on  the  Empress  Anne. 

The  envoy  should  never,  except  under  positive  in- 
structions from  home,  make  a  public  statement  of 
policy  to  anyone  except  the  government  to  which  he 
is  accredited.  To  do  so  on  a  public  occasion  may  give 
an  opening  to  politicians  or  the  press  to  misrepresent 
or  misconceive  his  own  or  his  government's  views,  and 
he  must  never  get  involved  in  a  press  controversy. 

Always  look  ahead.  The  party  "whip"  thinks  of  the 
day,  or  the  next  day,  when  the  critical  division  will 
arrive;  the  journalist  thinks  of  the  next  two  or  three 
days;  the  party  politicians  think  of  the  month,  or,  at 
furthest,  of  the  next  election.  But  the  diplomatist  and 
his  Foreign  Office  ought  to  think  of  the  developments 
still  further  off,  which  are  still  hidden  from  most  jour- 
nalists and  party  politicians. 

You  have  all  heard  of  the  advice  given  by  an  old 
Minister  to  a  young  man  charged  with  a  delicate  ne- 
gotiation: "Above  all,  no  zeal."  People  betray  them- 
selves by  eagerness.  An  astute  adversary  knows  how 
to  draw  advantage  from  every  indication  of  the  rela- 
tive importance  which  the  other  negotiator  attaches  to 
particular  points. 

As  I  have  referred  to  the  press,  it  may  be  said  that 
it  presents  one  of  the  modern  diplomatist's  most  deli- 
cate problems.  A  diplomatist  needs  in  every  country 
to  be  specially  careful  to  avoid  any  trouble  that  may 


DIPLOMACY  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  159 

arise  through  statements  made  by  him  that  are  liable 
to  be  misunderstood  or  misrepresented.  Everything 
depends  upon  the  particular  press-man  he  may  have 
to  deal  with.  If  he  is  a  person  of  honor  and  judg- 
ment, it  may  be  well  worth  while  to  give  him  private 
information  which  may  enable  him  to  correct,  or 
contradict,  misleading  statements.  In  America  and 
in  England  one  can  soon  discover  the  newspaper  cor- 
respondents who  deserve  confidence. 

It  is  easier  to  say  what  an  envoy  may  not  do  in  the 
way  of  seeking  private  information  or  exerting  private 
influence  than  to  define  what  he  may  do,  for  the  rules  of 
international  law  are  not  altogether  explicit  and  the 
practice  not  well  settled.  There  have  been  govern- 
ments which  asked,  and  sometimes  received,  from  their 
envoys  services  no  self-respecting  man  ought  to  render, 
such  as  bribing  persons  to  steal  documents.  It  would 
be  better  for  such  envoys  to  refuse  and  resign. 

You  may  ask  what  is  in  our  time  the  real  value  of 
diplomacy — that  is  to  say,  what  difference  does  the 
action  and  personality  of  diplomatic  envoys  make  to 
the  relations  of  states.  Much,  no  doubt,  depends  on 
the  country  and  on  the  government  with  which  an 
envoy  has  to  deal.  A  different  sort  of  man  is  needed  in 
Constantinople,  in  Teheran,  in  Madrid,  in  Stockholm. 
Broadly  speaking,  however,  and  thinking  of  civilized 
and  well  ordered  countries,  the  answer  will  probably  be 
that  an  ambassador  is  less  important  now  than  for- 
merly, because,  since  he  is  at  the  end  of  a  telegraph 
wire,  much  less  is  left  to  his  discretion.  Every  impor- 
tant decision  rests  with  his  government,  which  can 
from  hour  to  hour  instruct  him,  and  which  he  can  from 
hour  to  hour  consult.  Perhaps  his  chief  use  is  to 


160  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

inform  and  advise  them,  a  purpose  for  which  gifts  are 
needed  different  from  those  commonly  thought  of  in 
connection  with  the  office.  Sympathy  must  not  over- 
ride detachment,  nor  detachment  chill  sympathy.  It 
is  not  only  in  an  ambassador  that  both  detachment  and 
sympathy  are  valuable,  but  also  in  an  administrator 
of  a  colony  or  dependent  country,  such  as  was  Lord 
Cromer  in  Egypt,  such  as  are  your  governors  in  the 
Philippine  Islands. 

There  is  here  for  such  a  man  a  field  also  for  resource- 
fulness and  inventiveness.  An  envoy  is  brought  right 
up  against  the  difficulties  that  have  to  be  faced  and 
overcome  in  order  to  create  a  good  understanding  be- 
tween states.  He  knows  the  statesmen  of  the  country 
where  he  resides  better  than  his  chiefs  at  home  know 
them.  He  can  take  their  measure  and  tell  what  they 
are  after.  Mr.  Root  has  truly  said  that  every  contro- 
versy between  states  can  be  settled  where  there  is  a  will 
on  both  sides  to  settle  them.  It  is  an  envoy's  business 
to  discover  whether  the  minister  he  deals  with  is  "play- 
ing politics"  or  "sparring  for  position,"  or  whether  he 
really  wishes  to  settle  a  controversy.  It  is  moreover  his 
duty  to  watch  and  comprehend  the  public  opinion  of 
the  nation  among  whom  he  resides  and  to  explain  it  to 
his  own  government.  Expedients  for  settling  disputes 
may  occur  to  him  which  his  own  Foreign  Office  may 
not  have  thought  of.  Being  on  the  spot,  he  can  see 
things  his  government  does  not  see,  can  make  sugges- 
tions and  propound  solutions,  and  if  his  government 
trusts  his  judgment,  great  may  be  his  opportunities 
for  doing  good. 

From  diplomacy  as  the  art  by  which  international 
relations  are  handled  we  may  pass  to  International 


DIPLOMACY  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  161 

Law  as  comprising  the  rules,  so  far  as  they  have  been 
formulated,  to  which  those  relations  ought  to  conform 
and  by  which  they  may,  when  disturbed,  be  adjusted. 
It  is  a  part  of  the  machinery  which  exists  for  keep- 
ing the  peace  of  the  world,  since  it  embodies  prin- 
ciples by  which  states  have  agreed  to  be  guided — 
principles  which,  as  being  generally  applicable  to 
all  states,  all  may  without  loss  of  dignity  accept 
and  obey. 

Are  these  rules  fit  to  be  called  Law?  There  has  been 
much  controversy  on  this  point  between  different 
schools  of  jurists,  some  of  whom  have  argued  that  inter- 
national rules  do  not  deserve  to  be  called  Law  at  all. 
Some  of  these  lawyers,  or  speculative  thinkers,  empha- 
sizing an  obvious  fact  as  if  it  were  their  own  discovery, 
have  proclaimed  from  the  housetops  that  inasmuch  as 
within  each  State  nothing  is  recognized  as  Law  except 
that  which  the  supreme  authority  in  the  State  has 
enacted  or  is  prepared  to  enforce,  international  rules 
cannot  be  law  because  there  is  outside  and  above  the 
several  independent  States  no  supreme  international 
authority  either  to  enact  or  to  enforce  rules  binding 
upon  those  States.  As  I  sought  to  show  in  the  first 
of  these  lectures,  independent  political  communities 
are  in  what  is  called  a  State  of  Nature  towards  one 
another.  There  is  no  power  above  them  that  can  make 
law  for  them  or  enforce  law  upon  them.  The  school 
I  have  referred  to  accordingly  insists  that  there  can 
be  no  such  thing  as  international  law  becaue  there  is 
no  authority  entitled  to  issue  and  enforce  commands 
upon  all  States. 

It  is  obvious  that  whoever  sits  down  to  construct  a 
definition  declaring  nothing  to  be  Law  except  that 


162  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

which  a  State  commands,  can  rule  out  anything  that 
does  not  conform  to  his  own  definition.  It  is  plain 
enough  that  what  has  been  called  international  law 
does  not  belong  to  the  same  category  as  the  statutes 
of  England  or  Massachusetts.  International  rules  do 
not  proceed  from  an  authority  legally  recognized  by 
all  nations  as  possessing  not  only  the  right  to  declare 
the  rule  but  also  both  the  duty  and  the  power  to  com- 
pel obedience  to  it.  But  the  view  which  restricts  the 
term  Law  to  a  command  proceeding  from  the  State 
and  enforced  by  the  State  is  not  historically  defensible 
and  may  even  be  misleading,  for  there  have  been  rules 
generally  obeyed  which  rested  on  custom  only,  but  a 
custom  which  everybody  recognized,  having  the  weight 
of  long  practice  and  of  public  opinion  behind  it.  Rules 
may  be  obeyed  not  only  when  they  proceed  from  State 
authority,  but  when  they  have  the  force  of  habit  be- 
hind them,  and  from  fear  of  the  consequences  which 
disobedience  may  involve. 

A  rule  supported  by  public  opinion  and  the  breach 
of  which  exposes  the  offender  to  a  legal  or  practical 
outlawry,  may  be  strong  enough  to  have  the  practical 
effect  of  Law.  There  is  a  very  curious  instance  of  that 
in  the  laws  of  the  primitive  republic  of  Iceland.  In 
Iceland  there  was  no  State,  but  a  number  of  virtually 
independent  communities,  and  these  communities  had 
a  great  number  of  rules  which  they  all  recognized  as 
having  the  authority  of  settled  custom.  The  whole 
body  of  Icelanders  which  consisted  of  these  communi- 
ties accepted  the  customs  as  binding.  Once  a  year  a 
popular  assembly,  called  the  Althing,  was  convoked  at 
which  it  was  the  duty  of  a  high  official,  chosen  in  re- 
spect of  his  legal  learning,  to  repeat  publicly  from  mem- 


DIPLOMACY  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  163 

ory  these  rules  from  beginning  to  end  to  the  intent  that 
all  might  know  them.  When  an  offense  was  committed 
the  person  wronged  could  bring  a  lawsuit  in  the  courts 
against  the  offender.  If  the  offender  appeared  the  case 
was  heard,  and  if  the  decision  went  against  him  he  was 
bound  to  obey  and  pay  whatever  fine  was  imposed.  If 
he  did  not  appear,  or  if,  when  the  case  had  been  heard 
and  had  gone  against  him,  he  disobeyed  the  decree, 
there  was  only  one  penalty  that  could  be  enforced. 
There  was  no  State  authority  with  the  power  of  enforc- 
ing the  decree,  but  the  offender  was  deemed  to  have 
put  himself  outside  the  community,  and  the  penalty 
was  that  anybody  might  kill  him  because  he  had  been 
declared  an  outlaw,  and  if  anybody  killed  him  his  rela- 
tives could  not  bring  an  action  for  damages  in  respect 
of  his  having  been  slain.  That  simple  remedy  of  out- 
lawry provided  in  nine  cases  out  of  ten  for  the  en- 
forcement of  these  rules  in  Iceland,  although  there  was 
no  executive  government  to  enforce  them. 

Now  these  Icelandic  rules  were  and  were  called  Law. 
They  were  not  perfect  law  in  the  strictest  sense  of 
the  term;  but  they  were  generally  obeyed,  for  public 
opinion  supported  and  enforced  them,  so  that  in  nine 
cases  out  of  ten  they  were  found  sufficient  to  secure 
the  obedience  to  any  decision  which  the  Althing  Court 
pronounced.1 

So,  too,  in  the  Middle  Ages  the  fear  of  what  might 
happen  after  death  made  ecclesiastical  penalties  for- 
midable. There  was  no  ecclesiastical  executive  author- 
ity to  enforce  the  penalty  inflicted  in  any  order  of  an 
Ecclesiastical  Court,  but  to  one  who  believed  that  if  he 

1See  upon  this  subject  in  the  author's  "Studies  in  History  and 
Jurisprudence,"  an  essay  entitled  "Primitive  Iceland." 


164  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

disobeyed  such  an  order  and  was  excommunicated  for 
his  disobedience,  and  died  excommunicated,  not  having 
received  the  sacraments,  his  lot  in  a  future  life  would 
be  an  unhappy  one,  that  belief  had  a  tremendous 
power,  and  most  people  did  in  practice  obey. 

The  fact,  moreover,  that  the  aims  of  international 
law  are  justice  and  peace,  gives  it,  as  Dr.  David  Jayne 
Hill  has  well  said,  a  strong  moral  sanction.  It  is  no 
doubt  a  moral  rather  than  a  legal  or  compulsory  sanc- 
tion, still  it  is  powerful  because  it  has  the  respect  for 
justice  and  order  behind  it. 

In  earlier  days  philosophers  found  the  basis  of  inter- 
national law  in  what  they  described  as  "The  Law  of 
Nature."  You  will  find  Grotius  and  the  old  jurists 
calling  their  treatises  on  the  subject  "The  Law  of 
Nations  and  of  Nature."  That  law  of  nature  is  what 
St.  Paul  describes  as  "the  law  written  on  the  tablets 
of  the  heart,"  and  to  which  he  refers  when  he  says: 
"When  the  Gentiles  which  have  not  the  Law  (i.  e.,  the 
Mosaic  Law)  do  by  nature  the  things  of  the  Law, 
these  not  having  the  Law;  are  a  law  unto  them- 
selves." 

In  the  Middle  Ages  the  Law  of  Nature  was  asso- 
ciated to  some  extent  with  the  law  of  Rome,  because 
the  law  of  the  Roman  Empire  had  obtained  a  sort 
of  general  recognition  as  having  once  prevailed  over 
the  civilized  world,  and  as  being  still  used  in  many 
countries,  in  more  or  less  modernized  forms,  wherever 
it  had  not  been  superseded  by  any  other  system  of 
authority  proceeding  from  some  well  established  State. 
It  was,  moreover,  identified  with  the  Law  of  God  be- 
cause God  is  the  author  of  Nature;  and  though  few 
tried  to  state  and  nobody  could  prove  exactly  what 


DIPLOMACY  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  165 

the  Law  of  Nature  actually  contained  and  prescribed, 
and  though  many  might  in  practice  disregard  the 
moral  precepts  on  which  it  rested,  still  none  denied  its 
authority. 

Descending  to  the  region  of  concrete  facts,  let  us  see 
what  International  Law  has  been  since  the  days  of 
Albericus  Gentilis  and  Hugo  Grotius,  the  first  modern 
jurists  who  tried  to  give  it  shape  in  definite  rules. 
If  we  turn  over  the  leaves  of  a  treatise  on  the  subject 
we  find  that  most  of  the  positive  doctrines  laid  down 
are  concerned  with  War,  because  it  is  in  War,  or  in 
connection  with  War,  that  most  of  the  questions  arise 
which  international  rules  are  needed  to  deal  with. 
This,  of  course,  was  to  be  expected,  just  as  we  expect 
medical  treatises  to  be  chiefly  occupied  with  disease, 
not  with  health,  for  War  is  the  evil  which  Law  is  meant 
to  cure  or  mitigate,  or  if  possible  to  avert, — avert,  like 
a  disease,  by  prophylactic  treatment  But  unfortu- 
nately the  rules  for  the  conduct  of  War  are  just  those 
which  are  most  liable  to  be  disregarded  when  war 
comes,  because  a  belligerent  State  is  tempted  to  resort 
to  every  measure  which  promises  success,  the  prospect 
of  immediate  gain  to  be  won  by  its  own  arms  over- 
riding moral  considerations,  or  the  faith  due  to  treaties, 
or  a  respect  for  the  public  opinion  of  the  world.  Where 
a  stake  is  tremendous,  as  the  stake  of  war  is  tremen- 
dous, the  scruples  which  ordinarily  restrain  men  or 
States,  lose  their  deterrent  force,  just  as  an  individual 
man  will  for  the  sake  of  saving  his  life  do  things  which 
he  would  do  under  no  other  strain.  A  belligerent  gov- 
ernment argues  that  if  it  succeeds,  success  will  over- 
awe the  rest  of  the  world  and  will  still  more  certainly 
secure  pardon  from  its  own  citizens  for  offences  com- 


186  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

mitted  in  their  interest.  When  one  power  has  disre- 
garded rules  previously  accepted,  the  other  belligerents 
feel  that  they  cannot  fight  with  their  hands  tied  against 
an  adversary  who  has  his  hands  free,  and  that  their 
enemy,  who  had  first  broken  the  rules,  ought  not  to 
be  allowed  to  profit  by  that  breach.  Thus  it  was  that 
in  the  late  war  all  the  powers  began  by  observing 
the  rules  laid  down  at  Hague  conferences  against  the 
use  of  poisonous  gases  and  the  bombardment  of  un- 
fortified towns,  but  when  one  belligerent  had  violated 
those  rules,  the  other  belligerents  more  or  less  followed 
the  same  practice,  pleading  that  the  first  violator 
must  not  be  permitted  to  take  advantage  of  his  own 
wrong.  Cases  somewhat  similar  might  be  cited  from 
previous  wars.  The  results  of  all  these  violations 
committed  in  the  recent  war — and  I  do  not  here  mean 
to  claim  that  any  power  has  been  either  recently  or 
in  former  days  altogether  innocent — was  to  discredit 
international  rules  as  a  whole. 

The  ship  of  International  Law  has  sprung  many 
leaks,  for  it  has  been  tossed  and  knocked  about,  and 
driven  out  of  its  course  by  winds  and  currents,  so  that 
most  people  leapt  to  the  belief  that  it  was  unsea- 
worthy  beyond  repair,  and  might  be  treated  as  a  dere- 
lict. This  was  an  unwarranted  assumption.  The  ves- 
sel may  be  able  to  refit  and  pursue  its  voyage,  since 
storms  do  not  last  forever.  Nevertheless,  the  infrac- 
tions during  the  war  of  rules  that  had  seemed  well  set- 
tled have  shaken  public  confidence,  and  we  are  forced 
to  think  seriously  what  can  be  done  to  reestablish  con- 
fidence on  a  basis  more  secure.  Neither  the  moral 
sense  of  the  rulers  of  States  and  leaders  of  armies,  nor 
custom,  nor  the  fear  of  world  opinion  disapproving  de- 


DIPLOMACY  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  167 

partures  from  what  custom  and  morality  were  held  to 
have  established,  prevented  the  acts  I  have  referred 
to.  This  happened  for  the  simple  reason  that  there 
was  no  certainty  that  offences  would  be  followed  by 
penalties,  and  the  question  follows:  Is  it  possible  to 
cure  this  defect?  Can  any  authority  be  set  up  im- 
partial enough  to  try  offences  and  strong  enough  to 
inflict  punishment  on  States  which  break  the  rules  they 
have  solemnly  promised  to  observe?  That  is  one  of 
the  most  far-reaching  questions  that  stands  before  the 
world  today. 

Before  we  approach  the  problem,  before  we  con- 
sider what  steps  ought  to  be  taken  to  repair  and 
strengthen  the  storm-tossed  vessel,  a  few  words  may 
be  said  as  to  the  services  which  International  Law 
may  render.  One  of  the  most  important  is  that  of 
revising  and  redrafting  the  rules  which  were  generally 
accepted  before  1914,  and  of  examining  those  rules  in 
particular  which  related  to  the  treatment  in  naval  war- 
fare of  enemy  trading  ships,  and  of  neutral  ships,  in- 
cluding the  subjects  of  contraband  and  blockade.  It  is 
of  the  highest  consequence  to  lay  down  definite  rules 
as  to  the  relations  between  belligerents  and  neutrals 
on  the  sea  in  time  of  war,  setting  forth  the  exemptions 
to  which  neutral  ships  and  neutral  cargoes  are  to  be 
entitled,  and  binding  belligerents  to  respect  those 
exemptions.  Several  other  topics  may  be  named  as 
proper  to  be  dealt  with.  On  some  of  them  it  may 
prove  impossible  to  lay  down  positive  rules,  because 
the  cases  that  need  to  be  provided  for  are  too  various 
in  their  details  to  admit  of  being  dealt  with  in  general 
terms,  but  all  deserve  to  be  investigated  in  a  scientific 
spirit,  by  the  light  of  history,  of  the  doctrine  of  general 


168  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

utility,  and  of  "moral  principles,"  such  principles  as 
those  which  the  older  world  deemed  to  form  part  of 
the  Law  of  Nature. 

Among  such  questions  would  fall  that  of  the  dura- 
tion of  treaties,  i.  e.,  the  length  of  the  period  during 
which  they  must  be  deemed  binding.  It  is  agreed  that 
every  treaty  ought  to  be  observed,  else  why  make  it; 
and  it  is  also  agreed  that  few  treaties,  if  indeed  any, 
can  be  made  to  last  forever,  or,  shall  we  say?  for  an 
indefinitely  long  space  of  time.  Can  any  rule  be  laid 
down  determining  during  what  period  a  treaty  is  to 
be  held  valid  and  operative  which  contains  no  pro- 
visions as  to  its  duration?  It  is  sometimes  said  that 
when  circumstances  change,  the  treaty  naturally 
lapses,  as  a  statute  made  for  a  particular  purpose  be- 
comes obsolete  when  the  purpose  has  disappeared.  But 
this  doctrine  that  a  treaty  is  understood  to  hold  only 
when  circumstances  which  attended  its  making  are 
substantially  the  same  (rebus  sic  stantibus)  is  too 
vague,  and  could  be  used  on  slight  occasions  as  an 
excuse  by  a  State  dishonourably  desiring  to  repudiate 
its  obligations.  Can  anything  be  done  to  determine 
when  circumstances  have  so  far  changed  that  a  treaty 
can  no  longer  be  fairly  deemed  to  be  operative,  and 
when  such  a  change  has  come,  to  settle  whether  it  is 
the  duty  of  the  high  contracting  parties  to  denounce, 
or  to  propose  to  amend,  the  treaty?  Cases  from  the 
history  of  the  ancient  world  (in  which  treaties  were 
often  made  for  terms  of  years)  as  well  as  from  our  own 
times,  will  occur  to  you. 

Three  recent  instances  deserve  mention.  By  the 
Treaty  of  Paris  of  1856  Russia  had  promised  to  main- 
tain no  navy  in  the  Black  Sea.  In  1871  she  announced 


DIPLOMACY  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  169 

that  she  would  no  longer  respect  this  provision.  The 
announcement  was  made  during  the  great  war  of  that 
year  between  France  and  Germany,  when  it  was  im- 
possible for  France  and  the  other  Powers  that  had 
signed  the  Treaty  of  Paris  to  take  any  action  to  compel 
its  observance.  These  Powers,  however,  feeling  bound 
to  do  something,  tried  to  save  their  faces  by  calling  a 
Conference,  at  which  it  was  solemnly  declared  that 
Russia  ought  not  to  have  denounced  the  treaty.  The 
denunciation  was  nevertheless  recognized  as  a  fait  ac- 
compli. "You  have  done  wrong,"  said  the  Powers, 
"we  are  obliged  to  acquiesce,  but  please  don't  do  it 
again." 

It  was  done  again,  and  on  this  second  occasion  in 
a  smaller  case,  that  of  a  clause  in  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 
of  1878  binding  Russia  not  to  fortify  the  harbor  of 
Batum  on  the  Black  Sea.  In  1886  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment declared  that  it  would  disregard  this  provi- 
sion and  would  fortify  Batum.  Here  was  a  clear  breach 
of  the  treaty,  but  there  was  nothing  to  be  done. 
Everybody  felt  that  the  matter  was  not  of  a  suffi- 
cient importance  to  justify  a  declaration  of  war,  so 
Russia  had  her  way. 

Both  these  treaty  obligations  had  been  imposed  upon 
Russia  at  a  time  when  the  forces  arrayed  against  her 
were  too  strong  to  be  resisted.  She  accepted  them  un- 
willingly, under  a  sort  of  duress.  Contracts  made  be- 
tween private  parties  under  duress  are  sometimes  held 
void  by  courts  of  law,  and  although  this  doctrine  can- 
not for  obvious  reasons  be  applied  generally  to  treaties, 
the  fact  that  a  promise  was  extorted  by  menace  does 
make  some  difference  to  the  moral  judgment  we  pass 
on  a  State  which  subsequently  repudiates  it. 


170  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

A  third  case  is  that  of  Austria-Hungary,  when  Count 
von  Aehrenthal,  then  foreign  minister  of  that  mon- 
archy, declared  the  intention  of  its  government  to  an- 
nex Bosnia,  which  had  been  assigned  to  Austria  under 
the  Treaty  of  Berlin  hi  1878,  to  be  occupied  by  her 
without  prejudice  to  the  sovereignty  of  Turkey.  Of 
course,  nobody  supposed  for  a  moment  that  Austria 
would  ever  give  back  Bosnia  to  the  Turks,  but  the 
treaty  was  still  nominally  in  force.  Aehrenthal's  action 
was  an  evident  breach  of  the  treaty,  and  being  so  felt 
it  gave  a  general  shock  to  the  stability  of  conditions 
all  over  Europe.  It  was  in  fact  a  sort  of  premonition 
of  the  war  of  1914.  Russia  was  for  a  time  inclined  to 
resent  it,  as  a  disturbance  of  the  balance  between  her- 
self and  Germany  in  Southeastern  Europe,  but  she  was 
not  prepared  for  a  conflict  with  the  German  Emperor 
who  had  proclaimed  himself  ready  to  stand  beside  Aus- 
tria. The  action  of  these  two  Powers  was  felt  to 
have  been  a  serious  breach  of  the  public  law  of  Europe; 
and  the  irritation  caused  in  Russia  contributed  to  make 
her  come  forward  to  throw  her  shield  over  Serbia  in 
July,  1914. 

Other  subjects  which  well  deserve  investigation  are 
the  following:  When  can  intervention  by  a  State  or 
States  in  the  internal  affairs  of  another  be  justified? 
— i.  e.,  What  disorders  in  a  State,  what  circumstances 
making  it  a  nuisance  to  its  neighbors  (such  as  internal 
disorders)  warrant  their  interference?  Take  such  cases 
as  that  of  Cuba  in  1898,  when  an  insurrection  had  been 
going  on  for  several  years,  or  that  of  Mexico  at  many 
epochs  since  it  became  independent  a  century  ago,  or 
that  of  the  civil  war  of  the  Sonderbund  in  Switzerland 
in  1846-7,  when  England  saved  the  Confederation  from 


DIPLOMACY  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  171 

Metternich,  or  that  of  Argentina  under  the  tyranny  of 
Rosas,  or  that  of  Turkey  during  the  last  two  centuries 
when  her  misgovernment,  and  especially  the  treat- 
ment of  her  Christian  subjects,  became  international 
scandals. 

What  is  to  be  said  for  the  policy  of  neutralizing 
certain  States,  as  Belgium  and  Switzerland  and  the 
Congo  State  were  neutralized,  and  how  may  this,  if 
desired,  be  best  accomplished?  It  has  been  in  the 
cases  of  Switzerland  and  Belgium  a  very  useful  pro- 
vision and  some  hold  that  it  ought  to  be  more  widely 
applied. 

What  are  the  merits  of  what  is  called  the  Open  Door 
policy,  and  how  can  it  be  set  up  and  guaranteed,  with 
due  respect  to  the  independence  of  the  country  for 
which  it  is  guaranteed,  as  well  as  with  fairness  to  the 
commerce  of  all  countries? 

What  can  be  done  to  place  under  the  common  pro- 
tection of  all  States  interested  the  communications 
by  land  and  water  between  them  and  across  their 
respective  territories  into  those  of  other  States?  Many 
nations  have  already  made  arrangements  which  have 
worked  to  the  general  benefit  for  the  protection  of 
what  is  called  Intellectual  Property.  Provisions  for  In- 
ternational Copyright,  and  for  the  protection  of  patents 
are  cases  in  point.  Similarly,  rules  have  been  made 
to  prevent  the  spread  of  infectious  diseases  and  for 
other  sanitary  or  charitable  purposes.  The  Red  Cross 
is  now  an  international  institution.  How  far  can  the 
principles  underlying  such  arrangements  be  extended 
to  other  classes  of  cases  for  the  general  benefit  of 
civilization?  One  of  the  great  advantages  of  these 
various  schemes  is  that  they  accustom  nations  to  work- 


172  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

ing  together.  They  give  them  a  sense  that  they  are  citi- 
zens of  a  larger  world  than  their  own.  The  more  dif- 
ferent peoples  are  brought  in  contact  for  these  bene- 
ficent purposes,  the  more  they  learn  to  consider  them- 
selves as  being  all  members  one  of  another,  each  with 
an  interest  in  the  well  being  of  others,  the  better  it  is 
for  each  of  them  and  for  the  progress  of  the  world. 

To  deal  with  these  subjects,  as  well  as  to  revise,  and 
reestablish  when  revised,  the  rules  of  International 
Law  that  were  accepted  and  usually  obeyed,  before 
1914,  there  should  be  organized  some  body  com- 
posed of  men  specially  capable  for  the  work.  Non- 
omcial  associations  of  jurists  from  many  countries, 
such  as  the  Institut  du  Droit  International,  have  for 
years  past  rendered  services  of  high  value  in  this  direc- 
tion, but  differences  of  opinion  frequently  arise  between 
those  who  come  from  Britain  and  the  United  States  on 
the  one  hand,  and  those  who  come  from  Continental 
Europe  on  the  other,  and  the  conclusions  arrived  at 
have  no  official  authority.  Might  not  some  new  asso- 
ciation or  commission  be  now  created  by  the  most 
enlightened  and  civilized  States,  and  invested  by  them 
with  authority  to  amend,  and  codify  when  amended, 
those  rules  which  they  find  best?  The  smaller  coun- 
tries, such  as  Switzerland,  Norway  and  Holland,  who 
have  already  produced  many  distinguished  jurists, 
could  usefully  join  in  this  work,  and  would  be  all  the 
fitter  because  they  were  neutral  in  the  late  war. 
The  United  States  would,  by  its  detachment  from 
European  controversies,  be  specially  fitted  to  take  a 
leading  part.  During  the  last  ten  or  fifteen  years,  and 
especially  since  the  creation  of  the  American  Society 
of  International  Law  and  the  publication  of  its  ably 


DIPLOMACY  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  173 

conducted  Journal,  the  United  States  would  appear 
to  have  done  more  for  International  Law  than  any 
country  in  Europe,  and  therefore  if  such  a  Commission 
as  I  suggest  were  to  be  formed,  European  jurists  would 
consider  the  participation  of  the  United  States  to  be 
essential,  and  likely  to  carry  with  it  an  assurance  of 
success.  Such  a  Commission  could  not  indeed  be  em- 
powered to  enact  any  Code.  Its  function  would  be  to 
prepare  a  code  fit  to  be  submitted  to  the  Associated 
States  for  a  searching  examination  by  the  lawyers  and 
governments  of  each  separate  State,  so  that  all  such 
portions  of  the  Code  as  found  general  acceptance  might 
be  adopted  by  as  many  States  as  possible,  and  thus  re- 
ceive official  authority,  these  States  undertaking  to  ob- 
serve them.  Proposals  of  this  nature  seem  to  have 
received  in  Europe  less  attention  than  they  deserve, 
but  they  have  fortunately  occupied  the  mind  of  an 
international  jurist  so  eminent  as  Mr.  Root  and  have 
received  his  universally  respected  approval.  A  digest 
or  code  of  International  Law  is  the  natural  comple- 
ment and  almost  indispensable  accompaniment  of  an 
International  Court  of  Justice. 

I  have  already  observed  that  it  is  chiefly  to  the 
solution  of  war  problems  that  international  jurispru- 
dence has  been  directed.  We  have  got  now  to  think 
more  about  its  utility  in  peace  time  and  turn  it  to  bet- 
ter account  for  peace  purposes.  It  has  done  one  great 
service  in  helping  to  secure  protection  for  small  States, 
asserting  their  equality  in  point  of  rights  with  large 
and  powerful  States,  just  as  in  a  civilized  community 
the  law  and  the  courts  aim  at  dealing  out  equal  justice 
to  rich  and  poor.  It  is  moreover  the  natural  foe  of 
militarism,  because  Law  is  the  only  alternative  to 


174  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

Force.  In  the  slow  development  of  civilized  society, 
Law  has  succeeded  in  crushing  down  violence,  and 
expelling  violence  from  well  ordered  communities. 
How  is  that  idea  to  be  applied  to  the  relations  of 
independent  States  each  of  which  has  been  hitherto 
a  law  unto  itself? 

The  enactment  of  rules  of  international  law  to  be 
for  a  commonwealth  of  mankind  what  statutes  are 
within  each  State  is  a  comparatively  simple  matter. 
The  process  of  preparation  and  enactment  will  doubt- 
less take  time,  because  all  States  must  be  consulted, 
and  on  some  points  their  divergent  interests  (real  and 
supposed)  will  long  delay  and  perhaps  prevent  agree- 
ment. Nevertheless  the  matters  on  which  agreement 
can  be  secured  will  be  far  more  numerous,  so  a  fairly 
complete  international  code  may  be  expected. 

The  enforcement  of  the  rules  enacted  is  a  far  more 
difficult  matter.  As  between  belligerents  it  is  hardly 
to  be  looked  for.  Each  will  probably  disregard  in 
war  the  engagements  it  has  made  in  peace,  and  will  use 
every  means  of  attack  physically  possible.  But  as 
between  belligerents  and  neutrals  the  sense  of  honor- 
able obligation,  coupled  with  the  fear  of  offending 
neutrals  whose  unfriendliness  may  be  harmful,  will 
generally  suffice  to  secure  the  observance  of  any  rules 
accepted  in  peace  time,  and  this  will  be  a  real  gain. 

No  system  of  law  has  ever  been  perfectly  enforced. 
Human  instruments  must  be  used;  and  there  will 
always  be  some  stupid  or  hopelessly  prejudiced  juries, 
some  incompetent  or  corrupt  judges.  Where  inde- 
pendent States  are  concerned,  the  difficulties  of  com- 
pelling obedience  to  anything  called  Law  must  evi- 
dently be  greater,  for  there  does  not  now  exist  any 


DIPLOMACY  AND  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  175 

international  force  to  restrain  or  punish  offenders.  But 
the  power  of  opinion,  i.  e.,  of  the  views  and  feelings 
entertained  by  the  best  elements  in  all  nations,  is  grow- 
ing and  seems  likely  to  grow.  Few  States  would  today 
refuse  to  submit  to  arbitration  any  controversy  which 
an  arbitral  tribunal  is  fit  to  deal  with.  Still  fewer — 
indeed  hardly  any — would  refuse  to  obey  a  judgment 
rendered  by  such  a  tribunal.  The  idea  of  Law,  that  is, 
of  a  regular  and  permanent  means  of  preserving  order, 
and  of  protecting  the  weak  by  courts  of  justice  to  the 
exclusion  of  violence,  has  been  the  greatest  influence 
making  for  the  proper  internal  security  of  every  com- 
munity. That  idea,  having  behind  it  moral  authority 
and  the  sense  of  general  benefit,  has  now  to  do 
the  like  work  for  the  commonwealth  of  all  man- 
kind, forming  and  educating  a  public  opinion  of  the 
world  which  will  impose  a  check  upon  the  violent  or 
aggressive  propensities  of  any  one  State.  The  con- 
ception of  such  a  public  opinion  of  mankind  cherished 
by  the  reason  of  the  few  and  expressing  the  hopes  of 
the  many,  has  hitherto  lacked  body  and  substance. 
Such  substance,  such  a  concrete  form,  it  may  find  in 
International  Law  which  will  be  both  its  offspring  and 
its  guardian.  Opinion  may  anchor  itself  to  Law, 
Law  may  instruct  and  steady  Opinion.  The  task 
that  now  lies  before  us  is  to  see  whether,  and  how 
far,  principles  embodied  in  law  and  applied  in  con- 
crete cases  by  Courts  can  be  made  to  command  a 
respect  and  exercise  an  authority  before  which  all 
States  will  bow. 


LECTURE  VI. 

POPULAR    CONTROL    OF    FOREIGN    POLICY 
AND  THE  MORALITY  OF  STATES. 

THOSE  Europeans  who  have  deplored  the  failure  of 
diplomacy  to  apply  high  principles  to  the  conduct  of 
international  relations  and  to  secure  the  peaceful  set- 
tlement of  disputes  between  States,  have  frequently 
attributed  these  defects  to  the  methods  and  the  persons 
by  whom  diplomatic  business  has  in  time  past  been 
managed.  Such  critics,  European  and  American,  tell 
us  that  the  relations  of  States  have  been  ill  handled 
because  Monarchs  or  Cabinets,  or  the  officials  charged 
with  administration,  have  been  arbitrary,  unsympa- 
thetic, narrow-minded,  or  simply  incompetent.  Even 
in  States  where  the  constitution  gave  to  a  represen- 
tative assembly  the  right  to  control  foreign  affairs, 
those  affairs  had  been  usually  left  in  the  hands  of  a 
small  class  or  group  of  persons,  purblind  in  their  views, 
selfish  in  their  aims,  cynical  in  their  indifference  to 
peace,  jealous  of  their  own  power,  loving  to  do  their 
work  in  darkness  because  their  deeds  would  not  bear 
the  light  of  day.  If  and  when  free  peoples  should 
take  the  matter  into  their  own  hands  and  negotiate 
openly  with  one  another,  a  larger  sympathy  and  a 
more  intelligent  comprehension  of  the  character  and 
wishes  of  other  nations  would  change  everything  for 

176 


THE  MORALITY  OF  STATES  177 

the  better.  There  would  be  fewer  misunderstandings, 
and  when  controversies  arose,  these  would  be  settled 
on  principles  of  justice,  since  to  all  free  peoples  justice 
is  dear. 

This  view,  these  hopes  and  purposes,  have  expressed 
themselves  in  England  by  the  demand  for  what  is 
called  Democratic  Control  of  Foreign  Policy,  a  de- 
mand that  the  masses  of  the  people  shall  be  kept 
constantly  informed  of  all  that  is  being  done  in  the 
sphere  of  foreign  relations,  and  shall  have  the  right 
to  direct  and  exercise  the  function  of  directing  the 
course  to  be  pursued  therein. 

When  the  World  War  broke  out  in  1914,  a  consid- 
erable section  of  British  opinion  explained  the  catas- 
trophe by  declaring  that  in  all  the  countries  concerned 
foreign  relations  had  been  secretly  conducted,  with 
little  regard  to  the  popular  will,  and  insisted  that  had 
the  people  been  consulted  in  foreign  as  they  are  in 
domestic  affairs,  the  calamity  might  have  been  averted. 
Whether  or  no  this  belief  was  well  founded,  it  has  not 
been  lessened  by  what  happened  at  the  end  of  the  war. 
The  Peace  Treaties  (as  observed  in  an  earlier  lecture) 
have  created  general  dissatisfaction.  Those  treaties 
were  made  secretly,  with  no  reference  to  parliaments  of 
the  points  under  discussion,  and  though  the  statesmen 
who  made  them  did  not  belong  to  the  social  class  which 
was  accused  in  former  times  of  being  out  of  touch  with 
the  people,  the  work  the  plenipotentiaries  accomplished 
was  deemed  no  better  than  that  of  their  aristocratic 
predecessors.  Hence  the  demand  for  direct  popular 
control.  Men  argued,  "If  popular  control  has  worked 
well  hi  domestic  affairs,  why  not  in  foreign  affairs? 
Take  the  management  of  foreign  relations  out  of  the 


178  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

hands  of  the  Few  and  entrust  it  to  the  Many.  Just  as 
legislation  has  been  popularized  by  universal  suffrage, 
so  let  foreign  policy  be  also." 

These  arguments  may  seem  to  make  a  prima  fade 
case  for  a  change.  If  the  old  system  brought  Europe  to 
the  condition  hi  which  it  was  when  the  Great  War 
broke  out;  if  that  system,  still  more  closely  followed, 
sees  Europe  in  the  deplorable  condition  which  the 
Peace  Treaties  have  brought  about,  treaties  every  one 
of  which  already  needs  amendment,  is  it  not  well  to 
make  a  complete  new  departure  by  trying  the  method 
of  direct  popular  control? 

Apart  from  this  temporary  outburst  of  English  opin- 
ion on  the  subject,  the  question  of  the  power  which 
the  People  can  and  ought  to  exert  in  directing 
foreign  policy  is  profoundly  important  and  deserves 
to  be  considered  in  any  survey  of  international  rela- 
tions as  a  whole.  I  will  try  to  examine  this  matter 
briefly  by  enquiring,  First,  by  what  means,  that  is  to 
say,  by  what  constitutional  machinery,  can  the  People 
control  foreign  affairs?  Secondly,  assuming  proper 
machinery  to  have  been  created  for  that  purpose,  how 
far  are  the  People  qualified  to  use  the  powers  which 
they  are  to  exercise? 

What  would  democratic  control  of  foreign  policy 
mean  in  practice?  In  domestic  affairs  the  People  can 
act  either  directly  by  way  of  Referendum,  as  in  Swit- 
zerland, or  as  under  the  revised  Constitution  of  Massa- 
chusetts and  some  other  States,  or  they  can  act  in- 
directly through  their  representatives  in  a  legislature. 
Either  method  is  suitable  to  matters  that  can  be  dealt 
with  by  legislation.  But  foreign  policy  is  a  different 


THE  MORALITY  OF  STATES  179 

kind  of  matter.  The  facts  to  be  dealt  with  are  con- 
stantly changing, — changing  from  week  to  week, 
changing  at  home,  changing  abroad, — and  through  the 
changes  new  issues  are  emerging.  The  whole  people 
cannot  be  frequently  summoned  to  vote  directly,  or 
to  give  fresh  instructions  to  their  representatives. 
Those  representatives  who  have  been  elected  upon 
domestic  issues  cannot  tell  what  are  the  wishes  of  the 
people  upon  the  foreign  issues  that  are  from  time  to 
time  emerging  or  passing  into  new  phases,  for  thereby 
points  are  raised  that  were  not  before  the  people  at  the 
moment  of  the  last  preceding  election.  The  members 
of  a  legislature,  besides  being  occupied  with  other  busi- 
ness, are  too  numerous  to  debate  many  of  the  issues 
that  suddenly  come  to  the  front  in  foreign  policy.  The 
legislature  may  indeed  act  by  a  Committee — a  method 
on  which  I  shall  say  a  word  or  two  later.  But  that 
is  not  Popular  Control.  It  is  a  return  to  management 
by  the  Few,  and  a  management  which,  to  be  effective, 
will  often  have  to  be  secret.  It  is  a  relapse  into  the 
old  methods  which  it  was  desired  to  abolish.  The 
argument  that  popular  opinion  ought  to  be  ascertained 
and  obeyed  is  doubtless  true  in  principle,  but  the 
difficulty  is  to  know,  without  taking  a  special  vote  on 
each  important  issue,  what  it  is  that  the  people  really 
do  wish.  There  may  be  several  divergent  views,  and 
who  can  tell  which  view  is  that  of  the  majority?  Per- 
haps the  majority  have  no  view  at  all,  because  they 
have  not  had  time  to  inform  themselves. 

The  second  question  relates  to  the  fitness  of  the 
People  to  direct  foreign  policy.  I  will  begin  by  setting 
forth  the  arguments  of  those  who  deny  this  fitness,  and 


180  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

will  then  endeavor,  after  striking  a  balance  between 
those  arguments  and  the  doctrine  of  full  democratic 
control,  to  indicate  how  much  truth  each  view  con^ 
tains. 

It  is  urged  that  in  order  that  the  people,  or  their 
representatives,  may  have  an  opinion  of  value  upon 
any  question  of  foreign  policy  they  must  understand 
that  question.  They  must  know  all  the  main  facts 
of  the  case,  and  the  reasons  in  favor  of  the  various 
courses  that  might  be  pursued.  Not  one  in  a  thousand 
of  the  citizens,  not  one  in  ten  of  the  representatives, 
may  have  enough  knowledge  to  enable  him  to  form  a 
sound  opinion.  Control  over  policy  is  an  exercise  of 
will,  and  will  is  a  decision  to  take  one  course  or  another, 
founded  upon  a  judgment  of  the  arguments  for  each. 
Now  a  judgment  formed  without  knowledge  is 
mere  guesswork.  Domestic  issues  are  difficult  enough, 
especially  those  of  an  economic  nature,  but  most  of 
them  are  at  any  rate  within  the  range  of  the  citizen's 
home  experience.  Foreign  questions,  however,  demand 
an  acquaintance  with  history  and  geography  and  va- 
rious conditions  affecting  a  foreign  country  which  are 
far  outside  the  range  of  the  average  "good  citizen," 
however  capable  he  may  be  of  voting  rationally  on 
the  items  of  a  domestic  political  program.  He  does 
not  care  for  these  foreign  questions.  He  does  not  read 
about  them.  He  has  no  time  for  them.  How  can  he 
attend  to  them?  Even  the  names  of  foreign  cities 
and  foreign  statesmen  are  strange  to  him.  If  he  knew 
FitzGerald's  translation  of  Omar  Khayyam  he  would 
be  apt  to  say,  with  that  poet, 

"What  have  we  to  do 
With  Kai  Kobad  the  Great  or  Kai  Khosru?" 


THE  MORALITY  OF  STATES  181 

It  may  be  said  that  the  average  good  citizen  has  a 
source  of  knowledge  in  the  press,  a  source  about  which 
something  must  be  said,  because  it  is  a  principal  factor 
in  the  conduct  of  foreign  policy,  affecting  not  only  the 
mass  of  average  citizens  who  read  it,  but  also  legis- 
latures and  the  executive  government  itself.  Now,  it 
is  observed  by  those  whose  arguments  I  am  trying  to 
present,  that  a  newspaper  has  the  enormous  power  of 
supplying  whatever  facts  it  chooses  to  select  for  notice, 
of  bringing  its  own  views  before  a  multitude  of  readers 
who  would  not  look  at  them  were  they  not  printed 
side  by  side  with  the  paragraphs  that  give  the  news, 
and  also  of  repeating  over  again  from  day  to  day  both 
facts  and  views.  Newspapers  and  magazines  exist 
not  for  the  sake  of  disseminating  true  facts  and  incul- 
cating sound  opinions,  but  primarily  for  making  money 
by  maintaining  or  increasing  the  circulation  of  the 
journal,  because  the  more  circulation  the  larger  will 
be  the  receipts  to  be  expected  from  advertisements. 
There  is  therefore  a  strong  inducement  for  a  journal 
to  fill  its  pages  with  those  facts  and  those  views  that 
will  be  most  likely  to  attract  readers.  This  is  a  motive 
which  tells  more  or  less  upon  all  organs.  It  does  not 
make  for  impartiality.  Those  proprietors  and  editors 
who  have  a  high  sense  of  honor  and  wish  to  deserve  the 
respect  of  honorable  men  will  not  abuse  their  power  in 
the  way  of  suppressing  or  misrepresenting  facts.  But 
there  will  always  be  many  newspapers  which  aim  at 
circulation  by  publishing  what  they  think  will  please 
the  average  reader,  who  likes  to  have  his  own  country 
praised  and  other  countries  disparaged,  who  prefers 
to  see  his  country's  case  in  any  controversy  justified 
and  the  case  of  its  opponent  refuted  or  decried.  Na- 


182  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

tions,  like  men,  are  accessible  through  their  vanity. 
Count  Czernin,  in  one  of  the  most  interesting  of  recent 
books  dealing  with  the  war,  has  described  the  prevail- 
ing "servility  and  odious  sycophancy  which  surrounds 
monarchs."  A  similar  tendency  disposes  those  who  ad- 
dress the  sovereign  people  to  tell  them  they  are  always 
right  and  other  peoples  wrong,  and  to  promise  them 
victory  as  the  false  prophets  in  the  Book  of  Kings 
promised  victory  to  King  Ahab  when  they  said,  "Go 
up  to  Ramoth  Gilead  and  conquer."  This  is  one  reason 
why  unconscientious  organs  of  the  lower  type  cannot 
be  trusted  to  supply  the  knowledge  which  the  public 
needs.  Another  reason  is  that,  though  the  American 
press  and  the  British  press  are,  broadly  speaking,  not 
corruptible,  there  are  countries  in  which  money  exer- 
cises great  power,  buying  up  journals,  or  suborning 
them  to  pervert  facts  and  to  sell  their  advocacy  of 
opinion.  We  have  this  power  shamelessly  exerted  dur- 
ing and  since  1914  in  several  countries.  There  are  also 
countries  in  which  governments  habitually  use  certain 
journals  to  misstate  or  suppress  facts,  or  to  advocate 
particular  policies,  hounding 'on  their  organs  to  attack 
other  governments,  even  if  friendly,  in  order  to  work 
up  an  opinion  in  their  own  favor,  the  public,  except  a 
few  who  are  behind  the  scenes,  not  divining  the  sources 
whence  the  propaganda  comes.  Bismarck,  with  his 
subsidized  "Reptile  Press,"  set  an  example  in  this  way 
which  has  been  abundantly  followed  elsewhere.  The 
average  citizen,  however  desirous  to  judge  fairly,  is 
perplexed  by  the  opposite  views  which  newspapers  pre- 
sent and  between  which  he  has  scant  means  for 
discriminating.  Seldom  is  he  allowed  to  obtain  a  fair 


THE  MORALITY  OF  STATES  183 

and  comprehensive  view  of  the  political  situation  as 
between  his  own  and  any  other  country. 

It  would  thus  appear  that  apart  from  all  misrepre- 
sentation of  facts  and  all  honest  or  dishonest  partisan 
advocacy  of  views,  the  average  good  citizen  has  not  the 
means  of  obtaining  nor  the  leisure  to  study  the  mate- 
rials he  needs  to  judge  any  but  the  very  simplest  and 
broadest  questions  of  policy.  Even  supposing  him, 
however,  to  have  at  hand  some  materials,  can  we  be 
sure  that  he  will  use  them  any  better  than  they  have 
been  used  hitherto  by  the  small  class  which  has  been 
virtually  left  in  control  of  foreign  relations?  The  aver- 
age good  citizen  may  be  no  less  liable  to  take  a  narrow 
and  a  purely  selfish  view  of  the  interests  of  his  country. 
He  may  be  equally  prone  to  aggression,  may  be  equally 
disposed  to  resent  what  is  represented  as  an  affront, 
equally  liable  to  be  swept  away  by  passion.  The 
ancient  republics  of  Greece  and  the  republics  of  me- 
diaeval Italy  had  as  little  regard  for  the  rights  of  their 
neighbors  as  had  the  monarchies  and  the  oligarchies  of 
the  Middle  Ages.  It  is  often  said  that  the  masses  of 
the  people  most  desire  peace,  because  war  brings  to 
their  children,  with  an  equal  chance  of  death,  a  far 
slighter  chance  of  glory  than  it  brings  to  the  richer 
class.  But  wars  have  in  fact  been  generally  just  as 
popular  in  one  social  class  as  in  another,  for  they  ap- 
peal to  the  same  national  vanity  and  pride  and  to 
that  same  fighting  instinct  and  love  of  so-called  glory. 
This  has  been  seen  in  the  case  of  wars  now  recognized 
as  having  been  unjust  or  unnecessary,  such  as  were, 
in  the  case  of  Great  Britain,  the  Afghan  War  of  1878-9 
and  the  South  African  War  of  1899,  in  both  of  which 


184  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

a  considerable  section,  though  perhaps  not  a  majority, 
of  the  masses  supported  the  executive  governments 
which  made  the  wars,  and  which  had  in  both  cases  a 
party  majority  in  Parliament. 

As  respects  secrecy,  complained  of  as  tending  to  com- 
mit the  people  to  courses  they  would  have  disap- 
proved, it  may  be  sometimes  regrettable,  but  is  often 
indispensable.  When  other  Powers  are  covertly  in- 
triguing to  injure  a  State,  its  government  must  coun- 
terwork their  designs  by  means  which  would  be  use- 
less if  disclosed.  Alliances  may  have  to  be  concluded 
and  preparations  made  which  cannot  be  revealed  to 
the  legislature.  Information  must  be  obtained  from 
quarters  that  would  not  give  it  except  in  the  strictest 
confidence.  Hence  it  will  be  necessary,  so  long  as 
the  relations  of  States  continue  to  be  those  of  rivalry, 
suspicion  and  a  desire  for  aggrandizement,  to  leave 
the  conduct  of  all  details  and  sometimes  of  important 
decisions  also,  in  the  hands  of  a  few  experts,  giving 
them  a  wide  discretion. 

So  far,  I  have  stated  the  case  of  those  who  denounce 
the  old  methods  and  also  the  counter  case  presented 
on  behalf  of  those  methods.  Let  us  now  try  to  reach 
a  fair  conclusion  on  the  matter. 

There  is  doubtless  much  to  be  said  for  changing 
a  system  which  has  yielded  bad  results  in  the  past. 
A  democracy  is  not  consistently  democratic  if  it  leaves 
the  issues  which  make  for  war  or  peace  in  the  hands 
of  a  few  persons  permitted  to  pledge  it  before  they 
have  consulted  it.  Secret  agreements  have  frequently 
turned  out  ill  for  those  who  made  them,  whereas  pub- 
licity would  have  disclosed  the  dangers  lurking  in  them. 
The  secret  agreement  made  between  England  and 


THE  MORALITY  OF  STATES  185 

Turkey  in  1878,  and  the  secret  treaties  made  in  the 
recent  war  between  the  belligerent  allies,  are  now  gen- 
erally regretted. 

Some  of  those  who  advocate  the  transference  of 
the  management  of  foreign  affairs  to  the  mass  of  the 
people  seem  to  argue  thus:  "The  Few  have  managed 
foreign  relations  badly.  The  Many  are  the  opposite 
of  the  Few.  The  Many  will  therefore  manage  foreign 
relations  well."  This  reasoning  is  unsound,  be- 
cause it  omits  another  explanation.  The  bad  manage- 
ment of  foreign  relations  in  the  past  may  lie  in  the 
nature  of  foreign  relations  themselves,  or  perhaps  in 
the  nature  of  men  as  men.  The  difficulties  may  be 
such  that  no  set  of  men  will  really  conduct  foreign 
policy  with  wisdom  and  justice.  It  may  be  that  no 
plan  as  yet  suggested,  either  that  of  control  by  the  Few 
or  that  of  control  by  the  Many,  will  give  complete 
satisfaction.  In  one  point  the  Few  have  an  advan- 
tage. 

Yet  on  the  other  hand  there  are  advantages  that  may 
be  claimed  for  the  old  system.  A  long  course  of  deli- 
cate foreign  negotiations  cannot  be  conducted,  and  the 
executive  acts  they  require  cannot  be  determined,  by  a 
popular  assembly  or  even  by  deliberative  council  too 
large  for  familiar  discussion,  nor,  indeed,  by  any  body 
whatever  constantly  sitting  in  public.  Details  can  be 
discussed  only  by  a  small  body,  and  details  may  be  im- 
portant in  the  train  of  consequences  they  entail.  The 
situation  to  be  dealt  with  may  change  from  day  to 
day.  There  are  negotiations  which  (if  the  world  of 
international  politics  continues  to  be  that  world  of 
intrigue  and  rapacity  which  it  has  hitherto  been)  could 
not  successfully  be  prosecuted  if  the  public  were  kept 


186  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

informed  of  them,  and  might  yet  be  the  only  resource 
in  a  dangerous  crisis.  The  masses  of  the  people  do  not 
in  any  European  country  know  enough  of  foreign 
countries  to  enable  them  to  form  sound  opinions  in 
particular  crises.  Take  several  questions  which  are 
before  the  world  at  this  moment:  How  much  does  the 
average  French  or  English  voter  know  about  the  capac- 
ity of  Germany  to  pay  the  indemnities  promised  in  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles,  or  about  the  Polish  and  German 
elements  in  the  population  of  Silesia,  or  about  the 
claims  of  Poland  in  Lithuania,  or  about  conditions  in 
Western  Asia  Minor  and  the  respective  rights  of 
Greeks  and  Turks  to  territories  in  dispute  between 
them?  We  who  have  been  attending  the  Conferences 
of  this  Institute  have  been  learning  much  more  than 
we  knew  before  about  these  things.  But  we  are  priv- 
ileged here.  We  have  had  in  the  Conferences  some 
special  sources  of  first-hand  information.  The  aver- 
age voter  knows  scarcely  anything  about  such  matters, 
and  if  he  does  not  know  how  can  he  instruct  his  repre- 
sentative as  to  the  vote  he  shall  give?  If  we  turn  to 
representative  bodies,  who  presumably  are  somewhat 
better  informed,  do  we  not  see  how  apt  their  members 
are  to  be  influenced  by  the  party  feeling  which  leads 
them  to  attack  or  to  defend  some  particular  act  done  by 
a  government  because  they  are  either  opponents  or  the 
supporters  of  the  Executive?  Foreign  politics  become 
in  representative  assemblies  mere  counters  in  the  game 
of  politics.  It  has  been  very  difficult  to  get  a  question 
of  foreign  policy  discussed  in  the  British  Parliament 
absolutely  on  its  merits  without  regard  to  party  ties. 
We  find  this  in  every  country.  It  was  so  in  Germany 
in  the  days  of  Bismarck,  who  sometimes  played  the 


THE  MORALITY  OF  STATES  187 

game  of  foreign  politics  in  order  to  strengthen  his  posi- 
tion in  the  domestic  controversies  of  Germany. 

Nevertheless,  admitting  all  this,  it  is  also  true  that 
from  time  to  time  certain  broad  and  comparatively 
simple  issues  arise  on  which  the  people  ought  to  be  con- 
sulted before  any  irrevocable  step  is  taken,  and  on 
which  the  judgment  of  the  people  is  quite  as  likely  to 
be  right  as  is  that  of  the  Ministers  who  are  conducting 
the  negotiations,  or  that  of  the  Opposition  leaders 
who  are  denouncing  their  course.  There  is,  often, 
a  certain  kind  of  soundness  in  the  popular  mind  which 
may  prove  to  be  a  guide  safer  than  is  any  set  of  priv- 
ileged persons.  The  people  are  not  qualified  to  deal 
with  every  kind  of  matter,  but  when  there  is  a  plain 
issue,  and  especially  if  it  is  a  moral  issue,  there  is  often 
seen  a  fairness  and  even  a  wisdom  in  the  judgment  of 
the  people  which  we  are  not  sure  to  find  in  the  poli- 
ticians. The  people, — if  not  fevered  by  passion,  for 
then  they  become  dangerous — may  have  a  more  broad 
common  sense  view  of  what  is  and  what  is  not  worth 
contending  for  than  a  group  of  officials,  who  may  be 
steeped  in  traditions  or  prejudices.  They  may  some- 
times also  have  a  clearer  sense  of  what  is  just  and  rea- 
sonable and  a  greater  willingness  to  settle  disputes 
peacefully.  In  the  two  English  cases  already  adverted 
to,  they  condemned  the  Afghan  War  of  1878-9  as  soon 
as  an  election  gave  them  the  opportunity,  and  they 
passed  a  like  judgment  on  the  South  African  War  at 
the  election  of  1905.  If  public  opinion  is  generally  in- 
curious or  apathetic  about  foreign  relations,  that  is 
partly  because  these  topics  have  been  so  much  with- 
drawn from  public  knowledge  as  to  receive  less  public 
discussion  than  they  require. 


188  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

Much  more  might  be  done  than  has  hitherto  been 
done  in  Europe  to  keep  the  people  informed  and  en- 
able them  to  express  their  opinion  on  the  lines  of  pol- 
icy to  which  they  are  being  committed.  There  is  some- 
thing to  be  said  for  creating  a  small  committee  of  the 
legislature  which  might  be  found  useful  not  only  in 
criticizing  and  in  advising  with  the  ministers,  but  also, 
where  the  questions  involved  are  not  confidential,  in 
enabling  Ministers  to  be  brought  into  a  salutary  touch 
with  public  opinion  outside.  Though  this  would  be  in 
Britain  a  new  departure,  the  success  of  which  might  be 
doubtful,  the  experiment  seems  to  be  worth  trying. 
To  examine  the  working  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign 
Relations  in  your  Senate  would  require  more  time  than 
is  at  my  disposal. 

The  first  thing  and  the  indispensable  thing  to  enable 
the  people  to  control  those  large  issues  of  foreign  af- 
fairs which  they  are  entitled  to  determine  is  that 
they  should,  obtaining  more  knowledge,  give  a  more 
continuously  active  attention  to  the  affairs  of  the 
outer  world.  If  ever  this  should  come  to  pass,  their 
interest,  if  they  could  be  led  to  see  it,  would  make 
against  aggressive  policies.  Would  the  transference  of 
international  relations  from  a  professional  class  to  the 
people  tend  to  raise  the  moral  standard  by  which  the 
international  action  of  States  has  been  hitherto  regu- 
lated. Those  who  advocate  such  a  transfer  have  in- 
sistently argued  that  it  will  have  that  effect.  The  argu- 
ment raises  a  fundamental  question,  and  to  appraise 
it  we  must  enquire  what  have  been  the  causes  which 
have  kept  that  standard  low.  Why  have  those  who 
conduct  negotiations  and  direct  foreign  policies  failed 
to  attain,  or  perhaps  we  ought  to  say,  seldom  tried  to 


THE  MORALITY  OF  STATES  189 

attain,  the  moral  standard  that  is  required  from  honor- 
able men  in  the  private  relations  of  life,  and  even  in 
the  political  life  of  their  own  state,  although  the 
standards  of  politicians  are  usually  deemed  to  be  below 
those  of  private  social  life? 

That  this  moral  standard  has  not  been  attained  ap- 
pears both  from  the  dicta  of  statesmen  and  from  their 
practice.  Not  only  in  the  ancient  world  but  in  the 
sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  also,  the  maxim 
that  every  State  that  can  injure  us  is  our  natural 
enemy,  a  maxim  delivered  by  a  famous  politician  in 
the  sixteenth  century,  was  in  practice  accepted  and 
followed;  and  the  corollary  that  against  an  enemy  all 
things  are  permissible,  was  the  common  rule  of  con- 
duct, so  that  Napoleon  went  no  further  than  his  prede- 
cessors when  he  said  that  a  statesman's  heart  ought 
to  be  in  his  head.  .National  interests  were  taken  as 
equivalent  to  rights,  while  national  duties  were  vir- 
tually ignored.  Such  advances  as  some  countries  have 
seen  in  the  behavior  expected  from  individual  private 
citizens  towards  one  another  have  not  been  accom- 
panied by  similar  moral  improvements  in  the  relations 
of  peoples  to  one  another. 

Some  improvement  there  has  certainly  been. 
Treachery  and  murder  would  discredit  a  sovereign 
more  in  the  twentieth  century  than  they  discredited 
Cesare  Borgia  in  the  end  of  the  fifteenth.  Violence 
and  aggression  are  not  so  open  and  shameless  as  hi 
the  days  of  Louis  XIV  of  France  and  Frederick  II  of 
Prussia.  Nevertheless  there  were  plenty  of  instances 
even  before  1914  to  show  that  States  do  not  hesitate 
to  follow  their  own  interests  without  regard  to  the 
harm  they  cause  to  others  who  have  done  them  no 


190  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

wrong,  and  that  they  do  not  scruple  to  practice  against 
one  another  deceits  which  no  self-respecting  man  of 
business  would  practice  against  a  rival  in  trade.  With- 
out attempting  to  deal  with  the  whole  subject,  I  will 
submit  to  you  some  suggestions  which  may  throw  light 
on  the  problem. 

First.  The  fact  that  morality  stands  on  a  lower 
level  as  between  States  than  as  between  individuals 
may  be  partly  explained  by  considering  the  points  in 
which  the  State  regarded  as  an  organized  body  of  men 
differs  from  an  individual  man.  An  individual  is  re- 
sponsible to  his  fellow-citizens  and  feels  himself  amen- 
able to  their  opinion,  but  the  government  of  a  State  is 
responsible  to  no  one  outside  the  State.  A  constitu- 
tional State,  i.  e.,  one  in  which  the  will  of  a  monarch  is 
not  supreme,  is  impersonal,  because  its  acts  are  the  acts 
of  a  large  number  of  men.  In  a  constitutional  country 
responsibility  is  divided  between  the  executive,  the 
legislature,  which  in  some  countries  controls  the  exec- 
utive, and  the  citizen  voters  who  elect  the  legislature. 
An  act  done  by  the  State  proceeds  directly  or  indirectly 
from  the  wills  of  this  great  number  of  persons;  and 
though  the  blame  for  whatever  has  been  done  wrongly 
can  sometimes  be  fixed  upon  the  executive,  or  even 
possibly  upon  one  or  more  members  of  the  executive, 
such  as  the  Foreign  Minister  or  Prime  Minister,  they 
or  he  is  or  are  so  closely  associated  with  the  others 
that  responsibility  must  always  be  more  or  less  divided. 
Now  wherever  there  is  divided  responsibility  there  is 
a  weaker  sense  of  duty.  The  individual  man  finds  it 
easier  to  excuse  himself  for  turpitude  or  timidity  by 
pleading  that  he  was  beguiled  by  others.  In  absolute 
monarchies  it  was  different,  and  yet  even  Louis  XIV 


THE  MORALITY  OF  STATES  191 

when  he  said  that  he  was  the  State  — "L'etat,  c'est 
moi" — was  not  the  same  thing  as  Louis  XIV  the  man. 
He  purported  to  be  acting  for  and  on  behalf  of  his 
subjects,  and  he  might  feel  entitled  to  do  things  in 
their  behalf  which  he  would  not  have  done  on  his  own 
behalf.  Moreover,  everybody  knew  that  the  King 
must  be  advised  by  Ministers,  so  part  of  the  responsi- 
bility fell  upon  them.  Hence,  so  long  as  his  personal 
honor  was  not  involved  by  any  direct  personal  prom- 
ise, acts  of  injustice  or  deceit  done  by  the  State  which 
he  embodied,  were  done  rather  by  it  than  by  him,  and 
were  not  supposed  to  stain  his  personal  honor. 

When,  a  century  before  the  days  of  Louis  XIV,  the 
Emperor  Charles  V,  was  traveling  across  France,  he 
was  not  made  prisoner  by  King  Francis  I,  although 
that  king  had  been  his  enemy  and  even  his  prisoner, 
because  to  have  seized  him  would  have  been  a  breach 
of  the  rules  of  chivalry.  Charles  V  relied  on  those 
rules  and  Francis  I,  though  not  personally  a  man  of 
fine  feeling,  felt  himself  amenable  to  the  opinion  of 
European  knighthood  as  a  whole.  That  was  a  very 
strong  reason  to  keep  in  the  path  of  honor.  He  knew 
that  all  the  knightly  men  of  his  age,  such  as  the  ever 
famous  Chevalier  Bayard,  who  had  fallen  by  his  side 
at  the  battle  of  Pavia,  would  condemn  him  if  he  did 
an  unknightly  act.  By  the  time  of  Frederick  of  Prus- 
sia this  sense  of  what  chivalry  required  had  died  out, 
and  in  modern  States  it  seldom  happens  that  there  is 
any  single  person  on  whom  an  obligation  to  observe 
the  code  of  honor  can  be  fixed. 

Further,  every  individual  citizen  of  a  State  is  in  his 
daily  life  responsible  not  only  to  the  opinion  of  his 
fellow-citizens  but  to  the  law  of  his  country.  The  law 


192  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

maintains  a  standard  of  moral  conduct.  There  are 
kinds  of  base  conduct,  such  as  ingratitude,  which  law 
does  not  attempt  to  punish,  but  hi  the  sphere  of 
contracts  and  torts  and  crimes,  it  lays  down  rules  which 
must  be  respected,  and  enforces  them  by  civil  damages 
or  by  penalties.  Lawyers  are  wont  to  say  that  commer- 
cial morality  would  sink  to  a  low  level  were  it  not  for 
the  courts  of  law  and  especially  the  courts  of  equity, 
which  have  prescribed  a  standard  of  good  faith.  In  the 
international  sphere  there  is  no  law  to  keep  States  up 
to  the  mark  of  fair  dealing  or  to  restrain  them  from 
aggression,  because  there  is  no  penalty  prescribed  for 
an  offense,  no  damages  recoverable  for  a  tort  or  for 
the  breach  of  a  contract.  No  protest  was  made  by 
any  State  when  Austria  and  France  seized  the  territory 
of  the  old  Venetian  republic  hi  1797,  nor  when  Ger- 
many invaded  Belgium  in  1914.  It  is  only  weakness 
or  fear  that  has  usually  deterred  States  from  robbery 
by  violence,  and  nothing  has  deterred  most  of  them 
from  deceit. 

Note  another  point  wherein  the  standards  of  States 
and  individuals  differ.  When  an  individual  man  com- 
mits a  wrongful  act  he  does  it  for  his  own  benefit 
or  in  the  indulgence  of  his  own  revenge.  Selfishness 
is  the  motive.  Selfishness  is  an  anti-social  motive  and 
excites  repulsion  in  private  society,  so,  when  selfish- 
ness leads  a  man  to  be  mean  and  heartless,  other  men 
dislike  and  avoid  him.  But  when  the  rulers  of  a  State 
do  wrong  on  behalf  of  the  State,  this  element  at  least 
of  turpitude  is  absent.  Unless  the  act  turns  out  to 
have  been  a  blunder  as  well  as  a  crime,  its  perpetrator 
may  even  be  praised  by  his  own  countrymen  for  his 
disregard  of  those  "petty  scruples"  which  some  per- 


THE  MORALITY  OF  STATES  193 

sons  like  to  call  "the  bugbears  of  petty  minds."  The 
interests  of  the  country,  real  or  supposed,  are  taken  to 
cover  the  offense.  People  say,  "Well,  anyhow,  there 
was  something  patriotic  about  him — he  meant  to  do 
his  duty  by  the  country." 

Few  men  avow,  and  of  course  nearly  all  moralists 
condemn,  the  doctrine  that  the  End  justifies  the 
Means.  But  it  is  widely  followed  in  public  life,  and 
oddly  enough,  those  who  think  themselves  idealists, 
the  men  who  live  and  fight  for  the  thing,  whatever  it 
may  be,  that  they  put  above  everything  else  and  call 
a  Sacred  Cause,  frequently  apply  this  insidious  doc- 
trine. If  anybody  thinks  a  particular  cause  absolutely 
vital  to  human  welfare,  if  he  thinks  the  righteousness 
and  the  justice  of  the  nation  or  the  welfare  of  humanity 
depend  upon  it,  do  not  be  startled  if  you  find  him 
prepared  to  do  anything,  however  wrong,  in  defense 
and  furtherance  of  that  cause.  I  have  known  people, 
otherwise  admirable  in  character  and  conduct,  who 
have  openly  avowed  that  they  had  told  falsehoods  for 
the  sake  of  what  they  believed  to  be  a  sacred  cause. 
The  worldly  cynic  knows  the  danger  of  such  a  course, 
and,  if  he  practices  it,  covers  up  his  tracks,  while  the 
enthusiast  who  is  devoted  to  what  he  thinks  a  noble 
purpose  is  often  not  ashamed  to  do  evil  that  ^ood  may 
come.  The  dazzling  splendor  of  his  aim  blinds  him  in 
the  wrongfulness  of  the  means. 

This  is  especially  true  of  men  whose  devotion  to 
some  cause  holds  them  closely  associated  for  a  common 
enterprise.  As  formerly,  men  personally  worthy,  ex- 
cellent and  pious  men,  perhaps  members  of  religious 
orders,  were  ready  to  resort  to  and  defend  offenses 
done  in  the  supposed  interest  of  religion,  so  too  mem- 


194  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

bers  of  secret  revolutionary  societies  have  often  in 
later  times  developed  a  fanaticism  which  shrinks  from 
no  methods,  however  horrible.  This  was  seen  in  the 
French  Revolution  and  has  recently  been  seen  in  Rus- 
sia. Devotion  to  the  cause  becomes  an  obsession,  and 
suspends,  if  it  does  not  extinguish,  the  sense  of  truth- 
fulness and  even  the  stirrings  of  compassion. 

We  all  know  that  when  men  desire  something  ar- 
dently, they  will  welcome  help  from  quarters  which 
they  would  otherwise  hate  or  despise.  A  fine  old 
Dublin  physician,  one  of  the  heads  of  his  profession 
two  generations  ago,  and  himself  a  pious  Catholic,  ob- 
served to  a  friend  who  had  expressed  surprise  at  his 
being  consulted  by  a  statesman  violently  opposed  to 
him  in  politics  and  religion,  that  if  the  Pope  were  sick, 
and  the  devil  was  the  only  being  that  could  cure  his 
disease,  the  devil  would  be  called  in  to  prescribe. 

Now  the  interest  of  the  State  is  the  object  which 
has  most  often  prompted  and  been  most  often  used 
to  justify  deceit,  violence  and  cruelty.  "The  safety 
of  the  State  is  the  highest  law,"  l  said  the  Roman. 
Kings,  even  pious  kings,  statesmen,  even  popular 
leaders  in  civilized  countries,  have  constantly  broken 
the  moral  law  in  order  to  secure  advantages  for  their 
nation.  This  most  often  happens  during  a  war,  when- 
ever in  an  emergency  the  very  life  of  the  people  seems 
to  be  in  danger.  It  is  believed  that  to  save  the  State 
from  defeat,  perhaps  from  extinction,  resort  may 
rightly  be  had  to  every  possible  expedient.  If  an  indi- 
vidual man  may  do  wrong  to  save  his  own  life,  so  it 
is  argued  that  a  statesman  may  do  wrong  when  his 
country's  life  is  at  stake.  The  statesman  knows  that 

1  Salus  reipublicse  lex  suprema. 


THE  MORALITY  OF  STATES  195 

if  he  succeeds,  his  wrongdoing  will  be  pardoned  or 
even  applauded  by  his  fellow-citizens,  while  if  he  fails, 
his  share  in  the  failure  may  be  forgotten  in  the  general 
catastrophe,  or  his  action  be  excused  because  it  was 
done  from  a  patriotic  motive;  and  reflects  also  that 
he  would  have  been  no  less  blamed  had  he  feared  to 
venture  on  any  course  which  seemed  to  promise  suc- 
cess. Disgrace  will  attach  not  to  the  wrongdoing  but 
to  the  failure.  Here  again,  the  fact  that  the  wrong 
is  done  not  to  another  human  being  but  to  another 
State  makes  a  difference  to  our  judgment  of  it,  because 
no  one  feels  for  a  foreign  State  the  kind  of  sympathy 
that  might  be  felt  in  private  life  even  for  an  opponent 
or  a  rival.  The  foreign  State  is  not  a  human  being 
but  a  vague  entity;  and  it  may  be  an  actual  or  even 
a  possible  enemy,  in  which  case  it  is  supposed  to  be 
outside  the  sphere  of  moral  relations,  and  the  maxim 
"All's  fair  in  war,"  is  deemed  to  supply  an  excuse. 

And  here  we  come  to  the  last  point  of  difference 
between  the  relations  of  States  and  the  relations  of 
individuals.  In  the  case  of  individuals  reciprocity  may 
be  expected,  because  there  exists  within  each  country 
not  only  a  law  but  also  a  public  opinion  carrying  with 
it  a  social  censure  which  insures  for  each  man  some- 
thing equivalent  to  what  he  renders  to  others.  When 
a  man  refrains  from  violence  or  fraud  to  his  fellow- 
citizens,  he  does  so  knowing  that  law  and  public  opin- 
ion will  impose  a  like  restraint  on  his  competitor  or 
opponent.  But  if  a  nation  treats  an  enemy  State 
fairly  and  honorably,  speaking  the  truth  to  it,  and  does 
no  more  harm  in  war  than  the  customs  of  war  allow, 
what  security  is  there  that  the  enemy  may  not  be  trick- 
ing it  and  that  he  will  not  break  all  the  rules  of  war  in 


196  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

his  effort  to  destroy  its  troops  and  devastate  its  terri- 
tory? Men  feel  obliged  to  resort  to  the  same  methods 
against  the  foe  which  they  had  deprecated  when  used 
by  him  and  which  they  had  desired  to  avoid.  If  one 
side  begins  to  use  poison  gas,  or  to  drop  bombs  on  un- 
armed towns,  the  other  side  thinks  it  must  follow  suit, 
and  becomes  cruel  in  trying  to  vanquish  cruelty. 

These  considerations  go  a  long  way  not  only  to  ex- 
plain the  disregard  by  States  of  the  rules  recognized 
as  needed  to  govern  the  relations  of  citizens  to  one 
another  and  of  governments  to  their  own  citizens,  but 
also  to  palliate — I  do  not  say  to  defend,  but  to  pal- 
liate— some  at  least  of  the  familiar  infractions  of 
ethical  principles.  Even  the  doctrine  that  the  end  jus- 
tifies the  means,  a  doctrine  which  shocks  us  when  it  is 
boldly  proclaimed,  has  been  defended  by  experienced 
statesmen  as  not  wholly  false.  Cases,  they  say,  do 
frequently  arise  in  which  a  deviation  from  the  per- 
fectly straight  course  is  so  slight  in  comparison  with 
the  value  of  the  result  to  be  obtained  that  a  virtuous 
man  may  properly  do  what  would  otherwise  be  a 
wrongful  act.  Meticulous  scruples  may  have  to  yield 
to  emergent  necessities.  "Such  cases,"  they  say,  "can- 
not be  defined;  we  should  lose  our  way  in  a  labyrinth 
of  casuistry.  But  such  cases  exist."  Most  of  us  have 
had  experience  of  them,  and  have  found  how  difficult 
they  are  to  handle. 

These  explanations,  some  of  which  I  have  heard  from 
the  lips  of  practised  statesmen,  are  given  for  what  they 
are  worth.  But  whatever  force  may  be  allowed  to 
these  or  other  explanations,  they  do  not  justify  the 
want  of  conscience  that  has  in  the  past  made  inter- 
national relations  so  full  of  distrust  and  trickery,  and 


THE  MORALITY  OF  STATES  197 

that  still  keeps  State  morality  at  a  level  lower  than 
that  which  the  honorable  man  is  expected  to  reach 
in  private  life.  Can  it  be  true  that  a  State  may  violate 
all  the  rules  of  justice  and  good  faith,  and  slaughter 
any  number  of  innocent  persons  in  order  to  save  its 
own  life,  when  we  should  condemn  a  sailor  on  a  desert 
island  who  killed  his  comrade  because  there  was  not 
enough  food  to  support  them  both?  Such  a  case  came 
before  the  courts  of  England  not  long  ago,  and  it  was 
held — I  think  by  an  unanimous  court — that  the  law  of 
England — and  I  doubt  not  that  is  the  law  of  the  States 
of  the  American  Union  also — treats  the  killing  of  one 
man  by  another  in  order  to  save  his  life  as  murder.  If 
the  argument  of  State  necessity  were  to  be  allowed  to 
excuse  an  international  crime,  it  would  always  be 
pleaded  even  on  slight  occasions,  because  those  who 
allege  it  are  themselves  the  judges  of  whether  the 
necessity  has  arisen.  There  would  be  little  hope  for 
the  world  were  it  to  be  admitted  that  States  are  as 
against  one  another  no  better  than  wolves,  that  rapac- 
ity and  guile  and  remorseless  force  must  always  be 
expected  to  stalk  like  roaring  lions  through  a  world  in 
which  the  weak  will  be  the  victims  of  the  strong. 

In  order  to  reach  some  conclusions  in  the  matter,  I 
will  state  briefly  to  you  the  two  extreme  theories,  that 
one  may  see  whether  between  them  some  intermediate 
view  can  be  discovered.  These  two  extreme  theories 
may  be  stated  as  follows:  One  is  that  each  nation, 
being  in  a  "State  of  Nature"  towards  other  nations, 
with  no  law  and  no  superior  power  able  to  enforce  law, 
and  being  entitled  at  all  hazards  to  preserve  its  own 
existence,  may  act  as  it  pleases  towards  other  States; 
that  there  are  no  Duties;  that  the  thing  called  Justice 


198  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

is  only  the  interest  of  the  Stronger;  that  Rights  are 
whatever  the  stronger  can  obtain  by  Force.  This 
doctrine  is  a  very  old  one  and  you  will  find  it  clearly 
set  forth  in  some  chapters  (85-113)  in  the  fifth  book 
of  Thucydides,  where  the  historian  shows  how  the 
Athenians  used  it  to  justify  an  unprovoked  attack 
on  the  people  of  Melos.1  Machiavelli  restated  it. 
Many  governments  have  practiced  it,  and  there  seem 
to  be  some  that  practice  it  still. 

The  other  theory  is  that  every  man  is  bound  by  the 
ties  of  a  common  humanity  to  every  other  man,  and 
ought  not,  even  when  commanded  by  the  State,  to  take 
away  another's  life.  Neither  has  the  State  any  moral 
right  so  to  command  him.  To  this  doctrine  some 
Christians  add  another  which  they  think  they  find  in 
the  Gospels,  that  no  man  is,  even  at  the  order  of  the 
State,  to  use  physical  force  against  another.  No  one 
is  entitled  to  resist — he  must  submit  to  insult  and 
endure  injury  rather  than  defend  himself  against  it. 

This  is  a  view  which  requires  a  short  consideration, 
not  so  much  in  respect  of  any  practical  importance  at- 
tributable to  it,  but  because  it  has  recently  raised  acute 
controversies.  Seeking  to  base  itself  upon  the  Gospel, 
it  holds  that  the  person  injured  must  not  resist,  but 
endure  at  the  hands  of  any  enemy  any  injustice  or 
injury  rather  than  fight.  The  theory  has  never  been 
put  in  practice  by  any  State;  nor  has  it  ever  been 
accepted  by  any  large  body  of  Christians,  although 
it  is  held  by  the  Mennonites  and  by  the  Society  of 
Friends,  and  was  much  discussed  in  England  at  the 
time  when  compulsion  was  being  applied  in  1916  to 

1See  also  a  discussion  of  the  subject  in  the  first  book  of  Plato's 
Republic. 


THE  MORALITY  OF  STATES  199 

strengthen  the  volunteer  army.  It  is  hard  to  see  how 
that  extreme  form  of  it  which  prescribes  absolute  non- 
resistance  could  be  carried  out.  However  much  we 
may  respect  the  conscientiousness  with  which  the 
Moravian  Brethren  and  the  Mennonites  have  clung 
to  this  doctrine,  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  the 
precepts  of  the  Gospel  to  which  these  bodies  appeal 
are  to  be  taken  or  can  be  taken  literally.  Certain  it  is 
that  those  who  take  that  literal  interpretation  have 
not  shown  how  their  principles  can  be  applied  in  such 
a  world  as  this  has  been  and  is.  Suppose  that  a  band 
of  savages  were  to  burst  in  upon  the  Moravian  Breth- 
ren, slaughtering  their  wives  and  children  as  the  Turk- 
ish soldiers  in  1915  slaughtered  the  women  and  chil- 
dren of  the  Eastern  Christians?  Would  it  be  the  duty 
of  the  Moravians  to  stand  by  and  lift  no  hand  to  save 
the  innocent?  In  that  case  all  the  non-resisting  Chris- 
tians would  have  been  slaughtered  before  there  had 
been  time  for  their  example  to  mitigate  the  fury  of 
the  savages.  Recently,  when  some  theorists  in  Eng- 
land had  a  concrete  case  like  this  put  before  them  at 
a  discussion  at  which  I  was  present,  the  only  answer 
which  they  gave  was  to  say  that  the  thing  would  not 
in  fact  happen.  It  would  not  happen  in  any  country 
possessing  a  civilized  government  with  soldiers  and 
police  to  protect  innocent  law-abiding  citizens,  but 
the  physical  force  which  soldiers  and  police  would 
apply  against  savages  or  murderers  would  be 
itself  that  very  force  which  the  doctrine  of  non-resist- 
ance condemns.  Those  who  appeal  to  that  doctrine 
cannot  shelter  themselves  behind  the  fact  that  soldiers 
and  police  exist,  for  their  theory  condemns  the  appli- 
cation of  any  physical  force;  and  a  theory  must  be 


200  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

tested  by  applying  it  consistently.  Moreover,  in  Tur- 
key the  soldiers  and  police  were  themselves  the  mur- 
derers. Was  it  the  duty  of  any  Armenians  and  Nes- 
torians  who  might  possess  arms  to  allow  their  women 
and  children  to  be  murdered  when  resistance  might 
have  saved  them?  The  truth  must  evidently  lie  some- 
where between  these  opposed  theories,  one  of  which 
has  no  condemnation  for  oppression  and  cruelty  and 
the  other  of  which  would  remove  the  means  of  re- 
straints which  now  exist  to  prevent  them. 

No  one,  so  far  as  I  know,  has  formulated  any  body 
of  coherent  rules  defining  the  correlative  moral  duties 
of  States  towards  one  another.  I  would  not  venture 
to  propound  any  such  rules,  but  a  few  observations 
may  be  offered  bearing  on  the  subject  as  seen  from  the 
side  of  the  individual,  from  the  side  of  the  State,  and 
from  the  side  of  the  general  welfare  of  mankind ;  as  it  is 
easier  to  name  acts  which  a  State  ought  not  to  do  than 
to  set  forth  what  it  may  do,  let  us  take  cases  hi  which 
States  have  within  the  last  two  centuries  committed 
what  are  generally  admitted  to  have  been  dishonorable 
or  wicked  acts. 

The  State  must  not  seek  to  deceive  other  States, 
nor  undertake  obligations  it  does  not  mean  to  perform. 

It  must  not  break  its  plighted  faith.1 

It  must  not  make  unprovoked  attacks  upon  its 
neighbors. 

It  must  not  encourage  conspiracies  and  stir  up  rebel- 
lion in  other  countries  for  its  own  advantage. 

It  must  not  support  and  encourage  the  government 
of  another  State  in  acts  of  oppression  and  cruelty. 

1See  as  to  the  cases  in  which  the  obligation  of  a  treaty  may  be 
deemed  to  have  become  inoperative,  p.  168-70,  ante. 


THE  MORALITY  OF  STATES  201 

It  ought  not,  when  it  has  vanquished  an  enemy,  to 
inflict  humiliating  injuries  in  gratification  of  its  own 
revengeful  passion.  Vindictiveness,  odious  in  an  in- 
dividual man,  is  bad  policy  in  a  State,  for  it  prolongs 
exasperation  and  sows  the  seeds  of  future  trouble. 
Reparations  and  indemnities  may  be  exacted  as  dam- 
ages for  injuries  and  are  awarded  by  courts  of  law, 
but  vengeance  is  a  dangerous  guide. 

There  are  things  which  a  State  must  not  require  its 
envoys  or  its  ministers,  or  its  generals  in  war  time  to 
do.  If  it  demands  from  them  services  which  would 
be  offences  against  either  the  laws  or  the  code  of  honor 
in  its  own  country,  as,  for  instance,  if  it  directs  its 
officers  to  seize  as  hostages  and  even  to  put  to  death 
the  innocent  citizens  of  an  invaded  country,  it  will 
suffer.  If  the  public  sentiment  of  its  own  country  is 
outraged,  honorable  men  will  not  serve  it,  while  the 
public  sentiment  of  other  countries  will  certainly  con- 
demn it.  The  example  of  wrongdoing  will  lower  the 
moral  tone  of  the  citizens,  impairing  their  sense  of 
honor  and  justice  towards  one  another.  Scrupulous 
and  high-minded  men  may  be  loath  to  serve  a  State 
which  imposes  such  tasks,  and  politics  will  fall  into 
the  hands  of  the  base  and  reckless. 

If  a  State  stands  alone  hi  openly  disregarding  ethical 
principles  it  will  come  to  be  hated  as  well  as  feared, 
and  will  probably  drive  its  neighbors  to  form  alliances 
against  it;  while  if  other  States  pursue  like  courses 
the  difficulties  of  preserving  peace  will  continue  to 
grow,  and  as  confidence  cannot  exist  nations  must  re- 
main armed  against  a  sudden  attack.  A  State  which 
seeks  its  own  aims  merely,  disregarding  the  rights  of 
others,  disowns  the  obligations  morality  imposes,  and 


202  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

in  wronging  others  it  wrongs  mankind  at  large,  for 
it  hinders  that  ethical  advance  from  which,  as  a 
branch  of  mankind,  it  would  itself  ultimately 
profit. 

What  is  the  State  except  so  many  individual  men 
organized  for  common  purposes?  Though  some  Con- 
tinental writers  have  treated  it  as  a  sort  of  mystical 
corporation,  greater  and  wiser  than  the  sum  of  the 
citizens  who  compose  it,  there  is  nothing  in  the  State 
but  what  its  members  give  it.  It  is  that  aggregate 
of  the  minds  and  wills  of  the  citizens  to  which  we  give 
a  collective  name.  Did  the  individuals  when  they 
grouped  themselves  into  the  State  divest  themselves 
of  their  moral  feelings  and  bestow  none  of  these  feel- 
ings on  the  corporate  entity?  Can  they  rid  themselves 
of  their  moral  responsibility  for  what  is  their  action 
as  an  organized  body?  Does  responsibility  evapo- 
rate and  vanish  in  the  transition  from  the  many  citi- 
zens thought  of  as  individuals  to  those  same  citizens 
thought  of  as  a  corporate  unity?  Every  honorable 
man  recognizes  what  we  call  the  duty  he  owes  to  him- 
self. He  would  be  ashamed  of  himself  if  he  stole,  or 
lied,  or  ill-treated  his  weaker  neighbor.  Is  the  State  to 
have  no  similar  sense  of  duty  to  itself  as  an  entity  with 
a  life  continued  far  beyond  the  lives  of  its  individual 
members?  If  it  wrongs  others,  doing  things  unworthy 
of  its  members  as  men,  does  it  not  wrong  both  itself 
and  them?  On  the  other  hand,  if  it  recognizes  a  duty 
to  promote  the  well-being  of  its  members  by  educating 
them,  giving  them  good  laws,  leading  them  in  the  path 
of  intellectual  and  moral  progress,  may  it  not  be 
expected  as  a  branch  of  the  human  family  to  make 
its  contribution  to  the  welfare  of  the  other  members 


THE  MORALITY  OF  STATES  203 

of  that  family  by  itself  setting  an  example  of  honor- 
able conduct? 

It  must,  of  course,  be  admitted  that  there  are  some 
virtuous  acts  expected  from  the  good  citizen  which 
cannot  be  required  from  the  State.  The  rulers  of  the 
State  are  in  a  certain  sense  agents  and  trustees  acting 
on  behalf  of  the  people,  and  they  are  not  entitled  to  go 
beyond  such  authority  as  the  people  have  entrusted 
to  them.  They  cannot,  for  instance,  be  generous  with 
what  is  not  their  own,  as  an  individual  may  be  gener- 
ous with  his  own  property. 

I  remember  once  having  a  conversation  with  Mr. 
Gladstone  on  the  subject,  and  he,  than  whom  no  states- 
man ever  took  a  larger  and  more  human  view  of  na- 
tional duty,  dwelt  upon  this  limitation.  Statesmen, 
he  observed,  may  safely  assume  that  they  have  a 
mandate  from  the  people  to  take  any  action  which 
would  promote  the  people's  interest  and  may  also  as- 
sume that  the  people  will  not  expect  them  to  do  any 
wrongful  act.  But  they  may  feel  doubts  as  to  making 
concessions  to  other  States  which  a  broad-minded  man 
might  make  if  only  his  own  interests  were  concerned. 
"I  may  do,"  he  said,  "as  a  private  man  acts  which  mo- 
tives of  generosity  and  liberality  suggest,  and  yet  not 
be  entitled  to  do  similar  acts  as  a  Minister  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  nation  because  I  am  not  sure  that  I  am 
within  the  authority  which  the  citizens  have  given  me. 
If  I  wish  to  go  further  I  ought  to  consult  Parliament 
and  obtain  its  authority."  Expressions  of  compassion 
and  acts  of  charity  may  have  to  be  restricted  within 
narrower  limits  than  personal  sympathy  would  sug- 
gest, but  in  such  cases  the  statesman  is  free  to  consult 
the  representative  assembly  of  his  country  and  its 


204  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

approval  will  justify  him  in  believing  that  the  gene- 
rosity or  pity  he  desires  to  show  will  be  approved  by 
the  sentiment  of  the  people  at  large. 

Though  these  considerations  show  that  those  who 
direct  foreign  policy  cannot  be  expected  to  do  all 
that  exactly  as  a  conscientious  and  honorable  man 
would  wish  to  do  where  his  own  private  interests  are 
concerned,  still  it  may  be  said  that  the  more  the 
conduct  of  State  policy  can  conform  to  that  standard 
of  uprightness,  candor  and  fairness  which  secures  re- 
spect in  private  life,  so  much  better  will  be  the  prospect 
for  good  relations  between  States  and  for  the  main- 
tenance on  a  high  level  of  the  tone  of  public  life  in 
every  State. 

Will  a  more  active  participation  of  the  whole  body 
of  citizens  in  the  direction  of  foreign  policy  tend  to 
raise  the  standard  of  conduct  which  States  ought  to 
observe  toward  one  another?  I  have  already  expressed 
the  opinion  that  the  citizens  will  in  some  cases  bring 
to  the  consideration  of  foreign  issues  a  fairer  and  a 
broader  spirit  than  that  which  has  hitherto  been  usual 
in  the  diplomacy  of  any  country.  But  such  a  spirit 
cannot  always  be  counted  on.  Democracies  can  be 
grasping  and  unjust  like  other  kinds  of  government. 
He  who  should  draw  conclusions  from  the  way  in  which 
negotiations  have  been  conducted  and  treaties  framed 
since  1918,  with  the  apparent  acquiescence  of  some 
democratic  peoples,  might  doubt  whether  any  more 
foresight,  any  more  fairness  has  been  shown  in  these 
negotiations  than  belong  to  the  "old  diplomacy"  of 
monarchs  and  oligarchs. 

Perhaps  the  chief  gain  to  be  expected  from  a  fuller 
popular  control  will  be  found  in  its  fuller  publicity. 


THE  MORALITY  OF  STATES  205 

When  the  ministers  of  a  country  have  to  submit  their 
negotiations  and  their  treaties  to  the  public  judgment 
before  the  nation  is  committed  to  a  certain  course 
there  may  be  a  better  chance  of  avoiding  ignoble  or 
harsh  and  aggressive  action.  A  people  which  might  be 
disposed  to  accept  and  ratify  as  a  fait  accompli  what 
had  been  already  done,  even  if  unworthily  done,  on  its 
behalf,  might  refuse  to  approve,  when  there  had  been 
full  opportunity  for  public  discussion,  negotiations  or 
treaties  likely  to  lower  its  credit  in  the  eyes  of  the 
world  at  large. 


LECTURE  VII. 

METHODS  PROPOSED  FOR  THE  SETTLEMENT 

OF  INTERNATIONAL  QUESTIONS 

AND  DISPUTES 

WE  HAVE  now  surveyed  the  relations  of  States,  the 
organs  and  methods  by  which  their  relations  have 
been  conducted,  and  the  various  conditions  that  affect 
the  application  of  those  methods.  It  remains  to  exam- 
ine the  projects  that  have  been  devised  for  improving 
international  relations,  that  is  to  say,  for  avoiding 
disputes,  for  settling  controversies,  for  removing  sus- 
picions, for  preventing  wars,  and  making  preparations 
for  war  needless.  Suspicions  and  alarms  are  the  worst 
enemies  of  peace.  Aggressions  by  an  ambitious  State 
are  occasional  dangers,  and  controversies  between 
States  must  be  expected  as  long  as  States  exist.  But 
jealousy,  suspicion,  and  fear  are  perpetual  dangers, 
always  breeding  ill-will.  What  can  be  done  to  get  rid 
of  them  and  to  create  an  atmosphere  of  good- 
will with  the  security  which  good-will  creates? 

Among  the  expedients  to  be  considered,  we  may 
begin  with  Conferences  and  those  other  institutions 
for  promoting  peace  which  international  gatherings 
have  tried  to  create.  Diplomatic  conferences  or  con- 
gresses, the  latter  name  being  generally  given  to  meet- 
ings of  delegates  from  a  large  number  of  Powers,  some 
of  them  only  indirectly  interested  in  the  subjects  to 

206 


INTERNATIONAL  QUESTIONS  AND  DISPUTES        207 

be  discussed,  have  been  frequently  convoked  to  ar- 
range the  terms  of  a  treaty  after  a  war  in  which  a 
number  of  States  have  taken  part.  Such  were  those 
held  at  the  close  of  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  of  the  War 
of  the  Spanish  Succession  at  Utrecht,  of  the  Napo- 
leonic Wars,  of  the  Russo-Turkish  War  of  1877-8. 
Recently,  however,  such  meetings  have  been  held  when 
no  war  had  preceded  them,  in  order  to  deal  with  mat- 
ters of  common  interest  and  lay  down  rules  for  com- 
mon action.  Such  were  the  Hague  Conferences  of 
1899  and  1907,  which  were  to  have  been  followed  by 
another  in  1914.  Of  the  congresses  I  have  already 
mentioned,  those  of  Utrecht,  of  Vienna  in  1814-15,  of 
Berlin  in  1878,  were  meetings  of  the  envoys  of 
States,  who  thought  much  more  of  adjusting  the 
relations  of  their  governments  and  dividing  the  spoils 
of  war  than  of  the  true  interests  of  the  peoples  con- 
cerned. They  made  a  series  of  bargains  which  served 
peace  only  in  so  far  as  they  gave  effect  in  formal  in- 
struments to  the  results  which  war  had  produced,  the 
nations  being  too  much  exhausted  to  go  on  fighting 
any  longer.  But  they  did  little  for  the  more  distant 
future  because  they  left  the  deeper  causes  of  war 
smouldering  beneath  the  surface.  This  was  eminently 
true  of  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  at  which  Bismarck, 
Disraeli,  and  Gortschakoff  were  the  leading  figures. 
Its  provisions  regarding  the  Balkan  regions  and  the 
Turkish  Empire  generally,  though  applauded  at  the 
time  by  what  was  called  in  England  the  "Imperialist" 
or  "Jingo"  party,  gave  to  the  countries  of  Southeastern 
Europe  thirty  years  of  disorder  and  misery,  and  con- 
tained the  seeds  of  the  wars  of  1912,  1913  and  1914. 
This  Berlin  Congress  created  what  used  to  be  called 


208  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

the  Concert  of  Europe,  a  sort  of  combination  of  five 
Powers,  Germany,  Russia,  France,  Italy,  and  England, 
which  professed  to  keep  their  eye  on  the  Sultan  to 
compel  him  to  carry  out  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty 
of  Berlin.  But  the  Powers  aforesaid,  divided  by  their 
jealousies  and  antagonisms,  failed  to  do  this,  and  when 
frightful  massacres  of  the  Eastern  Christians  in  Asia 
were  perpetrated  by  Abdul  Hamid  in  1895  and  1896, 
some  of  them,  Russia  leading  under  the  cynical 
influence  of  Prince  Lobanoff,  prevented  England — 
which  by  that  time  had  awakened  to  a  sense  of  her 
duty  in  the  East — from  interposing  to  stop  these  hor- 
rors. Of  the  Conference  at  Paris  in  1919,  and  what 
was  done  or  left  undone  there,  I  have  already  spoken.1 
The  Hague  Conferences  belong  to  a  different  cate- 
gory. The  first  of  these  was  called  at  the  instance 
of  Russia,  uneasy  at  the  financial  strain  which  mili- 
tary expenses  were  throwing  upon  her,  and  primarily 
to  consider  the  question  of  reducing  armaments. 
Little,  if  anything,  was  accomplished  in  that  direction, 
but  in  divers  ways  good  work  was  done  both  then  and 
in  1907  towards  the  improvement  of  international 
rules  of  war  and  otherwise  for  the  common  benefit. 
But  these  conferences  labored  under  two  difficulties. 
As  all  civilized  States  were  represented,  and  were  rec- 
ognized as  equal,  the  least  important  State  had  the 
same  right  as  the  greatest  to  talk  at  large,  and  the 
envoys  of  some  of  the  smaller  States  so  abused  that 
right  as  to  unduly  protract  discussion  and  prevent 
decisions  from  being  reached  till  everyone  was  tired 
out.  Any  eloquent  declaimer  had  the  chance  of  his 
life,  and  took  it,  ramping  around  before  an  audience 

'See  Lecture  II,  ante. 


INTERNATIONAL  QUESTIONS  AND  DISPUTES        209 

compelled  to  listen.  Unanimity  was  required  to  give 
effect  to  decisions,  so  the  refusal  of  even  the  smallest 
State  could  prevent  a  decision  from  being  made  for- 
mally binding  upon  all.  Moreover,  some  of  the  lead- 
ing Powers,  one  of  them  more  militaristic  in  spirit 
than  others  had  then  fully  realized,  opposed  proposals 
making  for  the  reduction  of  armaments  and  the  amend- 
ment of  the  rules  of  war,  although  the  majority  de- 
sired those  changes.  The  old  deep-rooted  propensity 
to  prefer  a  selfish  interest,  however  slight,  to  the  gen- 
eral well-being,  reappeared,  as  was  indeed  to  be  ex- 
pected. Nevertheless,  the  results  were,  taken  as  a 
whole,  encouraging.  A  Court  of  Arbitration  was  cre- 
ated, which  was  soon  after  turned  to  good  account. 
The  conception  of  a  World  Council  to  deliberate  on 
behalf  of  the  world  took  for  the  first  time  a  concrete 
form. 

This  method  of  conference  may  usefully  be  resumed, 
and  might  perhaps  be  improved  and  extended.  The 
lectures  of  three  of  my  colleagues  have  given  you  ex- 
cellent examples  which  I  need  not  repeat  of  the  uses 
to  which  these  conferences  can  be  put;  as,  for  instance, 
for  the  purpose  of  securing  raw  materials  and  various 
forms  of  motive  power  to  several  countries  for  their 
common  and  reciprocal  benefit,  and  for  enlarging  gen- 
erally the  spheres  within  which  trade  can  be  permitted 
to  become  free.  In  an  earlier  lecture  I  dwelt  upon  the 
importance  of  that  question  for  the  countries  lying 
along  the  Danube  valleys,  and  it  has  even  wider 
extent.  So  soon  as  the  peoples  of  each  country  have 
become  convinced  that  they  have  more  to  gain  by  one 
another's  prosperity  than  they  have  by  raising  ob- 
stacles to  free  intercourse,  so  soon  will  the  facilities  of 


210  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

trade  throughout  the  world  have  their  proper  chance 
of  being  extended. 

The  Conference  method  is  specially  suitable  to  cases 
in  which  certain  propositions,  specially  interesting  to 
particular  Powers,  need  to  be  debated  by  their  repre- 
sentatives, such,  for  instance,  as  international  com- 
munications by  water  and  by  land,  and  arrangements 
for  developing  trade  between  countries  which  are  in 
special  need  of  one  another's  products.  A  conference 
for  that  purpose,  consisting  of  the  representatives  of 
countries  formerly  parts  of  the  Austrian  Empire,  with 
the  addition  of  Italy,  is  now  sitting.  A  still  more 
important  conference  has  just  been  called  to  meet  at 
Washington  within  the  next  three  months  to  resume 
the  effort,  defeated  at  the  Hague,  to  secure  an  all- 
round  reduction  of  military  and  naval  armaments. 
This  subject  is  so  vital  to  the  improvement  of  inter- 
national relations  that  a  few  sentences  may  be  given 
to  it. 

Navies  maintained  as  a  permanent  force  go  back 
to  the  eighteenth  century,  when  France,  Spain,  and 
England  kept  small  fleets  ready  for  emergencies,  but 
the  cost  of  building  and  equipping  warships  was  in 
those  days  light  indeed  when  compared  with  our  own 
days.  Immense  armies  came  later,  and  are  the  creation 
of  the  French  Revolutionary  epoch,  which  introduced 
compulsory  military  service,  or,  rather,  developed  it 
on  a  far  greater  scale,  for  the  obligation  .to  serve  in 
war  had  existed  in  most  countries,  as  in  England,  for 
instance,  from  primitive  times.  A  very  large  propor- 
tion of  the  population  began  to  be  called  to  active 
service,  first  in  France  during  and  after  the  Revolution, 
then  in  the  other  great  countries  of  the  European 


INTERNATIONAL  QUESTIONS  AND  DISPUTES        211 

continent.  Last  of  all  came  modern  science,  which  pro- 
vided armies  and  fleets  with  artillery  of  a  range  and 
variety  theretofore  undreamt  of,  adding  new  means  of 
attack,  first  in  explosives  of  immense  power  and  there- 
after in  airships  and  aeroplanes  and  submarines  and 
sea  mines,  so  that  war  began  to  be  carried  on  far  above 
the  surface  of  the  land  as  well  as  below  the  surface 
of  the  sea.  You  are,  of  course,  aware  that  the  Ger- 
mans used  a  gun  against  Paris  which  carried  more  than 
fifty  miles,  and  we  have  heard  since  then  that  a  gun 
has  been  invented — though  I  cannot  positively  con- 
firm the  story — with  a  range  of  fire  exceeding  a  hun- 
dred miles. 

The  notion  of  what  is  called  a  Nation  in  Arms,  a 
reversion  to  those  primitive  days  when  a  whole  tribe 
of  Cherokees  or  Sioux  in  North  America,  or  a  whole 
clan  of  Macdonalds  and  Campbells  in  Scotland,  went 
out  to  fight  its  neighbors,  began  with  Napoleon,  who 
bled  France  nearly  white  by  repeatedly  calling  to  the 
colors  a  large  proportion  of  his  subjects.  The  habit 
spread  to  Austria  and  Prussia  and  Italy,  but  was  most 
fully  worked  out  by  Prussia.  Only  Britain  and  the 
United  States,  protected  by  their  position,  escaped  the 
contagion,  though  the  principle  had  been  followed  by 
Britain  as  regards  its  navy  when  in  the  beginning  of 
the  last  century  sailors  had  to  be  secured  at  all  costs. 
Each  nation  forced  the  pace  for  the  others.  A  new 
conscription  law  in  Russia,  intended  to  augment 
largely  her  army,  was  one  of  the  causes  which  made 
Germany  hurry  into  war  in  1914,  because  she  deemed 
the  increase  of  her  neighbor's  forces  a  menace  likely  to 
become  every  year  more  formidable. 

Each  enlargement  of  a  standing  army  and  navy 


212  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

meant,  at  least  for  some  nations,  an  increase  of  the 
national  bellicose  spirit,  and  for  all  of  them  an  in- 
crease of  the  military  and  naval  caste  called  into  ex- 
istence for  war  purposes.  The  officers  of  the  army  and 
navy  belonged  to  the  wealthier  and  more  educated 
class,  and  in  some  countries,  such  as  Prussia  and 
Austria  and,  at  least  as  respects  the  navy  (which  held 
a  socially  superior  rank)  in  Russia  also,  to  the  class 
socially  highest,  so  they  exercised  a  great  influ- 
ence on  public  opinion  as  well  as  on  the  government. 
Here  was  a  huge  profession,  trained  for  fighting,  its 
mind  military  rather  than  civic,  its  constant  preoccu- 
pation with  fighting  creating  an  impatience  to  fight, 
while  the  vigilant  eye  it  kept  on  the  plans  of  rival 
countries  made  it  eager  to  get  ahead  and  be  the  first 
to  strike.  The  civil  population  admired  rather  than 
blamed  this  eagerness,  for  it  indicated  an  ardor  to  do 
what  the  soldier  caste  thought  to  be  their  duty,  and  as 
they  were  willing  to  risk  their  own  lives  they  counted 
the  lives  of  individual  men  a  small  matter  in  compari- 
son with  the  national  life  of  which  they  believed  them- 
selves to  be  the  saviors.  The  idea  that  the  safety  of 
the  State  was  to  be  found  in  the  constant  increase  of 
armaments  came  to  possess  the  whole  people,  so  that 
even  those  who  did  not  desire  war  repeated  the  old 
dictum,  Si  vis  pacem  para  bellum,  "If  you  wish  for 
Peace,  prepare  for  War."  This  was  why  European  na- 
tions, though  some  grumbled,  continued  to  bear  the 
rapidly  mounting  cost  of  armaments  and  munitions. 
These  were  regarded  as  an  insurance  against  war  as 
well  as  against  defeat,  and  probably  even  against  an 
attack,  for  each  nation  lived  in  dread  of  its  neighbors 
and  wished  to  frighten  them  into  peace. 


INTERNATIONAL  QUESTIONS  AND  DISPUTES        213 

Few  Americans  seem  to  have  realized  the  extent 
to  which  the  terror  of  a  coming  war  and  the  idea  that 
every  nation  must  go  on  increasing  its  armaments  as 
fast  as  possible  in  order  to  deter  its  neighbors  from 
attack,  had  seized  hold  of  the  European  continent. 
We  felt  it  in  England  also,  although  our  insular  posi- 
tion, combined  with  confidence  in  our  navy,  made 
us  take  it  a  little  more  easily.  But  on  the  Continent 
a  traveler  could  not  move  without  seeming  to  feel  the 
breath  of  war  in  the  wind. 

The  national  budgets  grew  fast  with  the  new  devices 
of  warfare  which  scientific  invention  multiplied,  each 
more  costly  than  its  predecessors.  It  is  said  that  while 
it  now  costs  many  thousands  of  dollars  to  cast  one 
of  the  great  naval  guns,  it  costs  more  than  a  thousand 
dollars  to  fire  from  one  of  them  a  single  shot.  I  will 
not  attempt  to  tell  you  how  long  they  are,  but  when 
you  look  into  them  you  are  reminded  of  the  Hoosac 
Tunnel  through  which  we  have  come  to  Williamstown. 

Is  there  anything  in  history  more  tragic  than  the 
fact  that  the  power  which  our  knowledge  and  mastery 
of  the  forces  of  Nature  has  given  us  can  today  be 
used  to  do  far  more  to  destroy  human  life  within  a 
given  space  of  time  than  any  recent  discoveries  have 
enabled  us  to  preserve  it?  These  inventions  have  in- 
creased faster  in  number  and  efficiency  during  the 
recent  war  than  they  ever  did  before,  and  they  are 
likely  to  go  on  increasing  so  long  as  wars  are  expected. 
Whatever  ships  one  Power  builds,  whatever  guns  it 
casts,  other  Powers  feel  bound  to  match  by  their  own 
building  and  casting,  for  all  live  in  disquiet  and  all 
feel  that  their  influence  in  the  world  depends  on  the 
war  strength  they  possess.  Hence,  it  is  only  an  agree- 


214  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

ment  between  the  Great  Powers  that  holds  out  any 
hope  of  reducing  armies  and  navies,  for  no  one  Power 
will  reduce  till  assured  that  the  others  are  doing  like- 
wise. As  the  greater  European  countries  have  already 
been  beggared  by  the  late  war,  it  is  plain  that  they  will 
be  ere  long  ruined  by  the  continuance  of  expenditure 
on  the  present  war  scale.  They  ought  therefore  to 
welcome  the  invitation  which  has  proceeded  from  the 
United  States  to  meet  in  a  conference  on  this  subject, 
as  that  invitation  has  already  been  most  heartily  wel- 
comed by  the  people  of  Britain  and  of  the  British 
Dominions  everywhere. 

Though  I  possess  no  expert  knowledge  that  could 
entitle  me  to  speak  with  authority  on  the  matter,  I 
may  venture  to  mention  some  of  the  questions  that 
will  arise  when  the  problem  comes  to  be  discussed. 
The  first  is:  What  scale  can  be  fixed  for  each  country 
as  that  which  its  armies,  its  fleets,  and  its  aircraft, 
together  with  the  war  muntions  needed  for  every 
branch  of  war  service,  shall  not  in  future  exceed? 
Obviously,  these  will  in  each  case  be  proportioned 
primarily  to  the  area  and  population  of  the  country. 
But  there  are  also  other  points  to  be  considered,  such 
as  the  strength  of  the  frontiers,  because  frontiers  natur- 
ally defensible  require  a  smaller  force  to  guard  them 
than  do  those  which  are  open,  and  the  means  of  com- 
munication, such  as  railroads,  within  the  country,  en- 
abling troops  to  be  quickly  moved  from  place  to  place. 
Regard  must  also  be  had  to  the  amount  of  danger  to 
be  apprehended  from  any  internal  disturbances  which 
troops  may  be  needed  to  repress.  Other  considerations 
arise  as  regards  the  sea  forces,  such  as  the  volume  of 
sea  commerce  to  be  protected  and  the  need  a  country 


INTERNATIONAL  QUESTIONS  AND  DISPUTES        215 

may  have  of  food  imports.  A  further  question  follows 
how  far  these  two  fighting  services  and  the  air  service 
also  are  to  be  dealt  with  as  parts  of  one  defensive  force, 
how  far  as  distinct. 

Another  difficulty  arises  regarding  the  term  of  serv- 
ice, and  the  relation  to  a  regular  trained  army  of  a 
militia  or  of  the  police,  or  of  a  volunteer  force  such 
as  we  instituted  hi  England  in  1859,  and  the  training 
of  a  number  of  officers  beyond  those  needed  for  the 
standing  rank  and  file.  When  Napoleon  after  the 
battle  of  Jena  had  compelled  the  Prussian  Govern- 
ment to  reduce  its  regular  army,  the  patriotic  spirit 
of  the  people  gladly  came  to  the  help  of  the  govern- 
ment, which  was  thereupon  allowed  to  pass  through 
courses  of  military  training  successive  sets  of  recruits 
who  thus  were  turned  into  effective  soldiers,  as  Na- 
poleon found  to  his  cost  in  1813.  The  Prussian  Gov- 
ernment was  not  to  be  blamed  for  resorting  to  this 
device,  seeing  that  the  terms  Napoleon  imposed  had 
been  such  as  no  independent  State  could  be  ex- 
pected to  endure.  It  may  interest  you  to  know  that 
the  occasion  which  called  for  the  creation  of  a  volun- 
teer force  in  Britain — I  remember  that  one-third  of 
the  whole  number  of  undergraduates  at  Oxford  volun- 
teered within  the  first  fortnight — was  the  fear  enter- 
tained of  an  attack  by  Louis  Napoleon,  who  was  reign- 
ing'in  France,  and  was  then  regarded  as  the  disturber 
of  the  peace  of  Europe.  A  German  Empire  had  not 
yet  come  into  being. 

Another  set  of  problems  arises  when  we  ask  how 
the  observance  of  the  limits  allotted  to  each  country 
is  to  be  secured.  There  would  be  little  gained  by 
agreeing  upon  a  reduction  to  take  effect  from  any  given 


216  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

moment  unless  the  rule  prescribed  by  the  agreement 
is  to  be  thereafter  continuously  observed,  for  increases 
in  any  country  would  forthwith  alarm  the  others.  It 
has  been  suggested  that  a  sort  of  Board  of  Inspection 
might  be  created  to  watch  over  the  fulfillment  of  un- 
dertakings made  to  keep  within  the  limits  prescribed, 
and  that  the  scale  agreed  upon  might  be  from  time  to 
time  revised  at  periodical  conferences.  But  even  sup- 
posing the  contracting  powers  to  be  willing  to  submit 
their  action  to  such  a  scrutiny,  it  may  be  hard  to  make 
it  effective.  Doubtless  some  kinds  of  preparation  for 
war  cannot  easily  be  concealed  The  building  of  battle- 
ships and  battle  cruisers,  or  of  Zeppelin  airships,  if  the 
building  of  these  is  resumed,  or  the  casting  of  huge 
guns  for  naval  or  siege-work  would  become  known  and 
could  be  stopped  if  an  authority  is  provided  capable 
of  discovering  and  arresting  such  departures  from  the 
agreement.  But  might  not  aeroplanes  and  submarines 
and  still  more  machine  guns  be  secretly  constructed, 
at  least  as  respects  the  standardized  parts,  which  could 
be  quickly  fitted  together  when  war  was  imminent? 
Explosives  could  be  made  in  chemical  factories  with- 
out attracting  attention,  because  the  factories  would 
be  kept  working  for  non-military  purposes  also.  It 
would  be  still  easier  to  manufacture  deadly  gases  on 
a  great  scale,  and  no  engines  of  war  seem  more  likely 
to  be  used  in  the  future  with  frightful  effect.  In 
Europe  one  hears  the  soldiers  and  sailors  say  that  'the 
next  war  will  probably  be  decided  by  aeroplanes  and 
gas.  It  has  been  proposed  to  forbid  the  manufacture 
of  munitions  of  war  by  private  firms  in  order  to  pre- 
vent any  capitalists  from  having  a  motive  to  bring 
war  about,  and  from  either  provoking  ill-feeling  be- 


INTERNATIONAL  QUESTIONS  AND  DISPUTES        217 

tween  nations  or  getting  up  war  scares  to  induce  gov- 
ernments to  place  with  them  orders  for  war  materials. 
The  danger  of  such  nefarious  action  upon  nations  and 
governments  has  probably  been  exaggerated,  but  sup- 
posing it  to  exist  and  to  have  the  effect  attributed  to 
it,  it  might  still  continue  to  operate  in  the  case  of  firms 
who  make  the  materials  most  needed  for  the  manu- 
facture of  munitions,  and  governments  might  be  dis- 
posed to  accumulate,  out  of  caution  for  the  future, 
inordinately  large  stocks  of  munitions  if  they  had  only 
their  own  State  factories  to  rely  upon  and  could  not  in 
an  emergency  have  recourse  to  private  firms. 

Some  have  suggested  that  the  most  effective  method 
of  limiting  expenditure  would  be  an  undertaking  by 
each  of  the  contracting  countries  not  to  vote  more 
than  a  prescribed  sum  of  money  in  every  budget  for 
naval  and  military  purposes,  for  the  estimates  pre- 
sented to  the  legislature  and  enacted  in  an  Appropria- 
tion act  would  show  whether  this  undertaking  had 
been  faithfully  complied  with.  To  this,  however,  it 
has  been  answered  that  an  unscrupulous  government 
desiring  to  elude  -its  engagements  could  do  so  by 
secretly  transferring  to  the  purposes  aforesaid  sums 
voted  by  the  legislature  for  some  quite  different  and 
non-military  purposes. 

It  is  worth  while  to  indicate  some  of  the  difficulties 
which  surround  this  subject,  in  order  that  we  may  all 
try  to  realize  beforehand  the  magnitude  of  the  task 
which  lies  before  any  Conference  that  attempts  to 
deal  with  it,  and  that  we  may  therefore  extend  to 
its  efforts,  as  I  perceive  the  American  people  is  doing, 
all  possible  sympathy  and  encouragement.  No  diffi- 
culties can  be  allowed  to  deter  the  nations  from  grap- 


218  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

pling  with  an  enterprise  of  such  urgent  importance. 
The  moment  is  opportune,  not  only  because  the  great 
European  States  cannot,  without  financial  ruin,  bear 
the  burden  which  armaments  now  impose  upon  them, 
but  also  because  the  greater  States,  being  for  the 
moment  exhausted  and  impoverished,  are  not  likely 
to  take  up  arms  against  one  another  for  some  years  to 
come.  The  causes  of  war  do,  no  doubt,  abound  in 
the  Old  World,  but  whatever  may  befall  among  the 
smaller  States,  a  period  of  at  least  nominal  and  formal 
peace  between  the  greater  military  Powers  may  well 
last  for  eight  or  ten  years  at  least.  Before  that  period 
has  expired  it  is  possible,  and  perhaps  even  probable, 
that  new  inventions  may  have  rendered  many  existing 
engines  of  war  virtually  obsolete.  -The  huge  battleships 
of  the  late  war,  for  example,  may  be  then  out  of  date. 
Even  for  the  cruisers  and  submarines  new  designs  and 
methods  of  arming  may  have  been  devised.  The  same 
applies  to  air  vessels  of  every  kind,  and  possibly  even 
to  explosives.  Already  in  England  we  hear  high  naval 
authorities  urging  a  complete  change  in  methods  of 
naval  warfare.  Prudence  therefore  suggests  that  it 
would  be  foolish  to  now  vote  immense  sums  for  gi- 
gantic vessels  of  war,  costing  perhaps  more  than 
twenty-five  or  thirty  million  dollars  each,  which  might 
turn  out  to  be  of  slight  value  when  the  time  for  using 
them  arrived.  Armaments,  it  is  truly  said,  depend 
upon  policy.  Every  nation's  policy  ought,  if  only  for 
financial  reasons,  to  be  a  policy  of  peace  for  years  to 
come.  Is  it  not  absurd  that  the  nations  which  were 
allies  in  the  Great  War,  no  one  of  which  has  any  real 
cause  of  quarrel  with  another  nor  seriously  expects 
an  attack  from  any  other,  should  be  making  prepara- 


INTERNATIONAL  QUESTIONS  AND  DISPUTES        219 

tions  against  a  danger  they  cannot  really  expect?  And 
to  put  the  matter  on  another  basis,  apart  from  any 
sentiment,  is  it  not  obvious  that  the  less  money  a 
nation  throws  away  now,  the  more  it  will  have  at  its 
disposal  if  plans  for  peace  should  eventually  mis- 
carry, and  the  mutterings  of  thunder  be  again  heard 
on  the  European  horizon? 

Every  one  recognizes  that  in  order  to  give  any 
scheme  for  the  reduction  of  armaments  a  fair  chance 
of  success  it  ought  to  be  accompanied  by  measures 
calculated  to  remove  all  causes  of  friction  that  now 
exist  or  are  likely  to  come  into  being.  This  brings 
us  to  the  methods  which  have  been  proposed  for  that 
purpose.  These  may  be  classed  under  five  heads, 
Arbitration,  Conciliation,  Alliances  (offensive  and  de- 
fensive), a  Federation  of  the  World  or  so-called  Super- 
State,  and  a  combination  of  as  many  States  as  possible 
for  the  preservation  and  guaranteeing  of  general  peace. 
Let  us  briefly  examine  each  of  these  several  methods. 

Arbitration  is  the  method  that  has  hitherto  attracted 
most  attention  and  has  been  most  successfully  applied, 
so  it  does  not  need  to  be  commended  to  you.  Regard* 
ing  its  application,  however,  disputable  points  have 
arisen  which  need  consideration  when  treaties  for  arbi- 
tration are  being  negotiated. 

The  most  important  of  such  questions  relates  to 
the  scope  of  arbitration.  Such  treaties  as  those  which 
were  made  in  Mr.  Roosevelt's  presidency  between  the 
United  States  and  several  other  Powers,  England  and 
France  among  them,  excepted  from  the  obligation  to 
refer  a  controversy  to  an  Arbitral  Court  questions  of 
what  are  called  National  Honor  and  Vital  Interest. 
These  terms  are  so  vague  as  greatly  to  reduce  the 


220  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

value  of  the  promise  to  arbitrate.  Under  them  any 
State  can  allege,  when  it  pleases,  that  a  particular 
question  is  deemed  by  it  to  be  vital  or  to  affect  its 
honor,  and  there  is  no  superior  authority  to  decide 
whether  such  an  allegation  is  well  founded  or  merely 
a  subterfuge  to  escape  from  its  obligation.  What  is 
meant  by  the  honor  of  a  State?  In  the  old  days 
of  duelling  "honor"  was  a  term  much  in  vogue, 
and  any  imputation  made  by  one  gentleman  to  an- 
other, such  as  that  of  deceit  or  cowardice,  was  held  to 
be  an  insult  which  must  be  resented  by  trying  to  kill 
or  at  least  to  wound  one  or  other  party,  and  the  man 
insulted  who  received  a  mortal  wound  from  a  more 
expert  swordsman  had  the  satisfaction  of  knowing 
that  he  died  having  vindicated  his  honor.  It  cannot 
be  intended  that  if  Nicaragua  were  to  impute  coward- 
ice to  the  United  States  the  United  States  should  go 
to  war  with  Nicaragua,  or  that  a  quarrel  between  Co- 
lombia and  Ecuador  over  the  ill  treatment  of  the 
citizens  of  the  one  by  the  government  of  the  other 
should  be  withdrawn  by  either  from  arbitration  be- 
cause the  demand  for  redress  had  been  refused  in  in- 
solent terms.  Let  me  add  that  it  can  never  be  to  a 
nation's  honor  to  repudiate  a  legal  obligation. 
Similarly  the  exception  of  vital  interest  was  de- 
fended by  suggesting  that  either  party  might  prop- 
erly refuse  to  submit  to  any  court  the  title  to  a 
territory  it  had  occupied  or  the  ownership  of  a  piece 
of  land  essential  to  its  safety,  perhaps  because  so 
placed  as  to  threaten  its  capital.  I  remember  some 
one  jestingly  asked  whether  the  United  States  would 
be  entitled  to  require  from  England  that  she  should 
submit  to  arbitration  her  title  to  the  Isle  of  Wight, 


INTERNATIONAL  QUESTIONS  AND  DISPUTES        221 

a  place  much  frequented  by  American  tourists,  and  it 
was  answered  that  in  that  case  England  might  invite 
America  to  submit  to  arbitration  the  question  of  the 
ownership  of  Long  Island.  If  there  is  any  force  in  the 
exclusion  of  cases  of  this  nature  (of  which  the  above 
are  extreme  illustrations)  it  would  seem  better  to 
arrange  that  the  question  of  what  is  a  vital  interest 
should  be  referred  to  a  preliminary  arbitration  rather 
than  that  under  a  term  so  elastic  disputes  really  fit  to 
be  settled  by  a  court  should  be  withdrawn  from  its 
competence.  One  cannot  imagine  that  any  court 
would  hold  that  a  nation  should  be  forced  to  submit 
to  arbitration  the  possession  of  its  own  capital  or  the 
surrender  to  another  country  of  its  only  access  to  the 
open  sea. 

Though  any  arbitration  treaty  is  better  than  none, 
still  every  limitation  on  a  general  treaty  is  regrettable, 
for  it  implies  the  possibility  that  the  parties  may  have 
recourse  to  war.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  when  the  habit 
of  entrusting  decisions  to  an  impartial  court  has 
spread  and  been  approved  by  its  success,  States  will 
no  longer  fear  to  bind  themselves  to  apply  it  in  every 
controversy  for  which  it  is  suitable.  These  cases  to 

• 

which  legal  methods  of  settlement  can  be  fitly  applied 
have  been  called  Justiciable,  a  term  which  I  shall 
often  have  to  use,  and  have  been  defined  as  follows: 

"Disputes  as  to  the  interpretation  of  a  treaty,  as  to  any  question 
of  international  law,  as  to  the  existence  of  any  fact  which,  if  estab- 
lished, would  constitute  a  breach  of  an  international  obligation,  or 
as  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  reparation  to  be  made  for  any 
such  breach." 

These  are  cases  which  every  one  admits  are  suitable 
for  arbitral  tribunals.  But  before  proceeding  to  dis- 
putes for  which  the  process  of  judicial  determination 


222  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

is  not  suited,  let  me  note  a  few  objections  which  have 
been  taken  to  a  general  promise  to  arbitrate.  One  is 
that  it  limits  the  freedom  of  a  State.  Well,  of  course, 
it  does.  So  does  every  treaty.  No  State  can  expect 
any  other  State  to  accept  an  obligation  unless  it  as- 
sumes for  itself  some  corresponding  obligation  to  that 
other.  Each  enlarges  its  own  power  or  secures  its  own 
safety  by  the  promises  it  gets  from  other  States,  and 
gives  in  return  a  promise  which  to  the  same  extent  re- 
duces its  own  absolute  liberty  of  action.  But  the  gam 
which  accrues  to  both  through  the  security  obtained 
outweighs  whatever  loss  is  incurred  by  parting  with 
full  liberty  of  action  in  one  particular  direction.  More 
is  won  by  assuring  peace  and  justice  than  is  lost  by 
renouncing  the  use  of  force;  and  that  is  why  the  bar- 
gain is  a  good  one.  Some  have  argued  that  a  legisla- 
ture, or  a  branch  of  a  legislature,  ought  not  to  bind 
itself  to  consent  to  arbitrate  all  questions  of  a  pre- 
scribed nature  which  may  arise  in  the  future,  because 
at  some  future  time  a  case  may  arise  which  it  does  not 
wish  to  arbitrate.  Obviously,  however,  a  promise  made 
for  the  future  has  no  value  if  the  maker  of  the  promise 
reserves  a  right  not  to  abide  by  it.  The  use  of  a  gen- 
eral treaty  is  to  create  the  sense  of  security  and  enable 
friendship  to  grow  up  between  peoples  because  they 
have  solemnly  renounced  the  thought  of  fighting  one 
another.  The  obligation  is,  of  course,  only  a  moral  ob- 
ligation, not  legally  enforceable,  but  no  self-respecting 
country  would  stain  its  honor  by  repudiating  such  an 
obligation. 

The  provisions  made  for  arbitration  by  the  last 
Hague  Conference  contemplated  a  body  of  judges 
named  by  the  States  who  had  accepted  the  scheme, 


INTERNATIONAL  QUESTIONS  AND  DISPUTES        223 

from  which  body  a  Court  was  to  be  selected  for  each 
particular  dispute  by  the  parties  concerned.  The  new 
Court  to  be  constituted  under  the  plan  more  recently 
framed  is  to  consist  of  a  fixed  number  of  permanent 
judges.  This  seems  a  preferable  plan,  but  it  will  be 
necessary  so  to  compose  this  permanent  body  as  to 
give  no  advantage  to  any  country,  or  closely  allied 
group  of  countries,  by  allowing  it  to  have  any  pre- 
ponderating influence  in  the  court.  The  success  of 
the  scheme  will  largely  depend  on  the  quality  of  the 
persons  selected -to  .fill  the  court.  There  are  none  too 
many  in  Europe  of  the  quality  needed. 

Excellent  as  is  the  method  of  Arbitration  by  an 
international  court,  there  are  many  cases  to  which 
it  is  not  applicable,  that  is  to  say,  cases  which  do 
not  fall  within  the  definition  already  given  of  "justi- 
ciable disputes."  These  cases  are  not  only  numerous, 
but  far  more  troublesome  than  those  that  are  "justi- 
ciable," because  inasmuch  as  strict  principles  of  law, 
or  even  the  more  elastic  principles  of  what  English 
and  American  lawyers  call  Equity,  cannot  be  applied 
to  them,  it  is  difficult  for  the  public  opinion  of  other 
countries,  or  of  honest  men  in  the  countries  directly 
affected,  to  judge  of  the  merits  without  a  full  knowl- 
edge of  all  the  facts.  Where  facts  have  become  known 
and  there  is  any  clear  principle  applicable  to  them  it 
is  only  an  arrogant  or  audacious  State  that  will  refuse 
to  settle  them  either  by  arbitration  or  by  diplomatic 
methods.  Where  the  absence  of  any  such  principle 
makes  arbitration  unavailable,  discussion  between 
governments  may  become  sharper,  and  the  temper  of 
peoples  angrier  and  hastier.  Whoever  takes  up  any 
history  of  modern  Europe  and  runs  through  the  wars 


224  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

which  have  broken  out  since  the  Treaties  of  Vienna  in 
1815,  will  find  that  comparatively  few  were  susceptible 
of  arbitration  by  a  Court  on  legal  principles.  I  will 
enumerate  those  which  occur  to  my  mind: 

The  war  between  the  Kingdom  of  Sardinia  and 
Austria  in  1848-49  and  the  war  between  Russia  (which 
had  come  to  the  support  of  Austria)  and  Hungary  in 
1849  had  nothing  to  do  with  legal  questions  suscep- 
tible of  arbitration. 

This  is  also  true  of  the  war  commonly  called  the 
Crimean  War,  between  Russia  on  one  side  and  France 
and  England  on  the  other  in  1853.  Of  the  points  in- 
volved few  could  be  called  justiciable,  and  those  were 
of  slight  consequence.  The  interests  which  France 
and  England  supposed  themselves  to  have  in  defend- 
ing Turkey  and  arresting  the  advance  southward  of 
Russia  were  political  interests  and  could  not  have  been 
settled  by  a  court  of  arbitral  justice. 

Similarly  the  war  of  1859  between  France  and 
Austria  was  waged  on  purely  political  grounds,  Louis 
Napoleon  desiring  for  various  reasons,  some  of  them 
domestic,  to  turn  the  Austrians  out  of  Italy. 

The  war  between  France  and  Germany  in  1870-71 
sprang  out  of  fears  on  both  sides  which  were  quite 
apart  from  legal  grounds  of  controversy. 

The  same  remark  applies  to  the  war  of  1877  between 
Russia  and  Turkey,  although  certain  legal  questions 
as  to  Turkey's  breach  of  her  treaty  engagements  might 
have  been  adduced  as  a  special  justification  of  Rus- 
sia's action  and  so  treated  as  justiciable  issues. 

The  war  between  Russia  and  Japan  in  1904  arose 
from  claims  and  projects  and  suspicions  between  the 
countries  not  susceptible  of  legal  determination. 


INTERNATIONAL  QUESTIONS  AND  DISPUTES        225 

This  was  even  more  true  of  the  war  between  Serbia 
and  Bulgaria  in  1885,  and  of  the  three  following  Bal- 
kan wars,  that  of  Greece  against  Turkey  in  1897,  that 
of  Bulgaria,  Serbia,  and  Greece  against  Turkey  in 
1912,  and  that  of  Serbia  and  Greece  against  Bulgaria 
in  1913.  It  is  also  true  of  the  war  of  Italy  against 
Turkey  in  1909,  for  which  it  was  thought  scarcely 
worth  while  to  advance  a  legal  casus  belli. 

Little,  if  anything,  was  said  about  arbitration  in  the 
quarrel  between  the  United  States  and  Spain  which 
led  to  the  Cuban  War  of  1898,  and  the  main  questions 
involved  could  hardly  be  deemed  justiciable. 

It  need  hardly  be  remarked  that  so  far  as  Russia 
and  France  were  concerned  the  war  which  broke  out 
in  1914  between  them  and  Germany  could  not  have 
been  averted  by  any  judicial  proceedings,  although 
some  of  the  issues  which  brought  England  and  subse- 
quently the  United  States  into  that  conflict  did  involve 
questions  of  international  law. 

Against  these  cases  not  suitable  for  arbitration  we 
have  to  set  only  two  which  might  have  been  referred 
to  arbitration,  the  war  between  the  Germanic  Con- 
federation and  Denmark  in  1864,  which  originated  in 
a  dispute  regarding  the  succession  to  the  Duchies  of 
Schleswig  and  Holstein,  and,  possibly,  the  subsequent 
war  between  Prussia  and  Austria  in  1866,  this  latter, 
however,  being  really  rather  a  political  quarrel  arising 
from  deep  seated  grounds  than  a  controversy  turning 
on  legal  questions.  To  these  may  be  added  the  war 
between  England  and  the  two  South  African  republics 
in  1899.  Here  one  of  the  chief  issues  involved,  that 
of  the  suzerainty  which  the  British  Government 
claimed  over  the  Transvaal,  was  a  legal  question  as 


226  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

to  the  interpretation  of  treaties,  and  the  British  Gov- 
ernment, unfortunately,  refused  to  refer  it  to  arbitra- 
tion because  they  contended  that  the  Transvaal  was 
not  a  Sovereign  State,  and  therefore  not  entitled  to 
demand  arbitration.  It  would  have  been  better  to 
have  waived  that  point,  which  was  not  of  real  value 
to  the  English  case  as  a  whole,  the  merits  of  which 
this  is  not  the  place  to  discuss. 

Out  of  the  sixteen  wars  I  have  enumerated  as  fall- 
ing within  this  period,  only  the  three  last  mentioned, 
or  perhaps  only  two  of  those  three  could,  so  far  as 
it  is  now  possible  to  judge,  have  been  settled  by  an 
Arbitral  Tribunal,  because  the  causes  and  issues  were 
political.  Evidently,  then,  some  other  method  besides 
that  of  judicial  determination  is  required  for  the  pre- 
vention of  wars. 

It  need  hardly  be  said  that  the  value  of  arbitra- 
tion is  to  be  estimated  not  by  the  number  of  cases 
for  which  its  methods  may  appear  to  have  been  un- 
suited,  but  rather  by  those  cases  for  which  it  is  suited, 
and  especially  by  those  in  which  it  has  either  pre- 
vented a  war  that  seemed  likely  to  arise,  or  in  which 
it  has  settled  questions  which,  even  though  not  such 
as  would  have  led  to  war,  were  disturbing  the  mutual 
good  will  and  friendly  relations  of  peoples.  Among 
such  questions,  it  is  enough  to  refer  to  those  disposed 
of  in  the  "Alabama"  Claim's  arbitration  at  Geneva  in 
1871  and  in  the  arbitration  at  the  Hague  of  the  old 
controversy  over  the  Newfoundland  fisheries  (1910). 

This  alternative  method  is  that  of  Conciliation  or 
Mediation.  The  latter  name  is  given  to  the  action 
of  a  third  State,  friendly  to  both  of  the  disputant 
States,  which  invites  both  to  accept  its  good  offices  to 


INTERNATIONAL  QUESTIONS  AND  DISPUTES        227 

help  in  settling  the  dispute.  It  is  a  method  that  has 
sometimes  proved  useful,  but  there  is  not  always  a 
suitable  mediator  at  hand  whom  both  parties  will 
trust.  Hence  a  plan  of  larger  scope  came  to  be  con- 
sidered, viz.,  that  of  creating  a  permanent  body  of 
persons  of  special  knowledge,  mature  judgment,  and 
wide  experience,  selected  from  different  nations  with 
a  view  to  their  impartiality  and  personal  authority  as 
well  as  to  the  other  qualities  aforesaid,  who  should 
constitute  a  permanent  Council  of  Conciliation  to  take 
cognizance  of  all  such  international  controversies  that 
might  arise  as  appeared  not  likely  to  be  settled  by 
the  ordinary  diplomatic  methods.  The  idea  of  apply- 
ing Conciliation  methods  when  those  of  Arbitration 
were  not  easily  applicable  was  to  some  extent  embodied 
in  a  treaty  made  between  the  United  States  and  the 
British  Government  in  1909  which  set  up  a  Commis- 
sion for  the  settlement  of  any  disputes  that  might 
arise  between  the  United  States  and  Canada.1  It  also 
found  expression  in  treaties  made  by  the  United  States 
with  Britain  and  France,  as  well  as  with  some  other 
States,  in  1914.  These  treaties  provided  that  when 
disputes  arose  between  the  nations  concerned  which 
diplomatic  methods  had  failed  to  settle,  and  which 
were  not  covered  by  existing  agreements  for  arbitra- 
tion, the  parties  should  not  declare  war  or  begin  hos- 
tilities until  a  certain  period  had  elapsed,  and  that 
within  that  prescribed  period  the  dispute  should  be 
referred  for  investigation  and  report  to  an  interna- 
tional commission,  constituted  by  the  terms  of  the 
treaty. 

1This  commission  has  worked   smoothly   and  successfully   ever 
since  its  establishment  in  1909. 


228  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

The  principle  of  these  treaties  is  obviously  capable 
of  more  general  application.  If  a  considerable  number 
of  States  were  to  join  in  a  general  agreement  to  apply 
the  principle  by  setting  up  a  permanent  Council  of 
Conciliation,  such  a  body,  being  created  by  many 
States,  would  enjoy  a  higher  authority  and  wider  in- 
fluence fhan  could  belong  to  any  international  com- 
mission either  created  for  a  particular  case,  or  by  two 
contracting  parties  only  who  established  it  as  between 
themselves.  Under  such  a  scheme  as  I  have  outlined 
the  Council  would  be  at  liberty  not  only  to  investigate 
but  to  include  in  its  report,  if  it  thought  fit  to  do  so, 
specific  recommendations  for  the  settlement  of  the 
disputes  it  had  examined. 

The  advantages  claimed  for  the  method  may  be 
appreciated  if  we  turn  back  to  consider  and  reflect 
upon  the  causes  which  have  led  to  those  modern  wars 
which  I  have  already  enumerated,  and  on  the  circum- 
stances attending  their  outbreak. 

One  of  these  causes  has  been  the  rapidity  with 
which  nations  have  allowed  their  governments  to 
hurry  them  into  war.  Whenever  hostilities  seem  to 
be  approaching,  each  of  the  antagonists  expects  a 
great  advantage  by  being  the  first  to  launch  its  armies 
and  fleets  against  the  other.  This  was  seen  in  1870, 
when  Germany  gained  by  being  ready  sooner  than 
France  was  to  deliver  a  tremendous  blow.  It  ap- 
peared again  in  1904,  when  Japan's  attack  on  Russia 
followed  instantaneously  on  her  declaration  of  war. 
Moreover  the  extreme  tension  which  the  approach 
of  war  produces  raises  the  temper  of  peoples  to  fever 
heat.  It  leaves  statesmen  no  leisure  for  reflection  and 
indeed  impairs  in  them  the  capacity  for  cool  and  clear 


INTERNATIONAL  QUESTIONS  AND  DISPUTES        229 

thinking.  Everybody  is  excited,  most  people  are  be- 
wildered. During  those  terrible  ten  days  that  elapsed 
between  the  delivery  of  Austria's  48  hours'  ultimatum 
to  Serbia  and  the  declarations  of  war  between  Russia, 
Germany  and  France  in  the  beginning  of  August, 
1914,  telegrams  were  speeding  so  swiftly  to  and  fro 
between  Petersburg,  Paris,  Berlin,  Vienna,  and  Lon- 
don, crossing  one  another  like  fiery  arrows  hurtling 
through  the  air,  that  a  deliberate  consideration  of  the 
numerous  proposals  and  counter-proposals  was  scarcely 
possible.  Had  the  negotiations,  as  in  the  old  days, 
been  conducted  by  written  dispatches,  the  chances  of 
a  peaceful  settlement  would  have  been  greater.  Now 
that  the  telegraph  has  superseded  the  post,  it  is  only 
by  imposing  a  formal  treaty  obligation  to  postpone 
actual  hostilities  that  time  can  be  secured  for  con- 
ciliation to  have  its  chance. 

Turning  from  the  question  of  time  to  the  actual 
issues  involved,  let  us  revert  to  the  thirteen  wars 
which  I  have  mentioned  as  wars  to  which  methods  of 
conciliation  might  have  been  but  were  not  applied. 
Most  of  the  disputes  to  which  those  thirteen  were 
due  could  probably  have  been  adjusted  had  they 
been  submitted  to  an  examination  by  a  competent 
and  impartial  Council  of  Conciliation.  Some  at  least 
of  the  wars  against  Turkey  may  be  left  out  of  account, 
because  she  is  an  uncivilized  State,  with  a  government 
stupid  as  well  as  savage.  Yet  both  in  1877  and  in 
1897  war  might  probably  have  been  averted  if  the 
matters  involved  had  been  handled  before  the  Turks 
were  committed  to  resistance.  I  omit  also  the  war 
between  France  and  Germany  in  1870,  for  the  causes 
were  deep-seated  and  the  differences  seemed  irrecon- 


230  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

cilable.  But  the  Crimean  War  of  1853,  into  which 
England  drifted  without  any  clear  view  of  the  real 
issues  or  even  of  her  own  motives,  and  the  war  of  1859 
between  France  and  Austria,  and  the  Serbo-Bulgarian 
war  of  1885,  and  that  between  the  United  States  and 
Spain  in  1898,  and  that  between  Russia  and  Japan  in 
1904,  and  the  deplorable  Balkan  War  of  1913,  and 
that  between  England  and  the  two  South  African  Re- 
publics, might  well  have  been  averted  had  there  been 
tune  for  defining  and  reporting  upon  the  real  issues,  for 
endeavoring  to  arrange  compromises,  for  focussing  the 
opinion  of  the  world  upon  the  merits.  I  do  not  at- 
tempt to  discuss  the  war  of  1914,  but  may  observe 
that  the  causes  of  strife  which  seem  to  now  exist  as 
between  those  minor  European  States  whose  condi- 
tions are  unstable  might  be  greatly  lessened  and  per- 
haps even  removed  if  a  method  of  investigation  such 
as  has  just  been  outlined  were  applied  to  them.  Let 
me  sum  up  briefly  the  advantages  that  may  be  ex- 
pected from  the  method  of  Conciliation  by  way  of 
investigation,  report  and  suggestions  for  settle- 
ment. 

In  the  first  place,  this  process,  by  interposing  a  delay 
before  hostilities  begin,  gives  time  for  passions  to  cool 
and  reason  to  have  its  perfect  work. 

Secondly,  it  compels  each  State  to  define  the 
grounds  on  which  its  claims  rest,  disengaging  the  minor 
from  the  really  significant,  and  it  will  sometimes  bring 
into  a  clear  light  weaknesses  even  in  these  latter. 

Thirdly,  it  enables  public  opinion  in  each  of  the 
States  concerned  to  have  an  opportunity  of  seeing 
whither,  i.  e.,  towards  peace  or  towards  war — their 
governments  are  leading  them,  and  of  expressing  their 


INTERNATIONAL  QUESTIONS  AND  DISPUTES        231 

judgment  as  to  whether  the  causes  alleged  justify  a 
resort  to  arms. 

Fourthly,  it  supplies  to  other  nations  the  materials 
which  may  enable  them  to  form  a  judgment  on  the 
points  of  issue  between  the  disputant  nations  and  on 
the  broad  aspects  of  the  case.  How  important  the 
judgment  of  other  nations  may  be  was  shown  by  the 
incessant  and  untiring  efforts  of  Germany,  France  and 
England  to  win  public  opinion  to  their  side  in  the 
recent  war.  They  all  appealed  to  the  moral  judgment 
of  mankind,  recognizing  that  the  civilized  world  has 
a  judgment,  and  admitting  that  moral  principles  have 
something  to  do  with  that  judgment.  Could  such  a 
judgment  have  been  expressed  by  a  competent  and 
impartial  international  authority  before  hostilities  be- 
gan, might  not  things  have  gone  differently? 

Fifthly,  where  national  pride  and  vanity  are  in- 
volved, as  they  always  are,  concessions  and  compro- 
mises become  more  attainable  because  a  nation,  if 
not  bent  upon  war  at  all  risks,  can  more  easily  make 
concessions  and  accept  compromises  when  these  are 
pressed  upon  it  by  an  authority  which  is  impartial  and 
respected.  Every  one  of  us  knows  how  much  easier  it 
is  to  yield  when  one  yields  to  the  advice  of  those  whose 
judgment  and  counsel  deserve  respect.  The  imputa- 
tion of  having  yielded  out  of  cowardice  is  a  reproach 
which  no  high-spirited  people  will  bear. 

It  is  not  easy  to  say  how  such  a  council  of  concilia- 
tion as  has  been  outlined  should  be  created.  Those 
who  suggested  it  conceived  that  the  countries  which 
entered  by  treaty  into  a  combination  for  preserving 
peace,  such  as  that  already  suggested,  should  each 
appoint  its  own  representatives  on  the  proposed  Coun- 


232  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

cil  and  should  appoint  them  for  a  term  of  years,  so  that 
the  Council  should  always  be  complete  and  in  being, 
and  that  its  members  should  not  be  exposed  to  the 
charge  of  having  been  appointed  for  the  purposes  of 
a  particular  dispute  and  because  of  their  supposed 
views  upon  it.  It  was  also  thought  better  that  the 
members,  though  of  course  they  would  be  in  touch 
with  their  respective  governments  and  aware  of  the 
sentiments  of  their  respective  nations,  should  not  act 
under  constant  instructions  from  their  governments, 
but  rather  deliberate  and  vote  freely,  as  members  of 
a  court  of  arbitral  justice  would  do,  according  to 
their  conscience  and  judgment,  in  the  interest  of  jus- 
tice and  of  general  peace.  They  must  of  course  be  per- 
sons of  sufficient  capacity  and  reputation  to  have  in- 
fluence with  the  Council  and  also  to  have  in  their 
respective  countries  an  influence  and  weight  sufficient 
to  insure  a  fair  consideration  in  those  countries  of  any 
proposals  with  which  they  might  associate  themselves. 
Such  persons  are  of  course  not  numerous,  but  they 
exist  in  all  civilized  countries  anywhere  and  any  of  you 
could  name  some  persons  in  the  United  States  who 
possess  the  qualifications  prescribed.  I  need  hardly 
add  that  the  representatives  of  a  country  would  not 
bind  its  government.  The  Council  contemplated  would 
have  no  executive  power.  That  would  be  retained  by 
the  governments.  Its  aims  and  function  would  be  to 
convey  to  the  public  opinion  of  nations  in  general — 
for  the  whole  civilized  world  is  interested  in  the  main- 
tenance of  a  general  peace — the  views  of  an  instructed 
and  impartial  body  as  to  the  real  merits  of  a 
controversy,  and  as  to  that  particular  solution  of 
an  urgent  problem  that  is  most  in  accordance  with 


INTERNATIONAL  QUESTIONS  AND  DISPUTES        233 

equity  and  the  general  interest.  To  do  this  honestly 
and  efficiently,  its  members  ought  not  to  take  an  ex- 
clusively national  view  nor  be  mere  agents  of  their 
governments. 

The  Treaty  of  Versailles,  in  its  plan  for  preventing 
war  by  the  action  of  two  bodies — a  Council  and  an 
Assembly — representing  many  nations,  took  a  different 
view.  Under  its  provisions  the  members  of  those  two 
bodies  are  distinctly  delegates  of  their  respective 
countries, — delegates  who  are  understood  to  ex- 
press the  views  of  those  governments,  and  some  of 
whom  are  Ministers  in  those  governments.  I  express, 
of  course,  no  view  as  to  the  respective  merits  of  the 
two  schemes,  but  am  content  merely  to  indicate  a  plan 
somewhat  different  from  that  of  the  Versailles  cove- 
nant, and  to  leave  it  for  your  consideration.  The  two 
schemes  are  in  some  points  not  incompatible,  and  some 
of  the  features  of  that  here  outlined  might  be  fitted  in- 
to the  Versailles  scheme.  Though  that  plan  is  more 
complete,  because  it  goes  further,  efforts  at  com- 
promise change  and  reconcilement  would  sometimes 
be  more  acceptable  if  they  came  from  a  body  which 
is  detached  from  the  executive  governments  of  the 
States  represented,  because  any  States  asked  to  yield 
and  accept  a  compromise  might  be  more  disposed  to 
do  so  if  the  request  came  from  a  body  which  is  not 
directly  controlled  by  the  governments  of  the  other 
States. 

I  have  not  dealt  with  the  question  how  either  the 
decisions  of  an  Arbitral  Tribunal  or  the  recommenda- 
tions of  a  Council  of  Conciliation  should  be  enforced, 
nor  even  with  the  preliminary  question  how  the  States 
that  have  bound  themselves  by  treaty  to  submit  their 


234  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

disputes  either  for  decision  to  the  Tribunal  or  for  in- 
vestigation and  report  to  the  Council  can  be  compelled 
to  fulfill  the  obligations  they  have  undertaken.  These 
questions,  being  the  largest  and  most  difficult  of  all, 
for  they  have  been  supposed  to  affect  the  sovereignty 
and  absolute  independence  of  States,  require  to  be 
considered  apart  from  the  particular  methods  to  which 
I  have  been  calling  your  attention. 


LECTURE  VIII 

OTHER  POSSIBLE  METHODS  FOR  AVERTING 

WAR 

WE  HAVE  seen,  as  all  who  have  considered  the  sub- 
ject have  seen,  that  valuable  as  the  methods  of  arbi- 
tration and  conciliation  are  for  lessening  the  risk  that 
unsettled  disputes  should  lead  to  war,  cases  may  still 
be  looked  for  in  which  States  will  not  turn  to  arbitra- 
tion nor  accept  conciliation,  or  in  which  a  recourse  to 
these  methods  may  fail,  because  the  decision  of  a  tri- 
bunal or  the  recommendations  of  a  conciliating  author- 
ity are  rejected.  If  this  happens,  to  what  means  of 
protection  are  States  to  resort  if  they  wish  to  save 
themselves  from  attack  by  a  stronger  nation  or  a  group 
of  nations  leagued  together  by  the  hope  of  gaining 
territory,  or  some  other  advantage,  by  superior  force? 

In  cases  of  this  nature  protection  has  usually  been 
sought  in  defensive  alliances  by  which  two  or  more 
States  pledge  themselves  to  stand  together  united  for 
reciprocal  aid;  each  undertaking  to  call  out  its  armies 
and  fleets  against  any  enemy  who  should  made  an 
unprovoked  attack  upon  any  member  of  the  Alliance. 
Such  alliances  have  in  time  past  done  much  to  protect 
small  communities  against  destruction  by  greater 
neighbors,  and  out  of  them  grew  up  in  the  Middle 
Ages  such  confederations  as  those  of  the  Hanseatic 
merchant  towns  and  of  the  Swiss  cantons  and  cities. 
So  our  own  time  saw  the  alliance  of  France  and  Britain 

235 


236  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

against  Russia  during  the  Crimean  War,  and  subse- 
quently the  so-called  League  of  the  Three  Empires 
(Drei  Kaiser  Bund),  Russia,  Germany  and  Austria, 
for  reciprocal  defense;  and  after  that  league  had  come 
to  an  end  there  was  seen  the  alliance  of  Russia  and 
France  designed  to  protect  each  against  possible  dan- 
gers from  Germany,  and  thereafter  the  counter-alliance 
of  Germany,  Austria  and  Italy  which  ended  when  Italy 
withdrew  from  it  in  1915.  Another  example  was  af- 
forded by  the  league  between  Argentina,  Chile  and 
Brazil  against  Paraguay,  then  ruled  by  an  unscrup- 
ulous disturber  of  the  peace  of  South  America.  Tem- 
porary safety  may  be  and  often  has  been  secured  by 
arrangements  of  this  kind,  which  may  be  perfectly 
legitimate  when  maintained  for  purposes  purely  de- 
fensive. But  the  system,  regarded  as  a  means  of  pre- 
serving permanent  peace,  is  open  to  grave  objections. 
Alliances  are  unstable,  and  may  fail  when  they  are 
most  needed,  because  the  interest  of  one  or  other 
party  to  the  agreement  may  change,  or  because  one  or 
other  may  disapprove  the  diplomatic  action  of  the 
other,  or  because  the  control  of  the  policies  of  a  State 
may  pass  from  the  hands  of  a  man,  or  a  cabinet,  or 
a  political  party  which  the  allied  States  trusted  at  the 
moment  when  the  treaty  was  concluded  into  other 
hands  that  inspire  no  confidence.  Bismarck  relied  so 
little  on  the  alliance  he  had  concluded  with  Austria 
that  he  effected  in  1884  what  was  called  a  Reinsurance 
Treaty  with  Russia,  keeping  it  secret  from  Austria. 
Britain,  after  having  through  the  mouth  of  one  minis- 
ter proclaimed  the  advantages  of  a  "splendid  isolation," 
thereafter  entered  into  a  secret  treaty  with  Italy,  which 
afterwards  expired ;  and  after  considering  various  tend- 


OTHER  POSSIBLE  METHODS  FOR  AVERTING  WAR  237 

ers  of  affection  from  Germany,  she  ultimately  ar- 
ranged her  differences  with  France,  and  disposed  of  the 
chief  questions  that  had  disturbed  her  relations  with 
Russia.  Thus  was  created  the  so-called  Triple 
Entente,  an  understanding  which  did  not  amount  in 
point  of  form  to  an  alliance  but  came  near  it  in  sub- 
stance. 

Alliances  between  strong  Powers  excite  and  prolong 
jealousies,  rivalries,  and  suspicions  among  other 
States.  Though  they  may  purport  to  be  purely  de- 
fensive, no  one  can  tell  what  secret  provisions  con- 
templating encroachment  upon  others  they  may  con- 
tain. They  are  apt  to  breed  an  aggressive  spirit,  be- 
cause a  State  which  has  powerful  associates  standing 
beside  it  or  behind  it,  is  tempted  to  take  an  arrogant 
or  domineering  attitude  towards  other  States.  The 
alarm  created  in  other  States  induces  them  to  form 
counter-combinations,  which,  though  professedly  for 
defense  only,  produce  in  each  of  the  counter-combining 
States  the  same  moral  effect  as  I  have  just  noted. 
Each  combination  becomes  more  confident  in  its 
strength,  and  more  unyielding  in  its  attitude.  When 
anywhere  in  the  world  questions  arise  which  interest 
a  number  of  States  those  which  belong  to  the  one 
combination  are  apt  to  act  together  therein,  irre- 
spective of  the  general  merits  of  the  particular 
case.  This  happened  with  the  Triple  Entente  and 
with  the  Triple  Alliance.  For  some  years  before 
1914,  whenever  Russia  or  France  contested  any  claim 
or  opposed  any  wish  of  Austria  or  Germany,  the  other 
member  of  the  combination  was  expected  to  give  dip- 
lomatic support  to  the  contention  of  its  own  partner 
and  to  resist  the  contention  of  any  of  the  partners 


238  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

in  the  Triple  Alliance.  Such  a  situation  gave  rise  to 
ill  feeling.  When  any  contention  grows  into  a  quarrel 
between  a  member  of  one  alliance  and  a  member 
of  the  other,  it  is  likely  to  become  the  common  quarrel 
of  all  the  partners  in  both  combinations.  In  1914 
Russia  was  involved  in  hostilities  with  Austria  by  the 
latter's  threat  to  Serbia,  which  Russia  had  taken  under 
her  wing.  Russia  drew  in  France,  as  her  ally,  and 
thereupon  France  drew  in  England,  as  a  sort  of  partner, 
though  not  formally  an  ally,  while  Austria  drew  in 
Germany,  her  intimate  adviser  and  backer  in  the  crisis, 
and  Germany  brought  in  Turkey,  which  she  already 
had  been  making  a  sort  of  dependent  ally,  and  whose 
leading  ministers  she  had  enlisted  in  her  service  by 
private  influences  of  a  kind  familiar  in  the  East. 

Thirdly,  Alliances,  since  they  rest  upon  armed  force, 
dispose  nations  to  think  in  terms  of  armed  force.  The 
obligation  of  each  allied  nation  is  to  maintain  fleets 
and  armies  and  all  engines  of  war  sufficient  not  only 
to  strengthen  itself  but  to  enable  it  do  its  duty  to 
its  partner,  and  it  keeps  urging  its  partner  to  maintain 
costly  armaments  at  the  highest  point  of  efficiency. 
Any  proposal  made  in  the  representative  assembly  of 
one  country  to  reduce  military  or  naval  appropriations 
is  treated  as  a  failure  to  fulfill  the  country's  duty  to 
the  Alliance ;  and  that  militaristic  spirit  which  regards 
Force  as  the  only  source  of  safety  and  is  ready  to  chal- 
lenge the  rest  of  the  world  is  fed  and  stimulated. 

Alliances  have  been  for  centuries  past  regarded  as 
the  only  practical  securities  for  any  country  against 
external  dangers.  Already  since  the  making  at  Paris  of 
the  so-called  Peace  Treaties,  we  have  seen  three  new 
States,  Rumania,  Yugo-Slavia  and  Czecho-Slovakia, 


OTHER  POSSIBLE  METHODS  FOR  AVERTING  WAR   239 

forming  an  alliance  between  themselves  against 
Hungary.  They  are  believed  to  be  trying  to  induce 
Poland  to  enter  this  so-called  Petite  Entente.  Latvia, 
Esthonia  and  Lithuania  have,  it  is  said,  been  nego- 
tiating with  one  another  for  a  similar  alliance,  which 
in  the  case  of  three  States  at  present  so  weak  seems 
a  natural  expedient  for  mutual  protection  against  at- 
tacks from  Bolshevik  Russia.  The  alliance  of  two 
governments  that  might  seem  so  naturally  antago- 
nistic as  the  Soviet  Republic  of  Russia  and  the  so- 
called  "Kemalists"  or  Nationalist  Turks,  shows  how 
far  a  common  hatred  of  other  States  can  go  to  draw 
together  Powers  which  have  nothing  else  in  common, 
and  which,  once  they  had  vanquished  the  forces  op- 
posed to  them,  would  begin  to  contend  against  one 
another  for  the  control  of  the  Transcaucasian  countries. 
Impressed  by  the  objections  to  the  plan  of  safety 
through  alliances, — since  it  is  a  system  liable  to  arouse 
suspicions  while  it  stands,  and  possibly  to  break  down 
when  it  is  most  needed — and  feeling  also  some  dis- 
satisfaction with  Arbitration  and  Conciliation  because 
they  may  fail  to  settle  disputes  between  nations  one 
or  other  of  which  does  not  really  desire  an  amicable  set- 
tlement, some  enthusiasts  conceive  that  peace  can 
be  secured  only  by  the  creation  of  an  authority  includ- 
ing and  standing  above  all  existing  States,  which  shall 
do  for  those  existing  States  what  the  Executive,  the 
Legislature  and  the  Judiciary  do  for  individual  citizens 
in  each  civilized  State.  They  argue  that  just  as  Law 
and  Order  were  by  degrees  established  in  each  country 
by  the  will  of  the  people,  and  when  established  were 
able  by  the  action  of  courts  and  police  to  administer 
justice  and  suppress  violence,  so  the  same  process  must 


240  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

be  applied  to  States,  which  are  to  be  regarded  as  mem- 
bers of  a  world  commonwealth  just  as  individual  citi- 
zens are  members  of  their  own  State.  The  advocates 
of  this  plan  appeal  to  the  United  States  of  North 
America  as  an  example.  If — so  they  argue — thirteen 
independent  commonwealths  were  found  willing  in 
1787-90  to  forego  a  part  of  their  sovereignty  in  order  to 
establish  a  union  which  should  prevent  strife  between 
them  and  ensure  them  against  attacks  from  without, 
why  should  not  the  independent  States  now  existing 
in  a  modern  and  more  advanced  world  seek  in  a  like 
union  a  remedy  against  the  dangers  which  threaten 
a  return  to  barbarism?  This  idea  of  a  Super-State 
embracing  the  whole  world,  a  Federation  of  peoples 
ruled  by  a  Parliament  of  Man,  appeals  to  the  imagina- 
tion. Its  vast  scale  is  fascinating.  It  holds  out  a 
hope  of  incalculable  blessings.  But  it  is  a  phrase, 
and  only  a  phrase,  a  phrase  which  has  no  definite 
relation  to  anything  in  the  actual  world  of  our  time. 
No  writer  familiar  with  the  initial  working  of  govern- 
ments, has,  so  far  as  I  know,  presented  it  in  a  con- 
crete form  by  showing  through  working  out  of  details, 
what  the  organization  and  government  of  a  World 
Federation  would  be  in  practice.  Schemes  there  have 
been,  but  either  vague  and  viewy,  or  based 
merely  on  the  suggestion  that  the  federal  system 
of  the  United  States  might  •  be  imitated  on  a 
world  scale.  Those  who  cite  that  example  ought  to 
try  to  recommend  their  suggestion  by  comparing  the 
conditions  under  which  the  American  Federation  was 
created  with  those  which  exist  today  in  the  world  as  a 
whole  and  showing  that  such  a  comparison  supports 
the  plan.  Does  it  not  rather  dissuade  from  the  attempt 


OTHER  POSSIBLE  METHODS  FOR  AVERTING  WAR  241 

to  imitate?  The  thirteen  States  of  1788  were  no  doubt 
independent.  But  their  citizens  spoke  the  same  lan- 
guage, had  the  same  social  usages,  cherished  the  same 
historical  traditions,  lived  under  the  same  institutions, 
were,  in  fact,  except  that  they  had  no  common  govern- 
ment (save  an  ineffective  assembly  of  delegates)  al- 
ready a  Nation,  a  branch  of  the  ancient  European 
nation  whose  authority  they  had  disclaimed.  In  order 
to  realize  the  difficulties  involved  in  creating  a  World 
State  on  the  American  pattern,  compare  with  the  facts 
of  that  American  case  the  facts  which  a  survey  of  our 
planet  presents,  and  consider  the  obstacles  which  an 
attempt  to  construct  a  World  State  would  have  to  over- 
come. I  waive  for  the  moment  the  preliminary  ques- 
tion whether  the  nations  of  the  world  are  (as  at  present 
advised)  disposed  to  resign  so  much  of  their  inde- 
pendence as  would  be  needed  to  create  the  projected 
Super-State,  since  whatever  supremacy  or  sovereign 
control  was  given  to  it  would  necessarily  be  withdrawn 
from  them. 

The  natural  differences  between  the  various  branches 
of  mankind,  differences  in  race  which  are  expressed  in 
physical  and  mental  characteristics,  in  language,  in 
habits  of  life  due  to  climatic  and  other  kinds  of  en- 
vironment, are  so  marked  as  to  make  it  seem  impos- 
sible that  they  should  be  able  to  understand  one  an- 
other sufficiently  to  work  harmoniously  with  one  an- 
other in  the  same  political  body  by  the  same  methods. 

The  historical  past  of  these  peoples  has  been  so  dis- 
similar as  to  add  immensely  to  those  differences  Nature 
has  created.  Only  a  few  have  enjoyed  freedom  and 
self-government  for  some  generations  or  centuries. 
Most  have  lived  under  monarchies,  sometimes  in  small 


242  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

tribal  units  where  tribal  opinion  had  a  certain  influ- 
ence, others  under  autocracies  ruling  either  through 
bureaucratic  officials  or  through  local  oligarchies. 
Some  of  these  peoples  are  so  obviously  unfit  to  share 
in  a  system  of  free  government — as  are  the  tribes  of 
tropical  Africa  and  tropical  South  America — that  they 
could  not  be  admitted  as  States  but  only  as  protected 
wards  of  a  World  Federation,  like  the  Igorotes  or  the 
Moros  in  the  Philippines  or  the  Kalmuks  in  South- 
western Siberia.  All  of  those  whose  forefathers  lived 
under  autocratic  rule  have  an  utterly  different  set 
of  ideas  and  traditions  regarding  government  from 
those  of  the  free  peoples,  and  it  would  take  several, 
perhaps  many,  generations  to  enable  them  to  assimi- 
late those  traditions.  The  level  of  education  among 
even  the  civilized  peoples  is  much  higher  in  some  than 
in  others.  Compare  Mexico  with  the  United  States. 

How  would  the  differences  affect  the  working  of  a 
World  Federation?  Assume  that  it  would  be,  as  most 
of  its  advocates  would  desire,  democratic  in  its  consti- 
tution, based  on  a  very  wide,  perhaps  universal,  suf- 
frage. If  the  governing  authorities,  Executive  and 
Legislative,  were  chosen  by  popular  vote,  the  votes 
of  the  Chinese  people  would  constitute  about  one- 
fourth  of  the  whole,  those  of  the  Chinese  and  East 
Indians  and  Russians,  taken  together,  at  least  one-half 
of  the  whole.  Of  course  no  rational  man  would  pro- 
pose a  scheme  which  would  give  such  results,  but  what- 
ever other  scheme  might  be  adopted  for  assigning  a 
certain  proportion  of  votes  to  each  people,  or  to  each 
State,  under  arrangements  permitting  these  votes  to 
be  cast  by  the  government  of  that  State,  would  be  open 
to  serious  objections,  raise  endless  controversies,  and 


OTHER  POSSIBLE  METHODS  FOR  AVERTING  WAR  243 

give  rise  to  constant  attempts,  once  the  Super-State 
were  constituted,  to  alter  its  basis,  for  no  civilized 
people  would  consent  to  a  system  of  taxation  imposed 
upon  its  citizens  by  the  votes  of  poorer  but  far  more 
numerous  peoples. 

If  each  component  State  were  required  to  have  a 
free  popular  constitution,  as  every  State  in  the  Ameri- 
can Union  is  now  required,  such  constitutions,  forced 
upon  peoples  unfit  to  handle  them,  would  work  badly. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  each  State  were  allowed  to  have 
whatever  form  of  government  it  pleased,  the  constant 
revolutions  in  some  States,  and  the  bad  character  of 
the  governments  they  set  up,  would  make  it  difficult 
for  orderly  civilized  governments  to  get  on  with  them, 
and  would  throw  the  machinery  of  the  Federation  out 
of  gear.  How  would  the  national  government  of  the 
United  States  have  worked  for  the  last  hundred  years 
had  the  twelve  Latin  American  so-called  republics  that 
now  exist  in  and  around  the  Caribbean  Sea  been  States 
of  the  Union?  If  the  backward  peoples  were  allowed 
to  exert  their  power  of  numbers,  either  by  the  direct 
voting  of  their  citizens  en  masse  or  by  the  number  of 
representatives  assigned  to  them  on  the  basis  of  popu- 
lation in  the  ruling  general  assembly  (or  assemblies) 
of  the  Federation,  the  result  might  be  to  throw  back 
instead  of  to  advance  civilization.  It  need  hardly  be 
added  that  able  adventurers,  men  with  popular  gifts 
but  without  scruples,  would  be  tempted  to  seek  their 
political  fortunes  as  leaders  in  the  backward  peoples, 
among  whom  their  arts  would  have  full  scope. 

Even  in  the  nations  that  have  the  best  political 
intelligence  and  have  had  the  longest  political  experi- 
ence, popular  government  has  disclosed  many  defects 


244  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

and  finds  itself  still  faced  by  many  difficulties.  How 
much  harder  to  work  a  vast  democracy  which  included 
the  untrained  races!  The  parts  of  any  structure  must 
be  sound  before  they  can  be  put  together  to  make  a 
sound  whole.  A  World  State  rent  by  a  struggle  of 
classes  such  as  threatens  to  rend  in  twain  not  a  few 
civilized  nations  might  be  more  formidable  than  even 
the  class  strife  we  now  perceive  in  those  nations.  Some 
critics  may  add  that  the  men  needed  to  work  so  gi- 
gantic a  machine  do  not  exist,  and  that  no  means  of 
discovering  or  producing  them  has  been  suggested. 
Such  men,  as  has  been  truly  said  by  many  voices,  did 
not  appear  when  they  were  sadly  wanted  to  recon- 
struct a  shattered  Europe  at  the  end  of  the  Great 
War.  Yet  the  task  of  comprehending  and  dealing 
with  all  the  numerous  and  intricate  questions  that 
would  confront  a  Supreme  World-Legislature  must 
prove  incomparably  heavier. 

Let  me  digress  for  a  moment  to  observe  that  the 
problem  which  the  modern  world  now  presents  is  far 
different  from  that  which  men  sought  to  solve  six 
centuries  ago  by  the  recognition  of  one  supreme  di- 
vinely appointed  government  for  the  small  European 
world  they  knew.  The  World  State  which  shone  like  a 
bright  vision  before  the  imagination  of  medieval  think- 
ers and  of  poets  like  Dante  had  a  basis  which  is  now 
entirely  wanting.  That  Christian  realm  was  to  find 
its  spiritual  head  in  the  Pope  and  its  secular  head  in 
the  Emperor.  Such  a  realm  which,  be  it  remembered, 
then  did  actually  exist,  so  far  as  regarded  ecclesiastical 
affairs,  though  only  in  a  vague  semi-legal  sense  as  re- 
gards secular  affairs,  rested  upon,  as  respects  the  larger 
part  of  Europe,  an  existing  religious  unity  and  upon  a 


OTHER  POSSIBLE  METHODS  FOR  AVERTING  WAR  245 

firm  belief  in  a  Divine  Commission  given  to  these  two 
Heads.  Nothing  of  the  kind  exists  now.  There  are 
in  our  far  larger  world  many  religions,  and  one  of 
the  strongest  is  fiercely  anti-Christian,  while  religious 
differences  and  antipathies  divide  even  peoples  nom- 
inally Christian.  The  ties  of  faith  and  sentiment  which 
bound  the  peoples  together  in  the  thirteenth  century 
are  wanting. 

These  and  many  other  difficulties  that  stand  in  the 
way  of  creating  a  World  State  with  any  prospect  of 
success  would  present  themselves  in  slightly  different 
forms  and  degree  according  to  the  particular  scheme 
adopted.  But  most,  if  not  all,  of  them  would  be 
sure  to  arise  in  any  scheme,  because  the  elements 
of  the  World  State  would  be  too  heterogeneous  for  a 
real  unity.  Institutions  which  would  be  fit  for  some 
of  the  members  would  be  unfit  for  the  rest.  Any  such 
scheme  must  assume  a  virtue,  an  intelligence,  a  civic 
spirit,  a  flexibility  and  adaptability  and  capacity  for 
steady  moral  and  intellectual  progress  of  which  few 
signs  are  now  discernible.  Adding  these  considerations 
to  the  patent  fact,  already  mentioned,  that  the  most 
advanced  nations  would  not  sacrifice  their  present  in- 
dependence in  order  to  try  any  such  experiment,  the 
notion  must  be  regarded  as  a  dazzling  vision  of  the  far- 
off  possible  future  rather  than  as  a  remedy  for  the 
present  troubles  of  the  world. 

If  we  have  found  that  alliances,  meant  to  secure 
against  war  the  nations  that  make  them,  have  proved 
more  often  causes  of  strife  than  remedies  against  it, 
if  we  have  been  obliged  to  dismiss  the  conception  of  a 
Super-State  as  outside  the  range  of  practical  politics, 
what  remains?  By  what  other  means  is  mankind  to 


246  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

protect  itself  against  such  storms  as  that  which  broke 
upon  it  in  1914?  Could  an  alliance  be  made  by  a 
large  number  of  States,  directed,  not  against  other 
States  but  against  war  itself,  an  alliance  which  should 
provide  means  for  averting  war?  Can  States  be  in- 
duced to  renounce  just  so  much  of  their  unlimited 
sovereignty  and  self-centered  isolation  as  is  involved 
in  pledging  themselves  not  to  resort  to  war  until  all 
possible  pacific  means  of  settling  disputes  of  every  kind 
whatsoever  have  been  exhausted,  can  they  be  perhaps 
induced  to  go  even  further  in  endeavoring  to  prevent 
any  State  that  will  not  try  those  means  from  lighting 
a  fire  that  may  spread  till  it  involves  those  who  stood, 
or  tried  to  stand,  outside  the  quarrel? 

Such  a  Combination  of  States  would  begin  by  de- 
veloping and  extending  the  scope  of  the  methods  of 
Arbitration  and  Conciliation.  These  two  methods  may 
be  made  to  cover  every  sort  of  dispute  that  can  arise 
between  States.  The  dispute,  if  it  is  of  the  kind  called 
justiciable,  would  go  to  a  judicial  tribunal  administer- 
ing the  principles  and  rules  of  international  law  in  a 
broadly  equitable  spirit.  If  not  justiciable,  it  would 
be  a  matter  for  Conciliation,  i.  e.,  for  finding  a  settle- 
ment which  the  parties  might  be  willing  to  accept 
because  it  gave  to  each  of  them  terms  which  fairness 
suggested,  and  which  would  best  contribute  to  the 
future  contentment  and  good-will  of  the  parties  con- 
cerned as  well  as  to  the  maintenance  of  general  peace. 

I  have  already  touched  upon  both  these  methods,  so 
we  may  proceed  to  consider  what  are  the  essentials 
such  a  Combination  of  States  ought  to  possess  and 
what  the  problems  which  arise  in  trying  to  create  it. 
The  time  at  my  disposal  does  not  suffice  for  a  discus- 


OTHER  POSSIBLE  METHODS  FOR  AVERTING  WAR  247 

sion  of  the  arguments,  but  it  may  help  the  concen- 
tration of  your  thoughts  if  I  indicate  the  salient  issues. 

First  of  all,  such  a  Combination  ought  to  consist  of 
a  large  number  of  States,  so  large  that  the  special 
interests  of  each  would  be  overruled  by  that  which 
is  the  general  interest  of  all,  i.  e.,  the  maintenance  of 
world  peace.  It  should  include  States  so  important 
that  they  would  possess  not  only  material  strength 
but  also  a  volume  of  educated  opinion  sufficient 
to  constitute  a  moral  force.  The  larger  the  number 
of  such  States  entering  the  Combination,  the  stronger 
would  it  be.  Some  few  independent  States  have  lagged 
so  far  behind  in  the  path  of  civilized  and  responsible 
government  as  to  seem  hardly  fit  for  admission,  but 
perhaps  it  would  be  better  to  admit  them  and  let 
them  profit  by  their  intercourse  with  their  elder 
brothers.  There  are  advantages,  no  doubt,  in  having 
all  States  members.  The  States  forming  the  Combina- 
tion should  be  prepared,  whatever  have  been  their 
previous  relations,  whether  friendly  or  hostile,  to  show, 
not  only  by  their  public  opinion  but  also  in  the  action 
of  their  respective  governments,  a  sincere  wish  for 
peace  and  an  earnest  desire  to  further  it  by  themselves 
always  resorting  to  Arbitration  and  Conciliation  as 
the  methods  for  adjusting  their  own  disputes  with 
other  nations. 

Now  let  us  consider  some  of  the  questions  that  pre- 
sent themselves  when  we  think  how  the  Combination 
desired  can  be  constructed  and  workr-t  Aristotle  has 
remarked  that  in  approaching  any  subject  one  ought 
to  begin  with  the  difficulties  that  surround  either  a 
theory  or  a  practical  project.1  To  examine  these  at 

1Meyu7TOJ'  TO  &  diropew. 


248  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

the  outset,  to  anticipate  the  objections  that  may  be 
taken  to  the  doctrine  or  scheme,  is  the  safest  way  of 
arriving  at  sound  conclusions  which  will  stand  fire. 

What  should  be  the  organs  by  which  a  Combination 
will  conduct  its  business?  A  chief  ami  is  to  avoid 
by  a  direct  interchange  of  views  the  delays  and  mis- 
understandings which  arise  hi  diplomatic  correspond- 
ence between  a  number  of  States.  There  must  be 
therefore  not  only  a  permanent  Tribunal  to  hear  and 
decide  justiciable  controversies,  but  a  Council  of  some 
sort  to  apply  methods  of  conciliation  to  disputes  not 
fit  for  legal  determination.  Should  there  be  for  this 
purpose  more  than  one  directing  body?  If  only  one, 
it  must  be  small  enough  for  free  and  familiar  discus- 
sion between  its  members;  yet  if  it  be  small,  only  a 
few  States  can  be  represented  on  it,  and  those  not 
represented  may  complain  of  their  exclusion  and  so 
lose  confidence  in  the  scheme.  This  has  led  to  the 
advocacy  of  a  second  body  in  which  all  States  can  be 
represented,  and  which  may  be  allowed  to  cooperate 
with  the  ruling  Council  by  way  of  suggestion  or  of 
criticism,  or  perhaps  of  review.  To  discuss  in  detail 
the  distribution  of  functions  between  the  two  bodies — 
if  two  be  deemed  necessary — would  involve  a  longer 
discussion  than  can  be  attempted  here. 

What  should  be  the  relations  of  the  members  of  the 
body  or  bodies  aforesaid  to  the  governments  of  the 
States  they  represent?  The  Covenant  contained  in  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles  makes  them  delegates  acting  under 
instructions.  A  Council  so  formed  might  prove  to  be 
merely  the  Foreign  Offices  of  the  various  States  under 
another  name.  A  slightly  different  plan,  outlined  in 
the  last  preceding  lecture,  would  give  them  more  hide- 


OTHER  POSSIBLE  METHODS  FOR  AVERTING  WAR  249 

pendence  and  allow  them  a  discretion  in  reporting  on 
facts  and  recommending  solutions.  Under  that  plan, 
however,  the  views  and  recommendations  of  the  con- 
ciliation council  would  not  bind  their  governments, 
since  they  would  not  be  mere  instructed  delegates. 
Though  these  recommendations  might  be  all  the  more 
likely  to  find  general  acceptance  if  they  did  not  pro- 
ceed from  the  governments  of  the  States  constituting 
the  combination,  the  fact  that  they  were  not  conj 
elusive  would,  when  questions  arose  as  to  the  action 
proper  to  be  taken,  involve  further  consultations,  at 
least  between  the  governments,  or  those  particular 
governments  which  had  been  entrusted  with  the  func- 
tion of  deciding  on  the  right  kind  of  action.  There 
are  advantages  and  defects  in  both  plans;  and  it  may 
even  deserve  to  be  considered  whether  there  might 
not  be  advantages  in  having  both  a  body  created  for 
conciliation  independent  of  the  governments  and  also 
a  small  council  representing  the  governments  to  de- 
liberate upon  executive  action. 

Should  the  voting  power  of  the  States  which  are 
parties  to  the  combination  be  equal  for  all  States, 
large  and  small  alike,  or  should  they  have  votes 
in  proportion  to  their  respective  populations  and 
strength?  Inequality  would  give  rise  to  complaints 
from  the  smaller  States,  but  equality  would  separate 
power  from  responsibility,  things  which  ought  always 
to  go  together.  It  would  be  absurd  to  provide  that 
when  a  question  of  executive  action  arose  Ecuador 
should  have  the  same  weight  as  Brazil,  Rumania  the 
same  weight  as  France. 

Should  unanimity  be  required  for  any,  and,  if  so, 
for  what  decisions?  Such  a  requirement  would  often 


250  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

prevent  executive  decisions  from  being  reacneo,  yet  it 
would  be  hard  to  expect  a  State  which  might  be  ex- 
posed to  special  risks  by  joining  in  executive  action  to 
join  in  that  action  against  its  own  wish. 

All  these  problems  relate  to  the  organization  of  the 
Combination  for  deliberative  and  for  executive  pur- 
poses. Further  questions  have  been  raised  which 
cannot  pass  unnoticed.  I  will  try  to  answer  each 
briefly. 

One  is:  Can  the  contemplated  Combination  be  pre- 
vented from  falling  under  the  influence  of  two  or 
three,  or  more,  of  the  greater  Powers?  The  reply 
seems  to  be  that  a  proper  organization  of  the  Com- 
bination ought  to  prevent  and  would  prevent  such  a 
contingency. 

A  second  question  is:  Can  each  and  every  one  of  the 
Powers  be  expected  to  discharge  its  obligations  faith- 
fully; that  is,  if  I  may  use  a  familiar  phrase,  "to  play 
up"?  This  is  a  question  no  man  can  answer,  but  there 
is  reason  to  believe  that  public  opinion  and  the  sense 
of  common  interest  might  succeed  in  inducing  each 
member  to  do  its  duty  loyally,  especially  when  a  closer 
intercourse  between  the  States  had  accustomed  them 
to  work  together,  and  when  the  very  existence  of  the 
combination  had  begun  to  form  that  public  opinion 
of  the  world  to  which  in  the  last  resort  we  must  look. 
A  disloyal  member  would  soon  begin  to  suffer  for  its 
disloyalty. 

Ought  the  Combination,  in  its  effort  to  prevent 
quarrels  from  arising  between  its  members,  go  so  far 
as  to  guarantee  to  each  member  the  territory  and  the 
commercial  advantages  it  now  enjoys  under  treaties? 
We  may  answer  this  pertinent  but  most  difficult  ques- 


OTHER  POSSIBLE  METHODS  FOR  AVERTING  WAR  251 

tion  by  observing  that,  however  desirable  it  may  be 
to  avert  quarrels,  quarrels  must  be  expected  wherever 
injustice  and  actual  hardships  produce  well-grounded 
discontent  in  any  people.  Unfortunately  there  exists 
today  in  many  parts  of  the  world  much  discontent  that 
is  well  grounded.  The  unwise  or  unjust  arrangements 
embodied  in  nearly  all  of  the  recent  treaties  have  pro- 
longed or  aggravated  such  discontents  in  some  regions 
and  have  created  them  in  others;  while  the  provisions 
made  for  the  protection  of  minorities  are  not  sufficient 
to  remove  those  discontents.  Any  guarantee  of  a 
status  quo  ought  therefore  to  be  accompanied  by  ample 
provisions  for  an  examination  of  the  existing  causes  of 
these  discontents  and  their  removal.  This  may  seem 
a  heavy  task,  but  it  must  be  undertaken  if  a  permanent 
peace,  and  good-will,  the  foundation  of  peace,  is  to  be 
secured.  The  sooner  it  is  undertaken  the  better,  or 
things  will  go  from  bad  to  worse;  and  a  Combination 
such  as  we  have  been  considering  is  the  fittest  body 
to  undertake  it.  It  is  here  that  the  work  of  enquiry 
and  reconciliation  will  find  its  appropriate  and  most 
beneficial  field  of  action;  it  is  here  that  the  participa- 
tion in  the  proposed  Combination  of  peace-loving 
States  who  have  nothing  to  gain  or  lose  but  can  ap- 
proach these  thorny  issues  in  a  spirit  of  impartial 
justice,  can  render  inestimable  services  to  a  distracted 
world,  lying  under  the  shadow  of  a  great  catastrophe. 
There  remains  the  question  of  how  and  when  the 
decisions  of  a  court  of  arbitration  or  of  a  body  charged 
with  conciliation,  whatever  its  form  and  scope  may  be, 
shall  be  enforced  against  a  State  which  refuses  to  use 
either  method,  or,  having  accepted  one  or  the  other, 
refuses  to  abide  by  the  decisions  delivered  or  to  follow 


252  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

the  recommendations  made.  Arbitration  will  settle  a 
great  many  disputes.  Conciliation,  backed  by  an  en- 
lightened public  opinion  which  has  the  facts  and  the 
recommendations  before  it — for  the  fullest  publicity  is 
indispensable — will  settle  many  more.  But  the  pos- 
sible, though  improbable,  case  of  a  recalcitrant  State 
must  be  faced. 

Two  methods  of  compulsion  have  been  suggested. 
One  is  that  of  a  general  boycott  of  the  offending  State, 
a  sort  of  pacific  outlawry,  cutting  off  the  offender  from 
all  communications  with  other  States  by  land  or  sea, 
by  mail  or  telegraph  or  telephone,  and  stopping  all 
commercial  intercourse  of  every  kind.  This  would  be 
a  formidable  engine  of  coercion,  resembling  the  ecclesi- 
astical excommunications  of  the  Middle  Ages,  and, 
like  them,  not  requiring  a  resort  to  armed  force.  The 
objection  has  been  raised  that  the  measure  would  be 
inconvenient  to  the  States  that  employed  it,  because 
their  commerce  as  well  as  that  of  the  offending  State 
would  suffer,  and  that  it  might  inflict  more  incon- 
venience on  some  States  joining  in  the  boycott  than 
on  others.  But  to  this  it  is  answered  that  whatever 
that  inconvenience  might  be,  it  would  be  less  than  the 
evils  a  war  would  cause,  and  that  it  could  not  last  long, 
because  no  excommunicated  State  could  support  for 
more  than  a  few  weeks  or  months  the  painful  conse- 
quences of  total  isolation,  and  would  dread  permanent 
injury  to  its  commerce. 

The  other  remedy,  the  use  of  armies  and  fleets  to 
coerce  a  recalcitrant  disturber  of  the  peace,  has  been 
objected  to  on  the  ground  that  it  would  amount  to 
war,  the  very  thing  the  proposed  Combination  desires 
to  avert,  and  that  it  would  require  the  Combination 


OTHER  POSSIBLE  METHODS  FOR  AVERTING  WAR  253 

either  to  maintain  a  military  organization  for  its  com- 
mon purposes  or  to  make  demands  on  the  component 
States  with  which  some  might  be  reluctant,  or  perhaps 
unable,  to  comply.  To  this  it  is  answered  that  a  State 
unwilling  to  send  an  armed  force  might  make  its  con- 
tribution in  the  form  of  money,  its  adhesion  in  that 
way  being  a  threat  to  the  recalcitrant  State  no  less 
effective  in  the  long  run  than  a  force  of  soldiers  would 
be. 

Not  less  important  is  the  question  when  the  extreme 
remedy  either  of  a  boycott  or  of  arms  should  be  applied. 
It  has  been  suggested  that  the  decision  to  resort  to 
either,  and  especially  to  arms,  ought  to  be  if  not 
unanimous,  yet  at  least  accepted  by  all  of  these  greater 
States  possessing  armies  and  navies  on  whom  the 
burden  of  enforcement  would  fall.  Much  might  turn 
on  the  attitude  and  probable  purposes  of  the  offending 
Power.  If  it  appeared  to  be  on  the  point  of  attacking 
a  weaker  neighbor,  measures  might  be  justifiable  which 
ought  not  otherwise  to  be  taken.  My  own  view  is  that 
it  would  be  better  not  to  set  out  by  imposing  the 
obligation  to  use  armed  force,  but  you  will  not  expect 
me  to  express  a  positive  opinion  on  this  point,  since  I 
cannot  here  and  now  enter  at  length  into  the  argu- 
ments adduced  on  each  side. 

It  has  seemed  best  to  state  frankly  to  you  the  diffi- 
culties which  surround  the  attempt  to  create  a  new 
organization  capable  of  preserving  a  general  peace. 
No  one  who  knows  how  many  attempts  have  been 
unsuccessfully  made  in  the  last  four  or  five  centuries 
will  be  surprised  at  these  difficulties.  Every  one  who 
has  studied  the  subject  has  recognized  them.  But  they 
must  not  be  allowed  to  deter  us.  The  obstacles  are 


254  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

not  insurmountable.  Whatever  they  may  be  they 
must  be  faced;  for  they  are  far  less  than  the  perils 
which  will  continue  to  threaten  civilization  if  existing 
conditions  are  prolonged.  The  world  cannot  be  left 
where  it  is  now.  If  the  peoples  do  not  try  to  destroy 
war,  war  will  destroy  them.  Some  kind  of  joint  action 
by  all  the  States  that  value  peace  is  urgently  needed, 
and  instead  of  recoiling  from  difficulties  we  must  recog- 
nize the  urgency,  and  go  forward.  I  have  ventured  to 
speak  freely  to  you  of  the  existing  conditions  in  Europe, 
because  they  do  not  seem  to  have  come  truly  and  fully 
to  the  knowledge  of  most  of  those  who  are  fortunate 
enough  to  dwell  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic,  and  I  have 
so  spoken  because  it  has  become  necessary  that  you 
here  should  realize,  as  we  do  in  Europe,  that  it  is  only 
by  the  joint  action  of  the  States  which  lead  the  world 
that  the  dangers  which  threaten  civilization  can  be 
met. 

Thirty  or  forty  years  ago,  when  both  Europe  and 
America  were  exulting  in  the  advances  of  physical 
science  and  in  the  diffusion  of  the  comforts  and  even 
of  the  luxuries  of  life  which  those  advances  had  pro- 
duced, thoughtful  men  felt  bound  to  utter  warnings 
against  over-confidence  in  the  future,  and  to  remind 
the  peoples  that  progress  in  these  material  things  does 
not  necessarily  mean  that  advance  in  intellectual  and 
moral  strength  in  which  the  true  welfare  of  mankind 
consists.  Today  it  is  not  words  of  warning  but  words 
of  cheer  and  encouragement  that  need  to  be  addressed 
to  those  whom  the  Great  War  and  the  calamities  it  has 
brought  have  driven  to  the  verge  of  despair.  The 
years  of  strife  have  wrought  world-wide  devastation 
and  ruin.  Thousands  of  ships  and  their  cargoes  lie 


OTHER  POSSIBLE  METHODS  FOR  AVERTING  WAR  255 

at  the  bottom  of  the  sea;  thousands  of  brave  crews 
lie  beside  them.  The  labor  of  five  years  has  been 
wasted  in  the  work  of  destruction.  Ten  millions  of 
men  have  perished.  In  England  and  France  half  the 
flower  of  our  youth,  many  of  whom  would  have  been 
the  leaders  of  the  coming  generation,  minds  that  would 
have  enriched  the  world  in  thought  and  learning,  in 
scientific  discovery,  in  literature  and  art,  have  been 
lost  to  us,  a  loss  far  greater  than  that  of  any  material 
things. 

Before  1914  there  were  those  who  believed  that  war 
would  prove  a  stimulating  and  ennobling  influence  on 
nations.  But  the  reverse  has  happened.  This  war, 
though  it  gave  splendid  examples  of  courage  and  devo- 
tion in  those  who  willingly  offered  their  lives  for  their 
country  in  its  hour  of  need,  has  disclosed,  not  less  than 
any  of  those  earlier  wars  which  history  records,  the 
weakness  of  human  intelligence  and  the  fallibility  of 
foresight  in  many  of  those  to  whom  counsel  and  direc- 
tion belonged,  statesmen  and  administrators  and  legis- 
lators. So  far  from  raising,  it  seems  rather  to  have 
depressed  the  tone  of  public  life  and  lowered  the 
standards  of  private  conduct.  Even  the  solemn  warn- 
ing which  it  gave  against  the  passions  from  which  wars 
spring  has  not  been  taken.  We  expected  that  it  would 
produce  everywhere  an  ardent  desire  for  peace  and  a 
resolve  that  the  causes  whence  sprung  these  calamities 
should  be  eliminated.  But  this  it  has  not  done.  Not 
to  speak  of  the  angry  class  struggles  within  the  nations, 
we  see  that  national  hatreds  and  rivalries  and  ambi- 
tions are  hotter  than  ever,  and  threaten  to  bring  fresh 
strife  upon  us.  It  is  possible — I  hope  it  is  not  prob- 
able, but  it  is  possible — that  so  soon  as  an  intermission 


256  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

of  fighting  has  enabled  the  hostile  peoples  to  recover 
their  fighting  capacity,  some  of  them  will  fight 
again.  The  great  lesson  of  the  war,  that  the  ambitions 
and  hatreds  which  cause  war  must  be  removed,  has  not 
yet  been  learned,  and  if  this  war  has  failed  to  impress 
the  lesson  upon  most  of  the  peoples,  what  else  can 
teach  them?  This  is  why  thoughtful  men  are  de- 
spondent, and  why  some  comfort  must  now  be  sought 
for,  some  remedy  devised  at  once  against  a  recurrence 
of  the  calamities  we  have  suffered. 

Four  other  lessons  stand  out  clearly.  I  will  briefly 
name  them. 

One  is  the  fact  that  the  causes  which  produced  the 
Great  War  are  deep  seated.  They  are  a  part  of 
human  nature,  arising  from  faults  in  political  human 
nature  as  it  exists  in  all  countries.  Here,  as  in  England 
and  in  France,  those  faults  have  been  charged  chiefly 
upon  two  States  in  particular,  or  perhaps  (as  respects 
the  conspicuous  manifestations  of  those  faults)  on  the 
small  governing  classes  in  those  two  nations;  for  we 
must  always  remember  that  the  whole  body  of  a  nation 
may  be  morally  healthier  than  its  governing  class.  But 
the  faults  exist  everywhere,  rooted  in  the  same  human 
propensities,  and  all  the  nations  must  bear  their  share 
of  the  blame.  A  glance  back  over  the  last  sixty  years 
will  show  this.  "There  is  not  one  that  doeth  righteous- 
ness, no,  not  one."  These  faults  are  a  part  of  that  old 
statecraft  which  has  lasted  down  into  our  so-called 
modern  civilization.  If  they  are  to  be  'expunged, 
they  must  be  expunged  everywhere,  for  their  existence 
in  any  nation  or  group  of  nations  keeps  them  alive  in 
the  others,  and  these  others  feel  obliged  to  fight  their 
antagonists  by  the  methods  their  antagonists  resort  to, 


OTHER  POSSIBLE  METHODS  FOR  AVERTING  WAR  257 

and,  like  them,  they  quickly  cease  to  see  anything 
wrong  in  what  seems  to  be  necessary. 

A  second  lesson — and  this  is  one  which  ought  to  be 
evident  to  every  reflective  mind — is  that  the_world  is 
now  One,  one  in  a  sense  in  which  it  was  never  one 
before.  Five-sixths  of  the  human  race  were  involved 
in  the  Great  War,  which  brought  men  to  fight  one 
another  in  regions  where  civilized  armies  had  never 
contended  before,  in  West  Africa,  in  East  Africa,  in 
Siberia  and  Turkestan,  on  the  shores  of  the  Baikal  and 
the  Caspian,  in  the  isles  of  the  Western  Pacific,  while 
ships  of  war  were  fighting  on  all  the  oceans  from  the 
White  Sea  to  the  Falkland  Isles.  As  this  unity  was 
apparent  in  war,  so  it  is  apparent  now  the  war  has 
ended.  Everything  that  affects  industry  and  com- 
merce in  one  country  affects  it  in  every  other,  and 
affects  it  instantaneously,  so  widespread  and  so  swift 
have  communications  become.  Electricity  is  the  most 
potent  of  the  unifying  forces  for  the  purposes  of 
knowledge  and  the  interchange  of  thought,  as  steam 
began  to  be  for  commerce  a  century  ago.  This  is  a 
fact  which  has  "come  to  stay."  The  human  race, 
whatever  the  differences  between  its  branches,  is  now 
a  unit  for  economic  purposes,  and  as  economics  have 
now  become  a  chief  basis  of  politics,  it  is  a  unit  for 
the  purposes  of  international  diplomacy.  We  see  the 
germs  of  political  strife  in  the  claims  made  to  the 
enjoyment  of  such  sources  of  natural  wealth,  wherever 
they  are  found,  as  coal  and  oil. 

This  brings  us  to  the  third  lesson.  Since  every  people, 
every  civilized  State,  is  now  a  member  of  one  all- 
embracing  community,  everything  which  affects  any 
single  State  necessarily  affects  each  of  the  others, 


258  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

primarily  its  economic  situation,  and  through  its  eco- 
nomic its  political  situation  also,  its  industry  and  its 
finance,  its  interchange  of  products  with  other 
countries.  Think  of  the  currency  and  the  effects  which 
rates  of  exchange  have  upon  the  relations  of  the  Old 
World  States  not  only  to  one  another  but  to  the 
Western  hemisphere  also.  All  States  are  now  members 
of  one  economic  body,  and  if  one  member  suffers  the 
other  members  suffer  with  it.  The  well-being  of  one 
people  never  permanently  injures  any  other  people,  but 
the  misfortunes  and  miseries  of  any  great  people  injure 
every  other  people  that  is  in  political  or  commercial 
relations  with  the  sufferers.  The  wealth  that  was 
destroyed  in  the  Great  War,  accumulated  by  the  labor 
of  many  peoples  during  many  years,  was  a  loss  to  all 
the  peoples,  and  every  future  war  will  be  an  evil  to 
all  of  them,  and  certainly  not  least  to  those  which  are 
now  most  advanced  in  prosperity  and  most  sensitive 
to  whatever  disturbs  the  processes  of  peaceful  produc- 
tion and  exchange.  Credit  and  security  are  now  the 
things  most  needed  for  the  economic  recovery  of  the 
world.  Security  is  the  pre-condition  to  the  reestab- 
lishment  of  sound  business  conditions  anywhere  and 
everywhere. 

This  brings  me  to  a  fourth  lesson.  Every  civilized 
nation,  since  its  fortunes  are  inextricably  involved  with 
the  good  or  evil  fortunes  of  every  other,  is  bound  for 
its  own  sake  to  take  an  interest  in  the  well-being  of 
the  others  and  to  help  them,  in  whatever  way  it  finds 
best,  to  avoid  or  to  recover  from  disasters.  The  greatest 
of  disasters  is  War,  more  terrible  in  its  consequence 
than  earthquakes  in  Sicily  or  famines  in  China. 

A  nation,  or  any  number  of  nations,  may  stand  aloof 


OTHER  POSSIBLE  METHODS  FOR  AVERTING  WAR  259 

when  it  or  they  see  the  disaster  of  war  approaching, 
and  may  think  it  to  their  interest  not  to  make  any 
effort,  or  to  join  in  efforts  made  by  others,  to  avert  the 
disaster.  That  is  a  matter  which  each  State  decides 
for  itself.  But  if  the  disaster  comes,  the  States  that 
do  not  join  will  suffer,  more  or  less  in  proportion  to 
their  own  wealth  and  prosperity,  in  the  consequences 
which  war  brings  upon  the  world,  for  that  which  affects 
some  cannot  but  affect  all,  all  being  now  in  the  eco- 
nomic, if  not  in  the  Christian,  sense,  members  of  one 
body.  Credit  declines;  security  disappears. 

War  therefore  injures  all  States,  and  as  the  sources 
of  war  reside  in  those  faults  of  human  nature  which 
are  common  to  all,  though  at  some  particular  moment 
more  violently  potent  in  one  people  than  in  another,  so 
the  work  of  trying  to  remove  or  reduce  those  sources  is 
a  task  which  will  succeed,  or  fail,  in  proportion  to  the 
number  of  peoples  that  join  in  it  and  in  proportion  to 
the  spirit  in  which  they  make  those  efforts.  And  this 
brings  me  from  the  sphere  of  material  interest  to  the 
sphere  of  sympathy  and  duty.  In  the  effort  to  prevent 
war  sympathy  and  interest  seem  to  coincide.  Business 
and  idealism  are  often  deemed  to  stand  at  opposite 
poles,  and  you  in  this  country,  who  have  long  been 
preeminent  for  the  energy  and  skill  you  throw  into 
business,  are  supposed  by  many  Old  World  critics  to 
be  grimly  practical,  and  nothing  but  practical,  in  your 
ways  of  thinking  and  acting.  You  are  yourselves 
aware,  as  those  who  live  among  you  soon  become  aware, 
that  this  is  not  so.  On  the  contrary,  there  is  no  coun- 
try in  which  the  idealistic  spirit  is  more  strong — if, 
indeed,  so  strong — and  is  so  often  found  in  keenly  prac- 
tical men,  as  here  in  the  United  States.  It  has  often 


260  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

shown  itself  a  powerful  force  in  practical,  and  even  in 
political  affairs.  It  was  said  long  ago  that  it  is  easy 
to  praise  the  Athenians  to  the  Athenians,  but  I  will 
nevertheless,  trusting  you  to  believe  that  I  do  not  mean 
to  flatter,  venture  to  say  to  you  what  I  have  often 
said  to  my  own  countrymen,  that  nowhere  is  there  a 
stronger  sense,  if  anywhere  there  be  so  strong  a  sense, 
of  national  duty,  and  nowhere  a  warmer  devotion  to 
high  ideals  than  there  is  here  in  America. 

I  do  not  presume  to  offer  advice  as  to  what  America 
can  do  to  avert  wars  over  the  world,  or  as  to  the  man- 
ner in  which  that  may  best  be  done;  nor  am  I  here  as 
the  advocate  of  any  scheme ;  my  only  wish  is  to  point 
out  that  something  needs  to  be  done  and  to  indicate 
what  at  the  moment  seems  the  best  path  along  which 
those  who  realize  the  need  for  action  may  advance.  If 
any  one  fancies  that  we  in  Europe  who  have  been  labor- 
ing for  many  years  past  for  what  we  hold  to  be  the 
interest  of  our  common  humanity  have  any  selfish  mo- 
tive for  our  action  and  wish  to  draw  in  America  or  any 
other  State  in  order  to  gain  something  for  England,  I 
know  of  no  foundation  for  such  an  imputation.  Those 
for  whom  I  venture  to  speak,  workers  who  have  noth- 
ing whatever  to  do  with  our  respective  governments 
(who  very  often  refuse  the  advice  we  offer),  believe 
that  some  sort  of  permanently  organized  joint  action 
by  peace-loving  peoples,  whatever  form  it  may  take,  is 
urgently  needed.  We  rejoice  that  such  joint  action  is 
now  to  be  attempted  in  the  crucial  matter  of  the  reduc- 
tion of  armaments,  and  we  fervently  wish  success  to 
the  negotiations.  The  plan  for  combined  action  re- 
cently created  by  the  Versailles  Covenant  will,  we 
trust,  with  whatever  amendments  may  be  found  neces- 


OTHER  POSSIBLE  METHODS  FOR  AVERTING  WAR  261 

sary — and  it  certainly  needs  amendments — ultimately 
succeed,  and  we  mean  to  persevere  in  supporting  it, 
and  all  the  more  because  it  contains  much  needed  pro- 
visions for  the  protection  of  backward  races.  Imper- 
fect it  may  be,  but  it  is  the  only  plan  which  has  yet 
been  launched  with  any  prospect  of  success.  All  we 
would  venture  to  say  to  you  is  this:  The  prevention  of 
wars  in  the  future  is  in  the  interest  of  every  country. 
We  Europeans  are  nearer  to  the  conflagration  than  you 
are,  but  prairie  fires  spread  fast.  You  desire  the  well- 
being  of  humanity  no  less  than  we  do.  The  call  of  duty 
to  save  humanity  makes  its  appeal  to  the  sense  of  duty 
in  every  nation  that  holds  a  great  place  in  the  world 
and  is  proud  of  its  historic  past  and  the  services  it  has 
already  rendered  to  mankind.  It  is  for  you  to  judge 
in  what  way  and  by  what  means  that  duty  can  best 
be  discharged. 

When  I  speak  of  Idealism  I  mean  not  that  blind 
faith  in  the  certainty  of  human  progress  which  was 
engendered  fifty  years  ago  by  the  triumphs  of  applied 
science  and  the  prosperity  they  brought,  but  rather 
that  aspiration  for  a  world  more  enlightened  and  more 
happy  than  that  which  we  see  today,  a  world  in  which 
the  cooperation  of  men  and  nations  rather  than  their 
rivalry  and  the  aggrandizement  of  one  at  the  expense 
of  the  other,  shall  be  the  guiding  aims.  Good-will 
sweetens  life;  nobody  is  so  happy  as  he  who  rejoices 
in  the  happiness  of  others.  Hatred  has  never  brought 
anything  but  evil.  The  sensible  idealist — and  he  is 
not  the  less  an  idealist,  and  a  far  more  useful  one,  if 
he  is  sensible,  and  sees  the  world  as  it  is — is  not  a 
visionary,  but  a  man  who  feels  that  the  forces  making 
fox  good  may  and  probably  will  tend  to  prevail 


262  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

against  those  making  for  evil,  but  will  prevail 
only  if  the  idealists  join  in  a  constant  effort  to  make 
them  prevail.  The  greatest  of  Roman  poets  has  com- 
pared the  cultivator  of  the  soil  who  must  ceaselessly 
struggle  against  the  obstacles  which  storms  and 
droughts  and  noxious  insects  create  to  his  raising 
crops  from  it,  to  a  man  who  rows  his  boat  up  a  swift 
river  and  will  be  swept  downstream  if  he  relaxes  for 
a  moment  his  efforts  to  make  way  against  the  current.1 
So  it  is  only  by  constant  exertions  and  by  quenchless 
hopes  that  those  human  relations,  those  moral  things 
which  are  the  most  important  for  happiness,  can  be 
made  to  move  forward  against  the  forces  that  resist 
them.  The  oars  must  never  be  allowed  to  drop  for  a 
moment  from  the  rower's  hands,  nor  his  muscles  to  re- 
lax their  strain. 

You  may  ask,  What  is  it  that  any  one  of  us,  you 
here  or  we  in  England,  can  do  as  individual  citizens 
to  improve  the  character  of  international  relations,  and 
especially  to  provide  security  against  the  outbreak  of 
future  wars?  To  answer  this  question  let  me  say  a 
few  concluding  words  bearing  not  only  on  the  causes 
of  war  but  on  the  whole  subject  of  international  policies 
which  we  have  been  studying.  We  have  already  seen 
how  much  violence  and  deceit  there  has  been  in  the 
conduct  of  States  towards  one  another,  how  much 
national  ambition  and  national  vanity,  masquerad- 
ing under  the  garb  of  patriotism,  in  the  minds  of 
peoples  as  well  as  among  their  leaders,  and  how  the 
leaders  have  played  upon  these  foibles  and  follies 

1Non  aliter  quam  qui  adverse  vix  flumine  lembum.  Remigiis 
subigit,  si  brachia  forte  remisit,  Atque  ilium  in  praeceps  prono  rapit 
alveus  amni.  Virgil  Georg.  I.  201. 


OTHER  POSSIBLE  METHODS  FOR  AVERTING  WAR  283 

of  the  individual  citizens.  Now,  what  is  a  State? 
Nothing  but  so  many  individual  citizens  organized 
into  one  community.  Such  as  the  citizens  are,  such 
will  the  leaders  be,  because  they  desire  to  please  the 
citizens.  If  the  citizens  are  swayed  by  the  impulses 
of  vanity  and  ambition,  their  leaders  will  try  to  win 
support  by  playing  up  or  playing  down  to  such  pas- 
sions. If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  citizens  demand  from 
those  who  guide  the  State  uprightness  and  fair  dealing 
and  a  considerate  respect  for  the  rights  of  others,  and 
if  they  reprobate  and  dismiss  any  statesman  who  falls 
below  the  moral  standard  they  set  up,  their  leaders 
will  try  to  conform  to  that  standard.  If  the  moral 
standards  of  States  have  been  generally  lower  than 
those  of  the  average  good  citizens  in  a  civilized  coun- 
try, why  has  this  been  so?  Because  rapacity  and 
vanity  and  hatred  and  revenge  are  mitigated  or  re- 
duced in  private  social  life  by  sympathy,  kindliness  and 
affection,  these  beneficent  human  feelings  tempering 
or  restraining  or  overcoming  the  bitter  and  unwhole- 
some passions.  In  the  relations  of  States  these  better 
feelings  have  had  little  or  no  scope  and  power,  because 
men  do  not  feel  towards  other  States  as  they  do  feel 
towards  their  neighbors  and  acquaintances.  If  the 
sentiment  of  a  common  humanity  which  moves  your 
hearts  when  you  hear  of  sufferings  in  other  countries, 
the  sentiment  which  made  you  send  splendidly  gener- 
ous gifts  for  the  relief  at  one  time  of  Sicilian  sufferers 
from  the  earthquake  at  Messina  and  at  another  of 
Chinese  peasants  dying  of  famine,  which  led  your 
Government  to  remit  the  Boxer  indemnities  and  made 
you  as  private  citizens  subscribe  tens  of  millions  of 
dollars  to  feed  the  children  of  the  Armenian  mothers 


264  INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS 

slaughtered  by  the  Turks  in  1915 — if  that  sentiment, 
coupled  with  the  sense  that  all  nations  are  the  children 
of  one  Father  in  Heaven,  were  to  lay  hold  of  the 
peoples  of  the  world  and  make  them  regard  the  peoples 
of  other  countries  as  fellow-citizens  in  the  common- 
wealth of  mankind,  would  not  the  attitude  of  States 
towards  one  anther  be  changed,  and  changed  funda- 
mentally for  the  better?  Would  not  the  sense  of 
cooperation  temper  the  eagerness  of  competition,  and 
reinforce  the  belief  that  more  will  be  gained  for  each 
and  all  by  peace  than  has  been  gained  or  ever  will  be 
gained  by  war?  You  may  say,  What  can  private 
citizens  do?  Well,  the  State  is  made  up  of  private 
citizens  and  such  as  they  are  such  will  the  State  be. 
Each  of  us  as  individuals  can  do  little,  but  many 
animated  by  the  same  feeling  and  belief  can  do  much. 
What  is  Democracy  for  except  to  represent  and  express 
the  convictions  and  wishes  of  the  people?  The  citi- 
zens of  a  democracy  can  do  everything  if  they  express 
their  united  will.  The  raindrops  that  fall  from  the 
clouds  unite  to  form  a  tiny  rill,  and,  meeting  other 
rills,  it  becomes  a  rivulet,  and  the  rivulet  grows  to  a 
brook,  and  the  brooks  as  they  join  one  another  swell 
into  a  river  that  sweeps  in  its  resistless  course  down- 
ward to  the  sea.  Each  of  us  is  only  a  drop,  but 
together  we  make  up  the  volume  of  public  opinion 
which  determines  the  character  and  action  of  a  State. 
What  all  the  nations  now  need  is  a  public  opinion 
which  shall  in  every  nation  give  more  constant  thought 
and  keener  attention  to  international  policy,  and  lift 
it  to  a  higher  plane.  The  peoples  can  do  this  in  every 
country  if  the  best  citizens  give  them  the  lead.  You 
in  America  are  well  fitted  to  set  an  example  in  this 


OTHER  POSSIBLE  METHODS  FOR  AVERTING  WAR  265 

effort  to  the  European  peoples  smitten  down  by  the 
war,  and  painfully  struggling  to  regain  their  feet. 
They  will  gratefully  welcome  whatever  you  may  do 
now  or  hereafter  by  sympathy  and  counsel  or  by 
active  cooperation  in  efforts  to  redress  the  injustices 
and  mitigate  the  passions  which  distract  most  parts 
of  the  Old  World.  Your  help,  your  powerful  and  dis- 
interested help,  will  be  of  incomparable  service  in 
every  effort  to  rescue  your  brother  peoples  from  the 
oldest  and  deadliest  of  all  the  evils  that  have  afflicted 
mankind. 


(END  OF  LECTURE  8.) 


INDEX 


Abdul  Hamid,  Sultan,  23-24, 
155;  massacre  of  Eastern 
Christians  by,  208. 

Adams,  Charles  Francis,  biogra- 
phy of,  154. 

Adrianople,  given  to  Turkey  by 
Treaty  of  Sevres,  67. 

Aerenthal,  Count  von,  breach  of 
treaty  by,  170. 

Afghan  War,  unjust  and  unneces- 
sary, 183;  condemned  by  Eng- 
lish electors,  187. 

Africa,  spread  of  Islam  in  and 
consequent  improvement  of 
negroes,  116. 

Alabama  Claims,  settlement  of, 
by  arbitration,  226. 

Albania,  independence  of,  54. 

Alexander  I  of  Russia,  25. 

Alexander  II  of  Russia,  150. 

Alexander  VI,  Pope,  15;  bull  is- 
sued by,  18-19. 

Alliances,  defensive,  between 
states,  235-236;  objections  to, 
236-238. 

Alsace,  results  of  annexation  of, 
to  Germany,  36. 

Althing,  Icelandic  assembly,  162- 
163. 

Ambassadors,  high  qualities  of 
American,  150,  157;  value  of 
work  of,  159-160.  See  Diplo- 
macy. 

American  Society  of  Interna- 
tional Law,  work  of,  172-173. 

Anarchists,  propaganda  of,  22; 
influence  of,  on  foreign  poli- 
cies of  states,  129-130. 

Angell,  James  B.,  excellence  as 
an  ambassador,  150. 

Angora,  headquarters  of  Turkish 
Nationalists,  68. 

Arbitral  tribunals,  145,  175,  219. 


Arbitration,  method  of,  for  re- 
moving causes  of  friction  be- 
tween states,  219-225;  interna- 
tional disputes  open  to  settle- 
ment by,  225-226;  alternative 
plans,  235  ff.;  use  of  method, 
in  plan  for  combination  of 
states  (League  of  Nations), 
246-247. 

Argentina,  development  of  na- 
tional sentiment  in,  121. 

Armaments,  growth  in  size  of, 
210-211;  plans  and  conferences 
looking  to  reduction  of,  212- 
214;  dependent  upon  national 
policy,  218-219;  removal  of 
causes  of  friction  .essential  to 
reduction  of,  219. 

Armenia,  position  of,  67-69; 
strength  of  character  of  people, 
69;  future  of,  hanging  in  the 
balance,  70-71;  sentiment  of 
nationality  created  by  religion 
in  people  of,  120. 

Armies,  feelings  of  officers  of,  to- 
ward officers  of  enemy  armies, 
135-136;  increase  in  magnitude 
of,  210-211. 

Asia,  results  of  Great  War  to 
countries  of,  65-72;  inflam- 
mable material  in,  72;  in- 
fluence of  religion  in,  on  inter- 
national relations,  115-116;  na- 
tional sentiment  in  countries 
of,  122. 

Australasia,  exclusion  of  foreign 
races  from,  128. 

Australia,  import  duties  in,  82- 
83;  sentiment  of  patriotic  self- 
reliance  in,  87;  Chinese  in,  126. 

Austria,  results  of  Great  War  as 
affecting,  44-47;  present  piti- 
able condition  of,  48-49. 


267 


268 


INDEX 


Azerbaijan,  possible  future  re- 
covery of,  by  Russia,  65;  now 
controlled  by  Bolsheviks,  70. 

Bacon,  Robert,  statesmanship  of, 
96  n. 

Balance  of  power,  origin  of,  16. 

Ballin,  Hamburg-American  head, 
the  case  of,  91-92. 

Baltic  States,  position  of,  63-64; 
danger  of,  from  Russia,  64. 

Belgium,  policy  of  neutralizing, 
171. 

Berlin,  Congress  of,  16,  207. 

Berlin-Bagdad  railroad,  99. 

Bismarck,  effects  of  policies  of, 
27-28;  on  "preventive  wars," 
146;  "Hound  of  the  Empire" 
of,  152;  information  on  diplo- 
matic methods  gathered  from, 
154;  subsidized  press  of,  182. 

Bolshevists,  prospects  of,  in  Rus- 
sia, 58;  attempted  conquest  of 
Poland  by,  61 ;  work  of,  in 
Ukrainia,  63;  armies  of,  in  Far 
East,  71. 

Borgia,  Cesare,  Italian  states- 
man, 15,  189. 

Bosnia,  included  in  Yugo-Slavia, 
52;  former  annexation  of,  to 
Austria  a  breach  of  treaty, 
170. 

Boundaries,  doctrine  of  natural 
or  strategic,  124-126. 

Boycott,  use  of,  against  offend- 
ing state  by  combination  of 
states,  252. 

Brazil,  sentiment  of  nationality 
in,  121. 

Bribery,  former  use  of,  in  diplo- 
macy, 109-110. 

British  Empire,  tariffs  in  com- 
monwealths of,  85-86. 

Bulgaria,  present  position  of,  54- 
56;  isolation  of,  57. 

California,  Chinese  in,  126. 

Canada,  tariff  in,  85,  86;  treaty 
between  United  States  and,  as 
to  fishing  rights,  95-96;  phe- 
nomenon presented  by  French- 
speaking  population  of,  122. 


Caribbean  republics,  national 
spirit  among,  121. 

Carinthia,  plebiscite  in,  45. 

Cavour,  work  of,  28;  biography 
of,  154;  and  Louis  Napoleon, 
155-156. 

Charlemagne,  champion  of 
Christianity,  11. 

Chile,  national  sentiment  in,  121. 

China,  present  position  of,  71-72; 
consortium  of  banks  for,  110. 

Chinese  immigrants,  rights  of, 
126;  laws  against,  127-129. 

Christian  church,  wars  between 
peoples  due  to,  10-12. 

Church  peace,  the,  13. 

Clovis,  champion  of  Western 
church,  11. 

Coal,  importance  of,  in  interna- 
tional relations,  75-76. 

Cobden,  Richard,  advocacy  of 
free  trade  by,  80;  treaty  nego- 
tiated by,  with  Louis  Napo- 
leon, 84. 

Colonies,  motives  of  European 
countries  in  acquiring,  106-109. 

Combination  of  states,  plan  for 
(League  of  Nations),  246-250; 
questions  concerning,  250-254; 
ultimate  success  predicted  for, 
260-261. 

Commerce,  influence  of,  on  for- 
eign relations,  74-111;  interests 
of,  among  chief  causes  of  war, 
145. 

Communism,  propaganda  of,  22; 
question  of  workability  of,  in 
Russia,  58;  influence  of,  on 
foreign  policy  of  states,  129- 
130. 

Concert  of  Europe,  creation  of, 
207-208. 

Conciliation,  method  of,  for  set- 
tling disputes  between  states, 
226-233;  enforcement  of  deci- 
sions of  courts  of,  233-234;  al- 
ternative plans,  235  ff.;  use  of 
method,  in  plan  for  combina- 
tion of  states  (League  of  Na- 
tions), 246-247. 

Conferences,  diplomatic,  as  a 
device  for  improving  interna- 


INDEX 


269 


tional  relations,  206  ff.;  Hague, 
207,  208-209;  Congresses  of 
Utrecht,  Vienna,  and  Berlin, 
207-208;  cases  to  which  spe- 
cially suitable,  210;  disarma- 
ment, 210-219. 

Covenant  in  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles, 233,  248,  260:261. 

Croatia,  included  in  Yugo- 
slavia, 52. 

Cuba,  American  intervention  in, 
170. 

Czecho-Slovakia,  the  new  repub- 
lic of,  45;  alliance  between 
Rumania,  Yugo-Slavia,  and, 
238-239. 

Dalmatia,  included  in  Yugo- 
slavia, 52. 

Dante,  De  Monarchic*  of,  14. 

Danube,  international  rights  to 
navigation  of,  94. 

Diplomacy,  date  of  beginning  of, 
148;  former  character  com- 
pared with  present-day,  149- 
150;  qualities  needed  in,  150- 
152;  business  of,  in  peace 
times,  152-153;  study  of,  in 
biographies  of  statesmen,  153- 
154;  truth-telling  and  false- 
hood in,  154-156;  maxims  of, 
156-158;  real  value  of,  159- 
160;  popular  participation  in, 
176  ff.;  reasons  for  secret,  184- 
189. 

Disarmament,  conference  on,  at 
Washington,  210;  certain  hard 
problems  of,  214-217;  to  be  ac- 
companied by  removal  of 
causes  of  friction,  219. 

Divine  right  theory,  Holy  Alli- 
ance based  on,  25. 

Dobrudsha,  question  of  the,  56. 

Educated  classes,  influence  of,  on 
international  policies,  133-138. 

Egypt,  financial  history  of, 
101. 

Emperor,  Holy  Roman,  duty  of, 
to  prevent  wars,  13-14;  weak- 
ening of  position  of,  as  de- 
fender of  the  peace.  14. 


England,  trade  relations  between 
Germany  and,  before  Great 
War,  88-90;  trading  interest  of, 
in  colonial  policy,  106-107;  re- 
pudiation by,  of  doctrine  of 
strategic  boundary,  124;  secret 
treaty  with  Turkey,  184-185. 

Enver  Bey,  23. 

Envoys.    See  Diplomacy. 

Erasmus,  The  Complaint  of 
Peace  by,  18. 

Erivan,  capital  of  Armenian  re- 
public, 68,  70. 

Esthonia,  independence  of,  59. 

Falsehood  in  diplomacy,  154-156. 

Family  relationships,  influence  of 
dynastic,  on  international  rela- 
tions, 113-114. 

Fear,  wars  due  to,  146. 

Federation,  World,  conception 
of,  239-245. 

Finance,  influence  of  interna- 
tional, on  diplomacy,  100-111; 
interests  of,  among  chief  causes 
of  war,  145. 

Finland,  present  position  of,  59. 

Fishing  rights,  international  con- 
troversies over,  94-98. 

Flags  of  truce,  8. 

Foreign  office,  diplomatic  pro- 
fession and  the,  149  ff. 

Foreign  policy,  the  demand  for 
democratic  control  of,  176-205. 

Foreigners,  exclusion  of,  127-129. 

Fourteen  Points,  national  as- 
pirations admitted  by,  122. 

France,  effects  upon,  of  Great 
War,  42-44;  friendship  of,  for 
Poland,  61 ;  sphere  of  com- 
mercial influence  of,  in  Asia 
Minor,  67;  loans  of,  to  Russia, 
102-103;  motives  of,  in  colo- 
nial ventures,  106. 

Francis  Ferdinand,  Archduke,  as- 
sassination of,  33. 

Freedom  of  the  seas,  meaning  of 
phrase,  93-94. 

Free  trade,  arguments  pro  and 
con,  81-83. 

French  Revolution,  propaganda 
used  during,  21. 


270 


INDEX 


Friars  as  envoys,  149. 

Friends,   Society   of,   theory   of 

non-resistance  of,  198. 
Friendship,  forces  which  create, 

between  states,  131-140. 

Georgia,  controlled  by  Bolshe- 
viks, 70. 

Germans,  "Great"  and  "Little," 
33-34. 

Germany,  view  of,  taken  by 
English  Liberals  in  1870,  35- 
36;  effect  upon,  of  victory  over 
France,  36;  results  to,  of  Great 
War,  42-44;  trade  relations 
with  Russia  before  1914,  88; 
relations  with  England,  88-90; 
lack  of  colonies  of,  90-91; 
material  considerations  no  re- 
straint upon,  in  entering  on 
war,  91;  motives  and  methods 
of,  in  colonial  policy  and  for- 
eign trade,  107-108. 

Gladstone,  W.  E.,  on  limitations 
on  generosity  of  states,  203. 

Governments,  adverse  influence 
of,  on  friendship  between  na- 
tions, 140-141. 

Grand  Design,  scheme  called,  18. 

Great  Britain,  tariff  in,  85-86. 
See  England. 

Great  War,  causes  leading  up  to, 
33-38;  review  of  results  of,  39- 
73;  lessons  derived  from,  256- 
259. 

Greeks,  relations  between  Mac- 
edonians and,  56;  sentiment 
of  nationality  among,  120. 

Grotius,  on  international  law, 
164. 

Hague  Conferences,  207;  aims 
and  accomplishments  of,  208- 
209. 

Hanseatic  League,  example  of 
defensive  alliance,  235. 

Hay,  John,  as  an  ambassador, 
150. 

Heraclitus,  on  knowledge  and 
wisdom,  137. 

Herzegovina,  included  in  Yugo- 
slavia, 52. 


Hesiod,  cited,  4. 

Hill,  David  J.,  on  international 

law,  164. 
Hindu    immigrants,    rights    of, 

126. 
Hofer,  Andreas,  Tyrolese  patriot, 

47. 
Holland,    profit    to,    from    East 

Indian  possessions,  106. 
Holy    Alliance,    an    attempt    to 

prevent  war,  24-25;  reason  for 

failure  of,  25-26. 
Hungary,  effects  of  Great  War 

upon,  49-53. 

Iceland,  laws  of  primitive,  162- 
163. 

Idealism  in  United  States,  259- 
260,  261-262. 

Indemnities,  Germany's  ability 
to  pay,  44. 

Individuals,  morality  of,  and  of 
states,  contrasted,  190-196. 

Intellectual  leaders,  influence  of, 
on  international  relations,  133- 
136. 

International  copyright,  provi- 
sions for,  171. 

International  law,  beginnings  of, 
8;  not  really  a  law,  160-162; 
practical  effect  of  law  pos- 
sessed by,  162-164;  strong 
moral  sanction  of,  164;  definite 
rules  of,  165-166;  subjects  to 
be  dealt  with  by,  167-172;  pro- 
posed organization  for  revising, 
172-173;  enforcement  of  rules 
of,  174-175. 

International  relations,  influence 
of  monotheistic  religions  on, 
9-13;  influence  of  Pope  and 
Holy  Roman  Emperor  on,  13- 
15;  evolution  of,  resulting  in 
device  of  balance  of  power,  16 ; 
effects  upon,  of  discovery  of 
new  lands,  18-19;  influence  of 
Holy  Alliance,  24-26;  influence 
of  Napoleon  Bonaparte,  26- 
27;  results  of  Bismarck's  ac- 
tivities, 27-28;  influence  of 
Cavour,  Kossuth,  and  Mazzini, 
28-29;  influenced  by  leaders 


INDEX 


271 


rather  than  by  masses  of  peo- 
ple, 30-31;  results  of  Great 
War  on,  41-73;  influence  of 
commerce  on,  74-1 1 1 ;  influence 
of  family  relationships  be- 
tween dynasties  on,  113-114; 
power  of  religion  on,  at  pres- 
ent time,  114-116;  influence  of 
racial  sentiment,  or  nation- 
ality, 116-126;  effects  of  infrac- 
tions of  rights  of  minorities, 
126-127;  questions  raised  by 
exclusion  of  foreign  races,  127- 
129;  forces  of  friendship  which 
affect,  131-140;  influence  of 
governments  themselves,  140- 
141 ;  influence  of  politicians, 
141-142;  influence  of  the  press, 
142-144;  diplomacy  and,  148- 
160;  as  affected  by  interna- 
tional law,  160-175;  question 
of  popular  control  of,  176-205; 
conference  method  for  improv- 
ing, 206-219;  method  of  arbi- 
tration applied  to,  219-226; 
method  of  conciliation  or 
mediation,  226-233 ;  alliances 
as  a  device  for  controlling, 
235-239;  idea  of  a  super-state, 
239-245. 

Ireland,  sentiment  of  national- 
ity in,  121. 

Islam,  rise  of,  and  effect  on  in- 
ternational relations,  10,  115- 
116;  improvement  of  African 
negroes  by,  116. 

Italy,  decadence  of  religious 
power  in,  in  reference  to  in- 
ternational relations,  14-15; 
unification  of,  by  Cavour,  28; 
results  to,  of  Great  War,  46- 
47;  sphere  of  commercial  in- 
fluence of,  in  Asia  Minor,  67; 
doctrine  of  strategic  boundary 
illustrated  by,  125. 

Japan,  present  state  of,  71-72. 
Japanese   immigrants,   rights  of, 

126;  laws  against,  127-129. 
Jews,    sentiment    of    nationality 

among,  120. 
Journalism.    See  Press. 


Justiciable  disputes  between 
states,  221,  223;  wars  outside 
the  category  of,  223-225. 

Korea,  Japan's  grip  on,  72. 
Kossuth,  Louis,  22;  memories  of, 
28-29. 

Laborism,  as  a  force  affecting 
foreign  policies  of  states,  130- 
131. 

Latin  American  countries,  fi- 
nances and  politics  of,  101- 
102;  sentiment  of  nationality 
in,  121. 

Latvia,  new  country  of,  59-60; 
spirit  of  nationality  in,  120. 

League  of  Nations,  52,  246-250; 
questions  affecting,  250-254. 

Leagues  between  states,  235-236. 

Liberal  doctrines,  influence  of, 
on  international  relations,  129- 
130. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  feeling  for,  in 
Europe,  134. 

Lithuania,  independence  of,  60; 
sentiment  of  nationality 
among  people  of,  120. 

Loans,  interests  in  foreign  coun- 
tries acquired  by,  100-103. 

Louis  Napoleon,  34;  results  of 
overthrow  of,  by  Germany,  35- 
36;  Cavour  and,  155-156. 

Louis  XI  of  France,  15. 

Louis  XIV  of  France,  17,  19. 

Macedonia,  results  to,  of  Paris 
Conference,  55-56. 

Machiavelli,  The  Prince  by,  15; 
theory  of  rights  of  states  enun- 
ciated by,  198. 

Magyars,  effects  upon,  of  Treaty 
of  Trianon,  50-51 ;  resolve  of, 
to  recover  lost  territories,  51- 
52;  national  feeling  among, 
120. 

Manchuria,  China's  weak  hold 
on,  71. 

Marsilius  of  Padua,  Dejensor 
Pads  of,  14. 

Masaryk,  President  of  Czecho- 
slovak Republic,  45. 


272 


INDEX 


Maxims  for  diplomatists,  156- 
158. 

Mazzini,  influence  of,  29. 

Mediation,  method  of,  for  set- 
tling disputes  between  states, 
226-233. 

Mennonites,  theory  of  non-re- 
sistance held  by,  IQ^IQO. 

Mexico,  national  sentiment  in, 
121;  outside  intervention  in 
affairs  of,  170. 

Minorities,  infractions  of  rights 
of,  a  ground  for  war,  126- 
127. 

Montenegro,  included  in  Yugo- 
slavia, 52. 

Morality  of  states,  188-205. 

Moravian  Brethren,  theory  of 
non-resistance  of,  199. 

Minister,  Congress  of,  16. 

Napoleon  I,  influence  of,  on  Eu- 
ropean politics,  26-27;  diplo- 
matic maxims  of,  157. 

Nationality,  principles  of,  vio- 
lated by  Powers  at  Paris  Con- 
ference, 46-47,  124-126;  influ- 
ence of,  on  international  rela- 
tions, 116;  what  constitutes, 
116-117;  definition  of  Senti- 
ment of,  118;  countries  in 
which  found,  119-120;  among 
Armenians,  Jews,  and  Irish, 
120-121 ;  created  by  religion 
among  Armenians  and  Jews, 
120-121 ;  in  the  Americas, 
121-122;  in  Asiatic  countries, 
122;  of  French  in  Canada, 
122. 

Natural  boundaries,  doctrine  of, 
124-126. 

Navies,  admiration  of  officers  of, 
for  officers  of  enemy  navies, 
135-136;  modern  vast  growth 
of,  210. 

Newfoundland  fisheries,  treaties 
concerning,  96-97. 

Newspapers.    See  Press. 

New  Zealand,  import  duties  in, 
82-83. 

Non-resistance,  theory  of,  198- 
200. 


North  German  League,  creation 

of,  34. 
North  Sea,  traffic  in  strong  drink 

on,  97-98. 

Oil,  influence  of,  on  international 
relations,  77. 

Open  Door  policy,  questions  con- 
cerning, 171. 

Osnabriick,  Congress  of,  16. 

Pan-Islam  ism,  example  of  propa- 
ganda, 23. 

Pan-Slavism,  ethnological  propa- 
ganda, 23. 

Pan-Turanianism,  23. 

Paris  Peace  Conference,  16; 
comparison  of,  with  Congress 
of  Vienna,  39-40;  want  of  so- 
called  Supermen  at,  41 ;  viola- 
tion of  principles  of  Nation- 
ality at,  46-47,  124-126;  effect 
of,  on  demand  for  democratic 
control  of  foreign  policy,  177- 
178.  See  Versailles,  Treaty  of. 

Patents,  international  protection 
of,  171. 

Pax  Ecclesice,  the,  13. 

Pax  Romano,  the,  9. 

Persia,  prospects  of,  71;  effect  of 
oil  fields  in,  77. 

Plato,  quoted  on  the  State  of 
Nature,  4;  discussion  of  rights 
of  states  by,  198  n. 

Poland,  prospects  and  problems 
of,  60-62. 

Politicians,  adverse  influence  of, 
on  friendship  between  nations, 
141-142. 

Pope,  early  function  of,  as  de- 
fender of  the  peace,  13;  weak- 
ening of  position  of,  14-15. 

Precious  metals,  influence  of  de- 
sire for,  on  international  rela- 
tions, 75. 

Press,  influence  of  the,  for  ill- 
will  between  nations,  142-144; 
treatment  of  problem  of,  by 
diplomatists,  158-159;  power 
of,  and  its  misuse,  181-182; 
corruptibility  of,  in  some  coun- 
tries, 182. 


INDEX 


273 


Preventive  wars,  17,  146. 

Production,  forces  of,  and  in- 
fluence on  international  rela- 
tions, 75-77. 

Propaganda,  campaigns  of,  20- 
22;  recent  illustrations  of,  22- 
23;  ethnological,  23-24;  aim  of 
modern,  24;  use  of  press  for 
purposes  of,  182. 

Racial  sentiment,  influence  of, 
on  international  relations, '116- 
126.  See  Nationality. 

Radical  doctrines,  foreign  poli- 
cies as  influenced  by,  129-130. 

Railroads,  international  trade  in- 
terests affected  by,  98-100. 

Red  Cross,  example  of  an  inter- 
national institution,  171. 

Religion,  influence  of  monotheis- 
tic, on  international  relations, 
9-13;  present-day  power  of,  in 
international  politics,  114-116; 
sentiment  of  nationality  in- 
spired by,  120-121 ;  one  of  chief 
causes  of  war,  145;  interna- 
tional antipathies  due  to,  an 
obstacle  to  World  Federation, 
244-245. 

Religious  orders,  formerly  links 
between  peoples,  138,  139-140; 
members  of,  as  envoys  to  for- 
eign countries,  149. 

Rhine,  not  a  natural  boundary 
between  France  and  Germany, 
124. 

Riga,  capital  of  Latvia,  59. 

Rivers,  international  navigation 
of,  94;  fishing  rights  in,  95- 
96. 

Roman  Empire,  approximate 
world-peace  under,  9. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  treaties 
made  during  presidency  of, 
219-220. 

Root,  Elihu,  tribute  to,  96  n.; 
on  settlement  of  controversies 
between  states,  160;  as  an  in- 
ternational jurist,  173. 

Rumania,  relations  of  Bulgaria 
and,  56;  new  alliance  of,  238- 
239. 


Russia,  present  position  of,  57- 
59;  future  course  of,  64-65;  a 
market  for  Germany  before  the 
war,  88;  effects  of  desire  of, 
for  warm-water  harbor,  92-93; 
French  loans  to,  102-103 ;  cases 
of  breach  of  treaties  by,  168- 
169. 

St.  Germain,  Treaty  of,  44-45; 
effects  of,  upon  Austria,  48-49. 

Scotland,  people  of,  a  national- 
ity, 119-120. 

Secret  diplomacy,  arguments  for 
and  against,  184-189,  204-205. 
See  Diplomacy. 

Self-determination,  principles  of, 
overlooked  by  Powers  at  Paris 
Conference,  124-126. 

Serbia,  included  in  Yugo-Slavia, 
52. 

Sevres,  Treaty  of,  66-67. 

Shakespeare,  love  of  Germans 
for,  133. 

Shuster,  Morgan,  in  Persia,  71. 

Skipetar  tribes  of  Albania,  54. 

Slave  trade,  influence  of,  on  pol- 
icy of  great  states,  78-79. 

Slovenes  in  Yugo-Slavia,  53. 

South  African  War  of  1899,  183; 
adverse  judgment  on,  by  Eng- 
lish electors,  187;  a  justiciable 
dispute,  225-226;  fit  subject  for 
court  of  conciliation,  230. 

South  America,  sentiment  of 
nationality  in  countries  of, 
121. 

Spain,  incapacity  of,  for  profit- 
ing from  colonial  trade,  106. 

Spitzbergen,  effect  of  discovery 
of  coal  in,  76-77. 

State,  evolution  of  word,  19-20. 

State  of  Nature,  different  views 
of,  3-5. 

States,  morality  of,  188-200; 
statement  of  rules  of  morality 
for,  200-201 ;  limitations  on  vir- 
tuous acts  of,  203-204;  mean- 
ing of  "national  honor"  and 
"vital  interest"  of,  219-221. 

Superman,  lack  of  a,  at  Paris 
Conference,  41. 


274 


INDEX 


Super-state,  conception  of  a,  239- 
245. 

Switzerland,  importance  of  neu- 
trality of,  emphasized  by  rail- 
roads, 98-99;  people  of,  a  real 
nationality,  119;  policy  of  neu- 
tralizing, 171. 

Tariff  wars,  84-85. 

Tariffs,  protective,  81-83. 

Territory,  lust  for,  among  chief 
causes  of  war,  145-146. 

Thirty  Years'  War,  16. 

Three  Emperors,  League  of,  24- 
26,  236. 

Thucydides,  cited,  198. 

Tirol,  annexation  of,  by  Italy, 
46-47. 

Trade,  and  international  rela- 
tions, 78-92 ;  questions  concern- 
ing routes  of,  92-100;  confer- 
ence method  for  settling  dis- 
putes concerning,  210. 

Transportation  and  international 
relations,  92-100. 

Treaties,  commercial,  83-86; 
period  of  duration  of,  168-170; 
secret,  184-185;  scope  of  arbi- 
tration relative  to,  219-221. 

Trianon,  Treaty  of,  effects  of,  on 
Hungary,  50-53. 

Triple  Alliance,  236,  237. 

Triple  Entente,  237. 

Truce  of  God,  13. 

Tunnels,  railroad,  in  politics,  98- 
90. 

Turkestan,  present  condition  of, 
71. 

Turkey,  results  to,  of  Great  War 
and  present  position  of,  65-69; 
mystery  in  lenient  treatment 
of,  by  Allies,  69;  European 
loans  to,  101 ;  secret  agreement 
between  England  and,  184-185. 

Ukrainia,  present  position  and 
prospects  for  the  future,  62-63. 

Union  labor  and  foreign  policies, 
130-131. 

United  States,  fishery  treaties  of, 
with  Canada,  95-96;  present- 
day  power  of  financial  inter- 


ests of,  100;  tribute  to  ambas- 
sadors of,  150,  157;  fitness  of, 
for  work  relating  to  interna- 
tional law,  172-173;  idealistic 
spirit  in,  259-260;  part  to  be 
taken  by,  in  averting  wars, 
260-261. 

Universities,  formerly  links  be- 
tween peoples,  138. 

Uruguay,  sentiment  of  national- 
ity in,  121. 

Utrecht,  Congress  of,  16,  207. 

Venezuela,  finances  of,  102. 

Venizelos,  statesmanship  of,  56. 

Versailles,  Treaty  of,  39-41;  re- 
sults of,  to  countries  of  Europe 
and  Asia,  41-73;  importance  of 
coal  shown  in  provisions  of, 
75-76;  plan  of,  for  preventing 
future  wars,  233;  provisions  of, 
as  to  Council  of  League  of  Na- 
tions, 248. 

Victoria,  Queen,  influence  of,  for 
maintenance  of  peace,  114. 

Vienna,  city  of,  effects  of  Treaty 
of  St.  Germain  upon,  48-49. 

Vienna,  Congress  of,  16;  Holy 
Alliance  born  at,  24-25;  Paris 
Peace  Conference  compared 
with,  39-40;  character  of,  207. 

Virgil,  cited,  4;  illustration  from, 
262. 

Vorarlberg,  rejection  of  applica- 
tion of,  to  join  Swiss  Confed- 
eration, 48. 

War,  view  of,  as  the  State  of 
Nature,  4;  preponderance  of, 
in  history,  6-8;  beginnings  of 
international  law  in  connection 
with,  8;  influence  of  monothe- 
istic religions  on,  9-13;  plan  of 
balance  of  power  to  prevent, 
16-17;  beginnings  of  secular 
plans  to  prevent,  17-18;  Holy 
Alliance  a  further  attempt  to 
prevent,  24-25;  summary  of 
chief  causes  of,  in  modern 
times,  144-146;  rules  of  inter- 
national law  affecting,  165-167; 
cases  of,  not  susceptible  to  AT- 


INDEX 


275 


bitration  on  legal  principles, 
223-225;  avoidance  of,  by 
methods  of  conferences,  of 
arbitration,  and  of  conciliation, 
206-233;  plan  for  a  combina- 
tion of  states  to  prevent,  246 
ff . ;  if  not  destroyed  by  peoples 
of  world,  peoples  will  be  de- 
stroyed by,  254;  the  opposite 
of  an  ennobling  influence,  255; 
lessons  from  the  Great  War, 
256-258;  all  states  of  world  in- 
jured by,  258-260. 

Washington,  D.  C.,  disarmament 
conference  at,  210. 

Washington,  George,  reverence 
for,  in  Europe,  134. 

Wealth,  national,  influence  on 
international  relations,  75- 
76. 

Westphalia,  Treaties  of,  16. 


White,  Sir  William,  British  am- 
bassador, 150. 

Wilson,  Woodrow,  the  Fourteen 
Points  of,  122. 

World  Council,  conception  of, 
209. 

World  Federation,  plan  of,  239- 
245. 

Yugo-Slavia,  new  kingdom  of, 
52-54;  relations  with  Austria, 
Hungary,  and  Italy,  53-54;  re- 
ligious parties  in,  114-115;  al- 
liance of,  with  Rumania  and 
Czecho-Slovakia,  238-239. 

Zeal,  avoidance  of,  by  diplomat- 
ists, 158. 

Zionist  movement,  rise  of,  120. 

Zollverein,  formation  of,  and  re- 
sults, 85. 


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